

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

AND ON

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 25, 26, AND MAY 2, 1984

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 1984

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met in joint session, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations) presiding.

Mr. YATRON. The joint subcommittee session will come to order.

Today, the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcommittee on International Operations hold the first of a series of hearings on the administration's decision to withdraw from the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and its implications for both this organization and the United States.

We have a distinguished group of experts this morning to discuss that issue with us.

Before hearing from them, however, I think it is useful to review that decision so we have the facts before us.

On December 28, 1983, Secretary of State Shultz sent a letter to the Director-General of UNESCO notifying him that the United States intended to withdraw from UNESCO effective December 31, 1984. According to the administration, the reasons for the withdrawal were the U.S. inability to reform UNESCO, and specifically: First, the politicization of almost every issue; second, statist concepts such as the new international economic order; and third, unrestrained budgetary growth and management problems.

Our purpose is to explore two sets of problems so that we have a full picture of the context in which the decision was made. What are the major problems in UNESCO? What can and should be changed? What are and what have been the problems with U.S. participation in UNESCO? How should and how can U.S. participation be improved?

Already several of us have requested the General Accounting Office to review various management issues in UNESCO and they will give us a status report on their progress in the next few weeks. We have also indicated in a letter to the UNESCO Director-General that only if he makes every effort to reform the organization this year will we in the Congress be able to recommend that the administration reconsider its decision to withdraw. I ask unani-

mous consent that these two letters be inserted in the hearing record.

[The information follows:]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 23, 1984.

Hon. CHARLES A. BOWSHER,
Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. BOWSHER: In our February 29, 1984 letter, we requested that you conduct an analysis of the United States' participation in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). As we explained in our earlier letter, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Science and Technology each has interest in the implications of potential U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.

This letter provides additional guidance on the type of information the Committees need from GAO to assist them in their oversight responsibilities. The Committees would like GAO to address five broad management areas in its review.

(1) General Management—What is the overall management structure of UNESCO and how does it operate?

(2) Program Management—How are programs authorized, developed, managed on a day-to-day basis, and evaluated for effectiveness?

(3) Financial Management—What mechanisms exist for evaluating the UNESCO budget and how are expenditures controlled?

(4) Personnel Management—How are vacancies in UNESCO filled and what controls exist to assure qualified candidates are hired?

(5) Contract Management—What are UNESCO's contracting procedures and how are contracts managed?

The detailed questions provided earlier by the Committees' staffs to members of your staff are covered by these broad management areas. As a result of discussions with your staff, it was agreed that the specific questions would be considered to be extent feasible in providing information on the management areas.

It was also agreed that the allegations pertaining to the activities of the Director General would be considered in the context of the management areas, rather than as individual allegations.

The Committees recognize that as work progresses, your office may need to make some modifications to the scope of the review.

Sincerely yours,

DANTE B. FASCELL,
DAN MICA,
GUS YATRON,
DON FUQUA,
JAMES H. SCHEUER.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., April 9, 1984.

His Excellency AMADOU MAHTAR M'BOW,
Director-General, UNESCO,
Paris 7e, France.

DEAR MR. DIRECTOR-GENERAL: We want to thank you for the courtesy your UNESCO office extended to the staff of the Committee and the Subcommittee during their visit last February to UNESCO Headquarters in Paris. Staff advises me that they were very pleased to meet with you directly and with senior members of the UNESCO Secretariat.

As you know, several members, including myself, have asked the General Accounting Office, an arm of the U.S. Congress, to conduct a review of UNESCO's management. We understand that the GAO team is now in Paris and has begun the review. I hope that you will make every effort to facilitate their access to documents and to UNESCO officials so that they may conduct and complete their review as quickly as possible.

We are very concerned about the present situation of U.S.-UNESCO relations. We are well aware that the decision of the President and the Secretary of State to leave UNESCO becomes effective this December 31, 1984. We do understand that there are problems in the Organization and we earnestly hope that you, as the Chief Administrative Officer, will take all necessary steps to ensure that changes are made

this year to address the concerns of the U.S. Government and those of other UNESCO Member Governments. We firmly believe that only if changes are made in UNESCO will the Administration reconsider its December 28, 1983 decision. We want to stress this factor by stating further that only if such changes are made will the Congress be prepared to recommend to the Administration that it reconsider its December 1983 decision.

With all good wishes,
Sincerely yours,

DANTE B. FASCELL,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs.*

DAN MICA,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Operations.*

GUS YATRON,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Human
Rights and International Organi-
zations.*

Mr. YATRON. At this point I would like to ask my colleague and cochairman of these hearings, the Honorable Dan Mica, if he has some opening remarks to make. Congressman Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, before I get into my opening statement, I would like to make an announcement with reference to my own subcommittee. We had planned to hold hearings on the possibility of problems with the Radio Free Europe broadcasts of the Olympics in America on May 3.

I have some good news, at least I think it is good news. We are putting a press release out on the table. We have received assurances from the International Olympics Committee and the U.S. Olympics Committee that the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty credentials problems may be resolved.

So the hearings will be postponed. And I say postponed because the Sarajevo Olympics were not broadcast by Radio Free Europe because credentials were denied. Now we are being told credentials will not be denied.

It appears to be a gentleman's agreement between all the parties. We welcome that. We are very thankful. But in the event the agreement doesn't hold up, this committee will have hearings immediately.

We are ready to proceed. It is our intent to do everything possible to bring appropriate focus, attention, pressure, and public concern if there is any attempt to deny credentials to the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to broadcast the Olympics. But right now, as I say, it looks good.

With regard to these hearings, I have read a great deal—in fact, last night I read the entire report as prepared by our staff—and I think I have learned more in the last 24 hours than anybody wants to know about it.

Not to say that it is not a serious subject.

As a cofounder of UNESCO, the United States has a special role to try to look at this recommendation to withdraw, I think, in a very serious, direct, and appropriate light. We need to look at its personnel, its policies and its records.

There have been several charges of budget mismanagement and a rapidly growing budget. In fact, some say a budget that is absolutely out of hand. There are problems with the Director-General

himself, with the policies, with politicization of the entire UNESCO organization.

After reading what I have and the press reports, it seems to me that all of the concerns which the administration has brought forth are indeed worthy of consideration. But I would say my summary would lead me to believe that the major problem may indeed be with the Director-General himself.

It may be focused on one person. These hearings are intended to find out exactly what the major problem is. The staff report is not quite conclusive on any one of the three areas that we focused on. The general concern of the leadership, direction, of one individual is in serious question here today.

So with that, I would like to ask permission to submit my entire opening statement for the record.

Mr. YATRON. Without objection.

[Mr. Mica's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAN MICA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE
STATE OF FLORIDA

Today, I am pleased to join my colleague, Chairman Yatron, in holding joint hearings to review the administration's announced decision to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization at the end of this year.

As a co-founder, the United States was instrumental in the establishment of UNESCO as well as in the formulation of its principles and goals. Cast in this light, withdrawal should not be considered lightly and without a thorough evaluation of the organization, its personnel, its policies and its record.

In its review, the Department of State presented three reasons for its dissatisfaction with the performance of UNESCO. The first is that the activities of UNESCO have been unnecessarily politicized and that extraneous issues have been repeatedly introduced and debated. As an example, the Department claims that UNESCO spends almost four times more money on education for Palestinian refugees as is allotted for educational programs for all other refugees.

Second, the administration has criticized the organization for, and I quote: the "Endemic hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press." The so called new world orders have received a lot of attention in this forum. At the same time UNESCO came very close to instituting a system of licensing of journalists and continues to lend favorable attention to statist concepts and collective rights to the detriment of individual rights.

Finally, the third reason for withdrawal concerns the budget and management practices of the organization. Beyond, the assertion by the administration that the organization's budget has grown wildly, UNESCO is credited with poor management and lack of serious prioritization.

Presently, we have a GAO team in Paris investigating UNESCO. I hope that the results of that effort will go a long way in assisting the United States in formulating changes it considers necessary to insure future participation. Meanwhile, I look forward to the frank and thorough discussions I anticipate we will have during the course of these hearings. Congress has an important role to play in formulating the policies that guide the future of our relations with UNESCO. I look forward to the ideas and suggestions our witnesses have come to share with us.

Our first witness will be the Honourable Esteban Torres, Member of Congress from the State of California. He will be followed by Mr. Owen Harries from the Heritage Foundation who was the Australian Ambassador to UNESCO. Finally we will hear from Ambassador Hennelly who headed the U.S. delegation to the last general conference of the UNESCO.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am ready to proceed.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Chairman Mica.

Now I would like to call on Congressman Leach, the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, for an opening statement.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a rather lengthy statement that was prepared for an earlier hearing before the Science and Technology Committee. I would like to request that it be inserted in the record at this time.

Mr. YATRON. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF IOWA

EMPTY-CHAIR DIPLOMACY IN UNESCO

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues on the subcommittee this afternoon and want to commend you for your leadership in holding these hearings.

The U.S. decision to leave the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has enormous philosophical as well as practical implications for the foreign policy of the United States. It is therefore incumbent on Congress to review the Administration's decision carefully and present alternative perspectives, if warranted.

As a former delegate to the U.N. General Assembly, I have witnessed first-hand the corruption in rhetoric that plagues the U.N. system today. American representatives have a responsibility to stand up foursquarely not only for U.S. interests but for the principle of rational dialogue. But in diplomacy, as in sports, it does matter how you play the game, and I am apprehensive that joining too stridently in intemperate word games at the U.N. is not only immature but potentially counterproductive. More profoundly deserting a principal U.N. agency appears at this time to be an unjustified response to an exaggerated problem.

Quitting is not the American way. Under the circumstances, it implies that we can't stand the heat in the crucible of North-South and East-West debate.

As its name implies, UNESCO deals principally with international education, scientific and cultural concerns. But our decision to abandon ship has extraordinary strategic implications. Indeed, it might well be argued that the Administration's ideological cut-and-run policy imperils U.S. security. After all, in the 20th century, no nation is an island. Security is collective rather than self-willed.

As Americans, we simply must come to grips with the reality that the United States does not now, nor will it ever again, claim as great a percentage of the world's economic and military might as it did at the end of World War II, when the United Nations system was established. Hence, in a very practical sense, our national security today requires that greater emphasis and sensitivity be applied to relations among States and to major international institutions such as the U.N. In a world which appears to have shifted, as Pope John Paul II recently warned, from a "post-war" to a "pre-war" mentality, responsible governments have an obligation to seek to strengthen rather than deprecate the U.N. and its affiliate organizations, like UNESCO.

The Administration needs apparently to be reminded that the UNESCO withdrawal decision is being made at the precise time U.S.-Soviet tensions have returned to dangerous cold war levels and major bilateral arms control talks have been suspended. War rages in two parts of the Middle East, in Afghanistan, in Central America, and in vital areas of Africa. International terrorism is on the rise, placing the internal security of many nations in jeopardy. In addition, UNICEF tells us that some 40,000 children will perish daily from lack of adequate diet and sanitary drinking water. The scale of human suffering, particularly today in Africa, is staggering.

Given the fact that weapons of mass destruction have proliferated and that for the first time in world history civilization itself is jeopardized by man's war-making capacities, the leadership of restraint has emerged as the only rational philosophical imperative of state-to-state relations. Exiting international institutions and procedures may be flawed, but the case for retreat from international dialogue is non-existent.

It is in this larger context that we need to examine the Administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO.

The Constitution of UNESCO begins with these well-known words: "The Governments of the States Parties to the Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare: That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. . . ."

Since UNESCO's inception 37 years ago, the United States has played a major role in it and the majority of its programs.

As the Administration's recently released "U.S./UNESCO Policy Review" acknowledges: "UNESCO leads the international effort to eradicate illiteracy." UNESCO has done valuable work in education planning and training in developing countries, in collecting statistical data not easily available elsewhere, in coordinating educational efforts internationally, and in the education of the aged, disabled, and women.

In the science sector, the Administration report notes that "UNESCO has been an effective international forum for encouraging scientific debate and cooperation." UNESCO promotes research, broadens access to research data, organizes international scientific efforts on a cost-sharing basis, and offers scientific and technological help to developing countries. Major UNESCO science programs in which the U.S. has an interest include the International Brain Research Organization, the International Center for Theoretical Physics, the International Geological Correlation Program, and particularly the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, which provides marine data on the U.S. Navy and the U.S. scientific community. In addition, the Man and the Biosphere Program, one of UNESCO's most successful science projects, fosters an integrated approach to the world's ecosystems.

In the cultural sector, the U.S. has long supported UNESCO's preservation and conservation activities, and major U.S. institutions, such as the Smithsonian Institution, USIA, the National Endowment for the Arts, and National Endowment for the Humanities, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and the National Park Service, have participated in UNESCO-related projects. The cultural heritage program, as the Administration's report points out, is one of UNESCO's most impressive achievements. The U.S. was one of the major contributors to the preservation of the Abu Simbel monument in Egypt and has, itself, eight natural and four cultural sites on the World Heritage List.

Even in one of the more controversial sectors of UNESCO activities—communications—the Administration's report has a number of positive things to say. Because of UNESCO's activities in this area, the United States has had the opportunity to promote and defend U.S. values and methods in communications. The U.S. has not only not lost in any major debate but has been successful in our leadership efforts to create the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC), thus giving impetus for Third World countries to focus on practical as contrasted with ideological communications problems. In addition, UNESCO with our support, assisted in the establishment of Africa's first community radio station in Kenya and was instrumental in giving guidance to the user-owned Caribbean News Agency. UNESCO also funds training fellowships in the U.S. as well as the procurement of U.S. communications equipment.

I take the time to point out the merit of these UNESCO programs because they have been obscured by the Administration's sweeping criticisms.

Everyone who is familiar with UNESCO is well aware of the problems plaguing that institution. They are serious. The Administration's statement of December 29, 1983, announcing the decision to withdraw, charged that UNESCO "extraneously politicizes virtually every subject it deals with," "has exhibited hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press," and "has demonstrated unrestrained budgetary expansion."

Congress has been fully cognizant of the problems in UNESCO as in many other U.N. agencies and in the General Assembly itself. It is precisely because of this awareness and concern that Congress has, by law, authorized the Administration to take action if Israel is illegally expelled or in any other fashion denied her right to participate, or if UNESCO implements any policy or procedure which has the effect of licensing journalists or imposing censorship or restrictions on the free flow of information. In the case of the first scenario, involving Israel, Congress has authorized the U.S. to suspend its participation and withhold payment of its assessed contribution until any illegal action against Israel is reversed. In the case of the second scenario, in which actions might be taken against a free press, U.S. funding to UNESCO is to be suspended.

Because Congressional concern is so deep as to be reflected in statute it is instructive to examine where UNESCO stands on these two issues at present.

In the case of the Israeli question, Assistant Secretary of State Gregory Newell acknowledged at a hearing held by the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations on February 7, 1984, that the Israeli question was not a problem for the U.S. and that this particular concern was not a reason for the U.S. withdrawal. In a report to Congress in February 1983 (required under Section 108 of P.L. 97-241) the Administration stated that while there have been a number of un-

acceptable resolutions on Middle East questions, "the worst excesses have been avoided." It further said that efforts to deny Israel her right to participate, such as had taken place in the IAEA, "have not prospered in recent years in UNESCO." Why? Largely, the report explains, because of the "forceful presentation of U.S. Government views, skillful diplomatic intervention by the Director General, and help of moderates in the Group of 77." Clearly, on this major issue, the U.S. has forcefully presented its case and successfully carried the day.

I would like to add that not only has UNESCO moderated on the Israeli issue, but, according to a January article in the *Manchester Guardian*, "The Israeli Government, concerned about the threat to its own membership, made strenuous efforts to stop the United States leaving UNESCO." The Israeli concern, the article went on to say, "was raised in a confidential 'action memorandum' sent to the Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, on December 16, last year. . . ." Later the article says, in quoting the same memorandum, "The Israelis have expressed concern that with the United States absent, Israel would eventually be ejected from UNESCO." As one well-informed diplomat observed, the U.S. decision to withdraw places Israel in a particularly awkward position. Israel's enemies are always looking for ways to deny it participation in international organizations; consequently, Israeli policy is premised on efforts, often strenuous, to join and stay in as many as possible. But, if the U.S. decides at the end of the year to withdraw, and Israel finds itself forced by circumstances to follow, it will have a far more difficult time rejoining UNESCO in the future than will the United States.

It is unclear to me how the United States can actively defend our own interests, let alone the right of Israel to participate in UNESCO, from an empty chair.

With respect to issues of a free press and freedom of communication, which is the second area in which Congress has taken a firm stand, the Administration reported to Congress just last week that "the Department of State concludes that UNESCO is not, at this time, actively implementing any policy or procedure proscribed by Section 109 of Public Law 97-241. None of the programs included in the Second Medium Term Plan (adopted in late 1982) or approved in the Program and Budget for 1984-85 poses any active, direct threat to a free press." Section 109 of Public Law 97-241, as my colleagues will recall, states that U.S. funds cannot be used for payments to UNESCO "if that organization implements any policy or procedure the effect of which is to license journalists or their publications, to censor or otherwise restrict the free flow of information within or among countries, or to impose mandatory codes of journalistic practice or ethics."

The Administration's February 1984 report continues by saying that marginal gains were made at the 22nd UNESCO General Conference in the communications sector: "On the ideological level, our view that any NWICO is 'an evolving, continuous process,' not an established, defined order, was accepted. Also accepted was our contention that any study of a 'right' to communicate must take into account traditional human rights (as opposed to collective, second generation rights). We successfully introduced new studies to the work program for 1984-85 concerning the 'watch-dog' role of the press, the role of the private media, censorship and self-censorship, and ways to strengthen freedom of information. We were also successful in eliminating projects calling for studies of the 'task' of the media, safety of journalists and grants to journalist organizations to study 'codes' of conduct, and implementation of the Mass Media Declaration."

In the Administration's "U.S./UNESCO Policy Review" the Administration also admitted that the recent 22nd UNESCO General Conference debate on this subject "gave evidence of a new and welcome degree of moderation." Although questions remain whether that moderation will increase or diminish, it doesn't take skilled guesswork to figure out that the hand of the Soviets and Third World radicals will be strengthened if the preeminent advocate of democratic values absents itself from future debate.

Dana Bullen, executive secretary of the World Press Freedom Committee, which speaks for various free press organizations in the West, was also quoted in the *New York Times* on November 17, 1983, as saying, "If anyone is looking for an assault on the media at this conference serious enough to justify United States withdrawal, they won't find it."

We must keep in perspective that UNESCO did not invent censorship, nor the idea of a state-controlled press. Rather, it has become a forum for a debate on these practices. As such, we should not shy away from the opportunity the institution provides to argue for our values—for a free press and freedom of expression. An activist human rights policy, one would think, would include active advocacy of the principles embedded in our Bill of Rights. The Administration is correct to object—and object strenuously—to efforts to sanction controls on a free press. But to retreat

when proper advocacy is prevailing strikes many UNESCO observers as an ironic, if not counterproductive, strategy.

It would also appear somewhat ironic for the U.S. to object too strenuously to the politicization of UNESCO while also advocating freedom of communication and freedom of expression. It would be contrary to Western traditions and democratic principles to imply that fair—perhaps even unfair—criticisms of the U.S. and the West should not be tolerated in international organizations. Our traditions as codified in the Bill of Rights are based upon the premise of Thomas Jefferson that in the free airing of views, truth would triumph over error. We have a right to be concerned, even enraged at times, over the excessive political rhetoric displayed within the U.N. system, particularly the trashing to the U.S., its allies and Israel by some of its more radical members. But our refusal to participate in UNESCO could well send a message that the U.S. is reluctant to rely on the outcome of the ongoing battle of words and that we are not confident our philosophical position will prevail. Some might also conclude that the flip side of refusing to do battle with words is a potentially excessive reliance on military means to resolve international disputes.

We must all acknowledge that although the U.S. may be the target of considerable criticism that lacks justification there is an element to that kind of free expression of views that is quite healthy. To repeat a point made in a different context earlier, it is difficult to understand how we can more effectively protect our national interests in a free press and the free flow of information from an empty chair.

Likewise, the Administration objects to other "statist" concepts debated at UNESCO such as the "New International Economic Order" and the "right of peoples." The merits of our position aside, I fail to understand how the U.S. will defend the interests of its business community, promote the idea of a free market and stand up for its human rights principles if it absents itself from the very fora from which competing ideas are debated.

Finally, some comments on the budget issue are in order. Fiscal restraint is the watchword these days in Washington and around the world. However, it is curious to note that while the Administration is correct in charging UNESCO with program growth, the Administration's budget figures show an actual decline of some 13 percent in UNESCO's 1984-85 biennium as calculated in nominal dollars. UNESCO has done a better job in restraining its budget in the last two years than the Reagan Administration and Congress have our own.

It is also important to note that the budget growth has not been as "unrestrained" as the Administration asserts. The original budget proposed by UNESCO called for an increase of some 10 percent in program growth but due to efforts by member states to bring that growth rate down, a "Nordic Compromise" was finally accepted by the General Conference which brought the growth rate down to the 3.8-5.5 percent range. It is precisely because of budget concerns expressed by the U.S. and other significant donors that UNESCO moderate its position. Again, it would appear we are cutting and running, despite substantial success in getting our way.

It should also be pointed out that UNESCO expenditures under that budget have significant spin-off benefits for the U.S. The Administration reported last year that "fellowships to Americans and foreign students studying in the United States, procurement of U.S. equipment, and consultant's fees and payments of American staff, amount to about 40 percent of the value of the U.S. contribution. Similarly, United States prominence in UNESCO's science and education sectors creates markets for U.S. scientific and educational products and materials."

Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to understand what caused the Administration to take so drastic an action as to serve notice of its intent to terminate membership in UNESCO. It is unclear what other alternatives—short of total withdrawal—were considered nor why they were rejected in favor of this radical option.

In the report to Congress last year required under Section 108 of PL 97-241, we were told by the Administration that "U.S. interests are generally well served by UNESCO programs, which are, for the most part, non-political and which can most effectively be pursued through international cooperation." The same Administration report also said "UNESCO is a major forum for U.S. multilateral diplomacy. As such, it provides the U.S. with an opportunity to promote U.S. (and Western) values and methods—particularly in the Third World."

Why then has the Administration taken the decision it has to withdraw from UNESCO?

And, if the latest General Conference was as constructive as the Administration reported it to be, why has the U.S. concluded that UNESCO is more beyond hope this year than last?

It would appear that strong ideological and/or domestic political concerns intervened in a process of what would otherwise have been a rational, professional calcu-

lation of U.S. interests, benefits, and problems in UNESCO. The language of U.S. criticism to date has been exceedingly strong but surprisingly ill-defined. For the Administration to refuse to produce a detailed case is to acknowledge implicitly that there may be holes in that case. And for the Administration to refuse to submit a laundry list of changes it wants in UNESCO procedures is to imply ideological hard-headedness and a desire not to be serious about reform.

The decision to withdraw appears to represent as much an indictment of U.S. policy and performance within UNESCO as it represents an indictment of UNESCO itself. The greatest democracy in the world has been brought to its knees in this important international forum as much by irrational forces at home as those abroad. Political leadership in America has appealed to the lowest rather than the highest instincts of the body politic and in this case allowed nationalistic irrationality to prevail.

Not long ago, we might recall, the U.S. Representative to the U.N. suggested that perhaps we should consider moving the U.N. headquarters to Moscow for six months out of the year. Another U.S. Ambassador said he would gladly stand at the dock and wave goodbye to the U.N. delegates. New York Mayor Ed Koch jumped into the fray by calling the U.N. a "cesspool," and the Senate chimed in by adopting the so-called Kassebaum amendment, which called for major cuts in our contributions to the U.N. and four of its agencies, including UNESCO.

Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and more extremist perspectives were avoided. The President himself went on record opposing the Kassebaum Amendment and told a gathering of U.N. delegates in New York that the U.S. was proud to be the home of the United Nations.

Now, as we face the impending withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO, it is my hope that cooler heads again will prevail and that the President will take a close look at what his subordinates have recommended. There is evidence a review process is under way, but it is unclear how seriously it will be conducted. In a memorandum from NSC Adviser Robert MacFarlane to the Secretary of State last December, MacFarlane states that the decision to withdraw was made with reluctance and that the President wants us to continue to make every effort to bring about meaningful change in UNESCO over the next year. That memorandum also indicates the President's desire that the Department of State consider upgrading U.S. representation to UNESCO and appointing a panel of individuals from the academic, media and corporate world to advise the Administration on this matter. Finally, MacFarlane indicated White House willingness to review the decision if concrete changes materialize in UNESCO this year.

In a second memorandum dated February 11, 1984, MacFarlane stated that in order to carry out the President's wishes, a major campaign to turn UNESCO around during 1984 would be needed. He suggests that such a campaign might include an action plan, the mobilization of international support and more involvement in UNESCO personnel assignments.

In this context it would seem particularly appropriate for Congress to exercise a major oversight role this year. The minimal consultation which took place with Congress about the withdrawal decision reflects unilateral expansion of Executive prerogative. It belies serious efforts to craft bipartisan, bi-institutional approaches to foreign policy.

Accordingly, I have introduced legislation which would go beyond a simple requirement of consultation, to require the President to seek specific authorization from Congress should an Executive recommendation be made to terminate U.S. membership in UNESCO. The Constitution is silent on the subject of terminating international agreements of this nature. Since joining UNESCO in 1946 involved a partnership effort on the part of the Executive Branch and the Congress and an authorizing resolution passed by both Houses it would seem logical that the decision to terminate our membership would likewise be made on a partnership basis. As it stands now, the Congress has simply been presented a fait accompli.

Membership in international organizations of this nature should never be considered cast in permanent stone. But when termination of involvement in an organization of such stature is under consideration, it is incumbent on the Administration to bring its case to the Congress and the American public. A jointly made decision would certainly give any Administration a stronger position in its efforts to protect and advance American interests.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for calling for an investigation of allegations of mismanagement against UNESCO by our own General Accounting Office. There have been allegations of mismanagement, both with respect to finances as well as personnel. Congress should rightfully be concerned with these allegations and if there is merit to them we should work to rectify the situation. But

let's be careful to keep petty abuses of power in perspective. Problems attendant with human foibles should be rooted out, but let's not allow concern for one director's management style mask an ideological pouting here at home. To refuse to stay and fight corruption from within is a denial of international responsibility. It may be a form of corruption itself.

Given the weakness of the Administration case as presented to date, I personally welcome Chairman Scheuer's initiative in seeking the involvement of an outside body to assist in evaluating UNESCO's budgetary problems. But whatever the result of an independent investigation of UNESCO's finances, it should be clear that few in Congress favor the disengagement of the United States from the entire United Nations system.

The American people are more deeply committed to the U.N. than many of its critics recognize. A CBS/New York Times poll, for instance, conducted in September 1983 revealed that 89 percent of the public favors the U.S. staying in the U.N. while only five percent favors withdrawal. In commenting on the results of the poll, CBS News noted that the Gallup Organization has asked about U.S. participation in the United Nations since 1951. It has consistently found the public supportive of U.S. participation. But never in its history of asking that question have as few as five percent favored getting out.

The American people seem to understand better than American politicians that isolationism has no place in the world today. If there is any hope of diminishing intolerance and hostility among nations it must come through a greater international commitment to education and mutual understanding which UNESCO symbolizes. Security in the 20th century may in the final measure relate as much to education and cultural advancement as the acquisition of increasingly costly and sophisticated arsenals of war. In a world in which weapons of mass destruction exist, arms control—while a prerequisite—is not enough. It is imperative to build up international organizations and advance international techniques of conflict resolution. Centuries ago American settlers could draw wagons around a campfire and provide protection against Indians, but today the only real protection against nuclear weapons is an advancement of human understanding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you once again for the opportunity to share my views on this subject.

Mr. LEACH. My own view is that the administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO has some overwhelming philosophical implications, as well as some practical ones for the future of U.S. foreign policy.

While, as its name implies, UNESCO deals principally with education, science, and culture, our decision to, in effect, abandon ship has certain strategic implications. My own view is that the decision must be seen in the context of our decision to suspend acceptance of the World Court's jurisdiction over disputes involving Central America, as well as our handling of the law of the sea discussions and our basic attitude toward the United Nations itself.

A question truly arises as to whether what we are witnessing is in partial measure a concern about one U.N. institution, or whether in a larger context, we are seeing an assault on the entire international system of law and order.

I would like to raise several brief issues that have been touched upon by some, one of which regards Israel. It should be very clear that the administration's decision to pull out has nothing to do with the policies of UNESCO toward Israel in the last few years, and that, in fact it has been publically reported that Israel suggested to the United States it would be concerned if we pulled out. Furthermore, in recent years, the Israeli issue has been well handled at UNESCO, not the reverse.

Second, regarding the free press issue, even the administration has acknowledged that no direct threat to the free press has occurred in the last several years and that basically the U.S. position has prevailed.

There is a lot of blame to be spread around for what has happened at UNESCO and the crisis that we have seen. However, as Mr. Mica has pointed out, there are some allegations of misconduct and mismanagement and, for that reason, I think most of us in Congress support a GAO inquiry. While it should be clear that any problems attendant with human foibles should be rooted out, we should not allow concern for one Director-General's management style to mask what appears to be some sort of ideological pouting here at home.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to participating in these hearings.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Mr. Leach. Now I would like to call on the gentleman from New York, Mr. Solomon, for an opening statement.

Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the chairman.

Let me just say at the outset that I have been looking forward to this series of hearings on a very important and interesting topic. In looking over the prepared testimony that has been provided by several of the witnesses this morning, I have been impressed by the candid and the constructive way in which UNESCO and its problems are discussed.

The decision by the Reagan administration to withdraw U.S. membership from UNESCO, a decision that I fully support, has provided the occasion for an international debate on UNESCO. And I would make one observation for my colleague from Iowa, that when Israel requested that the United States not withdraw, they said they would hope that we would not withdraw on terms using them as the crutch or the excuse.

Let me just say that this is a debate that is long overdue as far as I am concerned. If UNESCO is to fulfill the high purpose for which it was established, and for which our country has made a very strong commitment by word and deed over a period of many years, then I think UNESCO must be held accountable to its own principles and to its own procedures.

The problem is precisely that, a problem of accountability. In preparing for this hearing I was amazed to learn that 80 percent of UNESCO's budget is spent at the headquarters' office. Would any person in this room respond to charitable appeals in the United Way, for example, if the voluntary philanthropies we believe in were consuming 80 percent out of every dollar in overhead expenses?

I don't think so. I am sure none of us would respond. Why then should UNESCO be allowed to hide behind a self-imposed barrier with no accountability to anyone?

The very fact that UNESCO depends on involuntary assessed contributions from the members makes an examination of the organization's management and budgetary practices all the more imperative.

I am also hopeful that these hearings will shed light on the political problems that are plaguing UNESCO, that we can penetrate the smokescreen of overblown rhetoric that emanates from UNESCO headquarters.

Make no mistake about it, the decision by our Government to withdraw from UNESCO is not a case of picking up marbles and

going home because the game is not going our way. It is rather a recognition that UNESCO has an important mission, a mission that is going unfulfilled because of any number of serious problems within the organization itself.

If we are to continue providing 25 percent of the financial support for such an organization, we have every right to ask where the money is going, and whether UNESCO is truly living up to the ideals for which it was established.

Mr. Chairman, I would just say there are many of us who have had it with situations like this, not just with UNESCO. We have a situation locally with the Kennedy Center, where there is a big bailout bill coming through, where the taxpayers are being asked to pay an unfair share of costs for other people who benefit directly.

We had a water policy debate just the other day on the floor of the House, where we wanted to establish user fees, and let people who benefit directly pay their proportionate share. I think it is time we crack down on all of these organizations and special benefit policies.

I hope we get to the bottom of this today. I thank the chairman.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Solomon.

Does any other member care to make an opening statement?

[No response.]

Mr. YATRON. Our first witness today was to have been Congressman Esteban Torres from the State of California, but because Ambassador Hennelly has a prior commitment, Congressman Torres has graciously permitted the Ambassador to go first.

So our first witness today will be the Honorable Edmund Hennelly, Chair of the U.S. delegation to the 1983 UNESCO General Conference.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND HENNELLY, CHAIRMAN, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 1983 UNESCO GENERAL CONFERENCE

Mr. HENNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to thank Congressman Torres for his graciousness.

Mr. Chairman, as you undoubtedly know, my background is basically in engineering and law. I am not a diplomat.

So I would prefer to confine my comments and answers to any questions to the conference itself, and evaluations that I can draw from the conference itself.

Mr. Chairman, I have already submitted a written statement which I know you have. I would like, with your indulgence, to read a brief summary of that statement.

Mr. YATRON. Without objection, your entire written statement will be included in the record.

Mr. HENNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, it was a privilege to lead an exceptionally talented U.S. delegation to the 22d UNESCO General Conference in Paris last fall. The purpose of the conference was to decide on a 2-year program and budget for the 1984-85 biennium. The conference took place against a backdrop of considerable U.S. dissatisfaction with UNESCO; the executive

branch had initiated a major review of U.S.-UNESCO relations in June 1983.

Congress had passed an amendment to the 1982 State Department authorization bill providing that funds be withheld from UNESCO if the organization took measures to limit press freedom, and the image of UNESCO among a large segment of the public was far from favorable.

Many Americans viewed the organization as basically opposed to Western views and values. My own experience as a member of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO led me to believe that UNESCO suffered from several serious endemic policy and management flaws.

These included, first, politicization. Some member states appear to utilize UNESCO as a forum for debating international policies, rather than as an organization dedicated to cooperation in science, education, culture, and communication.

In the past, debate at UNESCO has often been marked by extreme anti-Israeli, anti-Western rhetoric. A second problem area was a propensity for global controls. In the mid-1970's and early 1980, the UNESCO forum became the chosen instrument of some member states who sought to cure the world's ills through imposing normative standards on the international community.

The most notorious example of this tendency was the push for a New World Information and Communication Order, which I will call NWICO from here on out. Responding to prodding from radical Third World and Communist bloc states, UNESCO approved a number of projects to study ways and means of establishing a NWICO, and the UNESCO Secretariat produced some working papers on the subject.

Whatever the ostensible purpose of these activities, they clearly lent themselves to abuse by authoritarian governments opposed to a free press. The measure included proposals to license journalists, establish a code of journalistic conduct, and so forth.

Fortunately, these proposals did not get beyond the drawing board—thanks to strenuous opposition from the United States and its free press allies. But the danger remained that they would be introduced at the General Conference and their introduction would contribute to the climate of anti-Western biases.

A third problem area was human rights. Some states were exerting pressures to put new so-called second generation rights or people's rights on a par with traditional human rights. While certain collective rights are widely recognized, such as the nation's right to self-determination, others are ill-defined and ambiguous.

For example, the right to economic development. The danger of equating the two sets of concepts is that the respect for individual rights could be diluted by focusing equal attention on collective rights.

Bluntly speaking, those concerned about traditional Western values were fearful that the thrust in UNESCO would give international legitimacy to abuses of individual rights by authoritarian states. Abuses justified by appealing to a supposedly higher or equally valid set of collective rights.

Fourth, peace and disarmament propaganda. The Soviet bloc and its allies have attempted for years to exploit UNESCO programs

for propaganda purposes. A perennial ploy is to try to interject peace and disarmament elements into every UNESCO area of activity.

For example, programs to mobilize scientists for disarmament, programs to insure that schools teach courses on peace and so forth, all, of course, treating peace and disarmament from a Soviet perspective.

Fifth, the budget. UNESCO among all the U.N. specialized agencies seemed impervious to repeated high level pleas for budgetary restraint.

The United States and its allies argued for zero program growth for international organizations at a time when almost every national government was tightening its fiscal belt. These arguments fell on deaf ears in UNESCO and the Secretariat proposed a 4-percent growth rate for the 1984-85 period.

Sixth, and last, UNESCO suffered from serious mismanagement problems. A number of the organization's programs are wasteful because of duplication or bad planning, are too ambitious, and/or too academic, and are over managed by top heavy Paris bureaucracies. In addition to these more or less technical management problems, certain recent trends appear to be shifting UNESCO's center of gravity toward the socialist bloc, for example, a proposal to hold the 23d General Conference in Bulgaria, the candidacy of a radical Third World apologist as president of the executive board, and the possible stacking of a number of UNESCO committees and boards against the West.

Mr. Chairman, if these were the problems, what we asked ourselves as we prepared for the conference were the solutions. In oral briefings and in written position papers, we were given very clear instructions by the Department of State.

These were (a) to keep the debate focused on UNESCO programs and budget rather than on political issues; (b) to assure that free press interests were protected and if possible to introduce Western concepts and values into UNESCO communications programs; (c) to write into the human rights chapter a clear distinction between traditional human rights and people's rights; (d) to deflect the Soviet drive to focus additional UNESCO programs on peace and disarmament; (e) to bring the budget down to acceptable levels; (f) to introduce better management practices, including an effective system for evaluating projects and programs; and (g) to steer the organization toward a more Western orientation by winning elections to leadership positions on the UNESCO boards and committees.

These were our objectives. At the end of the conference, in summing up the results, I prepared a balance sheet. In the win column, I included the following items: The conference was the least politicized in recent memory. There were no challenges to Israeli credentials. Anti-Israeli and anti-Western rhetoric was nearly nonexistent.

Two Middle East resolutions introduced by Arab States were extremely mild by U.N. standards and they passed by unusually slender margins. Even on potentially explosive issues such as the liberation of Grenada, the United States was given a fair chance to

explain its actions which effectively deprived the Soviets and the Cubans of a propaganda opportunity.

Indeed the Grenada debate redounded to the advantage of the United States and our Caribbean allies. Soviet propaganda efforts were also contained. Discussions of bloc sponsored peace and disarmament resolutions occurred off the floor in a restricted drafting and negotiating group which was mandated to work only by the strict rule of consensus.

The fact that the conference adjourned 3 days ahead of schedule is evidence of the business-like atmosphere that prevailed. On communications, in many ways the heart of our concerns, the United States more than held its own. No programs were adopted which posed a clear threat to press freedom and several Western concepts were added to UNESCO programs for the first time.

For example, the notion that censorship, including state censorship, impedes the free flow of information and the concept that the press has a critical role to play in exposing abuses of power including state power. In a related area, an area of grave concern to me, the United States also scored a satisfying victory on transnational corporations.

A group of Third World States had introduced an intemperate and destructive resolution that would have brought UNESCO into the business of regulating transnational corporations through a code of conduct. After a great deal of behind the scenes discussion and maneuvering, the resolution was reduced to a meaningless call for additional study.

On human rights, clear language was adopted by consensus that distinguishes between traditional human rights that, and I quote, "are universally accepted" and emerging concepts of people's rights that require additional study. On the budget, the Director-General accepted a compromise proposal introduced by a group of Nordic States that reduced proposed expenditures by \$10 million from \$384 to \$374 million for the 2-year period.

Some on the delegation, including myself, believe the Director-General might have made further reductions, but was prevented from doing so because the Nordic proposal constituted a political floor below which he could not go. The United States was elected to all five of the major committees for which we had candidates, including the critically important committee on informatics. Moreover, a candidate backed by the United States won election as president of the executive board.

Finally, on the positive side, I can report that U.S. views and positions were listened to with respect and that our concerns were largely taken into account. There was, I am told, a dramatically different atmosphere than at previous UNESCO meetings. The Jordanian President of the conference was so struck by the change that he told me he believed it heralded a new beginning in UNESCO's relationships with the West.

On the negative side of the ledger, I included the following: In spite of a reduction of \$10 million in the budget, the sum approved by the conference was somewhere between \$10 to \$15 million above the zero growth level. I cannot be more precise because the figures were subject to currency fluctuations on a nearly daily basis.

At one time I was told \$360 million represented zero growth. At another time, the figure was \$354 million. In any case, the United States voted against the \$374 million budget as a matter of principle, a stand that was accepted without rancor by a vast majority of the delegates, although the United States cast the only no vote.

A second negative result is that a majority of member States voted to accept Bulgaria's invitation to host the 23d General Conference in Sophia. In addition, we were unable to make much headway in carving out a larger role for the private sector in a number of UNESCO programs.

Finally, I would say that we were less than completely successful in impressing on the secretariat the need to streamline procedures, eliminate duplication and establish a better system of evaluation. The Director did ask me for concrete examples of the organization's management problems and I provided him with some suggestions. This was a step in the right direction, but much in this area remains to be done.

Mr. Chairman, it should be clear from the above that I believe on balance the conference was positive from the U.S. point of view. I believe we were successful for several reasons. First, because of a strong delegation; second, the fact that the United States was reviewing its relations with UNESCO was well-known. This very likely had a moderating effect on member states and on the UNESCO Secretariat alike.

Third, because there appears to be a new mood of moderation among many in the Third World, on communication issues, for example, I heard again and again that the developing countries were interested in concrete development results rather than sterile rhetoric.

Finally, I credit Director-General M'Bow with making a major contribution. He worked actively behind the scenes to assure a fruitful outcome in Paris. He mobilized the African delegates in ways that were designed to assure that the United States and the West got a fair hearing at the conference. He was accessible to me at all times and appeared willing to assist my delegation in every appropriate way.

Let me indicate at this point that despite progress at the conference I agree with the administration's decision to serve notice on UNESCO of our intention to withdraw from the organization. The executive review of U.S.-UNESCO relations took into account factors other than the results of the conference. Although I have made no secret of my view, that in light of the positive results at the conference and what appears to be the possibility for a new beginning in U.S.-UNESCO relations, the burden of proof lies with those who argue that U.S. interests can be better protected outside of the organization than within.

Nonetheless, there is clearly room for improvement and I sincerely hope necessary changes are forthcoming so that the President will be able to reconsider the decisions at the end of this year.

In the meantime, I believe we all need to consider how to project and advance our interests in international cooperation, in education, in science, culture, and communications outside of UNESCO. I also believe it behooves all Americans to consider carefully how we can best serve the interests of the United States in international

education, science, culture, and communication outside of UNESCO, whether we remain a member or not.

For my part, I have undertaken to bring a group of individuals interested in international business together to consider the problem. We need a concise inventory of the benefits U.S. transnational corporations derive from UNESCO and a well-developed plan to assure that they continue to be derived bilaterally or by other means.

In this connection, the New York-based conference board, a not-for-profit research organization, has undertaken to develop this inventory with the assistance of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and the Washington based Heritage Foundation. For example, how can we assure a strong voice for U.S. business in UNESCO's informatics program, a program that will deal with key issues in the area of computer data communications across national borders.

How can we be sure that the United States will have a say in deciding important copyright questions in the future? Scientists, educators, cultural experts and communicators will have other similar questions and will also need to seek answers quickly and realistically.

I believe, too, that we must consider how to continue to influence the direction UNESCO takes, whether we are in the organization or not, because what UNESCO does will surely affect our interests. What is to prevent UNESCO, for example, from adopting a code of conduct for transnational corporations if the United States is not a party to future debate on the issue. How can we oppose continuing Soviet efforts to subvert the organization to its own purposes?

How can we protect free press interests against renewed efforts by radical States to establish a new world communication order, if the main free press champion in the world is absent from the debate? In short, how can we assure that the United States does not lose by default in the world's main intellectual and ideological arena.

I confess, I have no pat answers to these questions. But I applaud this committee's investigations of the issues and place my support as your work continues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Hennelly's prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF EDMUND P. HENNELLY, CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE
22D GENERAL CONFERENCE OF UNESCO

My name is Edmund P. Hennelly, and I am appearing here today in my capacity as Head of the U. S. Delegation to the 22nd General Conference to UNESCO. It was a privilege to head the U. S. delegation and in all my experience, both in public and private life, it was among the most interesting and rewarding. I would like to begin by paying tribute to the excellent United States delegation accredited to that conference. The professional diplomats and private citizens on the delegation worked hard to represent the United States with dignity and seriousness of purpose. We enjoyed outstanding support from the professional staff of the U. S. Mission to UNESCO.

Let me also begin with a caveat. My background is in law and engineering, not diplomacy. I would, therefore, like to restrict my remarks -- and certainly any evaluations or judgments I may make -- to the conference itself.

It was clear to me when I agreed to lead the delegation that the Executive Branch, Congress and the public at large had serious reservations about UNESCO. In 1982, Congress passed the so called Beard Amendment to the State Department's Authorization bill. The amendment called for withholding funds to UNESCO if the organization took measures to limit press freedom throughout the world. In June of 1983, the International Organization Bureau of the Department of State began an in depth review of U. S./UNESCO relations to determine if UNESCO membership justified the annual costs to the United States of

some fifty million dollars. The public image of the organization, among Americans who knew about UNESCO at all, appeared to be that of a predominately anti-Israeli, anti-free press, anti-western debating society, rather than a serious forum for advancing international cooperation in education, science and culture.

My service as a member of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO for over a year had given me some insight into the organization. State Department briefings and position papers confirmed my view that UNESCO suffered from three major problems:

-- Politicization. In the UN system, the General Assembly and the Security Council were created to deal with international political disputes. The specialized agencies were supposed to deal with their specialized concerns; in UNESCO's case with education, science, culture and communications. In fact, debate in UNESCO has tended to range over the entire gamut of world problems. The U. S. withheld funds from UNESCO for several years in the mid 1970's because of the anti-Israeli slant of the organization. The UNESCO of the 1980's, while less stridently anti-Israeli than in the past, seemed incorrigibly addicted to anti-U. S., anti-western rhetoric;

-- Global controls. The UNESCO forum had become notorious for the introduction of international norms and standards, most

often based on increased state controls, as panaceas for the world's problems. The best known example of this tendency was the push for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Responding to prodding from radical Third World states, often allied with the Soviet Bloc, the UNESCO secretariat had produced working papers concerning international rules and procedures which, no matter what their intention, would in fact have hobbled press freedom and the free flow of information throughout the world. This push culminated in calls at the 1978 and 1980 UNESCO General Conferences for measures such as licensing journalists, establishing an international journalistic code of ethics, providing an international identification card for journalists, and so on -- all measures subject to abuse by governments and authorities opposed to press freedom. Though these measures were never enacted, they contributed to the climate of anti-western baisses.

-- Budget. There has been a feeling for some time among American policy makers, and certainly among the public, that the budgets of international organizations are out of control. In this respect, UNESCO was no different than other specialized UN agencies, or the UN itself. UNESCO was distinguished, however, by a seeming inability to respond even slightly to the growing protestations from the U. S. and other major contributors about run-away budget growth. During the last three years, almost all UN agencies have tightened their belts to some degree; UNESCO alone continued to press for double digit

budget growth. After the most serious demarches from the industrialized nations, UNESCO's proposed budget for the 1984/85 period was still based on 4 to 6% real growth. The U. S. favored a budget reflecting zero real growth.

The United States had two other specific, quite serious concerns about recent directions in UNESCO activities. The first was an effort by some member states to equate "peoples rights" with traditional human rights. The danger here was that respect for human rights, which protect individuals, would be diluted by a new emphasis on peoples rights, which protect collectives. There is obviously great potential for abuse in this approach by non-democratic states which claim to embody the will of the collective, and which claim that collective rights supercede individual rights when it suits their purpose.

A second difficulty was a series of actions taken by or proposed by a number of Third World and Soviet bloc states which, taken together, would have shifted UNESCO's center of gravity towards the socialist bloc; e.g., proposals to hold the 23rd General Conference in Bulgaria, to elect a radical Third World apologist president of the Executive Board, and to slant a number of UNESCO programs in education, science and culture towards peace and disarmament -- quintessential Soviet propaganda themes.

With these disturbing trends and tendencies in mind, the delegation's goals were easy to understand, if difficult to

achieve. Our instructions were:

-- (A) To ensure to the extent possible that the conference was non-politicized; that is, that debate focused on UNESCO's program and budget for the next two years, the subject of the conference, rather than on international politics.

-- (B) To eliminate from UNESCO's Communications sector, programs which would limit press freedom or the free flow of information throughout the world. Additionally, if possible, to introduce into UNESCO programs Western free press concepts and values;

-- (C) To bring the proposed budget down to acceptable levels, that is, to zero real program growth with significant absorption of inflationary costs;

-- (D) To make a clear distinction in UNESCO programs between traditionally recognized human rights and emerging peoples rights concepts which need additional definition and study;

-- (E) To deflect the Soviet drive to increase the number of UNESCO programs centered on peace and disarmament;

-- (F) To steer the organization towards a more Western orientation in a number of activities, including elections of individuals to leadership positions and elections of member states to the organization's various boards and committees.

As is with the case of almost any delegation to any UN conference, our delegation experienced some wins and some losses. The positive results of the conference can be summed up as follows:

-- (1) The conference was the least politicized in recent memory. There was no challenge to Israeli credentials. Anti-Israeli rhetoric was nearly non-existent. Two of the mildest Middle East resolutions ever seen at UNESCO were introduced by the Arab states, and these carried by an unusually slender majority.

-- The U. S. liberation of Grenada, which occurred just as the conference opened, was not exploited by the U. S. S. R., Cuba, and others, despite their best efforts to do so. We and our Caribbean allies were given ample opportunity to explain the nature and motives of the invasion during plenary sessions, and what might have been a propaganda set back rebounded to our advantage.

-- Soviet propaganda efforts to focus debate on peace and disarmament themes were contained. A restricted "Drafting And Negotiating Group" (DNG) was established to reconsider controversial resolutions, including a number introduced by bloc countries. The DNG consisted of several representatives from each geographic group, it met in closed sessions, and it could only act on the basis of consensus. These ground rules effectively kept most extraneous political debate away from the

main conference commissions.

-- The fact that the conference was able to adjourn three days ahead of schedule is evidence that it took a serious approach to the business at hand.

-- (2) UNESCO's Communications sector was improved.

Programs which could have hampered the workings of a free press were deleted or substantially modified, and several Western concepts were added, e.g. the concept that censorship, including state censorship, is an important impediment to the free flow of information, and the idea that the press has a critical role to play in exposing abuses of power.

-- That progress was made in this area was recognized by such staunch defenders of press freedom as the World Press Freedom Committee whose representative at the conference sent telegrams to interested groups at the end of the conference indicating that, and I paraphrase -- if anyone is looking for a reason to leave UNESCO, they will not find it in the communications program adopted at the conference. In the words of the Wall Street Journal, "efforts to impose a New World Communications Order were derailed".

-- I understand that the State Department's current report to Congress, in compliance with the Beard Amendment, indicates that UNESCO is not doing anything counter to the intent of that amendment to impede the ability of a free press.

-- (3) An appropriate distinction was made between traditional human rights and peoples rights. Language introduced by the United States in key places in the Program and Budget document was adopted by consensus. The effect is to distinguish between traditional human rights "which are universally accepted", and "people's rights", which require additional study.

-- This language, while seemingly academic and far removed from the real world of daily human rights abuses makes the distinction we were looking for in attempting to sort out conflicting claims in this complex area. It distinguishes between the human rights enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, between some collective rights such as the right to natural self-determination which are widely acknowledged, and between new, so called "second generation" rights such as the "Right to Development", which require a great deal of study and precise definition before they will be broadly accepted.

-- (4) Budget reduction. After considerable debate, the proposed budget for the years 1984 and 1985 were reduced by \$10 million, from \$384 million to \$374 million. This was still higher for the two year period than what would have represented zero real growth. The reduction came as a result of a Nordic countries compromise proposal, and some on the delegation, including myself, believe the Director General might have made further reductions, but was prevented from doing so because the

Nordic compromise constituted a "political floor" below which he could not go. Our explanation that we could not accept the compromise as a matter of principle was accepted by the Director General and the vast majority of member states. The important fact is that despite a great deal of hand wringing by the UNESCO Secretariat, the Director General made budget changes happen, and he has the power to continue to make them happen.

-- (5) Transnational Code of Conduct Victory. An intemperate and destructive resolution to bring UNESCO into the business of establishing a "code of conduct" for transnational corporations was introduced by a group of Third World countries. It was referred to the Drafting and Negotiating Group mentioned earlier, and after a great deal of behind the scenes manouever and debate, was reduced to a meaningless call for further study.

-- (6) Elections to Boards and Committees. The U. S. won election, in secret ballot, to all five of the major Committees for which we were candidates, including the critical Committee on Informatics. Moreover, the candidate backed by the United States for President of UNESCO's Executive Board, Ambassador Seddoh of Ghana, was a positive step in ensuring the objectivity of that body.

-- (7) Atmospherics. The general atmosphere at the conference was much different than I had expected. The debate in most cases was largely free of polemics. U. S. views were listened to with respect, our positions were recognized as

legitimate, and our concerns were taken into account to a very large degree.

There were, of course, also negatives, and I will briefly outline below areas where we did not fully achieve our goals:

-- Budget. In spite of some reduction, the budget was not cut enough to bring it into an acceptable range. The U. S. voted against the compromise figure. In this we were isolated, although a number of delegations abstained on the final vote.

-- Sofia Conference. The U. S., along with a number of Western European delegations, opposed accepting Bulgaria's invitation to UNESCO to hold the 1985 General Conference in Sofia. The invitation was nonetheless accepted in a lopsided vote.

-- Orientation towards the state, as opposed to the private sector, in UNESCO's spheres of activity. In education, science, culture and communications, there is an important role for the private sector, in our view. Members of the delegation proposed greater reliance on private sector resources in a number of instances, but to little avail. Most UNESCO member states believe that the state is the most appropriate agent for advancing international cooperation in science, for combatting illiteracy, and so forth. This view continued to prevail during the conference.

-- Peace and Disarmament Issues. Again, in spite of the

delegations best efforts, we were unable to eliminate the Soviet inspired interjection of peace and disarmament in a number of UNESCO programs. The U. S., of course, favors peace and disarmament. We do not believe, however, that UNESCO is the appropriate forum for debating these issues. Additionally, it is obvious that Soviet efforts to introduce programs which would mobilize scientists or educators for disarmament are designed to further the propaganda efforts of the U. S. S. R.

If the above can be taken as something of a balance sheet, it is apparent that, and I believe, the pluses outnumbered the losses in totaling up the conference results. I account for this in several ways. First, the fact that the United States was reviewing its relationship with UNESCO may well have caused the Secretariat and the member states to be on their best behavior.

Secondly, the delegation worked as a team to assert U. S. leadership in a firm but diplomatic manner. A number of delegates told me that they didn't necessarily agree with U. S. positions, but they were grateful to know exactly where we stood. The Jordanian President of the conference, Minister Said Tell, told me at the end that he perceived a new era at UNESCO because of the leadership of the United States.

Thirdly, I believe there is a new mood emerging among a number of moderate Third World states. This is seen in UNESCO's dealing with communications issues. Many delegates told me they

were tired of stale rhetoric and empty posturing on communications issues. They said they want instead to see concrete progress in meeting the communications development needs of their countries. In my view, programs like the International Program for the Development of Communications, which the U. S. proposed and continues to support, have gone a long way to bring about these new attitudes.

Fourthly, there is no doubt in my mind that Director General M'Bow worked actively behind the scenes to assure a fruitful outcome in Paris. UNESCO is an "African" organization in that Mr. M'Bow, from Senegal, is the highest ranking African in the UN system and the African states comprise a substantial portion of the membership in UNESCO. He mobilized the African delegates in ways that were designed to assure that the U. S. and the West got a fair hearing at the conference. I cannot speculate on why he chose this course; I can only report that he was extremely accessible to me, and was supportive in appropriate ways when it counted.

What can we do now to assure that the positive results of the conference are not lost. Let me say at this point that I support the Administration's decision last December to submit a letter of U. S. intent to withdraw from UNESCO. The Executive Review of U. S./UNESCO relations covered more ground than just the conference. There is clearly room for additional improvements,

and I sincerely hope UNESCO will improve its mode of operations and its programs sufficiently to warrant reconsideration of the decision to withdraw at the end of this year.

In the meantime, I believe it behooves all Americans to consider carefully how we can best serve the interests of the United States in international education, science, culture and communications outside of UNESCO, whether we remain a member or not. For my part, I have undertaken to bring a group of individuals interested in international business together to consider the problem. We need a concise inventory of the benefits U.S. transnational corporations derived from UNESCO, and a well-developed plan to assure that they can continue to be derived bilaterally, or by other means. In this connection the New York based Conference Board, a not for profit research organization has undertaken to develop this inventory with the assistance of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and the Washington based Heritage Foundation. For example, how can we assure a strong voice for U. S. business in UNESCO's Informatics Programs which will deal with key issues in the area of transborder data flow? How can we be sure that the U. S. will have a say in deciding important copyright questions in the future. Scientists, educators, cultural experts and communicators will have other, similar questions, and will also need to seek answers quickly and realistically.

I believe, too, that we must consider how to continue to influence UNESCO decisions from outside the organization. What is to prevent UNESCO from adopting a code for trans-national corporations if the U. S. is not a party to future UNESCO deliberations? How can we oppose renewed Soviet efforts to subvert the organization to its own purposes? How can we protect free press interests against renewed efforts to establish a New World Information and Communications Order by radical states within UNESCO if we are not participants in the debate?

I confess I have no pat answers to these questions. But I applaud this Committee's investigation of these issues, and I pledge you my support as your work continues.

Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Ambassador Hennelly, for your statement. Mr. Ambassador, what is the basis for the claim that peace and disarmament issues considered by UNESCO are Soviet propaganda themes?

Mr. HENNELLY. I can only speak from experience. In the various commissions where we considered various resolutions, in every instance the Soviets or Soviet bloc nation insisted upon inserting and interlineating peace and disarmament in programs that had nothing to do with peace and disarmament.

We saw it in the communications area. We saw it in the human rights area. We saw it in the educational area, even in the cultural area. It is almost as if the Soviets and the Eastern bloc have a record—they must constantly harp on peace and disarmament.

I might add, our Chinese friends are not far behind in that regard also.

Mr. YATRON. How many UNESCO programs are oriented toward peace and disarmament?

Mr. HENNELLY. I could not give you a specific answer, but I can say certainly not a majority. I think the thing that is of concern to me and others is the stridency of their demands. They fill the halls with rhetoric. It is a strident call for peace and disarmament. It is not necessarily 10 percent of the programs, but they make a lot of noise.

Mr. YATRON. Could you site examples where U.S. proposals to place a greater emphasis on the private sector were rejected in favor of continued use of the state as the primary vehicle for promoting international cooperation in science and other areas?

Mr. HENNELLY. The only example I can site generally occurred in the educational commission. I note in our audience we have one of our distinguished delegates who served on the educational commission and I think she would be more qualified to answer. But from my overview of the situation, the one commission where attempts were made by the United States to interject private sector aid was in the educational field, but was listened to with deaf ears.

The general consensus was that the state was in charge of education.

Mr. YATRON. Chairman Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, from your testimony, written and oral presentation, you indicated that you worked well with M'Bow, that you had access, that he did what you wanted. Maybe we ought to send you back.

Mr. HENNELLY. No, thank you.

Mr. MICA. It is my understanding that as of right now nothing has been done to prepare for any changes. How do we light a fire under him? How do we get him to act? What is the best route?

My feeling is that, again, as I said in my opening statement, all of the charges that have been leveled against UNESCO have some merit. They have a pro and con to them. When it comes right down to it, a great deal of the anti-U.S. rhetoric, the coordination and organization, appears to have come from the Director-General. So my feeling is maybe you change the Director-General.

Mr. HENNELLY. Let me respond to that.

Mr. MICA. Do you want to go back?

Mr. HENNELLY. Well, I will be very candid with you. If I had the time, only if I had the time, and I had the complete support of the Government, I think as a businessman I could shake it up a bit.

The Director generally has become a symbol. He is a lightning rod. And I personally welcome the GAO audit. I know nothing about the Director-General's personal finances, and I know nothing about the charges. I have never seen any proof to the contrary that he is not an honest man. In his dealings with me, he dealt with me on an equal basis, and I suspect he did so because he had finally gotten the word—the word had gotten through.

As I mentioned to someone recently, as Harry Truman said, to get the attention of a Missouri mule you have to hit him over the nose with a two-by-four. And I think our Government hit them over the nose quite a few times.

The Director-General sought me out within 48 hours of my being there, and we had many, many serious and private conversations. I constantly told him that the United States was serious; that the American public had had it; that we were there to see change effected. Of course, I had never been to a previous conference, but I am told by those who had served at other conferences that our conference achieved the most positive results attained by the United States in over 10 years.

I will give you one example of how the Director-General was helpful to the United States—and he, by the way, extended himself to all our delegates. Admittedly, he is elected by the sovereign body, as the majority leader or the Speaker in the Congress. However, he has a tremendous amount of power of persuasion.

When the Transnational Code of Conduct resolution came up, which gave me as a businessman a great deal of concern, I expressed my concern to him and to his aides, and I and members of my delegation saw his aides and himself personally lobby ambassadors of other African States to make them withdraw their support of the Transnational Code of Conduct. It was like watching something here on the Hill. It happened; it happened.

I was asked why I seem to understand——

Mr. MICA. If I may just comment on that.

If you are showing that he can cause it not to happen——

Mr. HENNELLY. He can certainly do that.

Mr. MICA. Then he obviously has been the one or could be the one that could have caused all of these other problems to occur.

Mr. HENNELLY. Well, some of the structural problems I would not lay at his doorstep. But he is the Executive Director, in effect. He is running that organization. And he certainly has the power to effect change.

Mr. MICA. If I may interrupt just a moment to tell you how I see it.

I have seen in the private sector—I have been on boards of directors—that in some organizations, the board shows up once every 6 months and the director hands him a list of proposals, and presents all the reasons why they should be approved. The board votes on it and walks out the door. And that is about all they know.

In other cases, the directors come in, they have meetings, they meet regularly, they present proposals, and the director carries them out.

My indication is that the nations involved in a 51-member board are taking their leadership from the director.

Mr. HENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely right. In fact, one of the recommendations I would like to suggest to this committee and to the UNESCO forum is that the Executive Board assert its leadership. There is an absolute necessity for leadership being exercised by the Executive Board of UNESCO and, believe me, in my judgment that has not been done in the past. There has been no cohesive leadership in that board.

I agree with your analogy of a rubber stamp corporate board. I believe that it is incumbent upon the sovereign members that make up that board that they assert their leadership, because their charter provides for leadership. And I have a number of suggestions I would like to submit to this committee if and when asked.

Mr. MICA. Would you not agree, then, the most basic change and the easiest way for the United States to stay in UNESCO is for M'Bow to resign?

Mr. HENNELLY. If I were to be facetious, I would say yes. But, no, I don't think that is the answer; I do not. Because I think this is an international organization.

The Director-General was elected by the unanimous vote of all the sovereign states, including the United States. And the fact that—in my own personal view, the fact that we find fault with him, I don't think we solve our problems by asking a duly elected head of an international organization to resign.

I think we need the kind of leadership that I believe he can give to this organization, to get the changes we want. Resignation is too simplistic.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is running out, but without any change after 3 years of trying, we can debate whether the effort on the part of the United States was strong enough to try to bring about change. Some say we did not do enough. But after 3 years of trying, if we don't see any change this year, should we still stay in?

Mr. HENNELLY. No, sir. We should definitely not stay in, if we see no change.

Mr. MICA. All right.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Chairman Mica.

Now I would like to call on the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You indicated that you would be prepared to comment on the changes you think should be forthcoming this year.

Could you list them for us?

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes; last night I jotted some down.

They are in the nature of three major categories: Structural, programmatic, and budget changes.

The first change that I would look to is that the UNESCO attain zero growth in the 1986-87 biennium. Second, I would like in this biennium—1984-85—to see a reduction in program spending by the elimination of obsolete programs, duplicative programs, programs that really are underfunded and are never going to mean anything—and I refer to those as pork barrel projects, just to take care of the constituencies—and I believe some of those programs can be put off.

Perhaps among the most important recommendations I have to make would be an improved budget technique. I would like to see more accessibility to data. I would like to see concise definitions. And, in that regard, I have an addition to my previous suggestion of strengthening the Executive Board—I would like to see a subcommittee of the Executive Board devoting itself primarily to budget and program matters before they become locked in. Also free accessibility to the auditor and the budget officer by the sovereign states and the members of the Executive Board; in other words, a complete two-way street of dialog on programs, before they are presented to the General Conference.

Again, on the strengthening of the leadership of the Executive Board—and I do want to emphasize this—ever since the United States notified its intention to withdraw, we have seen, and I have seen, a cohesive banding together by the Western allies which was not evident in the past. So we had many Missouri mules over in Paris. They all have gotten the word. And I do believe that this cohesiveness that we see with our allies is going to be positive in effecting change.

I would also like to see in the Executive Board, if it is going to assert leadership, a committee which would serve to review proposals and resolutions that have political overtones going far beyond the charter of UNESCO. If I may, a drafting and negotiating com-

mittee, where the strict rule of unanimous consent or consensus is applied.

Many times during my plenary statements I chided the organization for taking the time of the conference to discuss extraneous matters that necessarily did not belong there; they should have been discussed in New York or in Geneva. So I would like to see a lot of the rhetoric and the polemics of political issues having nothing to do with UNESCO sublimated, so that the real work of UNESCO can go forward.

I would like to see, where possible, within the Executive Board a secret ballot. We discussed a secret ballot during our conference, but we did not attempt it. The only time we had a secret ballot was for the election of the key officers. And it does work. I would like to see some use of the secret ballot in the Executive Board—not necessarily in the General Conference but in the Executive Board.

On the programmatic changes, I would like to see a shift away from the rhetoric on peace and disarmament. I would like to see an emphasis in the communications program more toward the basic objectives of UNESCO, as exemplified by our IPDC [International Program for Development and Communication] and away from this business of new world information orders. New order seems to connote a revulsion in Americans and in a lot of the West.

I certainly would like to see more qualified Americans in positions of importance at UNESCO. And there is one problem that I have been unable to understand, the interrelationship between UNESCO and the United Nations. All too often, something comes up at the United Nations, and suddenly it pops up at UNESCO. I want to know what the relationship—what the obligation of UNESCO is to take up a matter that originates in the United Nations. As far as I know, UNESCO is a separate organization. But the Transnational Corporation Code of Conduct issue was born in the United Nations and it suddenly appeared at UNESCO.

I would like to know, or would like to have the Executive Board or the Secretariat clearly define what is the responsibility of UNESCO with regard to matters that are raised at the United Nations.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I would just make one brief comment on the politicization issue. We have to understand that while there may sometimes be extraneous and unfortunate politicization it is a little bit ironic for the United States to be against censorship on the one hand with the new information order, and, on the other hand, to try to say that people cannot express their own personal or country's positions. So I think we don't want to press too hard. However, at the same time I think your point about a more constructive attitude is crucial.

Let me just ask one other major question. If the United States gets out, what alternatives do we have to obtain the same types of objectives and advantages we obtain by staying in, and what will be the cost of those alternatives from a financial perspective? Also, how do we protect our own interests and the principles we stand for if we are going to conduct empty-chair diplomacy?

Mr. HENNELLY. Congressman Leach, that is a concern that has motivated me to spend a great deal of my time since my return from Paris in examining. As I mentioned to you in my formal testi-

mony, I have asked the conference board, the National Commission, and only recently the Heritage Foundation, to give us a concise inventory of what are the resources that we have been benefiting from without our knowledge. I think until we know what we have been getting, it is awfully difficult to figure out how to replicate them.

Now, I have heard some examples of cost—I know that the Department of State is undertaking that review. I have heard idle chatter that in one area, the oceanographic area, the Navy would have to expend a considerable sum of money to replicate what they now get from UNESCO.

But I would like to start at the beginning and examine what it is we are getting so we can identify these resources and then determine how we replicate them. I am hopeful that study will be completed by the end of the summer. And, again, my interest, of course, primarily lies in the corporate field, international business, and it is those multinational corporations that are concerned. I think that this inventory has to be done for all sectors within UNESCO.

Mr. LEACH. Well, I appreciate that.

I am a little surprised the administration didn't do a careful assessment before their decision.

My time has expired, but as Congressman Mica has suggested, if you are willing, if you could indicate some specifics of programs you suggest might be eliminated, that might be helpful to the committee. You could submit them at a later point, if you prefer.

Mr. HENNELLY. I would prefer to submit that information at a later date. Certainly, peace and disarmament, I would phase out, if I could.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, sir.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Leach.

Since Ambassador Hennelly indicated earlier that he would have to leave early, I was hoping that we could limit each member to two questions. If there are additional questions, we could submit them in writing to Ambassador Hennelly and have him respond later.

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. YATRON. At this time, I would call on the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hennelly, I have two questions.

To what do you attribute this new mood, this new beginning?

Mr. HENNELLY. A recognition by the Secretariat itself, and the developing world, primarily the African States, that the United States really meant what it said; and also a recognition that they are being denied the fruits of the UNESCO charter because of the superfluous time and attention being paid to extraneous matters and rhetoric that have nothing to do with the objectives of improving literacy and scientific development, culture, and communications.

They are fed up, and I think more nations are getting fed up.

Mr. SMITH. Well, then, you would believe that it was not only the fear that we instilled in them, that we are serious about removing ourselves and our dollar funding, but also the fact that they have

awakened to the realities of the cheating of their own constituencies that has been going on over the years?

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes, Congressman. And I recall Minister Thiem, from the Sengal, in his closing statement, alluded to that. And he was directing his remarks to the East. It was a very encouraging sign to our delegation that others are awakening to this fact.

Mr. SMITH. Second, you listed as one of your positives the ability to have the United States give their side of the Grenada matter in a fair and impartial forum.

Would you mind telling me why we are debating Grenada at UNESCO in the first place? Why do you list that as a positive after we get beaten over the head?

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes. It is rather odd, and I condemned the fact that the issue had come up in the first instance. But it was there and we had to respond.

I responded immediately after the charge was made by the Soviets, Cuba, and the other bloc nations. I then subsequently received the instructions and information from the State Department, and in my plenary address I devoted a considerable amount of time to the events that led up to our involvement in Grenada. And I should tell you that at the conclusion of my explanation, I literally received a standing ovation. And every time the issue came up—and it only came up maybe three or four times—until when I finally gave my plenary address, it never came up again. When I was not in the chair, somebody else was, and they responded, and they were received with, believe it or not, applause for our position.

This had been a device by the Soviets and others who are out to exploit us, to smear us. It didn't work. It backfired. And I think the fact that we had a standing ovation set the tone: Don't bring it up again.

Mr. SMITH. Would you be willing to hazard for me a listing just by bloc, for instance, or geographic area, of those countries which tended to be less strident, less rhetorical, on issues where they had previously been rather anti-West or anti-United States or anti-Israel, as opposed to individual countries?

Mr. HENNELLY. I can only recall from memory. I could give you a more specific identification. It is rather difficult, I should say, Mr. Congressman, during a plenary session, to identify who is speaking out, who is voting. You have—there are approximately 500 people in the General Conference, and it is difficult to see where the voices are coming from.

But I would say that our allies—the Western Hemisphere was for us. The African States in the main were for us. The Europeans were for us. A lot of the problems came from the Eastern bloc and the Soviets; in the Western Hemisphere, there were some exceptions, like Mexico and Cuba. They attacked us. And Nicaragua attacked us.

But I think the change you are suggesting or asking for probably came primarily from the African States.

Mr. SMITH. What did Mexico attack us on?

Mr. HENNELLY. That is a question you will have to ask the State Department. I don't know. They have very excellent representation there. I cannot answer that question.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, we have Mr. Derwinski coming at some point in time?

Mr. YATRON. Yes; he will be here next Wednesday.

Mr. SMITH. I would like some questions prepared with reference to that.

Thank you very much.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Ambassador, it is certainly refreshing to hear your business-like approach and your recommendations. It really is encouraging to me.

Let me just take exception again to something that was said here about the United States trying to censor other countries' views. Certainly the United States has never done that. Some of those views can be brought up in other forums besides UNESCO. In UNESCO we deal with hunger and poverty and education and the needs of individual people, not collectivism. We certainly don't need a lot of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric about redistribution of wealth, which makes me throw up when I hear of such a statement from anybody.

Let me just say that in your prepared statement you made reference to UNESCO's programs being slanted toward what you rightly describe as "quintessential Soviet propaganda themes." And you talked about peace and disarmament in asking some other questions.

The CBS news program "60 Minutes" had a feature about UNESCO on last Sunday's telecast. Reference was made during that program to the expulsion by the French Government last year of 47 Soviet diplomats. Among those so-called diplomats, all of whom were identified as KGB agents, 9 were attached to the Soviet delegation at UNESCO, and 3 were actually on the UNESCO payroll. And the program said these 3 remained on the payroll for quite some time, even after their public exposure as KGB agents.

I have a couple of quick questions. Why do you think such people were allowed to stay on the UNESCO payroll? The CBS program reported UNESCO's own rules require employees to take a loyalty oath forswearing any allegiance to instructions coming from outside the organization.

Why were they left on the payroll? What is wrong there?

Mr. HENNELLY. Mr. Congressman, I share your concern over that. However, I have learned—as I think others have—that UNESCO considers itself an international organization beholden to no sovereign.

Actually, your remarks, your question should be directed to the Secretariat. But let me answer as I understand it.

As an international organization beholden to no sovereign, it must protect its employees until and unless information is provided to it showing the culpability of those individuals. And I am told that that information has not been forthcoming. I believe this is a matter between the French Government and UNESCO. Yet, I, too, am appalled by it.

But I recognize they don't want to get into a witch hunt type of operation. But I think there is a need for the French Government to respond to your concerns, which I share.

Mr. SOLOMON. Let me just ask, along that line, then, is the left-wing, anti-American, antidemocratic tone that comes from UNESCO these days the result of a general drift in the Third World politics? Or, is there some other element or elements coming from the outside that are seeking to manipulate that organization? Do you have any thoughts on that?

Mr. HENNELLY. As I mentioned in my prepared statement, I went to Paris with a very negative impression of UNESCO. I came away, after seeing change, with a positive impression.

The anti-Americanism that we were used to was not evident at this conference. We were listened to and respected, even where we voted "no," and we took very hard positions. I had delegates come up to me, of other nations, and say, "I don't agree with you, but I certainly appreciate your explanation. I understand the principle you are standing for."

Mr. SOLOMON. Would you restate why you think that change has taken place?

Mr. HENNELLY. I think they finally got the message. I think they really got it.

Mr. SOLOMON. That is what I wanted to hear. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Solomon.

The gentleman from the State of Washington, Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, what confuses me a little is that they have got the message, but where do we go from here?

Mr. HENNELLY. A good question, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I was at the United Nations as a delegate at the General Assembly, and I am certainly aware, clearly aware, of what you are talking about as far as bloc voting and the rhetoric and all the rest of it. And, of course, at the General Assembly, that is pretty much all you have, because there are no set responsibilities as the specialized agencies have. We have always valued these agencies as the most effective part of the United Nations.

Let me ask you: Do you think the criticism of the 24 Western nations, which I am sure you read, and the report that came out—do you feel that was an accurate report?

Mr. HENNELLY. I think it was a fair assessment, yes, sir. And may I suggest, Congressman Pritchard, I agree; we have not seen change yet. But there are two opportunities coming up within this year where we should be able to measure change; that is, the Executive Board meeting in May and the one in September.

In my judgment, if we don't see change after those two Board meetings, then I would be very pessimistic as to our reconsideration.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, I guess what concerns me is, that I am not certain that in this country we have a group focusing on this problem right now and sort of managing our strategy. I am not certain of it. I think it is all well and good for you to be working on this—getting a business group and some people from the Heritage Foundation together. But if you are going to have credibility up on the Hill, you have to have a far broader consensus than Heritage and some business people. You know, if we let this slide along and not make an all-out effort with our allies, it seems to me that we are

going to come up to the time for decision without this problem being chewed on enough. So that whatever decision is made, whether we are staying in or whether we get out, should be made only after adequate preparation.

There are those in the administration, State Department, who really want us to get back in. There are those who want us to get out. And it seems to be we cannot start from that basis.

What do we want to get out of UNESCO, and what changes are needed? Somebody ought to spell out for this committee exactly what changes we expect. And if they make those changes, are we going to go back in?

I think you also owe that to the group when you are saying, look, we are going to bail out of this thing unless you change. And I think you have to state pretty clearly what the desired changes are.

Maybe one of the witnesses is going to spell out these changes. I don't think you are in a position to provide this. Maybe Mr. Ed Derwinski, when he comes up, can elaborate for us.

But wouldn't you agree we owe it to the organization and also to our own country that we have this pretty firm?

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes, Mr. Congressman.

I, of course, have suggested some of the changes that I feel would be beneficial. I am incapable of speaking to the attitude of the State Department. Personally, I don't know that the State Department is going to come up with a laundry list.

As you note, my comments have been generalized statements. I have not specifically pointed to any particular thing, because they understand the particular things.

Mr. PRITCHARD. That is right. But this decision is going to be made in the White House—not the State Department. Everybody in this room knows that.

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PRITCHARD. And the State Department, or some people in there, may make some recommendations; but this is going to be a fundamental decision made in the White House. And I just hope the preparatory work is done so we don't just drift into this. Because, as you said at the start, we want to make sure that we have influence; we keep our influence on the decisions that are being made there. And it certainly is more difficult to do it from the outside.

On the other hand, if M'Bow and the operation don't change, I, for one, think that it is not wrong for us to step out in a year or two. But we should do it based on the best information, the best judgment, and not slide along.

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes, Mr. Congressman. And I just thought it may be something that the National Commission should address itself to, because the National Commission covers the broadest spectrum of UNESCO. And you, the Congress, created the National Commission. Perhaps that is where some of these ideas ought to be crystallized and set out.

I offer that as a suggestion. I understand your concern and frustration. I share it.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Pritchard.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I am concerned about one thing. The next General Conference doesn't meet until 1985, in the fall of 1985.

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. You are saying—I assume you are saying that unless UNESCO makes some changes by the end of the year, that we should follow the administration's suggestions and get out.

How are those changes going to be implemented if the next General Conference, which has to approve the changes, doesn't meet until late 1985?

Mr. HENNELLY. Congressman Gilman, I recognize what you are saying. Of course, I am aware of Secretary Shultz' letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations where he says, if concrete changes are effected, we will reconsider.

I am of the belief that the Executive Board, if it exercises leadership, can in effect start showing evidence of change. This is a matter, in my judgment, between the Director-General and the Executive Board. Admittedly, he would have to make changes in the 1984-85 budget, which was approved last year.

But I think the rules and the charter of UNESCO vest in the Executive Board certain authorities that then subsequently can be ratified at the General Conference in Bulgaria.

I, too, have struggled with that idea: How do you see change unless you go through the next General Conference? I would not be presumptuous to suggest that we wait until then, because our Government has already spoken.

Mr. GILMAN. They can actually make the changes, the Director and the Executive Board, without approval of the full conference?

Mr. HENNELLY. I think they can propose changes. It is my belief they can propose changes that can be ratified by the General Conference convening in 1985.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you be satisfied, then, in your recommendation to the administration, that if changes are proposed but not ratified that we should then reconsider?

Mr. HENNELLY. Yes, sir. But I would also ask for change occurring structurally with regard to budget techniques and things like that, personnel policies. I think the housekeeping details could be changed in this year.

Mr. GILMAN. We are very much concerned about the housekeeping details.

How do we keep an eye on it if we don't have a budget person in our own delegation assigned to UNESCO?

Mr. HENNELLY. I would certainly endorse that our mission in Paris be strengthened.

Mr. GILMAN. Have you made that recommendation?

Mr. HENNELLY. I have suggested it, yes.

I must say that I was privileged to have a professional budget officer on my delegation. And I would urge that a permanent budget officer be appointed and serve at the mission in Paris for our permanent delegation, yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. We don't have such a person now?

Mr. HENNELLY. No, sir, we do not.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I just have one very short question.

Mr. Hennelly, you talked about what you saw as a change in the whole attitude at the session that you attended, acceptance of ideas on the U.S. ability to act in a more impartial forum, to be more well received, to fend off some of the things we felt had been inappropriate over the years.

What about the mission of UNESCO? I haven't heard anything said about whether or not UNESCO is working. You have told me all about the intricacies of the meeting in Paris. What about all the money that we and other countries are spending? Are you satisfied from the short experience you have had that at least that money and the scope of the programs that are being run by UNESCO—forgetting all the political rhetoric, and all the nonsense aside—is there any value to UNESCO out on the street?

Mr. HENNELLY. Congressman, I can assure you I have been apprised of the substantive work UNESCO does, and I am in complete accord. We do receive a great deal of benefit, and I think your nongovernmental organizations who will be appearing here will testify to that.

This committee will be hearing from a former Deputy Director of UNESCO, the distinguished, Honorable Jack Fobes, and I think he can speak to that question.

But, yes, I am convinced from the readings I have done and the briefings I have received that the bulk of the work of UNESCO is beneficial to this world and the United States.

Mr. SMITH. So we are more interested at this moment, would you say, the administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO is more of a political decision than a substantive decision based on the value of UNESCO's services? Or you don't want to hazard that guess?

Mr. HENNELLY. I don't want to hazard that, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Do you want to go back to UNESCO? If you don't, you can hazard a guess.

Mr. HENNELLY. I believe if we have the kind of change I have suggested, yes; and I believe we should assert American leadership. It is time that the United States showed leadership, and I think we have the capacity to do so.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Ambassador Hennelly.

Our next witness is the Honorable Esteban Torres, a Representative in Congress from the State of California and a former U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO.

Let me welcome you. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. ESTEBAN TORRES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND A FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO UNESCO

Mr. TORRES. Thank you. I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify before your subcommittees here today on the subject of the United States withdrawal from UNESCO.

By way of background, I was the U.S. Permanent Representative with rank of Ambassador to UNESCO in Paris from 1977 to 1979

under the Carter administration. I was later elected to its Executive Board. As the U.S. Ambassador, I was responsible for representing the U.S. Government before UNESCO, and for overseeing the work of the U.S. Mission to UNESCO.

The proposal for the United States to withdraw from UNESCO at the end of this year has given rise to a number of allegations about the organization's policies and management. I want to discuss some of the issues and problems that I see in UNESCO as well as my views on the intended U.S. withdrawal from the organization.

First, I think it is important to note who is making the decisions about UNESCO's policies, programs, and budget. The organization has 161 member states.

The General Conference is the body which has sovereign power to determine UNESCO's budget and make policy decisions. It is made up of representatives of the member states.

The General Conference adopts UNESCO's budget and program every other year and decides the organization's medium-term plan every 6 years. The Executive Board, whose members are elected by the General Conference, is responsible to it for the execution of the program.

I might say, contrary to Ambassador Hennelly's comments, that the Executive Board is not a rubberstamp. I don't believe that I served as a rubberstamp to an organization in my capacity as a member of that Board.

The Secretariat is placed under the sole authority of the Director-General and carries out the decisions of the General Conference. The Director-General makes periodic reports to the governing bodies on the execution of the program and the management of the organization's funds.

I acknowledge that certain administrative problems exist within UNESCO. They do so with almost any body of that magnitude, given the size of its member states and the size of its organization.

Some have said that UNESCO is mismanaged. The management of the organization comes under the scrutiny of its two governing bodies, made up of representatives of member states, the General Conference, and the Executive Board.

In addition to that, two external monitors, the U.N. joint inspection unit and the external auditor, also compile regular reports on UNESCO management. In-depth information is always available to the Executive Board and permanent members.

Any member state may request any explanation it needs on the management and finances of the organization from the Director-General. As a former Ambassador to that organization, I could have at any time that information, my mission could have it, my Government could have it.

The claim that not enough information is available simply cannot be made. This and other administrative problems such as the question of the competence and salaries of staff members, are not insurmountable.

They require review and negotiations with the Secretariat and Director-General. Resolutions to these administrative problems can be worked out.

Another issue that has been raised in relation to the U.S. withdrawal is the belief that there exists an anti-Western bias in UNESCO—I believe a large part of this Israeli misunderstanding, as often reported in the Western media.

Mr. Chairman, I would like in line with that to ask unanimous consent that this very recent article in the Editor and Publisher, dated April 21, 1984, be inserted into the record as part of my comments.

Mr. YATRON. Without objection, it will be included in the record. [The information follows:]

[Editor and Publisher Magazine, April 21, 1984]

IS UNESCO MISUNDERSTOOD? ¹

DIRECTOR-GENERAL M'BOW SAYS UNFAIR AND CONFUSED REPORTING BY WESTERN JOURNALISTS LEAD TO CONFUSION ABOUT UNESCO

(By Andrew Radolf)

The decisions on world press freedom issues made by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are misunderstood largely because of unfair and confused reporting by the Western press. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow of Senegal, director-general of UNESCO, told *E&P* in a recent interview in New York.

"My personal feeling is the whole matter has not been presented in a way that would be clear and fair," M'Bow said. "Reporters who have no familiarity with the decisionmaking process confuse what states (countries) do and what UNESCO decides."

Though he speaks English, M'Bow chose to answer questions in French and have them translated by a UNESCO interpreter.

UNESCO's continuing involvement in communications issues, under the heading of a New World Information Order, was a key reason cited by the Reagan Administration for its decision to withdraw from the organization by yearend unless there were major changes in its policies.

The Administration, as well as many independent press organizations, contended that the NWIO debate was being used by the Soviet Union and its allies in both the Eastern bloc and Third World to justify government control of the news media and launch political attacks on the West.

"The proposals of states (that are) discussed quite freely" at the agency's general conferences "are not the viewpoints of UNESCO," M'Bow asserted. He stressed repeatedly that the resolutions passed by UNESCO involving communication and information issues "were reached by consensus, including the United States" and that the Western press failed to point this out. He stated that those resolutions do not advocate placing the news media under government control.

"None of the intentions attributed to UNESCO" about restricting press freedoms "are true," he said.

M'Bow charged there was "a deliberate move to play up the conflictual side" of the communications debate within UNESCO, with "particular" emphasis on the "East-West angle."

The Third World countries who are the spearhead of the New World Information Order do not want to get caught up in the East-West conflict over the role of the press, he said. "They want development and solutions to their problems."

Many Third World countries were emerging from a colonial past which "deprived them of their civilization," M'Bow said. Now that they are independent, they use UNESCO as a forum "to reassert their cultural identity and nationhood. This is a basic problem not clearly grasped."

M'Bow also suggested that Western reporters may have been manipulated in their coverage of UNESCO, though he declined to cite specific examples and said he did not want "to speculate" and start "attributing intentions to people."

He said that the "intentions" of some countries to sanction government control of the news media "have been mistakenly attributed to UNESCO in an attempt to frighten off the people of the press and get them to react against us."

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M'Bow denied that UNESCO itself has embraced a "licensing system" for journalists or has sought to impose a code of conduct for journalists.

"There isn't anything along those lines" in the communications resolutions adopted "unanimously by member-states," M'Bow said. "In all of UNESCO's decisions you will not find anywhere journalists should do this and not do that." UNESCO's constitution endorses the "free flow of ideas throughout the world," he added.

M'Bow said UNESCO became involved in such issues as the "security" of journalists not as an attempt to place restrictions on their activities, but to see that "their freedom is insured so they can go about their jobs."

He said this is the reason UNESCO established a "mechanism" to hear complaints from journalists "over violations of their rights."

"No one can decide the conditions under which one could insure the safety of journalists," he said. "It's for journalists themselves to say what they are."

When UNESCO "endeavors to open press agencies in a region of the world," M'Bow continued, "that does not mean that existing press agencies are impeded from working in that area. It was done to insure a plurality of sources of information."

He cited the International Program for the Development of Communications, which was first proposed by the U.S., as an example of how UNESCO "helps developing countries to increase their mass media and information possibilities."

The IPDC works mainly through voluntary contributions from governments and private organizations to aid Third World countries seeking to develop their communications capabilities.

M'Bow also defended his own role in UNESCO's debates, saying that the concept of a New World Information Order was "not attributed as my brainchild, but rather as the whole of UNESCO's."

M'Bow stated that it is not his job to restrain UNESCO's members from making proposals which are inimical to Western ideals and interests. He said the role of the director-general is to propose programs and a budget to the general conference and executive board but that it's up to the members to make the final decisions. Once those decisions are made, his job is "simply to implement them."

M'Bow said he drafts his proposals according to the "guidelines and wishes expressed by the membership."

He doesn't believe "there's any truth" to the "rumors" that only his resignation will make the United States decide against withdrawing from UNESCO.

M'Bow said he has no intention of resigning and emphasized that in 1980 he was "unanimously" re-elected to another term as director-general, which runs through 1987.

He also denied that he is a Marxist who used his views to influence the whole communications debate. He described himself as "a historian and a geographer."

Nevertheless, M'Bow insisted that the NWIO is "inevitable" because "communication represents something increasingly important in the lives of countries and individuals. Society is characterized by a constant information explosion."

He explained that this information explosion will itself be a major force for change. "There is going to be a new order, a new way of apprehending the world," he said.

The UNESCO's budget and management were two other problems areas pinpointed by the Administration in making its decision to withdraw.

The United States was the only country at last November's general conference in Paris to vote against UNESCO's budget of \$374 million for 1984 and 1985. The U.S. contributes nearly a quarter of that amount.

M'Bow said the budget issue was another example of reporting about the organization "without the necessary clarity."

He stated that the new budget actually decreased in current dollars from the 1982-83 level of \$430 million. The result, he said, is that under the new budget, the U.S.'s annual contribution will decline by about \$7 million.

The decrease in the budget was possible, M'Bow said, because most of UNESCO's transactions are in French francs which have declined in value against the dollar.

State Department officials referred to the decline of the franc as a "fortuitous event" and stated that in "real terms" the current two-year budget represents an increase of about 2% to 3%, with the budget for UNESCO's programs going up as much as 5%. The officials stated that the Administration's policy of zero budget growth for multilateral organizations was the reason for the negative vote in Paris.

"Are you looking at actual payment or is it principle," M'Bow countered. "In fact, the UNESCO budget has gone down."

M'Bow and his staff also responded to U.S. charges that the organization spends 80% of its budget on staff and only 20% on programs.

They did not deny the charge, but stated that UNESCO was established "to render services" and not to be an operational agency. "It's like telling a university it spends all its money on teachers or telling a research institute it spends all its money on researchers," said one M'Bow aide.

They said that through "extra budgeting resources," UNESCO has been able to field about 1,000 "operational projects" in over 100 countries.

M'Bow declined to comment what UNESCO will do if the United States goes ahead with its withdrawal plans. In general, he said the organization has two choices: to seek additional funds elsewhere or scale back its operations "in a way commensurate with the means available."

Auditors from the General Accounting Office are in Paris now going over UNESCO's records. The audit is expected to be completed by November.

M'Bow said he would "cooperate fully" with the GAO auditors and that he "eagerly awaits" their findings, but he declined to comment on the review itself.

He said the recent fire in UNESCO's headquarters did not damage any areas where important documents are stored, but only affected the building's "registry" for incoming and outgoing mail. He also denied that any "shredding" of sensitive material by the staff had taken place.

UNESCO's own auditor, who is appointed by the general conference, is the "comptroller of the United Kingdom," M'Bow said. He stated that the comptroller has "two staff members permanently in Paris" and that their "public reports" would show no documents were destroyed.

The State Department has recently formed a panel to evaluate UNESCO's performance this year and advise the Secretary of State about whether or not to proceed with withdrawal. James Holderman, chairman of the University of South Carolina and chairman of the U.S. Commission for UNESCO, heads the panel. Harold W. Andersen, president of the Omaha World-Herald Co. and chairman of the World Press Freedom Committee, is a panel member.

UNESCO's executive board is scheduled to meet on May 9 in Paris. M'Bow and other UNESCO officials made a point of saying that so far they have not received any proposals for changes in the organization from the United States.

"They never gave specifics, not even a shopping list," stated one aide.

If the United States does proceed with its withdrawal on December 31, the decision will be "a valid one," M'Bow said, but he would not make any prediction about what the U.S. will finally do.

Mr. TORRES. I believe the Ambassador who just spoke very well articulated the kind of negative thoughts he had about UNESCO prior to his going to the General Conference, and the sort of positive impressions and attitudes and feeling that he received upon being there and returning to this country.

There is a feeling that the United States has too often become the brunt of criticism from the organization, particularly the Third World countries. Well, that is the nature of the world we live in today. We are often criticized in many international forums about our politics, about our position, about our world leadership.

I think there is also a large what-to-do about the difficulty that we have in working with the current Director-General, Amadou Mahtar M'Bow of Senegal.

Let me say first in fairness to the Director-General, Mr. M'Bow, it must be said that he is a proud man, like many of us must feel. He is a product of African tribal tradition. His struggle as a leader in the independence of Senegal from France was equal to the service and commitment he gave to France as a sergeant in her army.

As a Francophile intellectual he is unwavering in his philosophical outlook. Some call this rigidity, others choose to call it tyrannical. I think Mr. M'Bow is plain tough and no-nonsense. He is nobody's "yes" man, let me assure you.

Ambassador Hennelly's statement reflects the Director-General's efforts behind the scenes as a leader in making for a fruitful general conference that just took place in Paris.

When I was the Ambassador there I saw the kind of effective leadership that he was giving, attempting to lobby the member states on very critical questions that impacted not only on us, but other member states in the various resolutions and actions of UNESCO.

I think our main problem with UNESCO is that many of its members advocate policies with which the United States differs, and these we should oppose. Many, however, pursue goals that we should share.

The United States must not isolate itself from the collaborators it must have if our goals in the world are to be realized. We must be willing to bear our fair share of the burdens and take the hard knocks, if you will, of international efforts to pursue these ends.

Unfortunately, the present administration exacerbates the dilemma by taking an essentially unilateralist stance. Rather than projecting a program of effective leadership in the U.N. system, the administration has adopted a narrow perspective in choosing to withdraw from an international network in which the U.S. interests are enmeshed.

UNESCO is an important forum for U.S. multilateral diplomacy. It provides the United States an opportunity to promote Western values in the world.

U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO could well be damaging to our intellectual, our commercial, and political interests. Participation in UNESCO programs in the areas of education, culture, science, and communications enables the United States to exert its influence in shaping member states policies in these areas.

The U.S. withdrawal will have a devastating impact on our intellectual interests and scientific pursuits. The leading role played by U.S. educators in literacy and other education programs will be lost.

American scientists need the international network provided by UNESCO. Many scientific projects in remote regions of the world depend heavily on UNESCO for obtaining data which cannot be gathered solely with the cooperation of foreign governments.

The United States will lose the benefit of ongoing UNESCO scientific projects in areas such as earthquake prediction, ocean research, and the management of world water resources. Clearly the U.S. scientific community will be dealt a serious blow.

The question was asked earlier, what benefits do we derive from UNESCO. Well, in answer to that, I believe that withdrawal from UNESCO would also be damaging to our commercial interests. UNESCO acts as the marketing arm for American publishers and printers who receive in return millions of dollars from the sale of their books to world markets.

U.S. withdrawal could cause UNESCO to cease promoting American printed materials, since we would not be member state. And this action obviously would have a direct impact on both income and jobs in the printing and publishing industries.

Moreover, copyright and royalty agreements now negotiated in this international forum would probably not be enforced, again, to the disadvantage of American artists, performers, and other creative individuals.

The UNESCO administered universal copyright convention facilitates the export of U.S. films, books, and records, and other materials which have been placed at a cost of over \$1 billion annually.

Other UNESCO expenditures of direct benefit to the United States include the procurement of U.S. equipment and scientific instrumentation and educational materials and fellowships to Americans and foreign students who are studying here in the United States.

Lastly, but as important is that U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO would be damaging to our political interests. U.S. absence would create a void in ideas. To abandon this organization to U.S. adversaries is to betray the U.S. commitment to freedom and equality for all human kind.

A stronger American commitment is needed to assert American values and principles. The United States is paying a high price to lose a voice in an organization that the rest of the world takes very seriously, very seriously.

Decisions on the exchange of critical information affecting the United States would thus be made without us. It is not a time of bailing out.

It is a time for working for improvements in the organized intellectual and cultural cooperation that is so important to the world. And I might just state that there is a mechanism currently at play in formulating the kinds of changes in the kinds of direction, the kinds of strategy our Government ought to be taking in concert with the U.S. Commission on UNESCO—Secretary Shultz has appointed 23 leading Americans from the gamut of American society to provide these recommendations and changes at the end of this year.

Only through a strategy of international collaboration can we hope to maintain our influence and advance the harmonization of relations among nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Congressman Torres, for an excellent statement.

How active was the Western Information Group when you were in UNESCO and to what extent did you meet to discuss strategy and tactics on difficult issues, such as communications and budget? Did you meet daily during the General Conference with the Western group representatives?

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, we met on various occasions as part of the Western regional group probably once a week, in the course of my 2-year tenure at UNESCO. I was a member of a group that is called the Geneva group, which is composed of 14 Western nations. I was the chairman of that group in 1978.

The Geneva group is the watchdog, or the monitoring group of Western nations at UNESCO that scrutinizes the UNESCO budget, the UNESCO fiscal responsibility. So there was continual meeting with these groups to discuss these problem areas.

Mr. YATRON. When you were the Ambassador from 1977 to 1979, how big was the mission staff?

Mr. TORRES. As I recall at that time, Mr. Chairman, I had a mission staff of 14 people, 14 officers.

Mr. YATRON. Was there a full-time budget officer?

Mr. TORRES. No; there was not a full-time budget officer. But, again, because we had access to the fiscal areas of UNESCO, we had on occasion State Department people that came in to review the budget. We had U.S. consultants that were hired by the Secretariat to conduct budgetary and fiscal inventories, and that information was made available to the member states, and in this case, to my mission.

Mr. YATRON. Was there an Agency for International Development attaché?

Mr. TORRES. Yes; there was.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much.

Chairman Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome my colleague's comments. I think you are able to bring to this committee firsthand information that many of us, including this chairman, can only be provided from material. As you probably gathered from my comments, I put less weight on many of the charges of the administration on the various problems of UNESCO—budgetary, politicization, and so on—although I agree they exist to one degree or another.

Still I keep coming back to what has been provided to me as chairman and what I think might be one of the bases of our problems. Let me share this with you.

I read this background information on UNESCO for the first time. I have heard a lot of comments about UNESCO over the last few months. But I have read in detail only recently.

Some of the comments I have been provided with are about Mr. M'Bow. I understand you worked with him. Maybe you can comment on this.

He apparently had a meeting earlier this year with his entire staff, 2,400 or so people, and threatened, if you will, some type of retaliation to anybody who leaked outside information.

Now, I think this would have some effect on our GAO investigation which is about to go on. Also, the charges indicated that he was paranoid, and that was one of the reasons, fear for his life, that he used to justify building a new penthouse on top of the building.

They say he is extremely intolerant. He goes into what are considered very famous rages that have created a feeling among those who don't want to tolerate the rage that they will just cooperate or not comment. Apparently in the past 3 years, 20 of his most senior staff resigned in disgust—I am taking the comments almost verbatim from what I have been given.

The director of personnel—I understand he has a pretty hefty position—is his wife's cousin, and totally unqualified for the position, a position that obviously effects on all of the personnel at UNESCO.

Among the professional staff, all of the people who work there, morale is at an all-time low. And one charge, and I will close with this, which I saw repeated on this week's "60 Minutes" program, is this incident where 47 Soviet spies, if you will, agents, were expelled from France. I understand three still remain on the payroll and get their UNESCO paychecks in Moscow.

I have just highlighted a few of the comments. I find them pretty astounding.

The last one in particular—that people who have been dismissed from UNESCO or expelled from the country, and who cannot serve UNESCO are getting their paychecks regularly in Moscow, approved personally by M'Bow—leads me to the conclusion that if you have this at the top, this may be a problem that first needs to be corrected before you even attempt to get to the other problems.

I say to you, again, that I have not had the firsthand experience you have. But I read all this with some shock and amazement. Did you see the “60 Minutes” broadcast?

Mr. TORRES. Yes; I did. I thought the “60 Minutes” reportage on UNESCO and the Director-General was a very cleverly contrived program which clearly was very negative to the Director-General.

I should clear the air on this before the committee here. That the ambassador who just spoke here awhile ago was not our ambassador to UNESCO as such, but rather the head of our U.S. delegation during a 1-week period.

We have an ambassador in place there, Mrs. Girard currently. If you saw the “60 Minutes” program, you also became aware of how the program painted her as a person who was not conversant with the issues, who was not being given information, who was totally remote from the activity of the organization.

I think that this does not bode well for us in national coverage, to show our people that way. Maybe—I cannot make a judgment on the lady. I don't know her. But I do know the Director-General. I have known him during my tenure at UNESCO.

I have known him in the subsequent years. And Mr. M'Bow, as I said, is a proud man, a man who, as I said, comes from a tribal tradition in Africa, a man who is used to authority and providing authority, and delegating authority.

Perhaps he has idiosyncracies, like we all have. The charge that he is paranoid is not an unlikely one. I know that there are attempts on his life. There are many people in Paris, which is the crossroads for a lot of espionage and terrorist activity and vengeance and assassinations, is a place where Mr. M'Bow is, his life is in danger. And because of that danger, he chose, unlike other Secretariat officers or diplomats, if you will, to live within the structure of the Secretariat itself, so that he had part of the premises converted into his living quarters.

Now, I would not want to live in the place I work in, but he chooses to do that, primarily because he feels that he is safer there.

The U.N. system, UNESCO, the U.S. Government, as a paying nation, would have to pay for his living costs outside of that structure, in a house or a rowhouse or a townhouse in Paris, very expensive, provide him with the transportation that he would need to go back and forth, provide him with the servants and all the other—

Mr. MICA. If I may just add. The report goes on to comment that although he wanted to live right on top of this building in a penthouse because he feared traveling back and forth, he spends over a third of each year traveling around the world.

Mr. TORRES. That he does indeed. There is criticism that he spends so much time traveling when, in fact, he might be sitting

behind his desk. He happens to choose, though, working with the member states, visiting the projects in the world, and it is a big world.

He visits all aspects of world programs and projects, meets with heads of state, meets with his staff people abroad. It is not the kind of thing many of us would like to do, but he enjoys it, he thinks that is important to keeping some cohesion in his organization.

I am not sure how that relates to his living on the premises. As I said, he chooses to do that.

He may be a tough administrator. I think he is a very tough administrator. He is a no-nonsense person.

It doesn't strike me as strange that 20 people would resign from the staff if, in fact, they had not been doing the job they were supposed to do, and he probably laid it on the line, shape up or get out. I really think that is what he does.

To the question that 47 spies were expelled by the French Government, I don't think 47 spies were in UNESCO. While there is an indication that three people from the UNESCO Secretariat, staff people, may have been spies, I cannot make a judgment.

I would think that UNESCO, because of the nature of the organization that it is, is probably full of spies from many areas. I am not sure exactly what led to this situation.

Nonetheless, as the ambassador before me said, these are international civil servants who until proven guilty the organization in which they serve as representatives of their governments cannot willy-nilly just expel them or cut them off from the staff payroll.

I believe that the same could happen to an American, or a Frenchman, or a British staff member. And there would not be just cause for the Secretariat, simply on the word of a government or hearsay to expel such a person.

So in short, Mr. Chairman, I believe that Mr. M'Bow is a person who has to be reckoned with. I agree with that. But I have found him in all my instances as an ambassador, as a permanent representative, as a member of the Board, a man to respond to our nation's requests.

I have made numerous demarches to the Director-General on notes of protest, and he has always on each occasion been able to deal with those in a most expeditious and diplomatic manner.

Mr. MICA. Thank you for your very eloquent comments regarding my concerns. Again, I tell you that is half of what has been provided to me, or not even half. If we have to deal with M'Bow, and we don't leave, how would you recommend that we proceed? What changes would you say would be helpful for us to ask for and how would we approach him?

Mr. TORRES. I think much in the same way that we have in the past. We are not dealing with a new situation. I think that the changes that may come forth from the group that Secretary Shultz has appointed in concert with our U.S. National Commission on UNESCO may be helpful.

I think that the GAO will come forth with viable recommendations that the Director-General will look at and adhere to. I think that given a positive outlook and a position from our standpoint to the Director-General that we can reach resolution on these.

All too often, Mr. Chairman, we approach the Director-General or UNESCO in a state of confrontation. We approach the members of the Board or the General Conference often in an adversarial position.

It was my experience in UNESCO as an ambassador, as a U.S. representative, to deal with the member states and the members of the Board and the Secretariat as coequals. I did not look down on them in a condescending way. I did not believe myself to be the great superpower representative and that they were going to do everything I told them to do.

But I conversed with them, many in their languages. I was able to converse with them in the Spanish language, in the French language, in English, and in the German language. I could get along with people. We never had problems of this magnitude.

So I think that all this bears an important aspect as to how we deal, not only with UNESCO but with other organizations in the international forum.

Mr. MICA. I thank my colleague.

I will stop until the next round, but I would like to say this. I continue to have concerns certainly about the Director-General, but I want my colleague to know that I intend to probe as deeply as possible into Mr. Newell's decision and the way the decision was brought about to withdraw from UNESCO.

Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And with all due respect to my colleague, Mr. Torres, you suggested that the United States has adopted a unilateral stance at UNESCO. I suppose the fact that we pay 25 percent of the budget and have less than 1 percent of the voting power sort of places us in an ambiguous position. But I think my question is, Is our stance really that unilateral?

As I understand it, some 24 other countries have joined us in our critique of UNESCO. So is it really a question of being unilateral, or is it having the guts to say enough is enough?

I think Mr. Hennelly, who testified just before you, talked about the positive results. Maybe it is about time we got some positive results through the actions that we have taken. I don't really see it as a unilateral action on our part, particularly with all the support that we have had.

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I don't deny that often kicking up a fuss, standing up, demanding to be heard, et cetera, is necessarily negative. I think it is good in some instances. We work and we live within an international community, and often to be heard and to get our point across, we have to set forth certain demands.

I might say to you that we don't vote at UNESCO. We are not outvoted as such. UNESCO has a unique system of dealing with issues through consensus, where member states, such as the United States, Great Britain, or France, or Nigeria, if you will, do not have to be brought to the point of embarrassment if they were outvoted. The consensus has prevailed as an effective device for dealing with adopting resolutions which are accepted by all in the body.

I think, Mr. Congressman, that what we have done at UNESCO of late speaks to a position that I feel personally—I believe that we

have taken a unilateral approach and following that our allies, Great Britain and the Netherlands and Canada and others, have felt, probably within the Geneva group that I discussed earlier, that they could bring about the same pressure, some clout, if you will, to bring about needed reforms in UNESCO. And that is what is happening.

Mr. SOLOMON. You agree there are needed reforms.

Mr. TORRES. I believe there are many areas that the former ambassador as a witness pointed out, that I think we have to work on. But I think that we have to make our position known, and we have to deal with the Director-General and the Executive Board in those changes.

I don't believe that by getting rid of the Director-General, by leaving UNESCO, as such, that we are going to rectify those particular problem areas.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Torres, you bring a different perspective here obviously, and I gather that you would be absolutely amazed if some major scandal broke concerning Mr. M'Bow in the next year. You would be very surprised at something like that.

Mr. TORRES. I would be surprised if that happened to anybody that I know and feel good about.

Mr. PRITCHARD. You have a very positive feeling about this fellow and the way he has managed this organization over the last number of years.

Mr. TORRES. I do. Given the breadth of the organization that he runs and the staff and the budget.

Mr. PRITCHARD. You know, the information we have is not just American. My experience at the United Nations was that when we got dealing with people like, from the Netherlands and the Brits and Canadians and others that they performed very well at the United Nations, understand it a little better than we do. I think they have better training for international work, and when they complain, I usually listen pretty hard.

So we have rather a clear distinction between your statements concerning the Secretary and the statements of the 24 Western nations. It has been my impression, not from your experience, but my impression from reading and talking to people, that this man has abused his authority and has threatened the good work that this organization can do and has allowed it to become politicized.

And while we can say, well, he is a proud man and he is a strong leader and all, that doesn't wash as far as getting the job done. So that is why I think it is terribly important that the committee that Shultz appointed—this Commission, and the United States, different people in the United States, working with our allies—make a very thorough and careful analysis so that when we reach the point where we either are getting out or getting in, we make the very best judgment.

I have been concerned because I have not seen the specifics laid out as to what we want changed. Do you feel there are some changes that would be helpful to the organization?

Mr. TORRES. Indeed, and I would hope that, as I said, they are in the context of providing effective management, as we would want to see in any private sector body, or nonprofit organization. I would like to see the same at UNESCO.

I believe that we ought to be working toward a zero budget figure. I think that can be achieved, and I think we have seen the Director-General begin to move in that direction. I would hope we would make our changes in UNESCO based on the ability for us to understand the nature of the people within that organization, that body of 161 member states, and not necessarily be biased by our own U.S. attitudes, if you will, or the attitudes of a small block of countries, but rather in the context of what is best for the entire global community.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, I think we ought to judge UNESCO on the product of its work. That seems to be the fairest way to judge them, rather than judge them on how they arrive there, or their feelings, or their passions, or our biases, or narrow viewpoints. What is the work product of the agencies? Because it seems to me that the rhetoric and the debate ought to go on in the General Assembly, but in these agencies, they ought to be measuring up to their responsibilities and not carrying on debates. Is that a fair analysis?

Mr. TORRES. I would not say so. I think that given the fields of competence of UNESCO—education, physical science, social science, communications, culture, for example, oceanography, the biosphere—all of these are areas that will engender debate, that each different country feels about its sovereignty, and about its representatives, and about its budget, and about its people.

And so you cannot keep the politics, shall we say, out of the discussion and the debate. As long as they don't villify or create sanctions against member states, I think that it is probably the proper place to discuss these things.

I think the Ambassador here before me said that he cannot quite understand how UNESCO takes up issues that are played on at the U.N. I think it is the reverse, at UNESCO, that many of the issues are born, and the ideas and the debate, and they then go to New York and are discussed at the General Assembly.

Mr. PRITCHARD. While I was a delegate at the U.N. General Assembly, I felt that the issues that were debated in the General Assembly came from the host countries. I didn't know they were coming out of UNESCO.

Mr. TORRES. But some are coming to UNESCO first, as sort of—in many ways, I think issues and controversies are being tested at UNESCO—will this fly? Will this issue become controversial? Will this be something we can expand upon in the U.N. Security Council? That has been my experience. Whether it is—

Mr. PRITCHARD. You put a little better face on it than my experience, though maybe things have deteriorated some since your time and my time.

But, you know, when you are dealing, say, in the Law of the Sea—which, I might say, I think the administration made a mistake in pulling out of; they should have stayed and made some changes—but when the delegates were discussing the problems of fishing and working on the problems of the oceans, from matters of

fact, we made progress. When they slid over into rhetoric and political haranguing, then all the progress stopped.

It seems to me this is the crucial point with leadership. Do they direct the organization on to the areas that you make progress in, or do you let it slide into these political debates that go on and on forever?

Well, we appreciate your testimony.

Mr. TORRES. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our colleague from California for analyzing his perspective of the UNESCO agency and for his comments.

I am a little curious about the budget proposals. You are saying there was a temporary assignment of a budget officer at one time or another. Didn't you ever find a need for having a full-time budget person assigned to the mission to fully dig into the budgetary problems?

Mr. TORRES. No, I did not, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GILMAN. How did you analyze the budget? I understand it is a very complicated budget, that you are really dealing with two budgets. You are dealing with the UNESCO budget and dealing with special purpose extrabudgetary programs. That it makes it particularly difficult for the General Conference and the Executive Board to work with those kinds of budgets.

Mr. TORRES. Well, the Executive Board and the General Conference are the genesis of those budgets because they are the bodies that approve the programs that are going to be put in place into its medium-term plan—in this case, a 6-year program.

The members of the Board—I will use myself as an example. We are present at those budgetary hearings. We have our staff on the Board. We have our Agency for International Development officer. We have our educational attaché, our science attaché. We have people that the International Organizational Department of the State Department provides to analyze, to sit there with us.

Mr. GILMAN. That is the point I am making. There isn't at the present time a full-time budget person or full-time AID person assigned to UNESCO.

Mr. TORRES. Today, you mean in our U.S. mission there?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes. Don't you feel that is an important part?

Mr. TORRES. I didn't feel it was important because all of the information was made available to us and we had enough expertise around us as a mission.

Mr. GILMAN. Who, while you were there, had the responsibility of analyzing the budget for you?

Mr. TORRES. In my situation, it was the Deputy Permanent Representative who had a role to play in monitoring that budget, communicating with the State Department and the U.S. National Commission and all the other relevant bodies, as to how those dollars were being put into effect.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you feel he had the wherewithal, the time and sufficient staffing to dig into that kind of a budget? How extensive was the budget while you were there? How much was the agency spending?

Mr. TORRES. As I recall at the time I was there, UNESCO's annual budget was something like \$240 million.

Mr. GILMAN. How many projects did the agency have throughout the world?

Mr. TORRES. I could not attest to those at this moment, but they were substantial.

Mr. GILMAN. Approximately how many employees did UNESCO have at that time?

Mr. TORRES. At that time as I recall, the figure was around 3,000 employees.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you feel that your deputy had sufficient capability and staffing and time to be able to dig into that budget?

Mr. TORRES. Indeed, I did, yes. Mr. Russell Heater was my deputy, a gentleman with long experience in the State Department on these matters, in daily communication. If he wanted to be in communication through cable and other means with the State Department, with the UNESCO Division at the State Department, to scrutinize those budgets and this was the basis of how I could present arguments to the Director-General or the Secretariat, where we felt—the U.S. Government felt, that too much money was being allotted to a specific area; enough to another, waste in some other area that we thought was waste.

Mr. GILMAN. How would you determine waste if you had no one sent out there to take a look at these things?

Mr. TORRES. But we do. We have access to the field staff of UNESCO. We meet with these people. We hear reports from the various divisions. We know what is going on.

Mr. GILMAN. Was their budgetary process continually under review by your deputy director?

Mr. TORRES. Yes. As far as I can recall, there was field staff from the State Department sent to Paris on assignment to scrutinize those budget issues, to work with the Geneva group I mentioned earlier.

Mr. GILMAN. That was on a temporary basis.

Mr. TORRES. It was on a temporary basis, but in order to maintain a continuity of information, those people did go to Paris.

Mr. GILMAN. How much time did they spend there?

Mr. TORRES. I would say they were there on at least two to three times a year.

Mr. GILMAN. How much time did they spend with you?

Mr. TORRES. They would stay a week, 3 days, 4 days. They would work with the Geneva group as I mentioned. There were consultants who were hired as I recall by the State Department to specifically go to UNESCO and review its books and see what its management procedures were.

Mr. GILMAN. There has been some talk that the Director-General has assumed a great deal of power primarily because the Executive Board has created a vacuum and he has moved into that vacuum, and that vacuum has been created because the Executive Board meets periodically, infrequently, doesn't have permanent mission people assigned to it and really don't fulfill its proper function as an executive board.

Could you comment on that criticism?

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Gilman, the Executive Board is made up of member state representatives, as I pointed out earlier, who are elected by the General Conference. In many situations they represent nationals of those various countries, not necessarily diplomats. They may be a head of a corporation in a given country, and he sits on the Board as a director; it may be a leading president of a university or university system in a given country. It may be an outstanding poet laureate of a nation. It may be a diplomat, much like myself, representing our country who sits on that Board. They are not independent board members, but they do take instruction, if you will, from the member states.

They do receive the kind of preparatory material that will allow them to participate in those Board meetings and to take actions.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, is it somewhat as Chairman Mica pointed out the tail wagging the dog here; the Director leading the assemblage? Or is the Executive Board directing the Director?

Mr. TORRES. If I may answer that, I would say that is not the case. I would say that I never saw it that way. I don't know what is going on today, but I would venture to say that it has not changed much.

Mr. GILMAN. What was the last year you served?

Mr. TORRES. 1979. And I would say that the Director-General—and again we acknowledge that, if we look at an analogous situation, as a board of directors of a corporation or a bank or nonprofit organization or a conventional body, the chairman, in this case, the Director-General, does play an important role in leadership, is a strong figure, as Mr. M'Bow is. But the Executive Board has a president who also guides the works and the deliberations of the Executive Board and he doesn't necessarily step aside to the Director-General's mandate or whims, if you will.

Mr. GILMAN. How often did the Executive Board meet in 1979 while you were still there?

Mr. TORRES. I would say we met, just off the top of my head, in 1979, two or three times.

Mr. GILMAN. How many days would they sit in meetings?

Mr. TORRES. You would generally meet for about a week.

Mr. GILMAN. There is——

Mr. TORRES. Perhaps longer. As I recall, there were long meetings, 2 to 3 weeks at a time.

Mr. GILMAN. There is criticism on part of the General Conference that there are not permanent missions established to UNESCO, that these are temporary assignments and they come in periodically. Some of them don't really fulfill the kind of responsibility that they should at the General Conference. Do you find that to be a valid criticism, that many member nations have only perfunctory representation to UNESCO?

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Congressman, it was mixed because many of the board members were full-time United States—I was a full-time permanent representative at UNESCO. The Netherlands had a like individual, the French Government, the United Kingdom, Japan.

Mr. GILMAN. There were very few that had that kind of full-time representation; is that true?

Mr. TORRES. There were a large number of them sitting on the Board, but on the other hand you had people coming from the

member states as Board members who came from New Zealand or came from Nigeria or Ghana, specifically for the meeting of the Board, the Executive Board.

But these are not people who are ill-informed or just come there on a temporary basis. This is really a part of their life, being a member of that Board. Many of them did express the feeling that they would like to live in Paris and not have to travel back and forth, but nonetheless, they did come prepared. They effected their positions and represented their governments in a very positive manner.

Mr. GILMAN. You have no criticisms, then, of the complexity of the Conference or the Board or the manner in which it fulfilled its responsibilities?

Mr. TORRES. Given the world circumstances and the tenor of what is happening in international affairs, this is the best and most positive way to run an organization.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. And I would like to thank my colleague.

I want the record to show that our colleague showed the truest of gentlemaness. He deferred his testimony to the previous witness and he had full veto power. That is a real gentleman. I appreciate that.

Mr. TORRES. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. We would like to proceed. We will proceed in a little different manner, if I may. We have two witnesses, Dr. Jack Fobes, former Deputy Director-General of UNESCO and former Chair of the U.S. National Commission on UNESCO; and Hon. Owen Harries, a former Australian Ambassador to UNESCO and a Resident Associate of the Heritage Foundation.

As I understand it, we have a pro and con here. We are going to have a phase off, bring these gentlemen up as a panel, if I may, gentlemen, because of time constraints. We are going to have to wrap this hearing up soon. I would like to ask each of you to limit your testimony to 5 minutes. We will let you each give your testimony before we begin questioning.

It would be, I think, for us helpful because we will have a proponent and opponent at the same time to give us countering views. May I call on Dr. Fobes to begin.

STATEMENT OF JACK FOBES, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL, UNESCO, AND FORMER CHAIRMAN, U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNESCO

Mr. FOBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In addition to my service with UNESCO and the U.S. National Commission, I should say that my interests in international organizations began at Northwestern University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Then, at the end of my military service when I was in Europe, I was loaned by the Army Air Corps to serve with the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations.

There were about 20 of us young officers who were borrowed at that time to write the first rules and regulations for managing and organizing the United Nations. Later on, when I served in the

Bureau of the Budget and the Department of State, my charge was the management problems of international organizations.

I served as a member of an advisory committee to the U.N. General Assembly later on and made studies of the way in which specialized agencies handled technical assistance. This and my other experience with the U.S. AID program in India, I think, gives me a picture of operations of international organizations at their headquarters and in the field.

So I could say that for almost 40 years of professional life I have had some kind of direct or indirect involvement with international organizations. It is for that reason, Mr. Chairman, that I submitted in answer to your letter written testimony at some length. I hope that you would find it possible to include that in the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection at this time, the testimony from Dr. Fobes and Ambassador Harries will be entered into the record in full, the complete text of your testimony.

Mr. FOBES. In accordance with your request, I will give a very quick oral synthesis of that paper. It really deals with three problems, problems in UNESCO about which I say a lot more study is needed than has been given to date. I in fact offer a study plan, not just for the Government, but for outside bodies including academic circles.

My second point emphasizes that UNESCO is part of the U.N. system and that many of the problems of UNESCO are common to other agencies, other international organizations. I say that we should prepare for many more future shocks similar to those that are now battering UNESCO.

Third, I emphasize we have a lot of homework to do. We need catching up and a lot of consultation to carry out if we are to anticipate and not be suffering from, as I say, the shocks. In that homework I think we are going to have to rebuild or reactivate, if you could call it that, a domestic constituency of the private sector which can help not only to improve UNESCO, but to get more benefit from U.S. participation in that organization.

I describe the several problems with the organs of UNESCO which have been mentioned here, the general conference, the Executive Board, the Secretariat. I deal with operational issues and suggest not only the problems that need study, but also some solutions for them and even a timetable, not only for short-term action, but for long-term action.

I am sure that somebody will feel my analysis is a bit academic and asks for too much study. But I consider that we are dealing with a very complex international organization system in which the number of intergovernmental organizations in the last 40 years has gone from about 80 to 350. This is not just a UNESCO matter even though it may be complicated by some particular circumstances.

These organizations have developed complex policymaking systems. They have developed bureaucracies which are as bad as those in many national governments. We are going to need to engage in a lot of brainstorming and looking at options.

I understand that you have received and that tomorrow a witness will be making reference to the observations of the past presidents of the International Studies Association which has been an

active body during the past 25 years. I happen to agree with their views. You might turn things around to the International Studies people and ask them to help in what I suggest is a major effort to foresee what is going to happen.

My second point, apart from the current problems in UNESCO, is that this is not just a passing phenomenon. We can expect to face more problems like this in the future because the whole world has changed dramatically in the last 39 years and the change promises to continue—the pressures on the international organizations are going to mount. I think we are going to find even more drastic changes.

I believe, for example, that we are going to see a lot more decentralization and regionalization of operations. One of the complaints that has been made about UNESCO is its centralization, because solving the problems of food and housing and water and energy and education and health and the like in the world not only demands a lot more self-reliance on the part of countries. At the same time these solutions demand a lot more mutual support and partnership and exchange of information.

This calls for transnational institutions of all kinds. I suspect we are going to see even more of them created, whether they are inter-governmental or extragovernmental—whatever they may be, we will find they are needed in order to handle the world's problems. In fact, the systems engineers will tell us that this is just the working out of something called Ashby's law. It is called the law of requisite variety. And the systems engineers tell us that in all aspects of life, not just in corporate and industrial production, only variety can in fact control and manage increasing variety and promote stability and resilience. That is waning on the world scene.

My view, of course, is that America wants to be a full partner in these developments that I predict are even going to become even more rapid. I cannot believe this country would abrogate its responsibilities as the leading nation on the Earth or think to protect its interests by standing aside.

Now I don't think the solutions are going to come just from America. As witnesses have just told you, Mr. Chairman, others have to be involved. In fact, I think the most constructive moves are going to come from an amalgam of the West and the new south, the new mood in Third World countries. And I think our participation in creating that amalgam is of great consequence.

My third and last point, Mr. Chairman, if we want to participate effectively in the reform and restructuring of UNESCO, and possible other U.N. agencies, we have to recognize that for the last 15 years our interest in and knowledge of the international organizations has been declining.

There was an informed public, I would say, a constituency in the 1950's and 1960's, but there is a much less well-informed public than today. That is partly because of complexity, but it is partly because it is harder for the public to find out what is going on. And I think the U.S. Government is responsible for that.

To take UNESCO, for an example, the situation is particularly bad. The staff of the National Commission for UNESCO has been steadily reduced since 1969. Today the Commission receives only part-time clerical support and no professional help. The Commis-

sion once published a newsletter for its constituency. There hasn't been a newsletter for several years.

It once had a library with a specialist that held all the UNESCO documentation and answered queries from the public and provided copies. This library doesn't exist anymore. The public cannot get the information. After each General Conference and other major UNESCO meetings, there was an informative delegation report made promptly and released to the public. This reporting is no longer available to the public.

The National Commission's sectoral committees once met regularly and provided useful sources of information and channels for exchange. These sectorial committees are now defunct. Yet, Mr. Chairman, when I go around the country, everywhere I find a kind of eagerness to learn about UNESCO. People ask me how can they find out about what is going on. They need to do so if we are to protect our interests.

I understand the National Academy of Science is starting a careful study.

I think it will prove what I just said. I think there is a constituency out there and that it makes a difference to these people and that they will tell us it makes a difference if UNESCO continues in its present or other form.

That means that in my view the Department of State is going to have to state a policy and offer a supporting hand to the development of this constituency. It is not enough just to monitor the problems and abuses of UNESCO.

I think we want the private sector involved to help us in our participation, so that we get more out of UNESCO. There is an ample supply of enterprise and initiative and self-interest in this country.

I admit, Mr. Chairman, there are moments when I worry and wonder whether America really cares enough to participate actively in what I call the reconstruction of international organizations. Then I remember our affluence, I mean not only material strengths, but the strengths that come from information, this country, and from the ideas and spirit of the people. That is what is going to give us the power to cope with this world. Most of all, I take heart from the intellectual, spiritual, and moral strengths which America has attracted, represents, and embodies, and has put forward into UNESCO.

I think UNESCO can be made more useful and relevant to this country. I believe that if we are willing to listen and learn, we will discover there is a lot more there than the rhetoric at which we take offense. We will discover in UNESCO that humanity wants to be whole, wants to increase its learning, wants to increase its resilience, in fact, wants to survive. We are going to need more than the World Health Organization, or the International Civil Aviation Organization, or the other technical bodies of the U.N. system. I think we need the elements of the mind and spirit that are embodied in the UNESCO constitution.

Drastic changes in that structure may be needed, but I think America has to get into the act.

[Mr. Fobes' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN E. FOBES

This testimony is concerned with the future of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and of United States participation in that Organization. It makes an overall assessment of problems and what might be done about them. It assumes that the United States Government is willing to engage in active negotiations for changes in UNESCO, to invest adequate resources for American participation and that the announced date of withdrawal will be extended until it is evident to all concerned that there is little hope for reform and restructuring of the Organization.

The analysis is based on the assumption that it is best to frame policy and action concerning UNESCO within the broader perspective of our attitude toward the future of international institutions in general.

It is in three parts:

- I. UNESCO as part of the United Nations system and the need of foresight and options for the future of that system;
- II. The main problem areas of UNESCO and possible corrective actions; and
- III. Strategy, Tactics and Timetables for Action.

I. UNESCO is an integral part of the United Nations System: There is need of policy and strategy for the future development of that system.

The Department of State says that it has "lost patience" with UNESCO. Such impatience reflects an uneasiness with all the international organizations in which we participate, but particularly those of the UN system. We are not alone. Complaints voiced from North and South, East and West, about international agencies reflect disenchantment with many public institutions. The international agencies have been placed under great strains in the last 25 years: burgeoning agendas for discussion discussion which mirror all the world's problems; requests for policy resolutions and program actions on almost every subject, but especially economic and social development, including education, culture and communications.

In many respects, the United Nations, including its special programs, and the Specialized Agencies have responded well to the pressures . But it must be admitted that the United States and other Member States have not been prepared nor been planning for the future. They have been acting with short-term perspectives and introducing only minor adjustments to cope with change.

The increase in the number of actors on the world scene, the development of technologies and the growing complexity of humanity's problems have been dramatic in the 39 years since founding of the United Nations. In partial response, we have seen the number of inter-governmental organizations increase from about 80 at the time of World War II to perhaps 350 today. During the same period, the number of international non-governmental organizations has increased from 800 to more than 3,000. In most cases,

these developments can be said to have been a natural human response to the need for such institutions.

The remaining 6000 days of this century, are likely to present at least as many challenges. We can and should prepare for adaptation of the multilateral institutions which furnish services to governments, corporations and the public generally, and which are essential to world order. The need for stability and resilience in the world system will demand more, rather than less, international cooperation, calling for innovative means and methods.

A time for Re-Assessment. The present crisis with UNESCO--and the latent crisis with other international bodies--should be accepted as a challenge and an opportunity. A full-scale assessment of the state of the world's international institutions should be launched. Growth, so rapid in the last four decades, has not yet been assimilated and lessons learned. We need to review what has happened and how developments took place in order to think about where we want to aim for the future. "Cosmetic" adjustments will not be sufficient to deal with a future of greater complexity and uncertainty.

Many feel that the United States has a responsibility to initiate such an assessment and to play a major role in it. Such a review, however, should be based on close collaboration among allies and like-minded countries and could usefully involve many of the non-governmental actors who now participate in transnational exchange and cooperation.

Developing Foresight and Options. It is well to recognize that we are ill-prepared to criticize UNESCO and other parts of the United Nations system, criticism which should be constructive and offer ideas for the future. The recent efforts by the Department of State to rationalize its decision to withdraw from UNESCO and to correct its failure to envisage alternatives in advance is evidence of this lack of readiness.

The Department of State has not created a "memory-bank" of experience, nor provided/ ^{for} continuity and for trained staff to assure effective participation in international organizations. It would appear, moreover, that the amount of staff time devoted to planning and broad issues of operations of the international agencies has declined at the same time that the programs and budgets of those agencies have been increasing.

America has a record of capacity for creative initiative and enterprise at home. In the past, it also showed this capacity in proposals to UNESCO which have proved to be successful programs. This country is admired for such invention and initiative. Since so many newly independent nations emerged on the scene and began to play an active role, however, we have often been reactive and defensive. We have not been doing a good job of listening and learning in multilateral institutions.

Will we continue only with "shock learning" and defensive tactics? Or will we begin to take seriously the matter of U.S. participation in UNESCO and engage in anticipatory learning? Our aim should be to develop an arsenal of options and to take initiatives which will contain or orient (favorably from our point of view) at least some of the inevitable pressures in a world of

change. It would be well to adopt the techniques used by corporations for strategic planning, including gaming and alternative scenarios.

We need now to make up for the lack of careful studies of structural, procedural and management problems of the international organizations. A survey of the professional literature in international relations shows a concentration of studies on regional political and security issues, on analyses of voting patterns and on criticisms of United Nations peacekeeping capacities. Apart from reports on budgets, there are few analyses on how the international organizations formulate policy and handle operations in economic, social and technical matters, deal with questions of coordination, evaluate performance and practice management of multinational staffs. This lack of analysis and foresight capacity must be corrected. Institutes of international affairs should be asked to take up this work.

II. What are the main problem areas in UNESCO and the range of feasible corrective actions?

The entire range of constitutional, structural, planning, operational and relationship questions in UNESCO (and other agencies) should be open to questioning and study. The institutions of the United Nations system have their roots in the 19th century and follow closely the model of the League of Nations. Changes in the world since then have been many and profound: the doubling of the population; increases in the number and variety of actors playing on the world scene; bewildering technological development of computers, television, satellites; microbiology; scientific discoveries especially in physics and biology.

At the same time that these developments have impacted the international organizations, there has been a greater public questioning of all the institutions of societies. For government, inter-governmental organizations and corporations, this has been called "the crisis of administrative legitimacy."

Using UNESCO as an example, the areas of the inter-governmental organizations needing examination fall under three main headings:

- A. The Principal Organs and Their Functions
- B. Operational Problems
- C. Relationships

Notes follow on selected principal problems under each heading which need attention and on the possibilities for remedial action.

A. The Principal Organs and their Functions

1. Policy-making: The General Conference of UNESCO

Problem(a) The conference is pressed to take up too many issues; its agenda becomes chaotic. There is consequent tendency to assume that every item calls for some kind of pronouncement on the nature of "international public policy."

Action Needed: While recognizing the desirability of a forum for discussion of the widest possible range of issues, limited only by the general competence of the specialized agency involved, provisions are needed to introduce greater discipline into the proceedings. For example:

- Those placing items on the agenda should be required to support the initiative with full explanations and justifications, including information on origins, motives, possible actions, etc.

- An orderly pre-review process should precede the formal Conference session so that all parties are informed and the submissions for the agenda item are as fully developed as possible. The Executive Board is charged with "preparation of the sessions of the General Conference." It should be required to give this matter much more attention.

The Conference itself must commission the pre-conference, preparatory work.

It may be noted that, where program "packages" have been prepared in advance by special inter-governmental councils, acting on behalf of the world community and representing the interested professional or other circles involved, the General Conference has been able to act quickly and responsibly. Given such preparatory work, complex issues of international cooperation are given adequate and relevant consideration.

Consideration may need to be given to less frequent Conferences. This has been rejected in the past, but may be more acceptable now in view of pressures on governments to participate in so many international conferences. Moreover, the addition of preparatory machinery will meet at least some of the demand for participation. The example of schedules and procedures in the World Meteorological Organization could be suggestive.

Problem (b) Conference procedures which should provide for full and fair discussion ("due process") are not always observed. This is due in part to the pressures of time.

Action needed: The situation would be improved if the preparatory measures suggested above were followed, making debate at the formal Conference session less frantic. In addition, however, those serving as Chairs of meetings need to be persons of experience and stature. They also need support and advice on procedures from more than a secretary of meeting (on substantive matters) and a legal adviser in the traditional sense. Innovative assistance for chairpersons and additional rules which help them manage discussion merit study.

2. Supervisory: The Executive Board

The Executive Board of UNESCO represents the General Conference (and therefore all Member States) in periods between sessions of the Conference. It is charged, among other things, with supervision of the execution of the program. Its mandate has been construed broadly to allow it to make judgements about changed circumstances facing the Organization, take appropriate measures in the light thereof and to authorize changes in the program. It is, like comparable bodies in other international organizations, a key organ for managing the agency.

Problems: The Board probably has too many members to operate effectively, at least if it insists upon working in plenary sessions and with all members participating at the level of its two commissions. The total number of days of meetings for it and its subsidiary bodies is inadequate to carry out its mandate. This limitation on working time is largely at the insistence of governments (costs and inability to arrange the necessary time of Board members and staffs), but the limitation is encouraged by the Secretariat.

Action needed: It may be possible, taking account of revised meeting arrangements for the General Conference (preparatory commissions), to reduce the number of members of the Executive Board. More likely, however, would be acceptance of a greater sharing of functions among Board members, in which each would act on behalf of the entire membership, either alone or in small groups, in order to carry out the tasks of the Board. There have been examples of assumption of this kind of responsibility in this fashion. The tendency should be encouraged. Such a method of operation naturally will evolve into multiple committees, working groups and the like--a desirable development, the costs of which will be balanced by a healthier organization.

This method of operation should also lead to a more responsible and collegial behavior by the Director-General and the Secretariat. He will be forced to provide general guidance to his staff and then expect them to exercise good judgement according to the requirements of the international oath of office as they service the several bodies carrying out Executive Board tasks.

Fortunately, Secretaries of the Board have collected detailed records of Board activities and have made some analyses of workload, etc. These provide a good basis for external studies which could suggest alternatives for improved methods of functioning. Such studies, if carried out jointly by two or more universities in different regions of the world, would be persuasive in gaining political acceptance of reforms.

Caution: It is sometimes proposed that Permanent Delegations in Paris of Member States could play a more active role in operations of the Organization. They now serve, of course, as channels of information from and to their countries, some of them more effectively than others. The motivation of those asking for more active roles for the Delegations seems to be that they could aid the Executive Board

in exercising supervision over execution of the program, becoming critics of the Administration. One suggestion, for example, was that Permanent Delegations could gather information and prepare reports for the Board in between its sessions.

This is a dangerous idea. It tends to dilute responsibilities entrusted to a Director-General and to the elected members of the board who serve in their individual capacity, as well as representing their governments for the explicit purpose of service on the Board.

3. The Administrative Organs: The Secretariat and its Director-General

The Constitution of UNESCO identifies the Secretariat as the third principal "organ" of the agency. Provision is made for election of a Director-General who shall be "the chief administrative officer of the Organization."

Problems: It is generally recognized that, as Member States find it more and more difficult to participate fully and effectively in the growing number of international organizations and as larger and larger General Conferences and Executive Boards find it difficult to operate as policy-making and supervisory organs, the Secretariat has gained power. A somewhat similar situation has developed for national parliamentary bodies.

The power of the Secretariat and its executive head has also grown as they became the agent and manager of increasingly sizeable and important flows of global information.

This growth in power has come about even though Secretariats basically are still performing the same servicing functions as those assigned to the League of Nations staff and adopted by the framers of the basic documents for the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Secretariats, even without seeking it, have acquired an enlarged importance in the scheme of things.

The role and status of the Director-General has also evolved significantly. Only a few scholarly studies have begun to help us understand this phenomenon. For UNESCO, the book by Richard Hoggart, An Idea and its Servants: UNESCO from Within (London: Chatto and Windus, 1978) is valuable on this point.

Action Needed: A better balance of power between Secretariat, on the one hand, and the other two

organs will be achieved in part by more effective performances by members of the latter organs. The Secretariat, under leadership of its head, has simply moved naturally into a vacuum.

Beyond that, however, a number of measures appear possible to adjust the role of the Director-General so that the incumbent can perform more acceptably the role which is that of "servant of the Organization." His oath of office requires him to "act with the interests of the Organization solely in mind." This is more than being a servant of the Member States.

Measures to this end can best be set forth in impartial and scholarly studies which should be commissioned from universities. This is preferred to having proposals come from groups of Member States.

B. Operational Problems

1. Planning and Programming: Deciding on Level, Aims and Content of Program Activities

Program and Budget Levels Criticism is made of the increasing budgets of UNESCO and other agencies. The issue is more than the amount of money. The U.S. and some other large contributors find the volume of program activity and the number of projects not to their liking. Budgets merely reflect the level of the program and the choice of methods of execution.

It is not enough simply to ask for greater "concentration," for emphasis on "priority projects" and for the elimination of those of "less importance." That is an inadequate policy statement. The needs of our world are increasing. Areas requiring international cooperation are neglected. The number of actors and their demands for participation and service mount. Some projects in the UNESCO program may have little impact or are otherwise inappropriate. Their elimination would open the way for substitution of others offering greater returns and of obvious urgency.

Making Choices: It is not sufficient to expect the Director-General or the Secretariat alone to achieve a "scaling down" or "tightening up" of the program. He and his staff are not comparable to an elected national administration. Nor can one expect an unwieldy and undisciplined Executive Board to recommend specific eliminations or substitutions in the program except in rare instances.

What is needed is external, objective assessment of experience and development of options for making the difficult choices involved in providing greater concentration on what will be generally accepted as priority activities. The Director-General, the Executive Board and the General Conference need help in identifying what is most likely to be efficient and effective. They need help in making these choices widely acceptable.

External assessment needs to come from outside the Organization, yet be recognized as informed judgement. Those engaging in assessment studies preferably should not be appointed by "the system" itself. Rather, the system in various ways can encourage and facilitate careful studies and honest and fair criticism by external bodies. Costs are involved, but represent a good investment.

For example, should not the United Nations University be asked to promote and sponsor studies of the past and the future of international institutions and to publish the best of these? Marshall McLuhan has observed that "no new idea ever starts from within a big operation. It must assail the organization from outside, through some small but competing organization." Should selected international non-governmental organizations be challenged to offer proposals for reform of UNESCO operations?

Preparing the Plans and Programs. Criticism is voiced of the processes of consultations and preparation of the UNESCO Medium Term Plan and the Biennial programs. At the same time, it is recognized that these processes emerged from the initiatives of the major contributors and have been praised for several of their features. Governments, however, have discovered that the very procedures which they demanded in an effort to increase control over programs and budgets are straining national capacities to keep informed and to exercise and express meaningful judgements.

One problem is that of realistic schedules for planning and consultation if all Member States are to have reasonable periods in which to review and comment on basic planning guidance. Expert, impartial study and advice should be able to develop imaginative ideas for an improved planning and programming process. Those ideas will probably require acceptance of selected critical points for government comment rather than the complete and detailed listing of questions and projects for every program area.

2. Review of Programs and Budgets and their Approval

At least three problems have been cited in respect of the review of draft programs and budgets and the procedure for their adoption/approval.

Some governments complain about the difficulty of studying what is admittedly a weighty and detailed set of program and project descriptions. The same complaint might be voiced about similar documentation for other major specialized agencies. The UNESCO program document, moreover, has been praised by several observers. This complaint does not appear as significant enough to merit special action at this time.

Of greater concern is the criticism that the first draft of program proposals from the Director-General is difficult to amend. A change in procedure should be worked out by a joint committee appointed for that purpose. Compromises from all parties will be needed. Governments will need to recognize that they must frame discussion at each General Conference so as to influence the program of the period to begin two years hence. Thereafter, the Director-General must be allowed to "fill out" the details and to present them in his draft program and budget. On the other hand, the Director-General will need to raise questions about that draft in sufficient detail with the Executive Board in advance of his complete draft so that Member States feel they have participated in the process.

The third criticism concerns what has been called the clarity of the translation of the draft program into budget figures. Although some of the fault lies with the unwillingness and inability of the Executive Board to fulfill its role of budget review, it must be possible to agree on improvements in presentation and calculation. It is understood that specific proposals on this point will be made at the next session of the Board with a view to their adoption for submission of the 1986-87 budget.

3. Finance

UNESCO activities are financed mainly from two sources: the regular budget (supplied by payments assessed on all members according to the UN contributions scale) and special-purpose extra-budgetary programs of the UN and UNESCO (funds contributed on a voluntary basis by governments and others).

Within the regular program and budget, all activities are treated equally as to funding, even though it is clear that there is a wide range of interest and participation on the part of the Member States.

It is very likely that, for a variety of factors, there will be pressures in the future for a more complex set of methods for financing international organization operations. Would it not be well now to initiate studies which would survey and describe the widest possible range of financing methods? Even though such an examination would have a long-term perspective, it is conceivable that it would provide the grounding for short-term adjustments which would meet the interests of a large group of Members States. For example, would the United States wish to see its share of regular budgets reduced in some cases? Issues of planning, control and level of participation, etc., obviously are involved and need airing.

4. Structures and Management Issues

The program and the administrative (Secretariat) structures of UNESCO have come under scrutiny in the past 10 years on several occasions. Uncertainty prevails among Member States, National Commissions and within the Secretariat, especially in the light of execution of the first program under the revised Second Medium Term Plan.

The Director-General, appropriately in my view, has insisted on a large degree of freedom to organize the Secretariat if he is to be responsible for execution of the program. There will always be tension between the incumbent of that post and the Executive Board as it attempts to exercise "supervision." The tension increases when Permanent Delegations get into the act of "second-guessing" the structures and management procedures of the Secretariat. Discussions by the Board on administrative structures at plenary level are not satisfactory to anyone, Board members or Director-General. Closed meetings on the subject in a mixed small body--specialists, retired senior international officials from other agencies, 3 or 4 selected Board members--might offer a constructive possibility.

The usual technique when organization and methods are questioned is to ask for appointment of a team of management consultants. This approach has been utilized twice in the history of UNESCO: 1956 and 1963-64. The results were limited, but generally constructive. The costs of such an operation are significant and must be considered. So must the terms of reference, appointment and selection of the panel. Excessive expectations of management surveys and audits should be avoided.

The hopes that the investigations and reports of the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit would bring about significant improvements in management of agencies does not appear to have been realized. Independent scholars could be asked to assess the experience of the last 10 years in this regard.

Personnel Management

The issue of quality and effective utilization of staff is related, of course, to the problem of administrative structures and management just cited. The concept of the international civil service, as first elucidated by the first Secretary-General of the League of Nations and the Noblemaire Report to the League, and generally observed today, appear sound and relevant to most international organizations operations. During the first 25 years of the United Nations system it may be said that adherence to principles, standards, spirit and motivation of the international civil service was strong.

It was hoped that establishment of the current United Nations International Civil Service Commission, would install a new era, with a renewal of commitment to the high standards and practices which had prevailed in the early years of the U.N. system. The hopes for that Commission have been only partly realized. We should ask scholars and experienced diplomats and international servants to examine the problems and to give us guidance for the future.

It is likely that we will have to envisage a more complex system of civil service for the varied instruments of world order. That will require different sets of rules for recruitment, staff remuneration, evaluation, management, etc. for separate "sets" of institutions and functions.

Meanwhile, a way must be found to reduce the tensions on the part of the Director-General, his staff and the Member States in respect to personnel

questions. Progress on a few points should be accepted as sufficient for the present.

For example, the status of "ombudsman" for the staff may need change in the direction of greater autonomy. Also, a "buffer" mechanism might be introduced which allows the Executive Board to seek and to receive information about general personnel questions and staff development without interfering with the necessary authority and independence of the executive head for managing his staff.

6. Evaluation

Too many generalizations, too much exhortation and excessive expectations have characterized the discussions about evaluation. It is as if Secretariats, government representatives and members of the Executive Board are afraid to "get down to business" and to face the consequences of evaluation. A review of the evaluations and assessments of various kinds made during the last 15 years at all levels in UNESCO might be revealing and offer guidance for the future. We could be provided with a typology of the several different types and utilizations of evaluation. The process has been most successful when specific samples have been carefully selected for review and when motivations and the serious intentions to act on the evaluation have been identified in advance.

C. Relationships

1. Coordination

In an increasingly complex system of international organizations, coordination among the institutions can be a significant factor in efficient and effective operations. Under present arrangements, it was assumed that adequate surveillance of this subject would be assured by the Economic and Social Council and by occasional reviews by each agency's executive board or council. Reliance was also placed on the Administrative Committee on Coordination consisting of the heads of agencies, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. When Member States began to lose confidence on this score and felt the need for more information, the General Assembly expressed misgivings and a special new committee on coordination was established.

The United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (mentioned earlier in connection with management issues) was also expected to help in improvement of coordination among UN agencies. Some of its reports are useful in

this regard, but do not receive adequate attention for various reasons.

Complaints that UNESCO might be exceeding its sphere of competence suggest that a review of coordination provisions is warranted. Although action to strengthen such provisions would involve action at the center of the UN system, there may be steps appropriate at the level of the UNESCO Executive Board. That body now discusses a detailed report on external relationships of its Program Commission. The organization of the discussion could be improved and some members of the board and their governments could be asked to assume greater responsibility on behalf of all Member States to go more deeply into the questions of coordination. Alternatively, a mixed advisory body, including representatives of non-governmental organizations, could perform a useful review, synthesis and high-lighting of important issues.

The questions go beyond short-term matters of good relationships; some anticipation of coordination issues would be helpful. Moreover, the relationship questions involve not only agencies of the UN system; they extend to a variety of regional and global bodies and to extra-governmental institutions and associations.

2. Collaboration

When UNESCO has been most successful and most appreciated, it has often been because it was able to enlist the cooperation of several other interested parties in a joint undertaking. First among these, of course, are the National Commissions. Valuable partners have also been the international non-governmental organizations. Regional institutes and universities have also been called upon to collaborate.

The capacity of the central secretariats of the major UN agencies to stimulate and to call up additional resources from outside bodies and to organize collaboration for projects of international cooperation and service needs to be seen as the vital factor in world order which it is. The UNESCO Secretariat has proved its importance as a catalytic agent in promoting useful work. It has been able to give sanction and credibility to valuable initiatives for exchange and international understanding.

There is general acceptance of the desirability of decentralization/deconcentration of structures and authorities of the headquarters Secretariat. This

means, among other things, the promotion of collaboration with a wide variety of outside bodies and, in some cases, reliance on them for the performance of functions. For this, new concepts of sharing and accountability need to be developed. Understanding of all the implications of this orientation, including costs, will be necessary on the part of Member States and the Executive Board.

"Brain-storming" of the future networks and collaborative mechanisms of the institutions of world order, reaching down into national constituencies, would be revealing and encouraging.

III. Strategy, Tactics and a Timetable for Action

Needed is a set of tactics for short-term dealings with UNESCO and a long-term policy and strategy for international cooperation in education, science, culture and communications (with or without UNESCO in its present form).

The short-term tactics should include:

- (a) An extension of one year of the period of notice of withdrawal--to December 31, 1985. This would be realistic in respect to ourselves in order to allow study of alternative arrangements to UNESCO. It would be both realistic and fair to the other Member States, especially our allies. They need time to adjust, to make changes either for an organization without the United States or an institution amended so as to retain American participation.
- (b) Identification of the 2 or 3 priority reforms on which action seems possible in the next 18 months and which we consider are in the interests of a more effective organization. Could these be: Reform in the methods of operation of the Executive Board

which enhance its authority; agreement on the budget base for costing the next biennial program; a management study of a few aspects of Secretariat structure and procedures?

- (c) Commissioning of studies of experience: what has been happening to international institutions; the significance of that experience for anticipating problems and designing options for the future. These studies would naturally lead into suggestions for longer term reforms. The studies could be carried out by post-graduate institutions and independent scholars. Hopefully, some work could be joint or at least parallel with that undertaken in other countries.
- (d) Convening of a conference of interested American groups, public and private (NGO's, universities, foundations, corporations, etc.) to consider the desirable nature, constitution and relationships of international institutions working in the fields of UNESCO around the year 2000 and thereafter.
- (e) Making known to governments and to interested NGO's well in advance of the next UNESCO General Conference (October 1985) the preliminary views and intentions of the United States concerning the future development of education, science, culture and communications on this planet. We would thus show the world that we believe in the future of organized international cooperation, however many

improvements we seek in it.

The development of a long-term policy and strategy will require several years if it is to embrace not only UNESCO but the United Nations system in all of its parts. Studies and consultations will take time. For this country to take up the challenge and to give evidence of such a commitment would call forth energies, ideas and cooperation. The world would breathe easier.

Most of the principal areas to be covered in developing the policy and strategy have been identified in Part II above. As the work proceeds:

- (a) Assuming that we remain in UNESCO, even provisionally, we should be prepared to participate actively in the search for the next Director-General of UNESCO (nomination in 1986 or 1987; election in November 1987).
- (b) Draft amendments to the UNESCO Constitution will need to be prepared for dissemination in 1985 and 1986 for initial discussion in 1987 at the 23rd General Conference.
- (c) Consideration might be given to establishment of a set of national and international mechanisms for continuing consultation on the future of the institutions of world order so as to promote responsible action, develop fresh perspectives and enhance human hopes. Could leadership for such mechanisms be entrusted to the United Nations University?

Mr. MICA. Thank you.
Ambassador Harries.

STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN HARRIES, FORMER AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO UNESCO, AND RESIDENT ASSOCIATE, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. HARRIES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As an Australian citizen, I greatly appreciate the invitation to testify before this committee. I will try to be as brief as I can.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. HARRIES. On the basis of my experience as an Australian Ambassador to UNESCO in 1982-83, I concluded that it is a grossly politicized organization, much more so than any other U.N. agency, and also that it is very badly and wastefully managed.

I would like to be precise about what I mean by grossly politicized. It is of course understandable that, given the nature of the issues with which it deals, UNESCO debates should reflect political views and differences. There should be no complaint about that. However, in recent years, two things have characterized UNESCO.

First, its agenda has shifted away from areas in which cooperative, constructive work, reasonable dialog, are possible, to areas in which confrontation and conflict are inevitable.

There has been a deliberate move toward controversial, highly ideological issues which are not clearly and obviously a part of UNESCO's mandate, in which UNESCO has no particular expertise, and which are already covered by other agencies and institutions. The so-called new international economic order, economic theory, strategic theory, and disarmament are cases in point. Inevitably, this has meant more ideology, more conflict, more politicization, and it has also meant a dissipation of UNESCO's resources.

Second, quite apart from the attitudes of member states, the secretariat, up to and most definitely including the Director-General, has ceased to maintain even the semblance of neutrality and impartiality, and in fact exhibits a consistent political bias. That bias is essentially a radical Third World bias, and in many key areas, such as human rights and disarmament, also, I think, a pro-Soviet bias.

This bias, I should stress, is reflected in the documents of UNESCO prepared by the Secretariat, even before they come to the floor of the debate. It is quite improper that an international secretariat should be thus politicized.

Now, the result of both these developments is a state of affairs in which the United States and the West in general, who pay over 70 percent of UNESCO's budget, are always in the dock, always under attack; their values, their institutions, and their interests are consistently blamed for the sins and problems of the world. That is what I mean by gross politicization.

As for bad management, I would highlight: the demoralization of the Secretariat, as exemplified by the fact that in a staff association poll last year, only 3 percent thought that UNESCO was currently recruiting high-quality people or promoting people on the basis of professional efficiency.

Excessive centralization—\$8 out of every \$10 spent by UNESCO are spent in Paris; 8 out of every 10 persons employed by UNESCO work in Paris, and Paris is not an underdeveloped city.

Third, failure to attract and hold good people. There are several hundred unfilled posts in UNESCO.

Fourth, the poor organization of conferences; and conferences are part of the major business of UNESCO.

Fifth, the absence of clear priorities and the consequent dissipation of scarce resources.

Sixth, the absence of impartial, objective evaluation processes of UNESCO's work.

Seventh, the failure to, or refusal to, restrict budget growth.

Mr. Chairman, the question arises, why are things as bad as they are in UNESCO? I would point to several factors.

First of all, there are several intrinsic structural features, including the divorce of voting power from financial contributions and also the prevalence of block voting. These structural features are of course common to the whole of the U.N. system, and therefore on their own cannot explain why UNESCO is so particularly bad.

Second, I would lay stress on the lack of firmness on the part of Western countries, particularly European countries, in resisting adverse trends within UNESCO until recently. There has been a mixture of a sort of fatalistic resignation and a misplaced complacency on the part of Western countries, which has encouraged a sense of irresponsibility in UNESCO.

Third, I would point to the weakness of the moderate, pragmatic Third World countries, who feel bound by the principle of group solidarity within the Third World, and have not resisted the pace set by the Director-General and radical Third World countries.

And, fourth, I come to a point, Mr. Chairman, which you have brought up several times in previous discussion, which I regard as essential. The character and performance of the Director-General, Mr. M'Bow, in my considered judgment, is the single factor most responsible for the present sorry state of UNESCO. He has great power; he has enormous power conferred on him by the constitution, deriving from his powers of patronage, deriving from his control of a Secretariat, which is there to carry out his will, and also from the fact that he has an assured majority.

In my experience, Mr. M'Bow is at the same time ideologically militant, temperamentally combative, and confrontational, authoritarian, and, as a manager, inefficient.

Mr. Chairman, on the basis of my experience in UNESCO, I had come to the conclusion before I left that working from within for reform stood little chance. It had, after all, been tried at length, and nothing much had happened. In fact, conditions had continued to deteriorate while it was tried, and I think the reason for this, Mr. Chairman, is not lack of ability or commitment on the part of the people involved; it simply is that in the UNESCO context, the deck was too heavily stacked against such an effort.

I therefore fully support the U.S. decision to withdraw. I think it is good for UNESCO in that it might constitute the traumatic shock necessary to stimulate reform.

I think it is good for the moderate Third World countries in that it will cause them to consider the cost of making UNESCO a vehicle and a factory for anti-Western propaganda.

I think it is good for other Western countries, in that it has created the conditions under which they can work effectively for change from within in a way which was impossible before.

I think it is good for the U.N. system as a whole, because there is no doubt that UNESCO was bringing discredit on that system.

And, last, and most important from the point of view of this committee, I think it is good for the United States in that it falsifies the notion, widespread in UNESCO in my experience, and perhaps in other parts of the U.N. system, that the United States was a kind of paper tiger.

I think it is good, too, because, in my opinion, it is harmful to a people's sense of itself to legitimize and fund an organization which consistently trashes its values and institutions.

I believe that the results of the American decision to date have been healthy and have born out these expectations. An opportunity and a momentum for change have been created. The important thing now is to exploit that opportunity and to maintain that momentum.

The alternatives, I believe, are thoroughgoing reform of UNESCO and, as the London Times said in a recent editorial, the effective end of UNESCO and the creation of alternative arrangements to carry out that part of the work which is worthwhile.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I suggest: That it is important that the United States should make it clear at this time that it is firmly committed to its decision and will not settle merely for promises or for cosmetic changes.

That it should work closely but discretely with other countries pressing for reform from within.

That the GAO review should be a thorough and effective one—I think a great deal turns on it. And I might say after a recent visit to Paris, I have some worries on that score.

And, last, that in case there should not be in the end substantial reform, thought should be given to alternative arrangements and structures for carrying out that part of UNESCO's work which is thought to be worthwhile.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Harries' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF OWEN HARRIES

I was Australia's ambassador to UNESCO from February 1982 until August 1983, when I resigned following a change in government in Canberra. I testify today in my private capacity.

I went to UNESCO neither as a starry-eyed innocent nor as a cynic. As a professional student of international affairs for twenty years and an advisor to the Australian government for another five, I was well aware of the general characteristics and shortcomings of the U.N. system. At the same time, I had recently completed a book-length study of the Third World for the Australian government in which I argued for a sympathetic and constructive approach to the problems of developing countries. So I went to Paris in anything but a negative or hostile frame of mind.

By the time I left UNESCO, however, I had reached the conclusion that the organization did not serve the interest of educational and cultural cooperation; that its main function was to act as a center for the dissemination of anti-Western propaganda and patronage for Third World elites; and that it was badly and wastefully managed.

Many things contributed to these conclusions, among them being:

- *that the programs of UNESCO, as prepared by the Secretariat under the close supervision of the Director General and approved by the majority of the states, reflected a pervasive, strong and consistent anti-Western ideological bias. The programs on communication, economic development, human rights and peace and disarmament, in particular, attacked Western values, interests and institutions.

- *that there was a particularly strong anti-Zionist and anti-Israel thrust to much of UNESCO's work. For example, the draft program for 1984-85 allocated eleven times more for the education of Palestinian refugees and so-called National Liberation movements than it did for all the rest of the world's refugees combined.

- *that, far from modifying or containing these ideological biases, the Director General and the Secretariat embodied and supported them.

*that eight out of ten dollars spent by UNESCO were spent not in the arid zones of Africa, the paddy fields of Southeast Asia or other parts of the Third World, but in Paris -- spent by and on the large bureaucracy situated there.

*that UNESCO's programs lacked clear priorities and focus and that, in an empire-building spirit, it was continuously encroaching into areas where it had little or no competence (e.g., economic and strategic theory) and which were properly the responsibility of other organizations.

*that there was no proper, objective system of evaluation of the organization's work and programs.

*that the Secretariat was demoralized, intimidated and inefficient. During the time I was at UNESCO a Staff Association poll revealed the astonishing fact that only 3 percent of those polled believed that UNESCO currently recruited high quality people or made promotions on the basis of professional efficiency. Despite excellent material conditions of work, able people left and pliant or ideologically acceptable people thrived.

*UNESCO conferences were characterized by contempt for proper procedures and blatant manipulation.

*unlike other U.N. agencies, UNESCO was completely unresponsive to the pleas of the major contributing countries to hold the budget to zero growth in real terms, pressing for 6 percent or more (it finally accepted less only when the threat of U.S. withdrawal had finally registered).

I do not want to be misunderstood. My disillusionment was not with the principles and aims of UNESCO as set out in its constitution, but with its practices. Again, it was not a matter of denying that UNESCO did any good work -- I believe it did and does, particularly in the scientific field, in basic education and in the preservations of monuments and sites. It was rather that that work was, in the overall balance, completely outweighed by the negative features of the organization.

What explains this state of affairs?

Partly, it can be explained in terms of features that UNESCO shares with other parts of the U.N. system, in particular the irresponsibility encouraged by the fact that those who have the votes do not pay and those who pay do not have the votes (In UNESCO 82 countries, a majority of members, collectively contribute less than 1 percent of the budget; the OECD countries, less than 20 percent of the membership, contribute over 70 percent of the budget).

Partly, too, it can be explained in terms of the resigned acquiescence towards the existing state of affairs shown by most of the Western countries until recently, their cynical conclusion that UNESCO was not worth a confrontation, that it was only a forum for rhetoric and posturing. This misplaced tolerance encouraged irresponsibility and extremism in UNESCO.

But most of all, it seems to me, the fact that UNESCO falls far behind even the low standard achieved by most other U.N. agencies must be explained in terms of the leadership provided by its Director General, Mr. M'Bow. His power -- derived from the constitution, from the great patronage he wields, from his ideological compatibility with the Third World majority -- is enormous. Formally he is the servant of member states; in practice he has been the undisputed master of UNESCO. He sets the tone, he provides the initiative, he is the boss. The ideological, confrontational, militant character of UNESCO reflects his personality. So do the inefficiency and the dubious management practices.

By the time I left UNESCO, I was fully convinced on the basis of personal experience that working to change the organization from within -- by rational argument, appeals to moderation, dialogue, thorough preparation for conferences, etc. -- was doomed to failure. I had come to believe that only political action by one or more of the major Western countries, action that would change the rules of the game and introduce new factors, could change things. That is why I fully supported the American decision to withdraw from UNESCO.

Events since the announcement of the American decision in December 1983 bear this out. That decision has created an opportunity and a momentum for change. More has happened to prepare the way for needed reform in the last four months than in the previous ten years.

--There has been a unprecedented and very healthy airing of UNESCO's problems in the mass media of the world.

--Other Western governments have shown a new firmness, with the British government delivering a tough letter to the Director General calling for far-reaching changes and 24 Western countries agreeing on a paper outlining basic reforms.

--Paradoxically, the American decision to pull out has made it possible for the first time for others to work effectively from within.

--Many of the more moderate Third World countries are now thinking hard, as they realize that the alternative to reform may well be the end of UNESCO.

--In the United States, the decision has received widespread bipartisan support and Congress has become involved with the setting up of a GAO review of UNESCO's affairs.

Where do things go from here?

At present the initiative is very much in the hands of those seeking thorough-going reform of UNESCO. But that initiative can easily be lost if there is any weakening of or resiling from the American decision which created it.

It seems to me that a condition for success is that the U.S. make it as clear as possible that it means what it has said; that it has no intention of settling for cosmetic changes or mere promises. The only event which could happen between now and the end of the year -- given the pace at which UNESCO makes its decisions -- that would justify an American change of mind, or even a delay in implementing the decision, would be the retirement of the Director General and his replacement by someone with the international stature and the ability to restore UNESCO's credibility. In that event, I believe the United States should stay in and put its enormous weight behind such a man.

In the meantime I suggest that two things are of paramount importance. First, it is essential that the GAO review be a thorough and wide-ranging one. A superficial or inadequate job would largely destroy the momentum for reform. Secondly, in case, after all, reform is not forthcoming, it is time to give thought to contingent alternative arrangements, outside UNESCO, to implement the international policies of Western countries on education, culture and science. I suggest that it would do no harm to encourage public discussion of that topic as soon as possible. On balance, if UNESCO's house can be cleaned up -- and I acknowledge that there is real doubt as to whether it can -- I would favor an American return to the organization in due course. But failing thorough reform, I think that most of the benefits derived from educational, scientific and cultural cooperation can be secured by other means.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Thanks, to each of you gentlemen for your very helpful testimony.

Let me just say, if I may, that I appreciate your comments with regard to our making our position known. The purpose of these hearings is to try to come to grips with the statement made by our administration, a decision to withdraw. Right now, I think that is an absolute decision, unless there are concrete changes. I don't think there will be any recommendation from this committee as a whole, unless we see some concrete changes.

Also with regard to GAO investigation, and all of the information that this committee is looking for and this Government is looking for, I think it is appropriate at this time—and I probably should have done this in my opening statement—to say we want to hear from everyone, all sides.

We are concerned about the GAO investigation. Apparently they had headquartered some of their staff right in the building, and personnel were fearful to go into their offices. So we are trying to make arrangements for anybody who has information to meet with them separately by moving to some other offices.

But this should be a call to anyone in UNESCO, any one of the 2,000 or 3,000 employees, to anyone in the United States and around the world, who has information to provide it to GAO or this committee or any committee in the Congress that has appropriate jurisdiction, and, of course, to the State Department.

Let me say again—we are very short on time. I am going to ask each of you to close with a statement after some questions, if you would, on this premise. If you were Director-General, what three changes would you bring about immediately? What would be the most important three changes? I guess they could include changing the Director-General.

But I would like to ask you, Dr. Fobes, is there any legitimacy to the charges that the administration has set forth in announcing this withdrawal, in your mind, with regard to budgetary problems, the attacks on freedom of the press, and so on? Do you not see any legitimacy to any of the charges, or do you see them in terms of degree?

Mr. FOBES. In respect to politicization, in respect of abuses because of the proposal for new world information and communications order, I do not see any validity in those charges.

In terms of the management of UNESCO, I see validity, although I think the way in which the charges have been framed, and the way they are being debated to the media, is very unfortunate. When I speak of management or administration, I am speaking of the Executive Board, the performance of which I don't think has been satisfactory. I direct this comment to Mr. Gilman, since he was asking a question on that score.

Mr. YATRON. Ambassador Harries, do you see any benefit for the United States if we stay in UNESCO? And, based on the strength of your comments, do you think the United States should withdraw from the United Nations?

Mr. HARRIES. No, sir, I do not. I draw a distinction between the United Nations as a whole and UNESCO in particular, and I think that it is particularly bad performance of UNESCO which is mili-

tating against the United Nations itself and strengthening the climate of opinion against the United Nations.

Mr. MICA. Any benefits for staying in UNESCO—any reasons you would articulate for staying in?

Mr. HARRIES. It depends what kind of UNESCO you stay in. I think at present the United States is able to bring much more pressure to bear to reform UNESCO from without and from having stated that it is going to go out, than it was able to do from within.

If UNESCO is functioning well, if it functions as it should function, then, yes, I do think there is benefit from being there. I am not opposed to international organizations such as UNESCO on any sort of principle. It is not the aims of the organization that has led me to these conclusions. It is the particular performance of UNESCO under the present leadership.

Mr. MICA. Would a simple change like a veto power or weighted vote make a difference in your opinion?

Mr. HARRIES. I think some sort of weighted voting—not across the board, I don't think that is practical. But I think that some sort of review process with weighted voting that would give large contributors some sort of control over program formulation is required.

As Ambassador Kirkpatrick has said, one of the basic problems of the system is that those with the votes don't contribute the money and those which contribute the money don't have the votes. There is a need to find some process of adjustment that closes the gap. It is a gap that encourages irresponsible behavior at present.

Mr. MICA. With respect to the previous question, you don't feel there is legitimacy to the claims concerning politicization or attacks on freedom of the press and budgetary problems, Dr. Fobes?

I noticed in your entire statement there was no comment with respect to Mr. M'Bow. You served directly with M'Bow, did you not?

Mr. FOBES. I did serve as his deputy, having also been deputy to the previous Director-General.

Mr. MICA. Are there a number of valid charges?

Mr. FOBES. My answers to any question on that will be carefully phrased because I consider myself still to be an international civil servant who took an oath to act in the interest of the organization.

Mr. MICA. I understand.

Mr. FOBES. I disagree with Mr. M'Bow on a number of questions concerning his management style and administration. However, I feel any such charges can be and should be handled through the Executive Board through a more active review by it of what, if any, changes should be made.

Mr. MICA. I understand your position. You indicated in your written testimony and oral testimony that \$8 of \$10 in UNESCO are spent in Paris. Is it a correct inference that 80 percent of their budget is for administrative purposes? Would you clarify that and would you comment on that, Dr. Fobes?

Mr. HARRIES. Well, it is spent in Paris. It is on administrative matters, on program matters, on publication, holding of conferences. The activities are very much centered in Paris.

When you consider that also money is spent in New York and Washington, that some money is spent in the developed countries

as a whole, when you come down to what is actually spent on the ground out in the paddy fields and in the arid zones of the Third World, it can't be much more than 15 percent of UNESCO's budget.

Mr. MICA. Well, now, you are going to have to educate me, and that is the purpose of these hearings, to educate those of us who need knowledge. When we say 15 percent of their budget is spent in Third World countries, does that include or is it possible to exclude sums granted for UNESCO to administer in other countries separate from the figures you are discussing, \$8 of \$10? Have you lost me?

Mr. HARRIES. Yes, I have, I'm afraid.

Mr. MICA. You pay salaries of two people to go to a Third World nation, say, and that is a heavy portion of the budget. They arrive at that Third World nation and they are given resources by other entities, other governments to use. It is essentially their talent, their administrative ability that is the basis for the program. The other money, equipment, material are supplied by another source. That would in effect skew or could skew the impact of what you are talking about, is that correct or not? I don't know.

Mr. HARRIES. I think that would be correct. I am talking about the portion of UNESCO's budget itself.

I might also say, Mr. Chairman, that the UNESCO budget is an exceedingly opaque document and it is very difficult to interpret it fully.

I don't claim to be a budget expert, and what I say on this point is what I have been told by people I regard as experts.

Mr. MICA. What do you mean, the staff is asking what you mean by "opaque document." I understand from critics that we can look at the general categories of spending and not get much information on the specifics of the spending. Is that what you refer to?

Mr. HARRIES. Yes.

Mr. MICA. Can we come to you, Dr. Fobes, on the \$8 of \$10 figure? That figure was mentioned on the "60 Minutes" program and has been mentioned in numerous documents that I have been given. It intrigues me.

If indeed the money is a basis for action and it pays professional people to then take other funds, I would say that it is probably an unfair characterization. If, on the other hand, less than 15 percent of what UNESCO gets is spent for what they were set out to do, that is quite an indictment.

Mr. FOBES. The \$8 of \$10 figure is one analysis. I think we need a good many other types of analyses of the UNESCO budget.

Ambassador Harries has explained that the \$8 goes for a wide variety of activities including conferences, General Conference, Executive Board, publications and the like. But there are at least a half dozen ways of analyzing that—this is the regular budget, by the way—analyzing that regular budget in which I can show that at least 30 percent of the funds spent under the regular budget are for the benefit of developing countries. It is a different analysis but I can show that by including, for example, expert meetings that take place.

If you make this detailed analysis, and I hope it is made and provided to the committee, and I would be glad to assist in that, it will

be realized that perhaps 45 percent of moneys spent by UNESCO is spent outside of Paris and spent in developing countries.

UNESCO's regular budget represents 55 percent of the total moneys available to it; 45 percent of its moneys come from the U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, and other sources such as the U.N. Fund for Population Activity and the like, voluntary funds managed by UNESCO which are spent outside of Paris in developing countries' projects.

So I think we need an analysis of funds and of the time spent by staff. I am not saying we won't find some criticisms, but I think that the \$8 of \$10 is misleading.

Mr. MICA. Your point is that UNESCO's budget which we are referring to is only the operating budget, primarily for the organization itself, that it represents 15 percent of all the funds for which it is responsible?

Mr. FOBES. And of the regular budget, you can say 30 percent is simply basically necessary because of languages, because of the general conference meetings, because of the executive board, and other basic infrastructure costs. After that, you can begin to talk about program and professional activities.

Mr. MICA. Do you have a comment?

Mr. HARRIES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think perhaps more significant than the 80 percent of the budget is that 80 percent of the UNESCO employees are located in Paris. That, it seems to me, does point to an inordinate degree of centralization in the organization. Lip service is paid by UNESCO to decentralization but I think in practice it is a very, very centralized organization in terms of the sort of work it is meant to do.

Mr. MICA. If you would like to comment, I would defer to my colleague Mr. Gilman.

Mr. FOBES. I think it is only the World Health Organization which can claim great decentralization of its staff. If you look at the FAO and ILO more of their staff is in headquarters than the staff of UNESCO. I think the proportions need to be studied and the reasons for these proportions.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly appreciate having the benefit of the expertise and opinions of our panelists. I think you have given us a great deal of food for thought.

Mr. Harries, you mentioned, and it has been mentioned before, that the budget is opaque. Can you tell us a little more of what you mean by that kind of a term?

Mr. HARRIES. Well, as I say, I have been impressed by the degree to which people who are much better versed than I am on the budget have enormous difficulty in penetrating what figures mean precisely, where certain items are to be found, and have enormous difficulty agreeing as to what items in the budget mean.

Having sat in the Geneva Committee and in the Western Group and having heard people—I stress that I am not a budget expert and I don't happen to be into the discussions on the budget—but the degree of differences of opinion on this seem to me exceptional.

If I can give you one example, when the budget for the 1984-85 period came up for discussion during the closing months of my stay

there, estimates as to what real growth was represented by this draft budget varied within the Western Group—from 6 to 30 per cent.

Mr. GILMAN. OK.

Mr. HARRIES. That is what I mean by opaque.

Mr. GILMAN. I take it you have a very, very different viewpoint than Mr. Torres, who said he had no difficulty in wrestling with the budget.

Mr. HARRIES. I was amazed to hear Mr. Torres say that. Certainly, currently virtually everyone in the Western Group on the budget and other matters claim to have difficulty in getting at the facts and getting the sort information they want.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Fobes, do you agree with that analysis of the budget problems in UNESCO?

Mr. FOBES. I agree in part, Mr. Gilman. My written testimony in fact picks the question of budget technique as something on which reform is necessary.

I think it is known that even when I worked in UNESCO, I had problems in trying to get a simpler budget presentation. However, I think the criticism also has to be made that the Western countries and the U.S. Department of State, have not worked hard enough on the subject of understanding the budget.

But I agree that budget structure and clarification is one of the points on which reform can be made, and should be made, and I think the Executive Board should spend—sorry to disagree with Congressman Esteban Torres—I think the Executive Board ought to spend three times as much effort as it does in reviewing the budget.

Mr. GILMAN. Is there sufficient expertise of staffing available to the Executive Board to accomplish what the Executive Board should be doing in fulfilling its responsibilities to the Conference?

Mr. FOBES. The expertise in most cases has to come from the governments whose members sit on that Board, although the Board is capable of calling on consultants to help it.

The answer is, it needs more help, yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. What about the staff of the Executive Board? Who selects the UNESCO staff of the Executive Board?

Mr. FOBES. The staff of the UNESCO Executive Board consists only of a secretary and some clerical help.

Mr. HARRIES. There is no staff, that is right.

Mr. FOBES. That is the full-time staff. It is appointed by the agreement of the Director-General and Chairman of the Executive Board. The Board could stand more independent staff if it is to carry out its job, yes.

Mr. GILMAN. If you wanted more information on the budget, Ambassador Harries, who would you turn to in the UNESCO agency?

Mr. HARRIES. You would have to turn to the Secretariat, to the people who prepared the budget. There is no independent staff.

Mr. GILMAN. Neither the Board nor the Conference have independent staff?

Mr. HARRIES. No, sir. They depend on the Secretariat and the Secretariat is under very firm control of the Director-General.

Mr. GILMAN. I am just concerned about one aspect of your testimony, Mr. Fobes. At the end of the testimony, you say draft

amendments to the constitution need to be prepared for dissemination in 1985 and 1986 for initial discussion in 1987 at the 23d General Conference.

Are you saying then that we can't make any changes really until 1987?

Mr. FOBES. No, sir. The tenor of my written statement is to suggest that the need for studies is going to go on for a long time and that some reforms are going to be long-term reforms, but I certainly believe that it is possible to make changes in the next year or 2 years.

Mr. GILMAN. Can we make changes, Mr. Fobes, as Mr. Torres suggested, by the Executive Board acting before even 1985?

Mr. FOBES. Yes, sir. The Executive Board has a good deal of power, representing the General Conference.

Mr. GILMAN. It doesn't have to await approval of the General Conference?

Mr. FOBES. For certain actions, I believe the Executive Board can act without waiting for approval.

Mr. GILMAN. Even budgetary reforms?

Mr. FOBES. Even budgetary reforms, yes, because the Executive Board is responsible for submitting the program and budget to the General Conference. It can exercise a good deal of influence over the manner in which that is put together and presented.

Mr. GILMAN. Let me address both of you then.

Do you feel that the Executive Board in this year can make sufficient changes to warrant our Nation staying in UNESCO and taking part in future UNESCO procedures and workings?

Mr. FOBES. My answer is yes, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Harries.

Mr. HARRIES. I am very doubtful in the time available and knowing the tempo at which UNESCO proceeds as to whether they can make those changes. They can promise certain changes, but as far as implementing them, I don't see it.

Mr. GILMAN. I note, Mr. Harries, that you take a very firm stand; you don't want us to weaken our position. But let me ask, if UNESCO adopts resolutions to make changes subject to review and acceptance by the General Conference, would you then recommend that we extend the time for final decision with regard to our future participation in UNESCO?

Mr. HARRIES. Congressman, I would prefer that, in the face of such promises, the United States should implement its withdrawal, wait for those promises to become fact, and go back in due course when they are in place and when they are working.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Fobes, would you like to comment on that suggestion?

Mr. FOBES. My view is that we ought to have a long-term plan as to where we want the world to be and UNESCO to be 20 years from now. If we should leave UNESCO for a period, this will be more costly to us and our ability to influence the outcome over the long term will be reduced.

I would prefer that we not withdraw. If necessary, extend the period of notice of withdrawal to give us time to examine the charges and to work with our allies and other countries to bring about change.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Fobes, what about the Commission that is studying UNESCO; are they sufficiently staffed to come up with some long-term plan for UNESCO, for the U.S. role?

Mr. FOBES. You refer to the so-called monitoring panel appointed by the Secretary of State.

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. FOBES. It seems to me the timeframe given that panel—and I am not aware of the staffing except that it has a secretary—the timeframe and the time that the members of that panel in fact are able to give to the subject simply do not promise development of the kind of plan or strategy and policy that you are suggesting.

I think they can certainly monitor and give useful advice on changes or whether the changes promised are in fact serious enough to make the Secretary of State change his mind. But I am not convinced that they are capable of going about things the way you would want them to.

Mr. GILMAN. Who would best undertake the responsibility of coming up with a long-range plan for the United States?

Mr. FOBES. I think it is through the National Commission for UNESCO, but we ought to mobilize the Georgetown University center, the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and other such bodies working with the Department of State and National Commission in order to produce that strategy and policy and plan.

Eventually, it must be a Department of State document, of course, but it needs a lot of help on that.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Ambassador Harries, you wanted to comment?

Mr. HARRIES. Yes. If I could qualify one thing I said about withdrawal.

There is one change that could happen between now and the end of the year in which I think would justify the United States rescinding its decision to withdraw, and that would be the retirement of the present Director-General and his replacement by a man of international stature and ability. If that happened, then the United States should stay in and throw its full weight behind the new man.

Mr. GILMAN. If you would yield, Mr. Chairman, I note that his nomination and election doesn't come up until 1986 or 1987.

Mr. HARRIES. Yes.

Mr. MICA. So he would have to resign. I would state for the record that Mr. Gilman and I do not seek nor would we accept the position if it were offered.

If I may, I would just close with this thought. I can think of three things I would do if I were Director-General, even though I am not seeking that office. I will share with you my hope as chairman of this hearing that by the end of the hearing we will be able to come up with not only all the general comments about the problems, but walk away with three or four specific ways that we can make recommendations for changes that might help us reverse the decision to withdraw. As I said earlier, I think the decision is set unless there are some major changes.

So who would like to go first? Just two or three comments.

Ambassador.

Mr. HARRIES. Mr. Chairman, I think you already have mentioned one which I would attach great importance to, and that is the creation of some sort of mechanism, weighted mechanism reflecting contributions to review programs at some point in the procedure. I think that is very necessary.

I think the second thing that is essential is the depoliticization of the Secretariat and that it be brought back to observe the standards that an international bureaucracy should observe, a bureaucracy intended to serve all member states impartially.

I think another very important thing is the restriction of UNESCO's program to its proper area of responsibility and competence, the respect of boundaries between itself and other agencies, because within the U.N. family generally the encroachment on the area of other people creates problems, is wasteful, leads to overlap, and dissipates the scarce resources of organizations.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Dr. Fobes.

Mr. FOBES. Mr. Chairman, I can offer the three suggestions that you might want to consider, but before doing so, I have to say that I have a higher regard for the level of performance, of the standard of performance of the international staff than Ambassador Harries has, even though I think they work under great difficulties. I am amazed that the program of UNESCO goes on in spite of what we hear both as to internal problems and external problems.

My three suggestions are: First, the Executive Board must this year show its willingness to operate in a more efficient and effective manner instead of in large plenary bodies. It must be willing to share the responsibility among its members to go into more detail, to give more effort. That could be done. They can show they really were going to work more efficiently.

Second, at the fall meeting of the Executive Board, there must be some advance in understanding over the issue of the next budget, next program and budget, even if it is only that the Board and Director-General agree on the base that will be used for that budget. That would be a very significant advance. It would reduce the opaqueness or whatever you might want to call it.

The third action would be the institution by the Board in exercising its supervisory responsibilities but in agreement with the Director-General—and if this requires a lot of private sessions to bring it about, all right—of an independent examination of some aspect of internal administration whether it is personnel or recruitment or whether it is the structure or decentralization or delegation of authority.

The world is very complex and this UNESCO institution is complex, and to ask for any more major reform than the independent examination of some one aspect is asking too much even in 2 years' time. But if something, if one thing can be done like that, it will change the whole atmosphere and make it possible to go on to other reforms.

Mr. MICA. I thank you very much, gentlemen.

Let me tell you that we truly appreciate your taking the time and having the patience to stay with us all morning. I know this

was a lengthy hearing, but I can tell you for this member and on behalf of Chairman Yatron and myself, it has been most helpful.

You have each provided a different and helpful perspective to our deliberations. I think as we report out later this year on this subject, your views will be well represented.

We thank you.

The subcommittees stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1984

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met in joint session at 9:55 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building. Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations) presiding.

Mr. YATRON. Today the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcommittee on International Operations meet jointly for the second of three hearings on the U.S. decision to withdraw from UNESCO.

Today we have a number of experts who will testify on the specific program sectors in UNESCO: Education, natural science, social science, communications, and culture. They will explore the contribution of UNESCO's major programs to the relevant American intellectual communities.

At this time I would ask unanimous consent to hold the hearing record open for written statements from the American Association of Museums, and the International Peace Research Society.¹

Does the cochair, Mr. Mica, have any opening remarks?

Mr. MICA. Just a brief comment, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say that I think these hearings started off in fine style. On one hand, we heard that UNESCO was a great and glorious organization, but one person said that we should leave it immediately. We also heard Mr. M'Bow described as a charmer, and one given to rages, all in the same hearing.

In all seriousness, I think it is appropriate that we continue with the witnesses we have today. The issue of our proposed withdrawal from UNESCO is an important one for this Nation.

But it has been quite an educational process. The tone and tenor of these hearings have been excellent.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much.

Now I would like to call on the ranking minority member, Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. I have no opening comments. I am sure some of the terminology that you used applies to many of us in Congress, as well. Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Leach.

Mr. Solomon, would you like to make a statement?

¹See apps. 2 and 3.

Mr. SOLOMON. I just concur in the remarks of Congressman Leach and Congressman Mica.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Since we have a large group of experts this morning, would each witness please keep his or her statement to 10 minutes? Your written statements will be included in the record in their entirety.

Our first panel of witnesses will include Dr. Hans Weiler and Keith Geiger. Dr. Weiler is a professor of education and political science at Stanford University and was formerly the Director of the International Institute for Educational Planning at UNESCO. Mr. Keith Geiger is vice president of the National Education Association.

We welcome you gentlemen to the committee and look forward to hearing your statements.

Dr. Weiler, you may lead off.

STATEMENT OF HANS N. WEILER, PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATIONAL PLANNING, UNESCO

Mr. WEILER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been asked, Mr. Chairman, to testify before this committee on what I see as the likely impact of the withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO, specifically as far as the field of education is concerned.

And I would like to address this question by first talking about what the withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO would mean for the program of UNESCO in the field of education. I would secondly like to say a few words about what I would see as the likely impact of such a decision on the professional educational community in this country.

I have prepared a statement which I submit for the record. I will try to summarize my major points briefly.

I think you are entitled to know something about both my credentials and my biases. As already has been mentioned, I have been the Director of the International Institute for Educational Planning at UNESCO, and in that capacity had a number of opportunities to acquaint myself firsthand with the education program of UNESCO.

I have since worked in a variety of capacities with a number of national and international organizations, including the World Bank, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and I am presently working with the African Development Bank on their future lending policy in the field of education.

In brief, I have had over the years ample occasion to concern myself from a variety of vantage points with the role of education in development and in social change, and with the contribution of organizations like UNESCO to the development, improvement and reform of education around the world.

The experience has been both sobering and reassuring. Where something as complex, subtle and controversial of the education of future generations is concerned, there are no simple truths and

ready-made answers, and this is true at the national as well as at the international level, and it is true where UNESCO is concerned as well.

Let me turn to the specific subject at hand, and to my first set of observations on the role and the activities of UNESCO in the field of education and on the effect which U.S. withdrawal would have on those activities.

With all due recognition of the importance of UNESCO's work in such fields as science, culture, and communications, it is in education that UNESCO has had since its inception a particular mandate and priority. It is the education sector which has traditionally claimed the largest share of UNESCO's budgetary and personnel resources.

The organization's total staff in the education sector comes to 573 or about 22 percent of UNESCO's total staff compared to 300 for the natural science's sector, 100 for the social sciences, et cetera.

Those areas of UNESCO's current program of work that deal with education—and I am referring to major programs, II, IV, and V in the current medium-term plan of UNESCO—are allocated a total of over \$84 million in the 2-year budget covering the 1984-85 biennium, which is equivalent to almost 20 percent of the organization's total budget and well over one-third of all of UNESCO's program expenditures.

Figures, however, tell only part of the story of UNESCO's involvement in the development and improvement of educational systems around the world, especially in that part of the world that is somewhat euphemistically called developing.

In UNESCO's second medium-term plan, which covers the years 1984 through 1989, three major program areas are devoted to educational issues. My statement covers these program areas in some detail.

The first of these, entitled "Education for All," attaches particular importance to the development of generally accessible universal primary education, to the struggle against illiteracy, to the democratization of education, to the further strengthening of adult education, enhancing the equality of educational opportunities for girls and women, the improvement of education in rural areas, and the improvement of educational opportunities for handicapped persons, refugees and migrant workers.

Looking at education in today's world as a whole, and not just in the exceptionally privileged societies such as our own, it is difficult to come up with a more pertinent set of priorities for an international organization which, like UNESCO, has a statutory mandate for the improvement of educational opportunity where there is the greatest need.

The other major program areas which deal explicitly with education have to do on the one hand with the formulation and application of education policies, and with the relationship between education, training, and society.

Altogether, Mr. Chairman, a wide range of concerns and activities, indeed, underlying and illustrating the special and central role which education has always played and continues to play in the programs of UNESCO.

Each of these broader clusters consists of more specific activities from the training of literacy personnel to the comparative assessments of educational innovations in different countries, and so on.

How is all of this likely to be affected by an eventual withdrawal of the United States?

I do not wish to talk here primarily about the financial implications of a withdrawal of the United States. Some of that may well be recuperated by a redistribution of the dues structure of the organization.

What I would like to argue here is not so much the impact which this substantial loss of revenue would have on the scope and effectiveness of UNESCO's work, because there are two other effects of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO which strike me as at least equally if not more important.

The first is that termination of U.S. membership in UNESCO would deprive the work of the organization and its member states of the tremendous pool of professional talent and human resources that is available in the educational community of this country.

No country in today's world comes close to the United States in both numbers and quality where aggregate professional competence in educational research, educational management and administration, educational technology and a wide range of other specializations is concerned.

Nor is this competence limited to educational issues and problems inside the United States, either.

This pool of competent professionals has been and continues to be an invaluable resource for the work of organizations like UNESCO. I am arguing that one of the more serious and more harmful consequences of separating this country from UNESCO would be to deprive the organization of a source of qualified and competent manpower of which it is very badly in need.

Let me move to a second set of observations, and that is the impact of the withdrawal from UNESCO on the professional community in this country.

I would argue that certainly over the long run the termination of this country's membership in UNESCO would have important negative effects upon this country's professional community in education and more generally upon this country's relationship to educational thought and practice in the rest of the world.

At first sight, the professional community in education in this country seems so strong and resourceful that it may well seem to be self-sufficient. There is probably more action in the State of California than in the whole of West Africa or in the Arab Peninsula. But the appearance of professional self-sufficiency is deceiving, Mr. Chairman.

From its beginning, and not just in education, scholarship and professional life in this country has derived much of its vitality from interacting, communicating, and collaborating with professional colleagues and groups around the world.

The remarkable influence of people like Montessori, Piaget, Steiner, and others upon educational thought and practice in this country would not have been possible without a tradition of wide-open channels of communication and interaction.

It is as a vehicle for the continuing flow of these exchanges in an ever-expanding world that UNESCO has come to assume an increasingly important role for the professional community in the United States—through its infrastructure of professional conferences, symposia, publications, et cetera.

This is particularly true where the growing and important professional community is concerned that has emerged in the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. From the point of view not only of maintaining a professional dialog across the many ideological and political cleavages that separate us from an increasing number of Third World nations, but also in the interests of sharing in the remarkable intellectual ferment that is generated within the southern part of this globe, we can ill afford to place ourselves outside of the one functioning network of communication that is, however imperfectly, provided by UNESCO.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude. I have had a good deal of first-hand experience in working with the complex, cumbersome and often interminably verbose subculture of UNESCO. An organization that handles its business in six different official languages and deals with administrative styles as different as those of Saudi Arabia, France, the Maldives, and the Mongolian Peoples Republic will always find it difficult to be perfect, but I concede readily that, in many respects, UNESCO is much more imperfect than it has to be and that there is tremendous room for improvement.

But I have also made it both a professional career and a personal commitment to understand as well as I can the problems which poor and underprivileged countries have in providing their citizens, through education, with the tools for understanding their world and for improving their life.

It is from this experience that I must conclude two things. First, that the solution of these problems depends critically upon the kind of help that UNESCO is capable of providing, and that it is still capable of providing, all of its shortcomings notwithstanding, better than any alternative international structure.

Second, that the United States has not only a moral and political, but also an intellectual obligation to assume its share and to continue its role in this worldwide effort.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much for your statement.

[Mr. Weiler's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HANS N. WEILER, PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION AND POLITICAL
SCIENCE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

THE EDUCATION PROGRAM OF UNESCO

Mr. Chairman:

You have asked me to testify before this Committee on what I see as the likely impact of the withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO, specifically as far as the field of education is concerned. I propose to address this question in two different steps: First, I would like to describe to you briefly the major preoccupations and activities of UNESCO in the field of education, and discuss how I would see these activities affected by a withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO. Since I believe, however, that a termination of American membership in UNESCO affects not only UNESCO, but the educational community in the United States as well, I will -- secondly -- discuss how I believe U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO will affect the quality of professional life for this country's educational community. I am, of course, at your disposal for answering whatever questions you might have on these or any other aspects of the work of UNESCO and of the relationship between UNESCO and this country.

You are entitled to know something about both my credentials and my biases as they relate to this task. I have been a student of the relationship between education and development, specifically in Africa, for the last twentyfive years, and have taught in this area at Stanford University since 1965. Throughout this time, I have followed UNESCO's activities in the field of education, but -- aside from occasional conferences -- it was not until 1974 that I became more closely associated with the organization. In that year, upon the recommendation of an international search committee, I was appointed by the then Director-General of UNESCO, Rene Maheu, as the third Director of the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), succeeding in this office Philip Coombs of the United States and Raymond Poignant of France. I served in this capacity until September 1977, at which time I returned to my teaching duties at Stanford. While the International Institute for Educational Planning enjoys a special statute within the overall framework of UNESCO, it forms administratively and programmatically a part of the organization, and its Director is one of the senior officials of UNESCO (D-2). Throughout this period, which included the UNESCO General Conferences of 1974 and 1976 and the first instance of major tension between this country and UNESCO over the issue of archeological work in the city of Jerusalem and the participation of Israel in UNESCO activities, I was involved in the work of UNESCO's Education Sector, of which the IIEP is a part. Since leaving UNESCO, I have kept myself informed about the further development of UNESCO's programs in the field of education, and have occasionally contributed to UNESCO conferences and publications. In addition, I have served, over the last few years, as a consultant or adviser to a number of national and international organizations in the area of education and development, notably the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Canadian International Development Research Centre, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Government of Tanzania, and others. At the moment, and with financial support from USAID, I am advising the African Development Bank on its future lending policy in the field of education.

In brief, I have had over the years ample occasion to concern myself, from a variety of vantage points, with the role of education in

development and social change, and with the contribution of organizations like UNESCO to the development, improvement, and reform of education around the world. The experience has been both sobering and reassuring: Where something as complex, subtle, and controversial as the education of future generations is concerned, there are no simple truths and no ready-made answers, and this is true at the national as well as at the international level. Where UNESCO is concerned specifically, the experience has been mixed as well. Working with and in the organization has been the source of more frustrations than I care to remember. At the same time, however, it has been professionally an immensely challenging and gratifying experience, and one which has convinced me that, all of its many shortcomings notwithstanding, there is no truly viable alternative to UNESCO for developing and sustaining worldwide communication and collaboration in education across the many cleavages that divide today's world. (For more detail on my overall analysis of UNESCO and of the criticisms raised against it, see my statement on "UNESCO: Take It Or Leave It?", of which a copy is attached.)

1. The impact of U.S. withdrawal on the work of UNESCO

Let me return to the specific subject at hand, and to my first set of observations: On the role and the activities of UNESCO in the field of education, and on the effect which U.S. withdrawal would have on those activities. With all due recognition of the importance of UNESCO's work in such fields as science, culture, and communication, it is in education that UNESCO has had since its inception a particular mandate and priority. It is the Education Sector which has traditionally claimed the major share of UNESCO's budgetary and personnel resources. The organization's total staff in the Education Sector comes to 573 (approved posts for 1983) or 22% of UNESCO's total staff, compared to 334 for the Natural Sciences Sector, 112 for the Social Sciences, 113 for Culture, and 82 for Communication. Those areas of UNESCO's program that deal with education (Major Programmes II, IV, and V in the Second Medium-Term Plan, 1984-1989) are allocated a total of over \$84 million in the two-year budget covering the 1984/85 biennium, which is equivalent to 19.5% of the Organization's total budget and well over one third (37%) of all of UNESCO's program expenditures. The 19.5% of UNESCO's budget that goes to education compares to 5.9% for culture, 8.8% for science and technology, 7.2% for programs related to the human environment and its improvement, and a mere 3.7% for the controversial program in Communications.

Figures, however, tell only part of the story of UNESCO's involvement in the development and improvement of educational systems around the world, especially in that part of the world that is euphemistically called "developing" (even though "underdeveloping" would in many respects be a more appropriate term). In UNESCO's Second Medium-Term Plan (4XC/4) which was adopted by an extraordinary session of the UNESCO General Conference in 1982 and which is to cover the years 1984 through 1989, three major program areas are devoted to education.

The first of these, entitled "Education for All", attaches particular importance to the development of generally accessible, universal primary education, to the struggle against illiteracy (to which alone some \$15 million are devoted in the current biennial budget), to the

democratization of education, to the further strengthening of adult education, to enhancing the equality of educational opportunity for girls and women, to the extension and improvement of education in rural areas, and to the improvement of educational opportunities for disabled persons, refugees, and migrant workers. Looking at education in today's world as a whole (and not just in the exceptionally privileged societies such as our own), it is difficult to come up with a more pertinent set of priorities for an international organization which, like UNESCO, has a statutory mandate for the improvement of educational opportunity where there is the greatest need.

The other major program areas which deal explicitly with education have to do with "the formulation and application of education policies" and with the relationship between "education, training, and society". In the first of these, UNESCO continues to give top priority to enhancing the capacity of individual countries to plan, manage, administer, and evaluate their educational systems, and to contributing for this purpose to the training of educational personnel. The International Institute for Educational Planning, with which I was associated in the 1970s, plays a key role in this effort, and has over the years made a major contribution to the training of key personnel in educational planning and administration, primarily from developing countries where local training facilities in these areas are still rudimentary or non-existent. The Institute's annual training program usually includes field visits to one or more countries to study different forms of educational management; three years ago, the Institute's trainees visited the United States for the first time, and came away from their visit not only with fond memories of American hospitality, but also with a much better understanding of the important relationship between education and society in this country.

Lastly, in the program area on "Education, Training, and Society", UNESCO has established a special focus on the linkages between education and other spheres of human activity, notably between education and culture, education and the world of work, education and the development of science and technology, and between physical education and the world of sport.

Altogether, a wide range of concerns and activities indeed, underlining and illustrating the special and central role which education has always played and continues to play in the programs of UNESCO. Each of these broader clusters consists of more specific activities -- from the training of literacy personnel at national and regional levels to the comparative assessment of educational innovations in different countries, and from the development of information systems for educational management to support for the introduction of local and national languages into colonial education systems. Over many of these specific activities one may well argue; in their entirety, however, they reflect in my view a very thorough understanding of the problems of education in today's world and a serious effort at placing the resources of the international community -- through UNESCO -- at the disposal of individual countries' attempts to cope with these problems.

How is all of this likely to be affected by an eventual withdrawal of the United States? The significance of such a step for the

organization's resource base is amply known and unmistakable: Losing 25% of its revenue is a major blow for any organization, but is clearly momentous in the case of UNESCO. And even though some of this loss might be recuperated through redistributing the dues structure of the organization, it would still amount to a substantial reduction in what UNESCO would be able to accomplish in its various educational and other programs; given the prominence of education in UNESCO's overall program, it would be particularly severely affected -- much more so than the much more controversial, but resource-wise much less significant programs in the field of communications.

What I would like to argue here, however, is not so much the impact which a substantial loss of revenue would have on the scope and effectiveness of UNESCO's work. Two other effects of a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO strike me as at least equally, if not more, important. The first is that a termination of U.S. membership in UNESCO would deprive the work of the organization of the tremendous pool of professional talent and human resources that is available in the educational community of this country. No country in today's world comes even close to the United States in either numbers or quality where aggregate professional competence in educational research, educational management and administration, educational technology and a wide range of other specializations are concerned. Nor is this competence limited to educational issues and problems inside the U.S. Decades of federal and foundation support for international programs in education -- albeit dwindling in recent years -- have helped generate a considerable pool of competence in the international and comparative analysis of educational problems in this country.

This pool of competent professionals has been, and continues to be, an invaluable resource for the work of organizations like UNESCO, for the recruitment of both staff and advisory and consulting personnel. In fields as complex as the relationship between education and the world of work, or the optimal use of appropriate educational technology, or the evaluation of new curricula, there is simply no substitute for solid professional competence -- and this country, comparatively speaking, has an abundance of that competence. There is thus an important contribution to be made by this country's professional community to the quality of UNESCO's work -- a contribution which, incidentally, would in turn provide American professionals with new insights and experiences at an international scale. It would be serious indeed if, as a result of a political decision to take the U.S. out of UNESCO, both UNESCO and the U.S. professional community would cease to benefit from this important interaction.

Having said this, let me add a point of criticism which I have made repeatedly with regard to the past involvement of the U.S. in UNESCO. A number of notable examples to the contrary notwithstanding, U.S. professional staff members in UNESCO have not always reflected the best in quality, experience, and skill that the professional community in this country has to offer. I have reasons to believe that the recruitment practices of the Department of State for posts in UNESCO and other international organizations have not helped optimally to tap this resource, and have contributed to a situation where, in spite of readily

available human resources, this country's professional impact on the day-to-day activities of the UNESCO secretariat has been much less than it could have been. By contrast, those -- relatively few -- cases where first-rate American professionals were recruited into UNESCO prove the point of how much difference competent people can make even in a relatively large and complex organization. If there is a future to the relationship between the U.S. and UNESCO, here is an area where remedial action is needed.

There is, however, a second consequence of this country's withdrawal from UNESCO which, in my view, would weigh heavily much beyond the financial impact. It would send a signal to the rest of the world that the United States of America is turning its back on the one international institution which many of the world's poorer countries have come to regard as their last remaining hope for the development and improvement of their fledgling educational systems. The effects of such a signal are difficult to predict, but they are likely to do further harm to what is already a very precarious situation in international cooperation and assistance for educational development -- a situation to the precariousness of which this country's foreign aid policies have contributed in no small measure. UNESCO is seen by its member states in the underdeveloped part of the world as a sometimes annoyingly slow and cumbersome, but nonetheless very valuable source of advice, assistance, and expertise when it comes to educational development. To see the leading country of the free world turn its back on such a key institution is likely to lead to even further discouragement and despair in a part of the world where earlier hopes for development are increasingly becoming the victim of a constantly deteriorating resource situation.

And I would argue that that image, the one that poorer countries have of UNESCO, is by and large correct, more correct than the image that we are being served by an increasingly partisan press. For who else is making a serious and concerted effort to help countries in Africa's Sahel or in Bangladesh bring a minimum of education to those groups whom progress has left behind: Women, especially in rural areas; migrant and nomadic populations; young and not so young squatters in the shantytowns, barrios and medinas on the fringe of the major urban agglomerations of the third world? Heaven knows much more than UNESCO can possibly accomplish is needed. There are an estimated 160 million adult illiterates in Africa alone -- and even if all of the resources that UNESCO has currently budgeted for its work on literacy were to go to Africa, it could spend less than a nickel on every one of them this year. And yet: without UNESCO's work on the eradication of literacy over the past twentyfive years, we could safely assume that the number of illiterates in Africa as elsewhere would probably be twice or three times what we have now.

2. The impact of withdrawal on the U.S.

I have so far talked about what I see as some of the consequences of U.S. withdrawal upon UNESCO and its work in the field of education. But these are not the only consequences. I would argue that, certainly over the long run, the termination of this country's membership in UNESCO would have important negative effects upon this country's professional community in education and, more generally, upon this country's relationship to

educational thought and practice in the rest of the world.

At first sight, the professional community in education in this country seems so strong and resourceful that it may well seem to be self-sufficient, and hardly in need of a UNESCO. In terms of research, publishing, organizational life, and training in professional education, there is probably more action in the state of California than in the whole of West Africa or on the Arab Peninsula. But the appearance of professional self-sufficiency is deceiving. From its beginning, and not just in education, scholarship and professional life in this country has derived much of its vitality from interacting, communicating, and collaborating with professional colleagues and institutions around the world. The remarkable influence of people like Montessori, Piaget, Steiner and others upon educational thought and practice in this country would not have been possible without a tradition of wide open channels of communication and interaction. It is as a vehicle for the continuing flow of these exchanges in an ever expanding world that UNESCO has come to assume an increasingly important role for the professional community in the U.S. -- through its infrastructure of professional conferences, symposia, publications, advisory panels, information services, etc. This is true not only where our "traditional" professional partners in Western Europe are concerned -- we don't really need UNESCO for sustaining our interaction with them --, but more specifically in the case of that growing and important professional community that has emerged in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. From the point of view not only of maintaining a professional dialogue across the many ideological and political cleavages that separate us from an increasing number of Third World nations, but also in the interest of sharing in the remarkable intellectual ferment that is generated within the "southern" part of this globe, we can ill afford to place ourselves outside of the one functioning network of communication that is provided by UNESCO. Some notable exceptions notwithstanding, the American professional community in education, for all its intellectual and organizational strength, is not particularly known for its international understanding and sophistication, and I say this as somebody who, for a major part of his life, has looked in on this country from the outside; working in a country as rich and varied as ours makes it easy to forget that there exist both important problems and significant ideas outside of our own boundaries. If anything, the majority of my colleagues in professional education in this country need the information and the inspiration that UNESCO can provide more rather than less; our students, the readers of our books, and the American public at large have a right to expect that we are, as educators, much more conversant with, and sophisticated about, the rich world of ideas outside of this country than, by and large, we tend to be. What I am afraid of is that a professional community which already has a certain tendency towards insularity, ethnocentrism, and self-sufficiency would be removed yet further from the precarious and imperfect, yet remarkably effective network of communication and cooperation that UNESCO has over the years succeeded in building, especially between the rich and the poor countries of this world.

Let me add here, even though it is not strictly part of my brief, that I would consider withdrawing from UNESCO also as terribly bad foreign policy. Leaving aside here the reactions of some of our friends in Western

Europe (which, in any event, tend to be much more differentiated and prudent than much of our official rhetoric in the matter), we are facing a real problem even among those countries in the Third World that are quite favorably disposed to us; frankly, I am sometimes amazed how many of those there are still left, considering our record in those parts of the world over the last twentyfive years. But even those that are favorable have a terribly hard time understanding why, of all countries, the United States is deserting an institution which not only it helped to build, but an institution which those countries have come to consider as a vital source of support for their own valiant efforts to improve the "life of the mind" for their people. Mali has no National Academy of Education on which to draw for expert advice on the evaluation of its village education program; Bangladesh has no R&D Center in Teacher Education from which it could get help in coping with the tremendous teacher training problems involved in its scheme for introducing universal primary education; Tanzania has no Rand Corporation for planning its technical schools, and couldn't afford it even if it had one. They all, and many countries like them, depend on whatever help UNESCO can provide, and they will have little understanding for why one of the richest and most powerful countries on earth is now turning its back on that very organization.

Let me conclude. Over the years, I have had a good deal of first-hand experience in working with the complex, cumbersome, and often interminably verbose sub-culture of UNESCO, and I could go on for quite a little while talking about the many disappointments that I have encountered in the process. An organization that handles its business in six different official languages and deals with administrative styles as different as those of Saudi Arabia, France, the Maldives, and the Mongolian Peoples Republic will always find it difficult to be perfect; but I concede readily that, in many respects, UNESCO is much more imperfect than it has to be, and that there is tremendous room for improvement.

But I have also made it both a professional career and a personal commitment to understand as well as I can the problems which poor and underprivileged countries have in providing their citizens, through education, with the tools for understanding their world and for improving their life. And it is from this experience that I must conclude two things: First, that the solution of these problems depends critically upon the kind of help that UNESCO is capable of providing -- and that it is still capable of providing, all of its shortcomings notwithstanding, better than any alternative international structure; and secondly, that the United States has not only a moral and political, but also an intellectual obligation to assume its share in this worldwide effort.

UNESCO: TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT?

Hans N. Weiler*

The decision by the government of the United States of America to terminate this country's membership in the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) is as momentous as it is unwarranted and imprudent. All indications are that the decision is not merely a threatening gesture to make Unesco change some of its programs and procedures; the rhetoric surrounding the decision has a definitive ring to it, and implies expectations for change of such magnitude that any organization, even if it could be moved more easily than an international body of 150-plus members, would have a hard time living up to them in a matter of twelve months. This would make the U.S. the only country (besides the Republic of South Africa) formally to leave the one specialized organization in the U.N. system in the founding of which this country once took particular pride. It would place the educational and scientific community in this country outside of the precarious, but remarkably effective network of communication and cooperation which Unesco has over the years succeeded in building, especially between advantaged and disadvantaged countries, through publications, meetings, seminars, scholarships and international training programs. It would confirm, even in those parts of the world that are friendly or at least not hostile to the U.S., the worst suspicions about our propensity for narrow ethnocentrism and a confrontational approach to international conflict. And it would, both through the financial loss and the psychological commotion caused by the United States' departure, deal a serious blow to an international system of cooperation and assistance on which the professional community especially in the poor countries of the Third World has come very vitally to depend. A momentous decision indeed, and one that presumably no country would take except for the most serious of causes. Let us take a look at the reasons on which the US government has based its decision.

First, Unesco is alleged to have become so politicized that it cannot adequately fulfill its original functions any more. That is true to some extent, except for the fact that the "politicization" of Unesco is neither new nor terribly surprising for any international organization that consists of governments and is thus bound to mirror the many and deep cleavages of today's world. It is even less surprising in an organization that deals with something that is, in any society, as sensitive and value-laden as education and culture. Who would ever realistically expect such an organization to operate safely outside of the "hot and cold winds of politics"? But there are, of course, different kinds of "politicization", and some we like better than others. Remember when this country, for twenty years, tried by every possible means to keep Mainland China out of the UN? Or when it was the staunchest supporter of West Germany's "Hallstein Doctrine" which tried, for many years successfully, to keep East Germany out of international circulation? Was Unesco not "politicized" then? And is it really surprising that the Unesco of our days reflects, just as any other international body, the deep and bitter

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cleavages that threaten to tear the Middle East apart? To deplore the politicization of Unesco means little as long as every party involved, this country not excluded, seems set on sustaining and aggravating rather than overcoming these cleavages. In fact, if there is anything remarkable about Unesco under these circumstances, it is that a very respectable amount of good and important work keeps getting done in spite of the pervasive international atmosphere of conflict and threat that has been characteristic of these last few decades.

Second charge: Unesco is operating inefficiently and wastefully, and we ought not to be the major supporter of a mushrooming international bureaucracy that practices, in the words of the State Department spokesman, "unrestrained budgetary expansion". True again, up to a point. There is waste in Unesco, as there is in any large bureaucracy, but the stories are vastly exaggerated. Rules against first-class air travel in Unesco are stricter than in US government travel regulations, and are enforced at least as strictly (and I have travelled a lot under both sets of rules). Given the enormous expansion in Unesco membership over the last twenty years -- from some twenty member states in the early sixties to 161 now -- as well as the constantly growing list of responsibilities, many of them added with the votes of the U.S., the growth of the organization's secretariat and budget has been comparatively modest. The last Unesco budget, which the U.S. decided to vote against, showed an increase in real terms of 6%. By comparison, the United States' own federal budget this year exceeds last year's budget by 10.8%. Just the other day, President Reagan's own commission on cost reduction has come to the conclusion that, in the words of the commission's chairman, "the government is run horribly", and that over \$424 billion could be saved over three years if it were run more efficiently. (That amount, incidentally, would be enough to cover the U.S.' annual contribution to the Unesco budget for just about the next thousand years...). The U.S. government, in other words, seems a rather odd candidate for leading a worldwide crusade against bureaucratic waste and inefficiency.

But let's look at the other side of the waste argument. Is Unesco really delivering its money's worth to its member states? That's a hard question to answer concisely, but let me try. In many respects, the answer would have to be in the negative, and I have myself been, from both within and outside the organization, one of the persistent critics of many aspects of Unesco's performance. Projects tend to take forever to move from the drawing board towards implementation and, once there, are implemented hastily and often imperfectly; enormous amounts of time are spent quibbling over what appear to be semantics; many meetings produce noble rhetoric and not much else; slogans ("non-formal education", "endogenous development", "integrated development strategies") often become substitutes for solid, down-to-earth work on real problems. All of that is true, at least some of the time, and all of that is annoying not only to those member states who, like the U.S., pay for most of Unesco's operations, but also to the poorer countries who are at the receiving end of these services and who badly need better assistance than they are often getting from the international community, through Unesco or otherwise. The fact that quite a bit of this slack is a function of working with administrative styles as different as those of Saudi-Arabia, France, Colombia and the Mongolian People's Republic, or of working in six official languages (Arabic, Chinese,

English, French, Russian, and Spanish) is relevant, but makes the failures no less annoying.

And yet: Right beside some of the more questionable accomplishments of Unesco stands an amazing amount of good, imaginative, and useful work in the service of improving the pursuit of education, science, and culture both in needy countries and in the international community as a whole: Work on improving, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, the educational opportunities for those groups whom worldwide "progress" has left behind: women, rural populations, non-literates; developing affordable and innovative programs for the teaching of science and technology; upgrading the professional qualifications of educational administrators; developing and sustaining a wide range of international documentation and information services from the Unesco Statistical Yearbooks to degree equivalency information to inventories of copyright laws to the International Oceanographic Data Exchange System; providing (badly needed) professional guidance for the development assistance programs of the large international donor organizations (World Bank, UNDP, regional development banks); supporting scientific exchange on terrestrial and marine resources and developing corresponding programs in environmental education; preserving endangered cultural heritage not only by physically saving the temples of Abu Simbel, but also by helping countries to revitalize their cultural traditions through their schools, their adult education programs, and -- yes -- their media.

And that leads us right to the third issue which has spoiled the relationship between this country and Unesco perhaps more than anything else: the alleged role of Unesco in endangering the freedom of the media and the press under the auspices of a "new world information and communication order" (Resolution 4/19, VI of the 21st General Conference of Unesco). Unfortunately, this is also the issue about which the greatest amount of distorted and misleading information has been spread around -- both by Unesco officials and by the Western media which, in this particular case, are not just "media" of information, but very much a party to the issue. The result of all of this has been an incredible oversimplification of one of the most complex and important issues of our time: the relationship between information and power, and the right of societies as well as individuals to have reasonably equitable access to both the sources of information and to the means of disseminating it. That there is a problem of inequity and concentration in today's media world can hardly be denied: The vast majority of the worldwide flow of news information is firmly in the hands of a handful of news agencies in North America and Western Europe; there is one copy of a newspaper for every third inhabitant in the industrialized part of the world, as compared to one copy for every thirty people in developing countries, not to mention differences in editorial resources, production technology, and means of circulation. For all our cherished and (on the whole) well-earned reputation of a free press, there is a very lopsided pattern of ownership, resources, and content when it comes to the existing international system of communication and information. Is it surprising that countries who feel disadvantaged in that system, who see foreign news agencies in control of the news they receive of the world and who feel frustrated over the difficulty of sharing with the outside world their own problems, turn to Unesco for help and

remedy? Given the state of the world, and the deeply entrenched international interests in the business of news, this was bound to generate controversy and opposition from precisely those quarters who stand to lose most from a change in the status quo -- even though, it should be noted, the "communications" sector of Unesco's work accounts for less than ten percent of the organization's activities and budget. Once again: The way in which some of Unesco's officials have chosen to address this issue has been just as irresponsible as the indignant outcry in the West over impending doom to the freedom of the press. What was and remains called for is a much more patient and differentiated international effort to bring about greater equity in both the gathering and the dissemination of news; by leaving the one organization that has at least the structural capacity of helping in this task, the U.S. would be effectively abandoning this effort.

I have called the American government's decision to leave Unesco unwarranted and imprudent, and I have indicated why. But what is the alternative? For the U.S. and Unesco to carry on business as usual can not be the answer; while the problems that have arisen between the two are not serious enough to warrant separation, they certainly call for a good deal of soul-searching on both sides. For a start, here is a set of suggestions for each side.

Where Unesco is concerned, there is, first, an urgent need to re-think the scope of the organization's work, and to concentrate on those areas where the organization can most effectively serve as an instrument of assistance, communication, and cooperation. I am referring particularly to the organization's tendency to include in its operations the full range of "development" issues ("Reflection on World Problems", "Action for Development", etc., in the language of Unesco's most recent Medium-Term Plan), over and beyond its charter concerns in the fields of education, science, and culture. I am sympathetic to the argument that one cannot adequately deal with, for example, education without seeing it in the context of the overall dynamic of social change and development, but that kind of "contextual perspective" should be part of Unesco's work in education, rather than give rise to a major separate program item on "world problems". It is hard to bring 161 member states to reduce rather than to keep expanding its collective agenda, but it is vital for Unesco's health and effectiveness to face the problem of choice, and to concentrate its energies and resources.

Secondly, Unesco (as all other UN organizations) should institutionalize a mandatory and regular turnover of its professional staff. Far too many of Unesco's staff have grown roots at Place Fontenoy in Paris, and have become stale and unimaginative in the process, depriving the organization of the necessary infusion of new ideas and fresh energies through new staff. UN salaries and benefits are comfortably high, and should easily provide departing staff with a cushion of resources while, presumably with the help of their government that sent them to Unesco in the first place, they try to relocate.

Third, Unesco (and this again applies to other UN organizations as well) needs more awareness in both its decision bodies (General Conference and Executive Board) and its secretariat of the need for minority protection. I am not talking about such things as veto rights, but about

procedural safeguards that assure particularly careful deliberation where any member state (or any group of member states) considers its vital interests and values affected. There is no protection against the possible abuse of such an arrangement, any more than against the abuse of the veto in the UN Security Council, but it's certainly worth a serious try.

For the U.S., a number of steps appear similarly essential if it is to maximize its future impact upon the course of Unesco's work. First, we urgently need a serious review of U.S. recruitment practices into international organizations in general, and into Unesco, in particular. In my experience, and a number of very notable exceptions notwithstanding, U.S. professional staff in Unesco does not even come close to reflecting the best in quality, experience, and skill that the professional community in this country has to offer. In all of Unesco's areas of activity, this country has a wealth of well-trained and experienced (if not always polyglot) professionals in academia, industry, and the media; very little of that is represented on the Unesco staff (or, for that matter, in U.S. delegations to Unesco's General Conference, as the Washington Post recently noted). I believe that this situation is a direct result of the way in which our State Department has for many years recruited UN personnel: preference is given to insiders of the Washington bureaucratic circuit, and no effort is made to generate a more wide-ranging professional talent roster from which convincing candidates for important vacancies can be drawn. Together with the propensity of most of Unesco's staff to hang on to their jobs as long as they can, this situation has made for a very thin and not very active line of communication between the professional community in the U.S. and the American staff in Unesco. Improving this situation -- through a revision of recruitment practices, more emphasis on foreign languages in professional training, and the introduction of such things as junior internships in Unesco -- is of the essence if the American presence in the day-to-day affairs of Unesco is to make a qualitative difference.

A second area where there is tremendous room for improvement in the U.S. is that of public knowledge about, and public interest in, Unesco. I know a good many countries around the world, but I know none where Unesco is as obscure an entity in public opinion as in this country. There is, of course, a hen-and-egg issue here: Do we know so little about Unesco because we are disenchanted with it, or are we disenchanted out of ignorance? It's perhaps a bit of both, but I would argue that a public that is both better informed about, and more interested in, the affairs of Unesco would contribute greatly to the democratic quality of our foreign policy process and of our relationship with Unesco. It is here that the U.S. National Commission for Unesco, quite unlike its counterparts in many other Western countries, has failed in one of its most important responsibilities. It would certainly help if our media could keep us better and more regularly informed instead of grinding their axe at the point of crisis; at the same time, there is much that our schools should and could do as part of opening up the study of history and society to the problems that lie outside of this country's frontiers.

Thirdly, however, and perhaps most importantly, this country will have to learn better how to live with a world of both friends and enemies without either rattling its saber or sulking behind its own shores each time we don't like what the rest of that world is doing to us. We will continue to face situations in which we get outvoted in international bodies and in which we vigorously disagree with the majority; to minimize the number of those situations and to cope better with them when they do arise will require more patience and diplomatic skill, a better understanding of this world's affairs and, above all, a little more humility.

Mr. YATRON. Our next witness is Mr. Keith Geiger.

**STATEMENT OF KEITH GEIGER, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION**

Mr. GEIGER. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, we are grateful for the opportunity to present testimony today and we are pleased that the subcommittees are examining U.S. participation in UNESCO. You are familiar with the National Education Association and its activities in general.

However, you may not be aware of our active and long-term interest in UNESCO and its programs. At the close of World War I, NEA urged U.S. participation in the League of Nations and called for the formation of an international commission on education.

During World War II, NEA proposed that international education programs be part of a worldwide effort to maintain peace once it had been achieved. In 1943, NEA called for the establishment of an international agency for education comprised of all nations to be dedicated to the development of international understanding for education and cultural cooperation.

In 1944, NEA proposed that such an organization be initiated within the framework of the United Nations, which it has had not yet come into being.

NEA became a consultant to the U.S. delegation at the San Francisco conference where the U.N. Charter was adopted, and worked with both Houses of Congress to assure that international education and cultural cooperation would be included among the charges to the United Nations.

NEA Executive Secretary William G. Carr was named as Deputy Secretary General of the 1945 London Conference and served as the staff coordinator of the committee appointed to write the preamble and the purposes of the constitution of UNESCO.

NEA has been a member of the commission since its founding, and NEA's current president has been a member of the commission since 1981.

We are also involved in UNESCO's program as the largest national affiliate of an international organization known as the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, known as WCOTP.

It is composed of approximately 145 national teacher organizations from nearly 90 nations around the world with a total membership in excess of 7 million educators. NEA looks to UNESCO as an important means to address the world problem of undereducated or illiterate children.

It is estimated that 121 million children between the ages of 6 and 11 do not today attend school. Along with WCOTP, NEA has consulted with UNESCO on programs to revise curricula to make them more relevant to cultural realities, to improve teacher training programs and create programs to improve the status of teachers, to increase the degree of consultation by teacher organizations in educational program planning and coordination.

At the December 1983 meeting of the U.S. National Commission, our representative, President Mary Futrell, voted with the majority to recommend that the United States remain within UNESCO,

suggesting that the problems which apparently do exist between the administration and UNESCO could be resolved while America remains a member.

The December statement of the U.S. National Commission recognized that disharmony does exist, but it urged the exercise of positive American leadership in UNESCO affairs in place of the reactive, damage-limiting stance we have so often adopted.

The statement also called for the State Department to develop regularized channels of consultation with the Director-General of UNESCO in order to make continued U.S. participation mutually valuable and productive.

We recognize that UNESCO is not a perfect organization. We have studied the available documentation concerning the Reagan administration's criticism of the organization and its secretariat.

NEA and many of the nongovernmental organizations which work closely with UNESCO believe that it moves too slowly, and it has too many levels of review. However, we join these organizations in support of the vital programs of UNESCO. We have no doubt that the nongovernmental organizations would support reforms which address managerial and administrative problems.

We have read recent exchanges of communications between the Director-General of UNESCO and the State Department, and were struck by the fact that we have never seen a document from the White House or the State Department to the Director-General telling him precisely what the administration views as inadequacies which must be remedied in order for the United States to remain as a participating member of UNESCO.

We look upon the failure of the State Department to provide the specifics of the administration's complaints to UNESCO's Director-General as a serious error of diplomacy if, indeed, our ultimate flat objective is to reform UNESCO rather than to leave it.

The National Education Association has been supportive of UNESCO's education programs and we urge Congress to assure continued U.S. funding for the United Nations and its specialized agencies, including UNESCO.

We have urged and supported WCOTP activities to help UNESCO foster improvement of educational programs in many lands. We have consulted with UNESCO officials, and have assisted in the drafting of plans for the Education for All Programs.

We believe that no substitute program exists to successfully address the educational needs of the world's children in the absence of UNESCO. We have, therefore, consistently urged that the United States remain in UNESCO while seeking sufficient remedies to any shortcomings which exist.

In order to resolve the dilemma surrounding UNESCO, we would offer the following alternative to the present U.S. position.

No. 1, the State Department should formally present the Director-General of UNESCO with a list of concerns regarding UNESCO and reforms which must be addressed by the organization as a condition of U.S. continuation within UNESCO.

No. 2, the formal notice of the United States that it intends to withdraw from UNESCO on December 31, 1984, should be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the General Accounting Office study of UNESCO, the issuance of findings from these subcommit-

tee hearings, and the submission of the formal set of conditions by the State Department.

No. 3, before the State Department may reinstate the required notice of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO to become effective on December 31, 1985, there must be direct consultation with the UNESCO Secretary General regarding reforms as set down in the conditions.

No. 4, during the intervening months, the State Department should engage in regular consultations with the Director-General regarding matters over which he exercises control in an effort to resolve the disputed items.

No. 5, Congress should continue to provide oversight on this time schedule and activities.

We thank you for the opportunity to present our views today. NEA, therefore, affirms our support for the statement by the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO on December 16, 1983, that continued U.S. membership in UNESCO is in the national interest.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Geiger's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEITH GEIGER, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairmen Yatron and Fascell, Members of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcommittee on International Relations: We are grateful for the opportunity to present testimony today and we are pleased that your Subcommittees are examining U.S. participation in UNESCO.

You are familiar with the National Education Association and its activities in general, and I am confident that you are aware that we are an organization of nearly 1.7 million American educators. You may not be aware of our active and longterm interest in UNESCO and its programs.

NEA's historical interest

At the close of World War I, during its July 1919 convention in Milwaukee, the NEA urged U.S. participation in the League of Nations and called for the formation of an International Commission on Education.

Again, during World War II, NEA advanced the view that international education programs must be part of a worldwide effort to maintain peace once it had been achieved. In May of 1943 NEA's Educational Policies Commission published a document, Education and the People's Peace, which proposed the establishment of an international agency for education comprised of all nations and dedicated to the development of

international understanding through education and cultural cooperation. In 1944 NEA proposed that such an organization be initiated within the framework of the United Nations, which itself had not yet come into being. NEA became a consultant to the U.S. delegation at the San Francisco conference where the U.N. Charter was adopted, and worked with both Houses of Congress to assure that international education and cultural cooperation would be included among the charges to the United Nations.

The manner in which these educational responsibilities would be advanced within the United Nations was to be determined at a Special Conference held in London in 1945. The NEA Executive Secretary, Dr. William G. Carr, was named as the Deputy Secretary General of the London Conference and served as the staff coordinator of the committee appointed to write the Preamble and the Purposes of the Constitution of the new specialized agency given the name United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization--UNESCO. The United States formed the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO in 1946. NEA has been a member of the Commission since its founding, and NEA's current President, Mary Hatwood Futrell, has been a member of the Commission since 1981.

We are also involved in UNESCO's program through our association as the largest national affiliate of an international organization known as the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession--WCOTP. Again, we were instrumental in forming this international organization

during the 1950's and its Secretariat was housed in the early days here in Washington. Now headquartered in Morges, Switzerland, WCOTP is composed of approximately 145 national teacher organizations from nearly 90 nations around the world, with a total membership in excess of 7 million educators. WCOTP has Class A consultative status with UNESCO in Paris and the WCOTP representative is Vice-President (and predicted to be elected in June as President) of all nongovernmental organizations with consultative status to UNESCO.

NEA's interest in UNESCO continues

NEA believes that educational and cultural cooperation within a world forum is an essential element in the quest for stability and peace among nations. We are convinced that poverty, lack of development, lessened quality of life, and illiteracy are the bases of revolution and war. The degree of illiteracy in the world is staggering. Most recent estimates indicate that this year 123 million children from age 6 to 11 will not be enrolled in even the most primitive of schools. In excess of 900 million children and adults are illiterate throughout the world. It is a problem, one of many, which is global in scope. As we address the problems of poverty and lack of economic, social, and cultural development it is inescapable that without education too many children will remain in poverty, and their parent nations impoverished.

And so NEA looks to UNESCO as an important means to address the problems of children. Our participation, as outlined above, is broad and continuous. Along with WCOTP, NEA

has consulted with UNESCO on programs to revise curriculum to make it more relevant to cultural realities; to improve teacher training programs and create programs to improve the status of teachers; to increase the degree of consultation by teacher organizations in educational program planning and coordination; and to increase national dedication to the education of women and rural populations. These are but a few of the matters involving international education cooperation where UNESCO has been the vehicle to unite activities for improving education.

One program should be mentioned separately.

The Education For All program, approved within the budget and program of the UNESCO Medium Term Plan for 1984-89, is under way. Its goal is the elimination of illiteracy by the year 2000. The program has two major thrusts: (1) basic universal primary education of all children, and (2) adult literacy instruction which will focus on women, minorities, the handicapped, and persons from rural areas. Regional consultations have been held for Latin America and the Caribbean; ministers of education from the African nations have begun their work; and an Asian consultation is in the planning process. A proposal is before the Secretariat of UNESCO to convene a major conference in 1986-87 to concentrate upon the matter of resources needed to complete the planned elimination of illiteracy. The conference would include educators, their organizations, education ministers, and representatives of other international organizations such as

the World Bank. NEA is proud that the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession has assisted in drafting this Education for All program.

NEA views the current controversy

In December 1983, at the meeting of the U.S. National Commission, our representative, President Mary Futrell, voted with the majority to recommend that the U.S. remain within UNESCO, suggesting that the problems which apparently do exist between the Administration and UNESCO can and should be resolved while America retains its membership.

The December statement of the U.S. National Commission recognized that disharmony exists. But it urged "the exercise of positive American leadership in UNESCO affairs in place of the reactive, damage-limiting stance we have so often adopted." The statement also called for the State Department "to develop regularized channels of consultation with the Director General of UNESCO in order to make continued U.S. participation mutually valuable and productive." The statement, which was adopted by 41-8, is appended to this testimony.

NEA has participated in the review of UNESCO by the U.S. National Commission and the recent interagency review as requested by the Departments of Education and State. On all these occasions, NEA has indicated that our interest is the children, their future, and the enhanced stability of nations through education. In each case we have urged continued

UNESCO participation by the United States in these most important programs.

We recognize that UNESCO is not a perfect organization. We have studied the available documentation concerning the Reagan Administration's criticism of the organization and its Secretariat. NEA and many of the nongovernmental organizations which work closely with UNESCO believe that it moves too slowly, has too many levels of review. They and we are sometimes frustrated with the apparent problems of bureaucracy. However, these same organizations and NEA argue in support of the programs of UNESCO, which we all deem to be vital. We have no doubt that the nongovernmental organizations would support reforms which address managerial and administrative insufficiencies.

Additional concerns have from time to time been expressed through State Department officials. Our information about these concerns is only hearsay knowledge gained from a study of the documents provided to Congress. We have read the exchanges of communications between the Director General of UNESCO and the State Department, and were struck by the fact that we had never seen any recent document from the White House, or the State Department, to the Director General telling him precisely what the Administration views as inadequacies, a bill of particulars of what must be remedied in order for the U.S. to remain as a participating member of UNESCO.

NEA was recently informed that such a document existed and had been transmitted to the Director General. We view this as an extremely helpful step. However, upon finding that the Director General had received no such communication, we pursued a response from State Department officials. Had they given the Director General a bill of particulars, a list of demands?

We don't know what to make of the response from Jean C. Bergaust, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs (copy appended). In it you will note the passage, and I quote, "We have not and do not intend to present UNESCO with a formal list of demands as we believe UNESCO reforms are a matter between the body of member states and the Secretariat" (emphasis added).

The State Department refers to the "Western Information Group" which is assembling a paper of concerns to be provided to the UNESCO Director General. The Western Information Group is, we believe, composed of representatives from the OECD countries and therefore would include a U.S. representative. The chairperson of this group is the UNESCO Ambassador from Greece. The Information Group has not threatened to withdraw from UNESCO, the United States has. It appears to be convoluted logic for Information Group to speak for the United States government in a matter of such importance.

We look upon the failure of the State Department to provide the specifics of the Administration's complaints to UNESCO's Director General as a serious error in diplomacy, if

indeed our ultimate national objective is to reform UNESCO rather than to leave it.

CONCLUSION

The National Education Association has been supportive of UNESCO's education programs through its participation within the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. We have worked with Members of Congress to assure continued U.S. funding for the United Nations and its specialized agencies, including UNESCO. We have urged and supported activities within the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession which have assisted UNESCO in bringing improvement of education programs to the children of many lands. We have consulted with UNESCO officials and have assisted in the drafting of plans for the Education For All program. We believe that no substitute program exists to successfully address the educational needs of the world's children in the absence of UNESCO. We have therefore consistently urged that the United States remain in UNESCO while seeking sufficient remedies to any shortcomings which may exist.

RECOMMENDATIONS

NEA suggests the development of an alternative to the present United States position on UNESCO. This alternative should have a number of elements.

1. The State Department should formally present the Director General of UNESCO with a list of concerns regarding UNESCO and reforms

which must be addressed by the organization as a condition of U.S. continuation within UNESCO.

2. The formal notice of the United States that it intends to withdraw from UNESCO on December 31, 1984, should be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the General Accounting Office study of UNESCO, the issuance of findings from these Subcommittee hearings, and the submission of the formal set of conditions by the State Department.
3. Before the State Department, with the approval of the President, may reinstate the required notice of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, to become effective on December 31, 1985, there must be direct consultation with the UNESCO Secretary General regarding reforms as set down in the conditions.
4. During the intervening months, the State Department should engage in regular consultations with the Director General regarding matters over which he exercises control in an effort to resolve the disputed items.
5. Congress should continue to provide oversight of this time schedule and activities.

The work of UNESCO is important to the enhancement of the quality of life for the children of the world. The improvement of education programs and the elimination of illiteracy are possible if the United States and other nations remain committed to international consultation and cooperation toward that end. NEA therefore affirms our support for the statement by the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO on December 16, 1983, that "continued U.S. membership in UNESCO is in the national interest."

We thank you for the opportunity to present our views today.

Resolution on US-UNESCO relations, passed 41 to 8, at the annual meeting of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, December 16, 1983.

The U. S. National Commission for UNESCO assembled at its 47th session:

Reaffirming its support for the objectives set forth in the Constitution of UNESCO;

Believing also that UNESCO best fulfills its mandate when it helps all nations benefit from advances in education, science, culture, communications and the humanities;

Concerned that the human resources available to UNESCO, both in member state delegations and in the secretariat, have diminished over the past decade;

Convinced that the Organization's effectiveness has been impaired by discordant debates on extraneous political issues and by the proliferation of contentious programs which have contributed to an unreasonable increase in its budget;

Noting that strong American leadership and a certain spirit of accommodation shown by the 22nd General Conference of UNESCO made possible the development of a consensus more consistent with U.S. views on important aspects of several contentious issues, especially in the field of communications;

Considering that, however imperfectly, UNESCO as a world forum does reflect the reality of world conditions and attitudes;

Having conducted its own thorough review of U.S. relations with UNESCO at the request of the Department of State, in the course of which the Commission received the views of a representative cross section of non-governmental organizations; and

Having conveyed the results of the review to the Department of State in a letter from the Chairman dated November 8, 1983;

1. Concludes that continued U.S. membership in UNESCO is in the national interest;
2. Calls for the exercise of positive American leadership in UNESCO affairs in place of the reactive, damage-limiting stance we have so often adopted;
3. Urges the Department of State to develop regularized channels of consultation with the Director General of UNESCO in order to make continued U.S. participation mutually valuable and productive.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 11, 1984

Dear Ms. Futrell:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 26, 1984 to Assistant Secretary Newell concerning our representations to UNESCO.

As you may have noted in the U.S./UNESCO Policy Review, the U.S. has made UNESCO aware on several occasions over the past 18 months and particularly during the six month policy review of our concerns about politicization, statist solutions to problems, and budget and management issues. Many of the same concerns have been raised by the Western Information Group in Paris, in which we actively participated in a paper that is being transmitted to the Director General. We have not and do not plan to present UNESCO with a formal list of demands as we believe UNESCO reforms are a matter between the body of member states and the Secretariat. In this regard, we note that other geographic groups, in addition to the Western Group, have been meeting to discuss reforms in UNESCO.

Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,



Jean C. Bergaust
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Organization Affairs

Ms. Mary Hatwood Futrell
President
National Education Association
1201 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Geiger, how many members belong to your organization and what plans do you have to educate your members about the serious and negative consequences of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO?

Mr. GEIGER. We have approximately 1.7 million members in every State in the United States. We have regular publications, both to our elected leaders and to our membership in general.

As I indicated, our president is a member of that commission. We will inform them through our communications of the serious consequences of withdrawal. We have already begun that.

We will continue to do so. We also work through the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession. And I might add the National Education Association in that organization provides about 40 percent of its budget and we have much, much less in the way of representation in that world organization.

I believe that is the glorious penalty for being from the United States. That is one of the things we have. We have the financial support for an organization such as that, and it does tremendous good for a lot of the other countries.

Mr. YATRON. Does the NEA have any international relations section? If so, how does it operate, and is this a vehicle for educating your membership about UNESCO?

Mr. GEIGER. Yes. We have an international understanding commission, and an international understanding staff of four or five people. We work regularly—in fact, the staff person in charge of international understanding probably would have testified today, but he is in one of the European countries working with our WCOTP group.

So we do have a staff and a task force, and we are able to communicate through those groups to our membership and also to the other world organization.

Mr. YATRON. In your statement you refer to NEA's work for children. What specifically does NEA do for children?

Mr. GEIGER. Obviously we are the teachers in the classrooms and the support personnel. We work with all of the different countries.

In fact, we send staff people and we send elected leaders to a lot of the other countries, specifically the Third World countries, to work with the developing nations in their education programs.

They send groups to the United States, and they tour the State Department, they come to the NEA building, they ask us for the kinds of materials we use to develop better teaching techniques for our teachers and better learning techniques for our children.

So we provide staff and leaders, not only in this country to conduct workshops, but we have one of our former staff people presently in Africa, working with the African Teachers Federation right now developing materials for the children in the classrooms.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Geiger.

Dr. Weiler, you say that the education sector absorbs 33 percent of UNESCO's program expenditure and about 22 percent of staff; is that correct?

Mr. WEILER. That is correct.

Mr. YATRON. Of the three major educational programs that you mentioned, which is the largest and which is the most important?

Mr. WEILER. The largest in terms of budget, if we take that as a measure of importance, is education for all, the first program that I described, which is particularly concerned with the expansion of primary education and with programs to eliminate illiteracy.

Mr. YATRON. The administration criticizes UNESCO for politicizing almost every issue and in particular UNESCO's allocations to disarmament studies, refugee education and human rights. Now, a staff study mission has found that these education programs form a small segment of UNESCO's overall education effort. Do you agree with this?

Mr. WEILER. Yes, I do, indeed. In comparison with the resources that are allocated to programs such as the ones that I have mentioned to expend universal primary education, combat illiteracy and so on—those are miniscule in terms of the budget resources that are invested.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Chairman Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask each of you gentlemen if you have seen any of the booklets that are used in any of the major education programs for raising literacy and eradicating illiteracy?

Mr. WEILER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. You have seen them. Tell me about one of them. What is the content? Let me tell you what I am looking for.

When I first came to the Congress we voted some funds for Nicaragua. I certainly felt that we ought to try to help bring a friend into the fold.

At that time we thought it might be a friend. As I recall, we built a lot of schools in Nicaragua. And Cuba sent all the teachers.

I think if I had to do it over again, I would do it in reverse. I would have the United States send the teachers and let somebody else build the schools. What I am saying is that I support the educational efforts of UNESCO.

But some of the documents indicate that even some of these efforts may not be in our best interests. So with that in mind, tell me what is in those books and how they are laid out.

Mr. WEILER. The material I have seen, and that reflects to some extent my own interests, have been conspicuous for one thing, and that has been the attempt to relate the learning of reading and writing to the typical pursuits of the local community in which the learner resides and works.

In other words, those have been materials that have tried to use examples from the agricultural life of a rural community as a vehicle of building up vocabulary, of building up a capacity to read and write.

If there is one thing about the material, or about much of the material, that has been prepared for literacy campaigns under UNESCO auspices, it is this effort, not just to convey skills of reading and writing, but to integrate those skills into day-to-day pursuits of the people who are supposed to learn to read and write in terms of their agricultural pursuits.

Mr. MICA. Specifically, is it politicized?

Mr. WEILER. Most of the material that I have seen is not.

Mr. MICA. The fact that the—I don't know his title—Assistant Director General for Education is a Soviet has had no effect on the pamphlets, the materials, the literature?

Mr. WEILER. I am sure the fact that the Assistant Director General for Education is a Soviet Russian has had an influence on the overall activities of the education sector. There is no question about that. I do not think it has had an impact on the literature that has been prepared under UNESCO auspices for literacy training.

Mr. GEIGER. I cannot speak to the materials because I have not seen them. I can relay an incident which happened last fall, which I think goes along with what you said, which is kind of interesting.

The staff person that I indicated probably would have been here today was on a mission to El Salvador last fall. When he came back he said one of the things that really startled him as he talked to the people in El Salvador was the question they asked: Why is it that the United States always sends us guns and ammunition and Cuba sends us schoolteachers?

It goes with what you are saying. If in fact that is true, or if they think that is true, that is rather scary as to their perception of us versus some other countries.

But I cannot speak to the textbook issue. I have not seen them.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, sometime before these hearings are over, maybe we could get the staff to get us legitimate examples, not prejudiced one way or the other, of what these textbooks contain. I have heard comments—that I ought to take a look at some of the literature we are paying for, and I don't know whether there is any truth to that charge.

You say stay in. Suppose I told you we have about \$25 million over 2 years that we put into education programs in UNESCO and I am going to introduce a bill tomorrow to give that \$25 million directly to the NEA and let NEA carry out Third-World programs.

Do you think you could do a better job?

The reason you favor staying in is because the money is now in that pot, but if you had the money in another pot, could you do the job?

Mr. GEIGER. Obviously I think the NEA could do a better job, but that is not an accurate statement.

I don't think any one organization can do a better job. I think it is our collective efforts. Our members say the same thing about the money that we put into the World Confederation. They say, keep that here, or we would use that for funding programs in some of the other countries rather than putting it into WCOTP where somebody else makes a decision as to where it is spent. But I think the problems of this shrinking world, and we all know it is shrinking.

I think it is the collective efforts and not efforts that we at the NEA might do or you as legislators.

I think we owe it to those countries to keep in and work with them and take care of the problems there. I don't think we could do it alone.

Mr. MICA. How about an end run as proposed by the administration? Let me explain. I intend to play the devil's advocate on all sides of this issue. Suppose we use a fund in trust mechanism whereby we would just give the money to a program to be adminis-

tered by UNESCO, where we could very directly delineate the programs that we were interested in giving funds for those and nothing else.

Mr. GEIGER. Do you want an honest answer?

Mr. MICA. Always.

Mr. GEIGER. It is the same administration that 2 or 3 years ago suggested that we go to block grants for education. Everybody knows the President's intent for block grants for education was to get the Federal Government out of education, period.

I think you can play all kinds of games that you want to, but I think I clearly know what this administration's intent is. It is to get out of it. We don't agree.

Mr. MICA. Well, let me go a little further, though.

Dr. Weiler, your comments too, please.

How about Peace Corps, AID, and the U.S. Information Agency? Tremendous abilities—at least one or two of them have been praised worldwide in the job they do. You don't think that we could do the job another way?

Mr. WEILER. I think there is a role for both of those types of organizations, Mr. Chairman. I think—and I have every respect, having worked with some of those organizations, myself—for the work they are doing.

But there is one very important difference between their work and the work of an organization like UNESCO. When you go to Mali, to Zambia, or Tanzania, U.S. AID is considered to be an American organization. UNESCO is considered to be their organization. From the point of view of credibility and legitimacy, UNESCO has a qualitative difference from the organization of foreign assistance of any one country, whether it is the United States, West Germany, or Great Britain.

I think this fact, that particularly the developing countries do consider UNESCO as their own organization, an organization in which they have a voice, does make a great deal of difference in the effectiveness of that organization.

There are things that UNESCO can do that U.S. AID cannot do, because they may be politically too sensitive, too controversial in the country.

Mr. MICA. I take it then that you feel on a worldwide basis there is a greater credibility to UNESCO than, say, bilateral approaches from America to the Third World nations.

Mr. WEILER. Yes.

Mr. MICA. How do you answer the concern raised by the administration that some \$200,000 is used for Palestinian education programs and less than \$60,000 for everything else? Is that correct? \$208,000 to \$63,000.

Mr. WEILER. I cannot verify the figures. Assuming that they are correct, then they do reflect the decision of the general conference of UNESCO since the budget allocations are a matter of the general conference.

So the question would be properly addressed to the general conference.

Mr. MICA. One last question. You are here to discuss the programs and I think you made a legitimate case for activities that the United Nations carries out in education. I have some concerns

about specific motives and so on, but have you looked at the complaints about budget expansion, the Director-General specifically, and politicization of the entire organization? Anti-U.S. bias seems to be proliferating.

I guess also the nepotism charges that are tied to the Director General—have you looked at these as separate issues, even though it shouldn't, directly affect the program, or does it?

Mr. GEIGER. Well, I think those are legitimate concerns.

As I indicated, the president of the NEA is a member of the U.S. Commission. I think those are legitimate concerns, but to say we are not going to deal with those concerns by working with whatever the governing body of that group is, and we are simply going to pull out, I think is the wrong way to do it. There is too much harm to be done by pulling out.

I think that needs to be dealt with, dealt with by the governing body. The fact that we have never seen the list of charges, of which at least supposedly there is one, means we are simply saying it is their problem, but we won't identify the specific issues.

I think we need to fight that battle, but I think we need to do it from within and not without.

Mr. WEILER. Mr. Chairman, I took the liberty of attaching to my statement, which deals with education, the text of another statement which I have made on a separate occasion in which I do address some of the issues you raise about politicization and management, and I draw the committee's attention to those points.

As I have said, it is very difficult for an organization that operates under a number of very difficult circumstances, such as operating in six different languages, to be quite as cost effective as organizations that do operate in one language.

From my personal experience, I consider the rather sweeping complaints about the management of UNESCO to be exaggerated. I very much appreciate the effort that the General Accounting Office is making in shedding light on this issue.

My expectation is that that review is not likely to produce startling results about mismanagement in UNESCO and will recognize, I am sure, that from the point of view of operating an organization such as UNESCO, under the kind of circumstances under which an international organization with 158 members operates, this is bound to be a rather costly and a rather cumbersome task.

I think many of the complaints about wastages and mismanagement have something to do with the nature of the organization and not so much with its administration.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I will defer.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Chairman Mica.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. In this country we largely operate with a single language and yet our budget went up over 10 percent last year compared to UNESCO's increase of over 6 or around 6 percent.

Do you think the case for California to secede from the Union is therefore stronger than the case for the United States to secede from UNESCO?

That was a gratuitous question. You need not answer it.

Mr. WEILER. I would read it as such.

Mr. LEACH. It has been pointed out that the Soviet Union has a high ranking representative in the Education Division of UNESCO and certainly I think we ought to recognize the Soviet Union is going to have a high ranking representative in every U.N. body. It is one of the members of the Security Council and the third largest economy in the world. But, from your perspective, Dr. Weiler, do you think if the United States withdraws, Soviet influence will therefore diminish, or do you think U.S. withdrawal implies of a lesser ability on the part of the United States to protect our interests? Can you comment on that?

Mr. WEILER. The only consequence that I would be able to predict with any degree of certainty is that the influence of the United States would diminish.

Mr. LEACH. And, if U.S. influence diminishes, does that not, by definition, imply that the influence of antagonists to the United States increases?

Mr. WEILER. It might increase, yes. But you suggested——

Mr. LEACH. I did not suggest anything. I asked a question.

Mr. WEILER. I think it is difficult to say what the departure of the United States would do to the internal power structure of UNESCO. I don't think it is an easy equation that whatever happens to the United States is automatically going to lead to——

Mr. LEACH. Certainly it is not a zero sum game. But it strikes a neutral observer, in looking at a situation involving an organization made up of many different interests, that if one of those interests preemptively leaves, the other interests will carry greater sway.

I personally have a hard time understanding how empty-chair diplomacy is going to be more effective than U.S. representation, particularly when we listened yesterday to the testimony of the last Reagan appointee to UNESCO in which he pointed out that at the last General Assembly the U.S. position basically prevailed in every single major area.

So the question I would then ask is, if the United States is not represented at the next General Conference, is the U.S. position as likely to prevail?

Mr. WEILER. Most certainly not.

Mr. LEACH. And administratively within UNESCO, if there is concern about the writing of, let's say, educational material, is there likely to be as great a counterweight of influence if there is no U.S. participation if there is an effort to politicize some of this material?

Mr. WEILER. I don't think there would be, sir. I fully concur that the influence, both in the general conference, and in the staff of UNESCO, the influence of the United States and the kinds of ideas that the United States has represented in UNESCO is clearly going to diminish if the United States were to depart.

This is not just a question of numbers. It is also a question of quality, the professional quality of the staff.

There are any number of instances I could cite where the presence and activities of individual members of the staff, American and otherwise, have made a tremendous impact on the day-to-day activities of the organization and on its success.

I argue in my statement that a great deal of attention ought to be paid on the part of the United States, not just to the numbers of staff members in the secretariat of UNESCO, but also to their qualifications.

Mr. LEACH. We have heard, presented before this committee, real concern about UNESCO's activities in the peace and disarmament area with the implication that this is a matter of Soviet influence. One of my questions is, since when have the issues of peace and disarmament been identified as Soviet concerns and not American concerns?

As I understand it, the NEA is for peace and it is for disarmament.

My concern here is, do we allow a preemptive U.S. withdrawal to suddenly allow peace and disarmament issues to be identified with the Soviet Union, and to imply they are issues with which the United States is not concerned?

I also have a specific question. Are there materials that reflect concern for peace and disarmament that somehow are contrary to the interests of the United States of America? I have not seen such. Are you aware of any?

Mr. WEILER. I am not, sir, not in that area. I personally feel that I can subscribe to virtually all of the materials and resolutions that UNESCO has made in that particular area.

Mr. GEIGER. I think the topic is a very interesting one. As you are well aware, we have produced some materials that certain people have described as being against the best interests of the United States. We don't believe they are. We believe they are good materials. We have had opportunities to speak to the education leadership of a lot of countries, including the Soviet Union, and we believe that peace and international understanding is an issue of all countries. It is an issue of all peoples. I believe it is an issue of all leaders. It is scary though to think we cannot get leaders to speak about it in the same terms we seem to sometimes want to speak about it.

But I think it is a concern of all of ours. I think I agree, if we pull out, it is going to look like we then are giving up that issue as one that we are concerned about, and we are very concerned about that.

Mr. LEACH. I have one last question. It goes back to the issues of history and legality. In 1946, when the United States joined UNESCO, that action was based upon a joint authorization of the U.S. House and Senate. My question is a procedural one, but it is one that is of real concern at this time because we are looking at an executive decision to leave UNESCO.

In your judgment, should a decision to leave UNESCO be one which the House and the Senate jointly authorize or should it be one of those areas of exclusive executive discretion?

Mr. WEILER. I am afraid, sir, I am not a constitutional lawyer, but as a political scientist at least it makes very good sense to me that decisions which have come about by virtue of a joint action of Congress should also be rescinded by the same kind of action.

Mr. GEIGER. We had some discussion of that just before we left to come over here with a couple of our lobbyists. I think I agree. If that is the way—I guess Carl Perkins might be the only one who

remembers back that far, so he might tell you how we got in, but if that is the way we got into it, it seems to me that would be the logical way that we ought to get out, rather than by Presidential edict.

Mr. LEACH. Well, there is a bill that has been introduced under my signature that calls for that. If I may ask, would you endorse that approach in terms of a potential amendment, for example, on the House floor to the Foreign Assistance Act? Does that seem reasonable?

Mr. GEIGER. I could not say our organization would endorse it because I have too many people who would then tell me why I made the wrong statement, but it sounds like it is a legitimate way to go, and we would surely take a close look at it.

Mr. WEILER. I would concur, sir.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Leach.

Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Gentlemen, I understand that Mr. Mica asked some of the questions I was interested in, but let me just say that I have here in front of me the U.S. UNESCO Policy Review, which was put out by the State Department on February 27, 1984. Let me just read you a couple of paragraphs and perhaps you could respond.

I wasn't here for all of your testimony, unfortunately.

Under "Alternatives in the Case of Withdrawal," on page 9, section (b): Even after leaving UNESCO, the United States could explore the possibility of providing conditional grants or funds in trust to UNESCO subsidiary organs."

It says:

Each of these institutes has its own governing or advisory board and thereby enjoys a limited autonomy from Paris Headquarters. A substantial United States contribution would help these organizations augment their scarce funds, enable us better to monitor the use made of U.S. funds, and demonstrate to the international community our continued interest in the legitimate work of UNESCO.

That was one of their recommendations.

And then further down, following that up, it says:

Non-governmental organizations with official affiliation with UNESCO might provide mechanisms for continued professional contact and financial aid. Among the most obvious organizations would be the International Council of Scientific Unions, the International Association of Universities, and the International Reading Association.

There is strong American representation on the governing boards of each of these organizations.

I think one of you gentlemen were alluding to that a little earlier.

What is your comment, either or both of you, on those two recommendations, or those alternatives?

Mr. GEIGER. Let me just take the International Council of Scientific Unions. I suspect if we would decide to withdraw from UNESCO and put some money in here, then at some point when whatever governing body of the International Council of Scientific Unions does something that we don't like, then we would make the decision to withdraw from there and put it into another group.

I am a strong believer in the Methodist Church. I believe in the church and I give to the church. But I have a sister who is a missionary in Africa. I suspect if I took all my money out of the Methodist Church and sent it directly to her, I would feel as though I am doing a better job for whatever it is, and I think that is what we are looking at here.

I mean, I think it is a copout. I think somebody is looking for a way to get out and put it into other groups, and if we don't like what they are doing, we pull out of those and put it into something else.

I believe UNESCO is a good organization. I think people who are trying to find other places where the money could do more good, I think it is a copout and I don't think that is the real reason why they want to put it elsewhere.

Mr. MICA. Would the gentleman yield?

What do you think is the real reason?

Mr. GEIGER. I am going to draw the fifth on that. I have thoughts, but I have made comments before that have been printed that I just as soon would not be printed.

So I would just as soon draw the fifth.

Mr. SOLOMON. The reason I pose these two questions is, the other day we were questioning Ambassador Hennelly and I said after he finished that we got the answer we were looking for. Then Congressman Pritchard followed up and asked if it is found advantageous to withdraw from UNESCO, then where do we go from here, how do we make UNESCO more effective? We don't just turn around and go back in, so are these alternatives? I was wondering—it may be a copout in your opinion, but would it be an alternative?

Is it something that we could do that would be effective?

Mr. WEILER. If I may, sir, I would not consider it as an alternative. I think there is every good reason for the United States to support more strongly than it has, and perhaps about as strongly as some other industrialized countries do, some of the specialized programs of the United Nations under funds in trust agreements or voluntary contributions.

I think this has been a very effective measure of contributing to the work of some of these programs in addition to the basic dues, the basic contribution to the day-to-day operation of the organization.

But I would consider it a violation of the spirit under which international organizations such as UNESCO have been organized to pick out those activities which one likes particularly and then only fund those, and not subject oneself to the democratic process of decisionmaking in the general conference which determines the expenditures and the budget for the organization as a whole, and makes it incumbent upon the member states to back up those majority decisions by their dues to the regular budget of the organization.

I would consider that truly as a violation of the principle of the organization of the United Nations, and therefore would not find it acceptable as an alternative posture of the United States with regard to UNESCO—much as I would appreciate and very strongly

recommend a further increase in the contribution of the United States to specific areas in which it has a particular interest.

It is a perfectly legitimate provision in the rules and procedure of the U.N. system that such funds-in-trust are possible and can be devoted to particular programs.

The International Institute for Educational Planning, of which I was in charge, was a beneficiary of quite a few of those contributions which member states made voluntarily, but this was over and above the regular contribution that was voted in the budget of UNESCO.

Mr. SOLOMON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Solomon.

Gentlemen, because we have four other witnesses, we will have to move ahead. Before we do this, though, I would like to ask Dr. Weiler one question. You may prefer to respond in writing at a later date. Chairman Mica also has several questions that he would like you to address later.

My question is, (1) are scholarships a part of UNESCO's education program and, (2), are a disproportionate number of scholarships given to African students in contrast to Asian and Latin American students?

[The following was subsequently submitted:]

RESPONSES BY HANS N. WEILER, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED IN WRITING

At the hearing before the two Subcommittees on April 26, 1984, I was asked to respond in writing to two additional questions in which the Subcommittees were interested. The questions and my answers follow.

QUESTION # 1: Are scholarships a part of UNESCO's education program? Are a disproportionate number of scholarships given to African students, in contrast to Asian and Latin American states?

ANSWER: Scholarships are a part of UNESCO's program in all sectors, including education. An overview of the number of fellowships and study grants awarded by UNESCO to nationals of member states in 1981, 1982, and 1983 is enclosed (Appendix I); this overview was provided by the UNESCO Secretariat through the Washington Liaison Office of UNESCO. Broken down by region, the largest share of fellowships has gone to Asia, although at a declining rate over the past three years (from 50% in 1981 to 39% in 1983). In percentage terms, Asia is followed by Africa (26% in 1983), the Arab states (17.5%), Europe (11.5%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (5.5%). There is no indication that African states were given a disproportionate share of fellowships, but it is noteworthy that Latin America has received a rather small portion of overall fellowship support.

QUESTION # 2: Could you briefly describe the work of the International Institute for Educational Planning? What is its budget? How big is the staff? Does it prepare publications? How many persons does it train every

year in educational planning and management? How are they selected? How is the program evaluated? How does the Institute relate to the International Bureau of Education that is based in Geneva?

ANSWER: Detailed information on the activities of the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is contained in the annual "Report by the Director on the Activities of the IIEP" to the Institute's Governing Board (for the latest report, see Document 22GB/4 of November 30, 1983), and in the biennial reports by the Institute's Governing Board to the UNESCO General Conference (the latest of which was submitted to the 22nd Session of the General Conference in 1983). The new Medium-Term of the IIEP covers the period 1984-1989 and is contained in Document IIEP/INF/84.1A. The following draws on this documentation in providing brief answers to the various parts of the question.

(a) The work of the IIEP

The IIEP was founded in 1963 as a joint initiative of the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, the French Government, and UNESCO, and was given special statutes which were to assure the Institute's professional autonomy in conducting research, training, and dissemination in educational planning and administration. In cooperation with institutions in UNESCO's member states, the Institute

- conducts research projects on key issues of educational planning (e.g., relationship between education and work, regional disparities in educational systems, methods of educational financing, the relationship

between educational planning, decision-making, and implementation, etc.);

- organizes training programs for educational planning personnel both at its Paris headquarters and in member states on a national or regional basis;
- has developed the leading international documentation center for the field of educational planning; and
- maintains a major program of publications in educational planning and related areas.

(b) The Institute's budget

The IIEP's budget for 1983 came to a total of \$2,465,505, of which \$1,780,000 or 72% were staff costs. This budget is covered primarily by an allocation from UNESCO's regular budget, which is voted by the General Conference and which, in 1983, amounted to 61.7% of the Institute's income, and by "voluntary contributions" by individual member states (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom) for another 30.8%. Attempts to solicit voluntary contributions from the United States have so far been unsuccessful.

(c) Staff

As of October 31, 1983, the staff of the Institute comprised 18 professionals, including the Director (Sylvain Lourie of France) and one member of the program staff from the U.S., and some 26 staff members in the General Service category.

(d) Publications

The IIEP publishes a wide variety of materials in the form of books, manuals, documents, research reports, training materials, working papers, etc. Its most successful series over the years have been the "Fundamentals of Educational Planning" of which over thirty titles have appeared so far. In many parts of the developing world, IIEP publications are the only materials available to educational planning and management personnel. In addition to regular lists of its own publications, the Institute publishes regular bibliographical listings of new international publications in educational planning.

(e) Training

The Institute organizes an Annual Training Program in Paris, shorter specialized courses, and individually tailored training programs. The 1982/83 Annual Training Program had an enrolment of 44 educational planners and administrators from a wide range of developing countries. The participants are nominated by their governments and are selected by the Institute according to their qualifications. Field visits to study educational planning in different member states are part of the program, and have included a very successful visit to the United States in 1981. In 1983, the IIEP organized three intensive training courses of shorter duration (in the Sudan, the Philippines, and Jamaica) and a larger number of specialized workshops, seminars, etc. Nineteen researchers, planners, and administrators from ten countries spent varying amounts of time at the Institute in 1983 as Visiting Fellows.

(f) Evaluation

The Institute's work is regularly assessed and evaluated by its own Governing Board, which is composed of senior educational experts from around the world and of representatives of the major institutions in the UN system. From time to time, specific activities of the Institute undergo separate evaluations by outside experts.

(g) Relationship with the International Bureau of Education (IBE)

As specialized institutions within the framework of UNESCO, the IIEP and the IBE maintain a close working relationship. While the IIEP specializes in the field of educational planning and administration and conducts its work primarily through research and training, the IBE covers a broader range of comparative educational issues, but concentrates on documentation and on the organization of the regular International Education Conferences.

APPENDIX I

Number of Fellowships and Study Grants Awarded by UNESCO
to Nationals of Member States (1981 - 1983), by Region

	Year	Number	Percentage
<u>North America</u>	1981	2	.2
	1982	1	.1
	1983	1	.1
<u>Latin America and Carribean</u>	1981	35	3.5
	1982	28	3.0
	1983	57	5.5
<u>Africa</u>	1981	193	20.0
	1982	266	30.0
	1983	286	26.0
<u>Asia</u>	1981	482	50.0
	1982	383	43.0
	1983	417	39.0
<u>Arab States</u>	1981	108	11.0
	1982	111	12.5
	1983	188	17.5
<u>Europe</u>	1981	146	15.0
	1982	99	11.0
	1983	122	11.5
TOTAL	1981	966	100.0
	1982	888	100.0
	1983	1071	100.0

Mr. YATRON. Chairman Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. What I will do, I am going to just state these for the record. The staff will give you the text of both of these questions and I would appreciate a written response as soon as possible. I believe that your answers would be helpful in preparing our analysis of the situation.

We would like a description of the work of the International Institute for Educational Planning. What is its budget?

How big is its staff?

What kind of publications are prepared?

How many people are trained every year in the educational training, planning and management?

How are they selected?

How is the program evaluated?

And, how is the Institute related to the International Bureau of Education of UNESCO that is based in Geneva?

I am not sure I understand the last one myself.

And, does the NEA get reports from UNESCO educational programs through its membership in the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Professions?

How frequent, how informative, and how detailed are these reports?

Do you have any input into the UNESCO policies and programs dealing with education.

And, finally, I would like to know what you are doing in a grass-roots way to make the American public, the teaching profession, NEA, and so forth, aware of the problems with UNESCO, your position and whether or not we should or should not withdraw.

I tell you, as an aside, that I don't believe that I have had a single letter asking us to stay in.

Mr. GEIGER. You are going to get all these questions to us in writing, I hope.

Mr. MICA. Yes.¹

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much Mr. Geiger, for appearing here today.

Our next panel is Dr. Walter Rosenblith, Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences; Dr. Harold Jacobson, director, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, and visiting fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars; Leonard Sussman, executive director of Freedom House; and Mrs. Terri Morton, chair, U.S. Committee for the International Council on Monuments and Sites.

We welcome all the witnesses. Our first witness will be Dr. Jacobson. Will you please proceed with your statement?

¹See app. 4 for Mr. Geiger's responses.

**STATEMENT OF HAROLD JACOBSON, PROGRAM DIRECTOR,
CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
VISITING FELLOW, WOODROW WILSON CENTER FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL SCHOLARS, AND PAST PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES ASSOCIATION ¹**

Mr. JACOBSON. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you on the impact on the social sciences in the United States of the U.S. decision to withdraw from UNESCO.

I am glad that you will be printing the written statement that I have given.

I would also ask your consent to include in the record a letter that I have sent along with several other persons who served as president of the International Studies Association on this subject. We sent the letter to Chairman Fascell of the full committee.

Mr. YATRON. Without objection, that will be included in the record.

[The information follows:]

¹ Professor Jacobson has published widely in the field of international law and organizations. See H. K. Jacobson, "Networks of Interdependence," New York; Alfred Knopf, 1979, 486 pp.; and R. W. Cox and H. K. Jacobson ed., The "Anatomy of Influence: Decision-making in International Organization," New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, 497 pp.

April 19, 1984

Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
2354 Rayburn Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Fascell:

As past and present presidents of the International Studies Association, we write out of concern about the United States declared intention to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. While we understand some of the reasons that have led the United States government to take this decision, we are concerned about the consequences of United States withdrawal from UNESCO, both for the ability of United States scholars in our field to pursue their work and more broadly for the position of the United States in world affairs.

The scholarly pursuit of international studies is rapidly developing in all areas of the world. It is important that U.S. citizens be in contact with and participate in this development. UNESCO can facilitate the creation of forums for indispensable exchanges of data, research findings, and views. Such exchanges are vital for the enrichment of scholarship in all countries, including the United States.

International studies require data from all over the world. Because of governmental controls and nationalism, it is increasingly difficult for scholars to obtain access to data in many parts of the world unless these data are gathered and made available through multilateral arrangements that insure local participation in all stages of the work. UNESCO can facilitate such joint efforts in a variety of ways.

We regret that UNESCO has not made the contribution that it could have made to the development of international studies. UNESCO has performed valuable services, particularly in assisting professional associations including our own, and in assisting the development of international studies in less developed countries. In earlier decades, UNESCO sponsored research that was important in the development of international studies. In recent years the social science budget has suffered from fragmentation and to some extent has been expended on work of marginal utility or dubious merit.

UNESCO should do more to promote the development of international studies. The question is will this goal be served by the United States, which has by far the largest international studies community in the world, withdrawing from the organization?

The United States receives many more direct benefits from UNESCO programs in fields other than the social sciences. Some of these benefits can be obtained only through continued United States participation in UNESCO. Should the United States jeopardize the continued realization of these benefits by withdrawing from UNESCO?

As professionals in international studies, we are acutely conscious of the important contributions of the United States to the creation and effective functioning of the multilateral institutions that have made possible vital international collaboration in the period since World War II. Would United States withdrawal from UNESCO serve to further international collaboration?

We do not believe the questions raised at the conclusion of the preceding three paragraphs have been convincingly answered in the affirmative. Only if they can be should the United States take any final decision to withdraw from UNESCO.

We strongly hope that UNESCO, with United States cooperation, will take steps to make it a more effective and useful organization. We strongly urge that the United States continue to be a member of UNESCO and strengthen its participation to insure that the organization fulfills its potential. We as individuals are willing to contribute in any appropriate way to this effort.

Sincerely yours,

Minos Generales
Wesley W. Posvar
Vernon Van Dyke
H. Field Haviland
William C. Olson
Robert C. North
Norman D. Palmer
Richard C. Snyder
William T. R. Fox
Alexander L. George

Kenneth E. Boulding
Vincent Davis
Herbert C. Kelman
Chadwick F. Alger
Ole R. Holsti
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Henry Teune
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Mr. JACOBSON. I would like to read a brief summary of my statement. I will make several of the points that are also included in the letter.

Although the benefits to the social sciences in the United States of U.S. membership in UNESCO are not as substantial as they once were, nor as we social scientists would like them to be—and I speak here as an individual social scientist, they nevertheless are important.

U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO would jeopardize further realization of these benefits, would make it difficult if not impossible for UNESCO to develop a stronger program in the social sciences, and might contribute to the development of trends that could pose very serious problems for U.S. social science and for the development of social sciences as scholarly discipline.

The benefits to social science in the United States of U.S. membership in UNESCO are both direct and indirect. Direct benefits accrue from the limited number of research projects and research colloquia and symposia that UNESCO sponsors.

U.S. scholars who participate in these activities gain access to data and to scholars from all parts of the world. Such access is extremely important to us. Another direct benefit that we receive is several of us use UNESCO publications.

The Social Science Committee of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO would like UNESCO to pursue a more active program of research in the social sciences, and it would also appreciate more symposia.

Would we continue to enjoy these direct benefits if the United States were to withdraw? We could, of course, continue to purchase UNESCO publications. Since a lot of the invitations to participate in UNESCO come on an individual basis, we could perhaps also continue to participate in those activities.

What we would lose, I think, by withdrawal from UNESCO—and this is an issue to which I believe the U.S. policy review has not paid sufficient attention—is that we would lose an ability to make a substantive contribution to the definition of the UNESCO program.

This could mean that these programs would provide fewer direct benefits than they now do to the United States. Moreover, since the United States has the largest social science community in the world, and by common agreement the most advanced social science, the definition of a UNESCO program would sorely miss the substantive contribution that the United States could make.

Could we find substitutes for UNESCO's fora and other arrangements that would enable us to achieve the direct benefits that we now gain? Obviously we could not continue to participate in the definition of UNESCO program. We could have several other arrangements for collaboration. There are some activities, though, that I think could not go on for us without the UNESCO imprimatur. It would be very difficult for us to have the kind of contacts that we have through UNESCO with certain Third World states and with scholars in Communist states without UNESCO.

The indirect benefits that accrue to U.S. social science are perhaps more important. They surely account for a larger portion of

the UNESCO annual program in the social sciences of roughly \$11 to \$12 million a year.

Most of this program is developed in the strengthening of social science globally, and to the strengthening of social science in the Third World. Social science in this country is greatly strengthened by strengthening social science abroad. Through strengthening social science more data became available to us and there are more scholars with whom to interchange ideas. I think there is also a broader case for the United States for the development of social science abroad.

Social science can provide objective empirical data by which the effects of private and public actions and policies can be judged. A strong social science within a country can contribute to the development of democracy, and to the quality of debate about public and private policies in that country.

The development of social science throughout the world can contribute to the realization of U.S. interests that are much more fundamental than the relatively narrow professional interests of U.S. social science.

UNESCO's main programs are devoted to the development of social science. They involve the subventions to international professional associations, and they involve making it possible for Third World scholars to come to these meetings. They involve direct assistance to Third World institutions and scholars.

U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO would substantially reduce the limited funds that are now devoted to these purposes. It would also reduce the opportunity for the United States to contribute to the definition of these programs.

There are problems in UNESCO's social science programs. They are both the responsibility of the United States and of UNESCO. Within UNESCO there has been an absence of leadership and a failure on the part of the UNESCO Secretariat to maintain high standards of scientific objectivity.

Within the United States there has been a basic failure to provide leadership within the social science community and to provide leadership in the definition of UNESCO programs.

I think it is especially important that the United States provide leadership in the coming years. There has been a debate in UNESCO about the indigenization of social science. It is not yet clear what this term means.

It is important that the United States contribute to defining what indigenization means. It must not be allowed to mean that social science is turned into pure ideology. It can legitimately mean that social science should be devoted to national concerns and that analyses should be conducted from the point of view of the national interests of the countries where the social science is located.

But it must also mean, that social science everywhere should continue to apply the universal standards of empirical evidence, and of proof, so that theories about causation will be well founded.

If the United States were not in a position to contribute to this debate, it would weaken social science throughout the world and would result in serious problems for U.S. social science.

I recognize that there are serious problems within UNESCO. I think that UNESCO, even with these serious problems, would be

vital to social science, and I think the United States is in a better position to deal with these serious problems and to contribute to the growth and betterment of social science as a member of UNESCO. Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

[Mr. Jacobson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAROLD K. JACOBSON, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, PROGRAM DIRECTOR AND RESEARCH SCIENTIST, CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, AND CURRENTLY A FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittees, I am grateful for this opportunity to testify before you on the prospective impact on social science in the United States of U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Although I speak as an individual social scientist, I do so from the vantage point of having served since 1980 as the representative of the American Political Science Association on the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, having been for almost a decade co-chair of a research committee of the International Political Science Association, and having served as President of the International Studies Association during 1982 - 1983. In addition, as a research scholar in the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan, I have participated in and directed several multi-national research efforts.

Although the benefits to social science in the United States of U.S. membership in UNESCO are not as substantial as they once were, nor as we social scientists would like them to be, they are nevertheless important. United States withdrawal from UNESCO would jeopardize further realization of the benefits that we now receive, would make it difficult if not impossible for UNESCO to develop a stronger program in the social sciences, and might contribute to the development of trends that could pose

serious problems for U.S. social science and for the development of the social sciences as scholarly disciplines.

The benefits to social science in the United States of U.S. membership in UNESCO are both direct and indirect. Direct benefits accrue from the limited number of research projects and research colloquia and symposia that UNESCO sponsors. United States scholars who participate in these activities gain access to data and to scholars from all parts of the world. Such access is extremely important for us.

Many of us study phenomena that occur in foreign countries. We cannot do this without data from these countries. Even for social scientists who are primarily concerned with phenomena that occur within the United States, data from other areas of the world are important so that the U.S. situation can be seen in a broader context. In many instances, obtaining access to data from foreign countries is becoming more and more difficult for U.S. scholars because of increasing nationalism and governmental controls in these countries. UNESCO can provide a framework within which data can be gathered on a collaborative basis and made available to all who might be interested. Some of the work that UNESCO has done on life quality during the past decade could be seen as fitting this pattern.

The social sciences, as other scholarly disciplines, develop through the interchange of ideas, concepts, and theories. UNESCO colloquia and symposia provide fora for such interchanges. In recent years U.S. social scientists have participated in and organized UNESCO sponsored conferences dealing with such topics as arms control and disarmament education and the future of the social sciences in North America. The second conference included papers by such U.S. social scientists

as Dr. Kenneth Prewitt, President of the U.S. Social Science Research Council.

The social science committee of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO has urged that UNESCO pursue a more active and extensive research program, as it did in the late nineteen-forties and early nineteen-fifties when UNESCO-sponsored research on international tensions and racism made major contributions to social science. The committee has urged UNESCO to inaugurate a major research program on migration. Migration affects countries throughout the world, and understanding the phenomenon of migration is important to the development of social science theory and to policy. The committee would also favor more meetings on substantive topics of concern to the U.S. social science community. If UNESCO were to expand these activities, it would increase the direct benefits that U.S. social science receives from UNESCO.

U.S. social scientists utilize and thereby directly benefit from several UNESCO publications. The World List of Social Science Periodicals and the World Directory of Social Science Institutions are examples. U.S. scholars also find UNESCO publications in substantive areas such as the impact of new communication technologies on education and communications in developing countries, project assessment and evaluation, and the status of women to be useful.

Some U.S. scholars find some issues of the UNESCO-edited International Social Science Journal useful. Whether or not it justifies its annual subvention of roughly a quarter million dollars is questionable. Articles in it are generally not of the quality of articles in the journals of U.S. or international professional associations, and there is little in

it that makes an original contribution to social science.

Social scientists in the United States would be able to obtain UNESCO publications whether or not the United States remained a member of the organization. Since invitations to participate in research projects and colloquia and symposia can be issued on an individual basis, U.S. social scientists might continue to be invited to participate in these activities even if the United States were not a member of UNESCO.

What the United States would lose by withdrawal from UNESCO would be a voice in the determination of the substantive content of the UNESCO programs. This could mean that these programs would provide fewer direct benefits to U.S. social science since there would be no direct way to express the interests of U.S. social science. Moreover, since the U.S. has the largest social science community and by common agreement the most advanced social science, the definition of the UNESCO program would sorely miss the substantive contribution that the U.S. could make.

Scholarly activities in the social sciences are organized by other international organizations than UNESCO, for instance the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, by international professional associations, as a result of bilateral agreements among governments, and as a consequence of ad hoc agreements among individual institutions and scholars. None of these other possibilities, however, provides a full substitute for the sponsorship of UNESCO. Its imprimatur is particularly important in dealing with scholars in the social sciences from many communist countries and from many Third World countries and makes possible collaboration that might not be possible under other auspices.

Indirect benefits accrue to U.S. social science from UNESCO's programs to facilitate the development of social science globally and especially in the Third World. These programs account for the bulk of the roughly eleven or twelve million dollars that UNESCO expends annually in the social and human sciences sector. Social science in this country is strengthened through the strengthening of social science abroad. The argument to substantiate this assertion again relates to the collection and dissemination of empirical data and to the development, elaboration, exposition and testing of ideas, concepts, and theories about social phenomena. As social science develops abroad more data and ideas should be put into international circulation and thus become available to scholars in the United States

There is also a broader case for the development of social science abroad. Social science can provide objective empirical data by which the effects of private and public actions and policies can be judged. A strong social science within a country can contribute to the development of democracy and to the quality of debate about private and public policies in that country. The development of social science throughout the world can contribute to the realization of U.S. interests that are much more fundamental than the relatively narrow professional interests of U.S. social science.

UNESCO engages in many activities that facilitate the development of social science throughout the world. Its subventions assist international professional associations in the social sciences. Indeed, these associations would not exist had it not been for actions of UNESCO. These associations provide fora for essential international communication among scholars. UNESCO

subventions also make it possible for scholars from developing countries to participate in the activities of these associations. Such participation can be the only or the primary vehicle for such individuals to keep abreast of developments in their fields after they finish their graduate studies.

UNESCO has also provided assistance for social science institutions and for training social science scholars in the Third World.

The social science committee of the U.S. national commission for UNESCO would be pleased if UNESCO would do more to facilitate the development of social science throughout the world. More resources than are currently expended by UNESCO on the social and human sciences could productively be devoted to this task. That proportion of UNESCO's budget that is currently devoted to this task could be used more effectively. For some years the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO has urged that UNESCO concentrate the limited funds that it devotes to the social and human sciences on a small number of high priority activities that could have major impacts. This has not occurred. The program continues to be fragmented among many small allocations and to include some activities of marginal utility and dubious quality.

United States withdrawal from UNESCO could substantially reduce the limited funds that UNESCO currently devotes to the social and human sciences. It would also eliminate the U.S. voice in shaping these programs. As I stated above, it would be extremely serious for UNESCO for the largest social science community and the one with the most advanced social science not to be represented in UNESCO councils. The definition of UNESCO's programs would surely suffer.

Both UNESCO and the United States bear some of the responsibility for UNESCO's programs in the social sciences not being more effective than they are. There has been an absence of leadership within UNESCO. The fact that the position of assistant director-general for the social and human sciences has not been filled on a permanent basis since Rudolfo Stavenhagen resigned in the summer of 1982 after having served for not much more than two years has been a major problem. The sector badly needs a forceful and effective leader.

Another problem is the failure to insure that all UNESCO activities concerning the social sciences adhere to high scientific standards. UNESCO staff members, perhaps because of their status as international civil servants, sometimes find it difficult to maintain high scientific standards. It is difficult for them to disagree with the governmental representatives to whom they are in some respects responsible. The International Social Science Journal, for instance, does not maintain the standards of peer review that one would expect of a professional journal.

To insure the application of higher scientific standards in UNESCO's programs in the social sciences, it might be useful to follow a practice used extensively in UNESCO's programs in the natural sciences. In these programs responsibility for maintaining scientific standards is frequently transferred outside of the secretariat. In UNESCO's natural science programs the International Council of Scientific Unions plays a major role in maintaining scientific standards. Perhaps the International Social Science Council could play a similar role with respect to UNESCO's programs in the social sciences.

Because United States scholarly activities are so decentralized, it is difficult for U.S. scholars in the social sciences to coalesce to formulate and to seek to implement effective international programs in UNESCO and other international bodies. No individual institution is regarded by the U.S. social science community as having a legitimate mandate to speak for the community. UNESCO officials do not know to whom to turn to deal with U.S. social science, and the social science community in the United States is so vast as to be virtually impenetrable. By default much of the responsibility for liaison between UNESCO and the U.S. social science community has fallen to the social science committee of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. It has been ill-equipped to meet this responsibility.

The situation with respect to U.S. policy concerning the social sciences in UNESCO need not be as bad as it has been. The United States delegation to the last UNESCO General Conference did not include a professional social scientist, thus it did not include a professional who could speak authoritatively about UNESCO programs in the social sciences. The social science committee of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO has not had professional staff assistance in recent years. UNESCO's program in the social and human sciences is no better than it is in part because of U.S. failure to provide leadership or even to insist that U.S. interests be adequately recognized.

It is especially important that the United States play a leadership role in the development of the social and human sciences program within UNESCO in the coming years. Since the middle of the nineteen-seventies a crucial debate has gone on within UNESCO about the indigenization of

the social sciences, and decisions have been taken affirming that UNESCO programs should contribute to the indigenization of the social sciences. To date the concept of indigenization remains largely undefined. It is vital that the United States play a major role in the definition of indigenization, both for U.S. interests and for the interests of the social sciences as scholarly disciplines.

Representatives of developing countries have taken the position in UNESCO debates that social science as it has developed in the West has served the interests of Western countries. Their perception has a factual basis. Cultural anthropology was used by the administrations of the European countries in their efforts to gain and maintain colonial empires. Successive acts of the U.S. Congress have provided funds for the development of area studies with the rationale that developing knowledge and scholars in the United States in these fields would serve U.S. security interests. All recent U.S. administrations have included in major positions prominent social scientists who were presumably chosen in part because of their substantive training and expertise. Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Kenneth Adelman, Chester Croker, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick are examples. That developing countries as they contemplate their own futures should want to emulate Western examples and make social science serve their own national purposes should hardly occasion surprise.

It would be futile for the United States to ask that the developing countries not insist that their own social science establishments address the questions that are their primary national concerns and from the point of view of their national interests. Most social science activity in the United

States is directed toward the analysis of U.S. problems and is conducted from the point of view of U.S. interests.

Social science involves the study of human beings who exist within certain cultural, economic, social, and political contexts, and now and for the foreseeable future nation states will provide the most important of these contexts. As long as this is true, social science will inevitably be less universal in character than natural science.

For its own sake and for the good of social science, however, the United States must insist that social science should develop according to sound canons of scientific practice. This means that knowledge must be empirically based and that in developing theories about causation sound rules of evidence and logic must be followed. It also means that data and ideas must receive a wide international circulation.

Indigenization legitimately can mean devoting attention to national problems and basing analyses on national interests and values. Undoubtedly and welcomely it will mean that more theories will be introduced and developed by local scholars. It must not mean the rejection of Western ideas simply because they are of Western origin nor an abandonment of insistence on rigorous standards of logic and proof. It must not mean isolation of national social science communities, either that of the United States or any other country.

If the United States were absent from the debate on indigenization, it would seriously weaken the quality of this debate and could place the outcome at risk. Social science that ignores the second half of its title can easily become simply blatant ideology. There are undoubtedly some in the world who would welcome such an outcome.

There is an unfortunate unbalance in international social science. Social science inevitably involves commenting on governmental policies and sometimes implicitly or explicitly rendering judgements on these policies. U.S. social scientists and those from other democracies freely criticize the actions of their own governments, but social scientists from countries that do not have democratic governments seldom if ever publicly criticize their own governments. Because of this situation, in international gatherings of social scientists situations can arise where criticism is directed exclusively at the actions of the governments of the United States and other democratic countries. There is no perfect immediate solution to this problem. U.S. social scientists and those from other democratic countries have an obligation to insure that their criticisms are not one sided. Although we cannot ask social scientists from countries that do not have democratic governments to behave as if they lived in countries that did have such governments, we can insist that in their work they adhere to appropriate scientific standards and procedures. We will be in a much weakened position to do this if the United States is absent from the debate in UNESCO on the definition of indigenization.

I strongly urge that the United States remain within UNESCO and work to strengthen UNESCO's programs in the social sciences. As an analyst of international organizations and U.S. foreign policy and as a U.S. citizen, I also support continued United States membership in UNESCO on broader grounds.

Mr. YATRON. Our next witness will be Dr. Rosenblith.

**STATEMENT OF WALTER ROSENBLITH, FOREIGN SECRETARY,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES**

Mr. ROSENBLITH. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear here on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences which was chartered by President Lincoln in 1863. From its beginning, the academy had a Foreign Secretary, because it recognized that science is indeed a universal activity.

I am currently the Foreign Secretary, elected by the membership, and as such the Chairman of the Office of International Affairs of the National Research Council.

We have prepared written testimony for you. I would appreciate it if it could be entered into the record, as well as a letter sent by NAS President Frank Press to Chairman Fascell in answer to a question that had been addressed to him and also the appendixes to that letter.¹

With respect to UNESCO and the question that exists in the area of the national sciences, first, I would like to emphasize the fact that the national sciences are, by their very nature, multilateral. The laws of nature are the same under all skies. And under those circumstances, there has been always in the scientific community a desire to work with colleagues in all countries.

As time has gone on, we have seen the organization of discipline-oriented scientific unions, and after the Second World War, we have seen the creation of new centers of excellence all over the world, some of which, for instance, CERN, Geneva, or the Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, have been helped in their founding by UNESCO.

So there has developed around the world an international science system of which UNESCO is one of the participants. And I shall return to that point toward the end of my remarks.

If you look today at UNESCO and the U.S. scientific community, it is important to realize that 1946 and 1984 are not the same general situation. I need not tell you gentlemen how much the political world has changed.

But let me just—in order to give you some feeling—quote our past president, Phillip Handler, who unfortunately died a few years ago, in which he said after the Second World War, the United States was three-fourths of the world's natural sciences. Today, he said, we are maybe one-third. This gives you some feeling how the specific gravity has changed.

There has been an enormous development of science and technology all over the world. There is hardly a country, even some of the poorest developing countries, that does not consider that science and technology is part of its domestic, yea, its foreign policy.

I think it is important to realize that the natural sciences include both laboratory sciences and field sciences. And whether you talk about field sciences, Earth sciences, the biological sciences, climate, or the cosmos, the whole problem is one that cannot be handled by a single country.

¹ See appendixes to Mr. Rosenblith's statement.

So it is interesting that in the early thirties the International Council of Scientific Unions, which has been referred to here earlier, was founded. As a matter of fact, my predecessor at that time, the foreign secretary, became the first president.

The International Council of Scientific Unions plays an enormous role in terms of the world scientific community, and is the chief scientific consultant to UNESCO.

It is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, just as the Academy of National Sciences is, and this combination, this complementarity between a nongovernmental volunteer brain trust and an intergovernmental piece of machinery is one of the essential things that we need in order to be able to have the kind of quality, the kind of access, and the kind of exchange of information that is required for the progress of science.

Let me just briefly characterize for you the scope and the scale of UNESCO's science programs, which accounts for roughly \$60 million a year or 28 percent of UNESCO's total program. The U.S. financial contribution to this multilateral science program is the largest of the contributions made to any of the other multilateral science programs or organizations.

The programs, just again to give you some feeling for what goes on there, include the International Hydrological Program, the international Geological Correlation Program, the Man and the Biosphere Program, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, and so forth. But we should not forget that UNESCO also spends a significant amount of money in a subvention to the International Council of Scientific Unions. Just so you have no illusions about the size of the International Council of Scientific Unions let me say that of its \$1.5 million annual budget, roughly one-third comes directly from UNESCO in this way. The budget of ICSU and its constituent unions is in the order of \$4.5 million.

At the present time, we are being asked do you have any problems with UNESCO? Indeed, we do. We think that UNESCO's problems include its bureaucracy, its management, and the number of vacant posts that are left open; all of this could be greatly improved. As a matter of fact, I have personally, together with officers of the International Council of Scientific Unions, intervened with the Director-General in order to make such improvements.

But I think we also should not forget that, as far as this country is concerned, the support of the scientific program in UNESCO has not been what it should be. There is a very serious lack there.

The fact that we are so undersupported in this matter also accounts for some of the posts that have not been filled by American citizens. If this country were to stay in UNESCO, I would not advise that we think we can get along with the present machinery. We need to be much more serious about the way in which we would support this.

UNESCO obviously needs U.S. science, and this case can easily be made. But I think the case of how does U.S. science benefit from UNESCO is really one of the key issues. Many of the global observational programs could not be undertaken unless we had intergovernmental machinery with which to interact on a multilateral basis.

In today's world, the question of access—access to data, access to people, access to territories, access to shores—all of these matters depend critically on a combination of what you might call a scientific brain trust and what you might call the intergovernmental complementarity in the machinery.

Since science is something that needs contributions from all general pools all over the world, the whole problem of the development of natural science in the various developing countries is extraordinarily important. And I must say that the issues of science education are very often reflected in the mirror of some of the problems that we have in our own country when we see how few young people really get the science education they need.

The costs of U.S. withdrawal would be significant to U.S. science, and the questions have been raised, are there any alternatives, and how could we bridge this gap?

The National Academy of Sciences has not prejudged the issue. We are undertaking a study, a review, in which we want to—as objectively as we know how, with the help of people who have worked with UNESCO, others who have perhaps not worked with UNESCO, and the professional organizations of this country—come to an understanding as to the existence of alternatives. Also, I don't think one should talk about total alternatives, since I have given you some indication already how fractured these programs are, but are there partial alternatives? How could we operate them?

We want to undertake a critical review of UNESCO science. We want to undertake a critical review, asking ourselves what kind of reforms would have to be made in the area of science. I must say that when you look at the bill of particulars that the Western group of 24 countries under the leadership of the Dutch has submitted to UNESCO, it doesn't mention anything really in the area of science, since the general impression is that the natural sciences is the best part of UNESCO.

I think we know better. We have some suggestions to make, and we would like to make them. But first, we need to have a careful inventory of existing UNESCO-sponsored programs and arrangements for U.S. scientific interaction. We need to make an analysis of the extent to which these arrangements depend or do not depend critically on affiliation with UNESCO.

We need to have suggestions for alternative interim arrangements for facilitating the essential U.S. scientific interactions with UNESCO-sponsored programs. And finally, we need to make initial recommendations for future U.S. directions in multilateral global scientific cooperation, both within and without UNESCO.

This review, which we expect to be supported by the Department of State, should give us a first leg up on the set of questions that I think you and your committee have before you.

But let me venture, in conclusion, a few reflections.

We should avoid fragmenting our participation in UNESCO-related science activities and avoid disrupting currently functioning mechanisms in the absence of suitable alternatives.

It appears that with the exception of a few special situations such as oceanography and perhaps geological programs, it will be far from easy to establish and fund alternative arrangements that

would ensure U.S. participation and leadership in the majority of UNESCO science activities.

The lack of a focal point with the requisite technical competence in the U.S. Government will complicate the process of managing our substantive interests in UNESCO science.

And the preliminary evidence that we have collected emphasizes the need to inquire more deeply into the objectives, the consequences and the benefits of U.S. participation in intergovernmental science programs.

This view is further supported by what is happening in many other U.N. agencies. Let me just say that our immediate concerns must not blind us to the fact that the basic changes that have made science and technology essential elements of many countries domestic and foreign policies need to be addressed, too.

When UNESCO was founded in 1946, the "S" in UNESCO was the only symbol of science seen anywhere in the United Nations. Today there are many U.N. organizations that have scientific enterprises, scientific advisory committees, and so on. What we should do is take advantage of the universality of the laws of nature to design a structure capable of mobilizing the growing intellectual resources of humanity to solve our common global program.

It is with this perspective in mind that we should explore our longer-term needs to allow American science to both fully benefit and contribute.

[Mr. Rosenblith's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALTER A. ROSENBLITH, FOREIGN SECRETARY, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND THE SCIENCE SECTOR OF UNESCO
TO THE ANNOUNCED U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO

I appreciate the privilege of testifying before the distinguished Subcommittee on International Operations and the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. You have asked me to comment on the implications for the U.S. scientific community and the "Science Sector" of UNESCO of the results of a U.S. withdrawal from that organization. I should like to state at the outset that we at the NAS are deeply concerned with the potential impact. In a letter to Chairman Fascell on April 17, 1984, Dr. Frank Press, President of the National Academy of Sciences, provided the Committee on Foreign Affairs with our preliminary assessment prepared originally as a contribution to an interagency review conducted in October, 1983. In his

letter, Dr. Press noted that the NAS is undertaking its own review to assess impacts more specifically and to propose alternative arrangements for facilitating essential U.S. scientific interactions with UNESCO-sponsored programs. You may wish to include Dr. Press' letter in the record of this hearing.

Universality of Science

It may be useful to touch briefly on the history and traditions of international communications and cooperation among scientists to put the current UNESCO problem in proper context. Over the past centuries and particularly during the last 100 years, the universality of the scientific enterprise has been shown through the mobility of scholars in the sciences between centers of learning and advanced research. The advancement of scientific knowledge is recognized as a common good and the health and dynamics of this enterprise depend on sharing and confirming research findings worldwide.

During the first half of this century, there were great advances in the physical sciences and since World War II, there has been enormous progress in both the biological and physical sciences. Exchange of scholars and their findings led, before the 1930s, to the creation of distinguished centers of excellence, particularly in Western Europe, and to the establishment of nongovernmental international scientific unions in the major disciplines. It was taken for granted that bright, promising American scientists would seek out and participate in the research activities of such centers through doctoral and postdoctoral training. This was the time when the Solvay conferences, and the Gottingen and Copenhagen

colloquia, brought together scientists from many countries and from a broad range of fields; when the center of the scientific world was a select group of universities and research institutes in Western Europe extending to a few promising centers in North America. It was a time of ferment and excitement in the scientific community across national frontiers.

Hitler and Mussolini and their totalitarian regimes share the responsibility for the waves of refugees who came to the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. Among them were some of the leading scientists of this period. The center of growth of the scientific world shifted increasingly to the United States. Nevertheless, in the postwar years, the traditions and values of the great centers of training and research in Western Europe, which had been reconstructed with considerable assistance from the United States, continued to attract young American scientists. Moreover, when new institutions like CERN (European Center of Nuclear Research) were created, they chose as their first directors outstanding American physicists.

During this period of increasing scientific cooperation, attention began to be focused on solving global problems of the earth, oceans, atmosphere, and the cosmos. The disciplines needed to solve these problems and others, such as environmental and ecological problems, required the cooperation of scientists on a global scale. Nongovernmental scientific unions facilitated such interactions among researchers. At the conclusion of World War II, these many activities and events called for intergovernmental action. The time was ripe for the United Nations to encourage and support scholarly interactions in a more comprehensive fashion. The United States and its allies helped to bring this action about.

UNESCO and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)

When Unesco was founded in 1946, the S in UNESCO represented the first symbol of science in the United Nations complex. (UNESCO's preamble stated that it had been created "for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind....") Immediately after the formation of UNESCO, a formal agreement was concluded between the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), an international nongovernmental body, and UNESCO, an inter-governmental organization. Later, ICSU was admitted to Consultative Status (Category A). This relationship implies that UNESCO relies upon ICSU in connection with the international coordination of the activities of NGOs working in the domain of science, and that in exchange, the organizations affiliated with ICSU participate in the programs of UNESCO in their areas of competence. In order to review and coordinate the scientific programs -- currently active or to be undertaken -- meetings of the ICSU-UNESCO coordinating committee are held at approximately six month intervals.

What is ICSU and how has it grown and changed in structure since its inception? It represents the principal vehicle of scientific communication between American scientists and their colleagues in other countries. ICSU was originally formed in 1931. Its first president was George Ellery Hale, the brilliant American astronomer and advocate of international scientific cooperation. Hale, who had also held the post of Foreign Secretary of the NAS from 1910-1921, stressed in his 1934 ICSU address that, "in most...branches of science, effective international cooperation,

leading to results not available by individual or local efforts, is not difficult to establish." This principle has been verified and strengthened through subsequent program management responsibilities of ICSU and its nongovernmental member unions. The structure of ICSU is characterized by dual membership, encompassing both scientific unions -- such as the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics, the International Mathematical Union, the International Union of Biochemistry, the International Union of Nutritional Sciences -- to name just four of today's 20 unions, and approximately 70 national members. National members adhere to ICSU through their Academy or National Research Council. For the United States, the National Academy of Sciences is the adhering body to ICSU and its member unions.

The table on the following page reflects some of the enormous changes that have taken place in most of the sciences whether we think of the earth and space sciences, or of the spectrum of the biological sciences ranging from the molecular and cellular to pharmacology and immunology. The multiplication of the disciplines led to a recognition of the interaction and of the need to create multidisciplinary programs, committees or study groups, which could respond to the more complex and difficult issues on mankind's agenda. Among the global problems that no single scientific discipline is capable of solving by itself are those of the environment, the atmosphere, the oceans, climate, and the polar regions. ICSU recognized this challenge and organized itself to deal with it. The 1982 statement of the National Science Board in Science in the International Setting contains this relevant paragraph:

GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS (ICSU)

Year	Comments	No. of Nat'l		No. of Nat'l		No. of Union		No. of Scientific		No. of Scientific		No. of Individuals	
		Members	Associates	Members	Associates ¹	Members	Associates ¹	Members	Associates ²	Members	Associates ²	Listed in ICSU Yearbook ³	Listed in ICSU Yearbook ³
1946 ⁴	Establishment of UNESCO	39	nonexistent	nonexistent	7	nonexistent	nonexistent	nonexistent	nonexistent	nonexistent	nonexistent	?	?
1954	First ICSU Yearbook	40	-	-	11	-	-	2	×	190			
1964		59	-	-	14	-	-	12		536			
1974		61	1	17	8			18		868			
1982	Latest ICSU Yearbook	69	5	20	17	22		1,139					

NOTES:

¹International organizations that do not qualify for full union membership.

²Includes permanent services, coordinating committees, inter-union commissions, panels, boards, steering committees, (i.e., "other" scientific bodies than unions).

³The ICSU Yearbook is an annual directory, first issued in 1954; the latest issue is dated 1982.

⁴Sporadic information from the Report of the Fourth General Assembly of ICSU, London, 1946 (in French).

"Under the auspices of the ICSU, a number of multilateral scientific programs have been successfully carried out, often with the cooperation and assistance of inter-governmental organizations and member governments. The International Geophysical Year Program (1957-58) has offered a useful paradigm for subsequent efforts in the atmospheric, geophysical and ocean regimes."

The International Geophysical Year (IGY) involved approximately 50,000 scientists and engineers from 67 nations, and 4,000 observation stations covering the earth from pole to pole. The IGY program was given invaluable assistance from UNESCO through the provision of planning funds to ICSU.

UNESCO and the U.S. Scientific Community

Since its establishment in 1946, UNESCO has provided an important medium for American scientists to collaborate with their colleagues in other countries to attack major global research problems. Interdisciplinary programs of direct interest and benefit to the U.S. scientific community have been carried out in collaboration with the scientific unions, U.N. agencies other than UNESCO, and a host of national research institutions in participating countries. The United States and the world scientific community have greatly benefited from enhanced access to scientific communication through the exchange of essential data, the design and implementation of joint research efforts, and the establishment of a productive network of interactions among research scholars. American

scientists have frequently initiated and taken a leading role in these activities. Current worldwide investigations of considerable value to U.S. scientists include the International Hydrological Program (IHP), the International Geological Correlation Program (IGCP), the Man and the Biosphere Program (MAB), and the long-standing collaborative activities under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). Other international scientific collaborative activities sponsored by UNESCO with significant U.S. participation include statistical indicators of research and development, science and technology information systems, engineering education projects, and secondary and university course content development in science education. The main lines of current UNESCO-sponsored activities in the natural sciences are summarized in Appendix I.

The scientific interests and activities of UNESCO have changed a good deal in mission and effectiveness since its creation when approximately 44 nations banded together to pursue relatively common purposes for advancing the state of scientific knowledge. The number has grown to 161 nations, with considerable emphasis now devoted to development assistance activities. Many of these latter activities are of interest to the American scientific community which has provided scientific leadership and experience to the developing world. Increasingly, scientists from Third World nations are making significant contributions to global research efforts. The magnitude of Third World involvement has given a different emphasis to UNESCO's mission and programs.

Questions are being posed on the value of specific areas of UNESCO-sponsored programs to the U.S. scientific community: How well does UNESCO

carry out these programs? What measures might be taken to improve the performance of UNESCO? What might be the loss to our scientific community, as well as to those of other countries, if the United States withdraws from UNESCO on December 31, 1984? Coupled with this last question is the significance of the contributions of the American scientific community to UNESCO.

As referred to earlier, an interagency assessment of the Natural Sciences programs, prepared under the supervision of the National Science Foundation, was submitted to the Department of State on October 21, 1983.¹

This assessment stated that "the scientific benefits the United States derives from participation in UNESCO clearly warrant our continued participation. However, the significant impediments enumerated above [the assessment] should be corrected." It was recommended that "the United States should take a strong leadership role and commit additional resources to specific programs of interest and benefit to the U.S." and that "the United States should endorse, at the highest levels, a central mechanism to coordinate and manage U.S. participation in UNESCO."

The Academy's preliminary review of last October provided Chairman Fascell by Dr. Press, President of the National Academy of Sciences, dealt with some of the questions noted above. In summary, this review (see Appendix II) stressed that science-related programs represent, in many ways, UNESCO's most successful effort and fulfill an important function for the United States in terms of international science cooperation and

¹National Science Foundation. Natural Sciences in UNESCO: A U.S. Interagency Perspective, October 21, 1983.

science education. Certain sciences, particularly those concerned with the oceans, climate, the solid earth and biosphere, depend critically on international cooperation. This preliminary review also addressed criticisms of UNESCO structure and management -- problems requiring serious corrective action. But in the final analysis, in the area of the sciences at least, it was felt that at the present time, there is no real alternative to UNESCO. It was also felt that the U.S. government should provide a greatly improved focus for U.S. participation in UNESCO science activities.

We stressed the value of UNESCO-sponsored global research efforts that provide our scientists with a multilateral structure to facilitate cooperation with colleagues in all corners of the world; hence, access to and exchange of research data; access to important, otherwise unavailable, research localities; and participation in the building of scientific infrastructures in developing countries.

Distinguished members of the U.S. scientific community who have been associated with UNESCO science activities over many years have recently provided testimony to Joint Subcommittee hearings of the House Committee on Science and Technology. Professor Paul T. Baker, who represents the NAS on the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, and is chairman of the U.S. National Committee for the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere (MAB) Program, foresees disturbing and costly consequences to U.S. science in general, and the MAB program in particular, if the United States withdraws from UNESCO. He underscores the lack of U.S. oversight and support of its participation in UNESCO science activities compounding the already troublesome frustrations generated by the UNESCO bureaucracy. He is

pessimistic about alternative mechanisms to meet U.S. MAB objectives as well as U.S. funding of its own MAB-related programs. Professor William Nierenberg, member of the Academy and the Natural Science Board, noted that there are alternative mechanisms through the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission to continue U.S. participation in UNESCO-sponsored activities in ocean sciences. From the foregoing preliminary reviews and testimony, with some exceptions, it is not possible as yet to provide precise answers to the questions pertaining to the impact on science of the announced withdrawal of the United States at the end of 1984.

A Critical NAS/NRC Review of UNESCO Science

The decision to announce U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO was taken for reasons largely unrelated to the science activities. Indeed, concern for the impact of the withdrawal on U.S. involvement in UNESCO's science programs was apparently not a significant aspect in the decision. For this reason, a comprehensive review of the impact on U.S. science of the announced withdrawal from UNESCO is needed. The serious concern of the Governing Board of the National Research Council and the Council of the National Academy of Sciences on the probable impact on U.S. science interests has led to initiation of a review, a first phase of which is to be completed by mid-summer 1984 involving the preparation of:

- o an inventory of existing UNESCO-sponsored programs and arrangements for U.S. scientific interaction;
- o an analysis of the extent to which these arrangements depend or do not depend critically on affiliation with UNESCO;

- o suggestions for alternative interim arrangements for facilitating essential U.S. scientific interactions with UNESCO-sponsored programs;
- o initial recommendations of future U.S. directions in multilateral and global scientific cooperation, both within and outside UNESCO.

This review, which is expected to be supported by the Department of State, will give major attention to identifying alternative interim arrangements, but will also look into longer-term concerns during a second phase of this review process.

There is movement among major contributors to UNESCO (primarily the OECD countries) to press for reforms -- budgetary, administrative as well as substantive -- that might influence the assessment by the Monitoring Panel¹ which is charged to "monitor and report on the activities and practices of, and development within UNESCO during the calendar year 1984....The functions of the Panel...will assist the Secretary of State to determine the future relations of the United States with UNESCO." Consideration should also be given to establishing a "blue ribbon" international visiting committee composed of distinguished scientists and science administrators outside UNESCO to evaluate UNESCO programs, personnel policies and management.

¹Charter and Membership of the Monitoring Panel on UNESCO, Undersecretary of State for Management, March 22, 1984.

In our view, UNESCO-supported science activities would suffer seriously from the absence of, or substantially reduced U.S. participation and leadership even though some individual U.S. scientists might be asked to continue to provide advice and guidance in certain of these activities. With this in mind, let me venture a few reflections.

- o We should avoid fragmenting our participation in UNESCO-related science activities and avoid disrupting currently functioning mechanisms in the absence of suitable alternatives.
- o It appears that with the exception of a few special situations such as oceanography and perhaps geological programs, it will be far from easy to establish and fund alternative arrangements that would ensure U.S. participation and leadership in the majority of UNESCO science activities.
- o The lack of a focal point with the requisite technical competence in the U.S. government will complicate the process of managing our substantive interests in UNESCO science.
- o The preliminary evidence that we have collected emphasizes the need to inquire more deeply into the objectives, consequences, and benefits of U.S. participation in intergovernmental science programs. This view is further supported by the conclusions of a workshop, "U.S. Participation in International Scientific and Technical Cooperation," held at the NAS in September, 1983.

Our immediate concerns must not blind us to the basic changes that have made science and technology essential elements of many countries domestic and foreign policies. This brings with it consequences in the

workings of intergovernmental machinery. Thus, we would be wise to try to bring into play those interpersonal, nonpolitical aspects of the scientific endeavor that have proved so profitable in acquiring new knowledge. We need to recognize the essential complementary strengths that governmental and nongovernmental organizations can contribute. Taking advantage of these capabilities should make for effective international cooperation. Thus, the universality of the laws of nature should allow us to design a structure capable of mobilizing the growing intellectual resources of humanity to solve our common global problems. It is with this perspective in mind that we shall needs to explore our longer-term needs to allow American science to both fully benefit and contribute.

UNESCO Program and Budget for 1984-85: Natural Sciences Sector

The Natural Sciences Sector includes Major Program Areas VI, IX, and X of the UNESCO Program and Budget Document, 22C/5. Total funds requested for these three areas over a 2-year period are \$117.8 million or approximately \$59 million per year. The Natural Sciences Sector consumes about 28% of the total UNESCO budget for program operations and services.

The three program areas are:

VI. The Sciences and their Application to Development

IX. Science, Technology and Society

X. The Human Environment and Terrestrial and Marine Resources

An area of high priority to the U.S. scientific community is the one on the Human Environment and Terrestrial and Marine Resources, which contains major global observational programs such as the International Geological Correlation (Cooperation) Program, the International Hydrological Program, the Man and the Biosphere Program, and the activities sponsored by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission. The subvention to the International Council for Scientific Unions (ICSU) is contained in Program Area VI. Other Program Areas containing activities of interest to the U.S. scientific community are:

V. Education, Training, and Society -- secondary school science education.

VII. Information Systems and Access to Knowledge -- General Information Program, Documentation Services, and Science and Technology Information Services (UNISIST).

The Statistical Division provides the only central source of R&D statistical information for the world's non-OECD countries.

Major Program VI: The Sciences and Their Application to Development

(1984-85 Budget Proposed: \$58.9 million)

VI.1 Research, Training and International Cooperation in the Natural Sciences

- special training and research grants in mathematics, physics, chemistry biology
- regional and international cooperation through ICSU and regional discipline centers

VI.2 Research, Training and International Cooperation in Technology and the Engineering Sciences

- natural research and training infrastructures, technological adaptation, engineering and technical education
- regional and international cooperative programs

VI.3 Research, Training and International Cooperation in Key Areas in Science and Technology

- special training activities in informatics
- training and resource centers in microbiology, MIRCEN's
- renewable energy resources

VI.4 Research, Training and International Cooperation in the Social and Human Sciences

- inventories on research potential, information and documentation, training and teaching at university levels
- regional cooperation in social sciences centers, International Social Sciences Council (ISSC, journals, documentation center)

VI.5 Research, Training, and Regional and International Cooperation in Some Key Areas in the Social and Human Sciences

- development of disciplines, history, anthropology, geography, linguistics
- management, work and leisure activities, study of man, status of women.

Major Program IX: Science, Technology and Society

(1984-85 Budget Proposal: \$9 million)

IX.1 Study and Improvement of the Relationship Between Science, Technology and Society

- studies, social assessments, training activities in consultation with ICSU, ISSC, and the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, Niels Bohr Centenary
- evolution of S&T progress, scientific research and arms build-up
- S&T extension services, publication of journal "Impact", science prizes

IX.2 Science and Technology Policies

- regional conferences on S&T policies, analyses, data bases, info exchange
- technical assistance on establishing policies, S&T priorities, analytical instruments, evaluation
- training, teaching materials on S&T policy development.

Major Program X: The Human Environment and Terrestrial
and Marine Resources

(1984-85 Budget Proposed: \$49.9 million)

X.1 The Earth's Crust and Its Mineral and Energy Resources

- International Geological Correlation (Cooperation) Program activities, geology for economic development, land-use planning
- interdisciplinary research on earth's crust, remote-sensing and data processing, continental thematic maps
- training seminars, postgraduate courses.

X.2 Natural Hazards

- assessment and prediction
- mitigation of risks

X.3 Water Resources

- International Hydrological Program activities
- hydrological processes, parameters, man and the water cycle
- integrated water management methodologies, regional projects in rural areas, training courses

X.4 The Ocean and Its Resources

- Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) activities, climatic change, living resources, marine environment
- continental margin, standards, physical properties
- Integrated Global Ocean Services System, tsunami warning system, data exchange, publication of research findings
- strengthening infrastructures, training activities
- IOC Secretariat services, regional and support services.

X.5 Management of Coastal and Island Regions

- interdisciplinary research projects, systems studies
- integrated management studies, pilot projects, data dissemination
- training of specialists.

X.6 Land-Use Planning and Terrestrial Resources

- Coordination of MAB program, promotion of national projects, regional cooperation, land-use planning and resource management in humid and sub-humid tropical zones, comparative studies, training
- land management in arid and semi-arid zones, research seminars, training
- land-use planning, monitoring environmental changes in temperate and cold zones
- dissemination of information, technical cooperation projects.

X.7 Urban Systems and Urbanization

- integrated research in different biogeographical regions, collaboration and circulation of technical information
- training, information exchanges in town planning and architecture
- public participation, future studies.

X.8 The Natural Heritage

- inventories on ecological areas, research on conservation of natural heritage
- implementation of World Heritage Convention, promotion of international instruments on natural heritage conservation
- biosphere reserve network, subvention to International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
- training of conservation specialists.

X.9 Environmental Education and Information

- communication of ecological research results to non-specialist audiences, research results for land-use management, teaching materials for general education, publication of "Nature and Resources"
- exchange of information and experimental data, research promotion, training, regional cooperation
- awareness in administrators, economists, engineers.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Appendix II

OFFICE OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY
1600 CONSTITUTION AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20010

October 21, 1983

Mr. Gregory J. Newell
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of International Organization
Affairs
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Newell:

Last week the NRC* Advisory Committee for the International Council of Scientific Unions (AC/ICSU) considered the State Department review of U.S. participation in Unesco, as outlined in your August 12 letter to me. In the absence of an NRC committee directly concerned with Unesco, we have drawn on the experiences and perceptions of several individuals from the nongovernmental sector knowledgeable about Unesco and its science programs. This letter conveys the general sense of the discussion.

(1) Science-related programs represent in many ways Unesco's most successful effort and fulfill an important function for the U.S. in terms of international science cooperation and science education. Unesco provides opportunities for multi-lateral contacts and collaboration that might not otherwise be available to U.S. scientists. Certain sciences, particularly those concerned with the oceans, climate, the solid earth and the biosphere, depend critically on international cooperation. The assistance of governments is frequently required for access to areas and data needed by U.S. scientists working in these disciplines, and Unesco is a forum in which such cooperation by governments can be achieved.

(2) There is much criticism levelled at Unesco programs, structure and management, but, in the area of the sciences at least, there is no real alternative to Unesco at the present time. The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), a nongovernmental organization representing the world scientific community, is sometimes mentioned as a possible alternative because ICSU, and its member unions, effectively promote international scientific activity in a broad range of natural science disciplines. Although Unesco provides a substantial

* NRC - National Research Council

subvention, ICSU does not have the resources or operational capabilities of an intergovernmental organization which are required for implementation of most global programs. Thus, ICSU serves an important complementary function to Unesco. American scientists participate actively in ICSU and because of the close ICSU-Unesco relationship can significantly influence Unesco science programs. In fact, a strengthening and expansion of the ICSU-Unesco partnership could be to the mutual benefit of both organizations.


(3) With respect to the management of Unesco science programs, there is certainly room for improvement. The Unesco bureaucracy and the associated overhead expenses need to be reviewed and a greater portion of funds channeled into program implementation. Only through successful scientific programs based on the active involvement of the scientific community can budgetary support be justified. An international visiting committee of distinguished scientists and science administrators might be helpful in designing a built-in review mechanism for Unesco science programs to help judge not only their intrinsic scientific merit, but their management as well.

(4) The participants in the discussion felt that the mechanisms necessary to ensure effective U.S. participation in Unesco are not currently available. While there is reason to believe that many U.S. scientists are active in Unesco programs, there is no instrumentality either inside or outside of government to ascertain the full dimension of that involvement, let alone to take advantage of it. The demise, for all practical purposes, of the U.S. National Commission for Unesco and the termination, due to funding cutbacks, of a small NRC group concerned with Unesco science programs, coupled with the apparent lack of interest and support for science in Unesco at the State Department, signify the extent to which guidance is lacking. Unesco programs do not always fit the organizational structure of the U.S. government. Perhaps the National Science Foundation, in collaboration with the National Academy of Sciences, could provide an effective focus for U.S. participation. Without an appropriate and funded infrastructure to manage our investment in Unesco, frustration is bound to continue.

I understand that, unfortunately, there is no one on the U.S. delegation to the Unesco General Conference who can speak for U.S. science, one of our nation's greatest strengths. Quite aside from lost opportunities to interact with and influence other delegations, which frequently have a science representative, such an omission suggests a lack of U.S. interest in the science programs of Unesco.

I hope these views will be helpful to you in the important review activity in which you are engaged.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Walter A. Rosenblith". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Walter" and last name "Rosenblith" clearly legible.

Walter A. Rosenblith
Foreign Secretary

Approved by Professor Rosenblith;
signed in his absence.

Congress of the United States
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

April 5, 1984

Dr. Frank Press
President
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20418

Dear Dr. Press:


The Committee on Foreign Affairs has had a long-term interest in U.S. participation in the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies and is particularly concerned about the announced intention to withdraw from UNESCO effective December 31, 1984.

In particular, because your Department was one of those that participated in the US/UNESCO Policy Review by preparing an assessment of costs and benefits to the U.S. of withdrawal on our international programs in science, including oceanography, I am writing to request that you provide the Committee with a copy of the assessment you submitted to the Department of State on this subject.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,


Dante B. Fascell
Chairman

DBF:pgj

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

2101 CONSTITUTION AVENUE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20418

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

April 17, 1984

The Honorable Dante Fascell
 Committee on Foreign Affairs
 U.S. House of Representatives
 2354 Rayburn House Office Building
 Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Fascell:

Your letter of April 5, 1984 requested our contribution to the inter-agency assessment on the costs and benefits to U.S. science resulting from the announced withdrawal of the U.S. from UNESCO. I am pleased to provide you with our views which were contained in a letter dated October 21, 1983 from Professor Walter Rosenblith to Assistant Secretary Newell. Professor Rosenblith, Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences, prepared these views in consultation with scientists from the nongovernment sector knowledgeable about UNESCO. You should be aware of the fact that because of time constraints, these views were not based on a comprehensive review of UNESCO activities.

The Governing Board of the National Research Council and The Council of the National Academy of Sciences are deeply concerned with the potential impacts to science of a withdrawal by the U.S. from UNESCO. We have therefore initiated a review of these impacts along with an assessment of possible alternative arrangements for facilitating essential U.S. scientific interactions with UNESCO-sponsored programs. This review, the first stage of which is to be completed by July 31, 1984, is expected to be financed by the Department of State. A Fact Sheet outlining the nature of this review is enclosed. It will also be necessary to establish contacts with scientists abroad, consultations that will take quite some time.

Professor Rosenblith would be pleased to meet with you and your Committee to discuss this serious matter of particular concern to many members of the American scientific community.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
 Frank Press

Frank Press
 President

Enclosure

bc: P.W. Hemily
 W.A. Rosenblith
 P.L. Sitton ✓
 M.M. Treichel

4/5/84

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C. 20418

CABLE ADDRESS: NARECO
TWX # 710-22 4461OFFICE LOCATION
JOSEPH HENRY BUILDING
21ST STREET AND
PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

REVIEW OF IMPACT ON SCIENCE OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO

The announced intention of the U.S. government to withdraw from membership in UNESCO, effective December 31, 1984, has implications for the U.S. scientific community involved in UNESCO-related programs and for international science cooperation generally. The United States and the world scientific community have greatly benefited during the post-war years from enhanced access to scientific communication through the exchange of essential data, the design and implementation of global research programs, and the establishment of a productive network of interactions among research scholars. In order to assess the impact on science of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO and to identify possible alternative arrangements for an effective continuation of U.S. participation in these science activities, the Office of International Affairs of the U.S. National Research Council has initiated a review that will draw primarily on the advice and experience of scientists, scientific institutions, and societies which have been associated with UNESCO programs and, more widely, with members of the scientific community concerned with global scientific communication and cooperation.

This initial review, to be completed by mid-summer 1984, is expected to be financed by the Department of State. It will involve the preparation of:

- an inventory of existing UNESCO-sponsored programs and arrangements for U.S. scientific interaction;
- an analysis of the extent to which these arrangements depend or do not depend critically on affiliation with UNESCO;
- suggestions for alternative interim arrangements for facilitating essential U.S. scientific interactions with UNESCO-sponsored programs;
- initial recommendations of future U.S. directions in multilateral and global scientific cooperation, both within and outside UNESCO.

Since the establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1946, numerous members of the U.S. scientific community have been professionally engaged as participants, initiators, and program leaders in global observational investigations. Many of these have involved other intergovernmental as well as nongovernmental organizations. The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), in particular, has played an important role in sponsoring and guiding many of these efforts. Current worldwide investigations include the International Hydrological Program (IHP), the International Geological Correlation Program (IGCP), the Man and the Biosphere Program (MAB), and the long-standing collaborative activities under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). Other international scientific collaborative activities sponsored by UNESCO with significant U.S. participation include statistical indicators of research and development, science and technology information systems, engineering education projects, and secondary and university course content development in science education.

The Office of International Affairs of the National Research Council serves the international interests of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Dr. Rosenblith, for your statement. The subcommittee stands in recess for about 5 minutes, so that the Members can vote.

Congressman Mica has already gone to vote and is on his way back. I have about 3 minutes left to get over there. So we will temporarily recess and reconvene in about 5 minutes when Mr. Mica comes back.

[Short recess.]

Mr. MICA. We apologize for the interruption.

Ms. Morton, if we may ask you to proceed. I understand you have finished, Dr. Rosenblith. We would like to continue, but we are going to have to stop this at a certain point. However so we want to get all of this on the record.

STATEMENT OF TERRY MORTON, CHAIR, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MONUMENTS AND SITES

Mrs. MORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to come before the two subcommittees. My focus is not the broad cultural program of UNESCO, but the cultural heritage program.

There are three U.S. committees devoted to the international cultural heritage—the International Council on Monuments and Sites, [U.S./ICOMOS] of which I am chairman; the International Council on Museums, [U.S./ICOM] which is related to the American Association of Museums; and the International Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, [U.S./ICCROM] which is related to the program of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.

U.S./ICOMOS' relationship with UNESCO is primarily through ICOMOS, the cultural heritage arm of UNESCO. U.S./ICOMOS not only helps exchange preservation information and expertise worldwide, it also interprets the U.S. unique preservation system to the world.

This system consists of two partnerships. One is between the private organizations and Federal, State, and local governments. The other partnership is between the academic community, professional, and specific volunteers.

I have been asked what has UNESCO done for the U.S. cultural heritage program. UNESCO was directly involved in shaping U.S. cultural heritage legislation.

It was to Western and Eastern Europe that American officials went to study private and governmental practices prior to the enactment of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.

This study tour was conducted by UNESCO's cultural heritage division. Policies, techniques, methods, and legislation were studied in Great Britain, Germany, Poland, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.

The information gathered is the basis of the very dynamic U.S. preservation program today. Extensive educational programs and information exchanges aid the U.S. cultural program. Communications between specialists are carried out today through the nongovernmental organizations [NGO's]—ICOMOS, ICOM, and ICCROM

receive subventions or contracts to help carry out some of their programs.

Americans have been accepted as participants in the international conferences and meetings. Some of them have received UNESCO fellowships and travel grants. A conference was held last week in Washington, D.C., sponsored by UNESCO, the Smithsonian, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and U.S./ICOMOS. It was directed to North American journalists.

Its theme was "The Challenge and our Cultural Heritage, Why Preserve the Past?" U.S./ICOMOS participates in a 3-week study tour every other year sponsored by UNESCO and ICOMOS for specialists on problems in the rehabilitation of historic districts.

Under the program Americans have gone to East Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. ICOMOS conducts a general assembly and scientific symposium on cultural heritage every 3 years.

U.S./ICOMOS will host the 1987 general assembly in Washington; 600 preservationists and conservationists from around the world will participate in this exchange of ideas and information. Americans receive UNESCO reports and publications, including Museum, Courier, and the World Heritage Bulletin.

UNESCO helped establish ICCROM, the International Center for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. It is located in Rome and is now autonomous.

It has 68 member states of which the United States is one. It conducts 6-month programs on conservation and restoration.

Many Americans, especially architects, conservators, and archeologists, have profited from these courses which have raised standards of conservation throughout the world.

UNESCO has also drafted international conventions and recommendations on cultural heritage. The American Government has always been represented at meetings of Government experts to review final drafts.

Many clauses have been modified to take into account the American position. U.S. Government has ratified two of these conventions on cultural heritage. One on the illicit import/export and transfer of ownership of cultural property, and the second concerning the protection of the cultural and national heritage of the world.

The original proposal to establish the World Heritage Convention was advanced by President Nixon in 1971. In 1972 the World Heritage Convention was adopted by the UNESCO General Conference.

In 1973, the United States was the first country to ratify the World Heritage Convention. The United States has now been joined by 81 countries. Today there are 165 cultural and national sites inscribed on the World Heritage list. There are 12 U.S. sites on the list—8 natural and 4 cultural.

Mr. MICA. Is that the list that includes Everglades National Park in Florida?

Mrs. MORTON. Yes; it is.

And there are some other very good sites from the State of Washington, Pennsylvania, and California.

I have been asked how well does UNESCO perform its cultural work. U.S./ICOMOS believes that UNESCO has been carrying out

its responsibility to cultural heritage successfully, and that it is one in which Americans have had an active role.

The potential of UNESCO's cultural heritage contributions to the United States, however, have not been totally realized and could have been more effective if the United States had involved itself differently.

Unfortunately, their mutually beneficial program has not received sufficient appreciation of the general public or to some degree by the U.S. Government. This may be due to the fact that the U.S. Government does not have a ministry or department of education and culture analogous to those found in other countries through which contacts between UNESCO and universities as well as cultural institutions can be directly channeled.

The U.S. Commission of UNESCO has not been sufficiently funded and staffed for it to be a leader for UNESCO programs in the United States. The U.S. Commission does not have a role and status that commissions in other countries have.

A new look should be taken to determine U.S. responsibility for the World Heritage Convention, an international treaty that it ratified. The United States through the State Department is in arrears for its 1982, 1983, and 1984 dues at approximately \$248,000 annually. The United States initiated the World Heritage Convention. Why has it dropped its leadership position and support of this outstanding program?

I have been asked would withdrawal of American leadership in UNESCO negatively affect the work of the U.S./ICOMOS. While it is possible that in spite of U.S. withdrawal, American citizens will be involved in future projects, it is through the NGO's or individual specialists and contracts to UNESCO, this move would exclude governmental participation. American contributions as well as gains from these programs would be affected.

Although the U.S. Government can continue to observe the two conventions relating to cultural heritage that it has ratified, because they have an indefinite life, withdrawal would mean that the United States would not be involved in the preparation and adoption of future instruments nor could they participate in them.

U.S. withdrawal may mean that UNESCO's cultural heritage budget for program and staff would be reduced by one-fourth affecting international restoration campaigns, missions of experts and unique exchange of information through publications, conferences, and training programs.

Withdrawal would impair the programs of ICCROM. There is no training program in the world for conservators, restorationists, with the breadth and depth of the Rome center. Assistance to UNESCO-ICOMOS and UNESCO-ICOM documentation centers in Paris which are linked to the Rome documentation center would be reduced.

These programs have not yet reached their potential. The United States has no resource similar to these three documentation centers, and has not been able to establish a linking documentation center in the United States.

We are currently unable to use what is available in Paris and Rome except when in those cities. We have been unable to put U.S.

materials into the computer systems of the centers in order to share the U.S. experience.

The ICCROM library is the best in the world on its subject, and should be maintained at its level.

Cultural heritage programs of education, expert assistance and information exchange could be carried out on a bilateral basis by U.S./ICOMOS and U.S./ICOM with access to 65 other national ICOMOS committees and 77 ICOM committees, but only with increased Federal funding and private resources.

Today these three cultural heritage NGO's do not provide a strong infrastructure in the United States. They are poorly funded, have few staff members, minimal educational programs and low promotional activities to keep their professional constituency and the American public informed and involved.

Working bilaterally with other nations would be effective, but it would be different from the benefits or potential benefits to the United States from its continued association with UNESCO, which is our principal means through which we can identify with all nations of the world concerned with cultural heritage.

Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mrs. Morton.

[Mrs. Morton's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERRY B. MORTON, CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMITTEE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MONUMENTS AND SITES [U.S./ICOMOS]

Mr. Chairmen, I very much appreciate the opportunity to come before the two Subcommittees, which I do on behalf of the three United States Committees devoted to international cultural heritage: US/ICOMOS, the International Council on Museums (US/ICOM) and the International Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (US/ICCROM). Since US/ICOM is providing written testimony, my remarks will be summary on its behalf. I must caution you that I am not familiar with UNESCO's total cultural program but only its cultural heritage program.

Introduction: ICOMOS was established in 1965, following the recommendation of UNESCO's International Monuments Committee and its American Chairman, Dr. Joseph Brew of Harvard University, that the Committee should be strengthened into a worldwide alliance for cultural heritage. The UNESCO International Monuments Committee then became moribund. At the same time in 1965, the United States Committee of ICOMOS was formed.

US/ICOMOS is one of 66 ICOMOS national committees forming a worldwide international preservation alliance. We are striving for environmental quality through the study and conservation of historic monuments, buildings and districts. ICOMOS also seeks to cultivate people's interest around the world in the protection of their own cultural heritage.

US/ICOMOS not only helps exchange preservation information and expertise worldwide, it also highlights and interprets the unique American preservation system to the rest of the world. This system consists of two partnerships. One is between the private organizations and federal, state and local governments. The other partnership is between the academic community, professionals and civic volunteers.

It was to Europe that American officials went to study private and government practices prior to drafting the Historic Sites Act of 1935 and the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. It is to many parts of the world that Americans go for cultural inspiration and formal study to gain insight, ideas and preservation techniques. Represent-

tatives from other countries come here to study adaptive use, community action, tax incentives and rehabilitation techniques. US/ICOMOS is the focus of this international cultural resources exchange in the United States.

Under a cooperative agreement with the National Trust for Historic Preservation, US/ICOMOS supports and conducts international programs of mutual interest.

Under a contract with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, US/ICOMOS promotes ICCROM programs in the United States. US/ICOMOS became a member of the U.S. Commission for UNESCO in 1983.

US/ICOMOS has a close and responsive relationship with UNESCO through ICOMOS. UNESCO is a vital organization, having made many significant and immeasurable contributions to cultural heritage worldwide and to the United States. This is the principle means through which the United States public sector can identify with the nations of the world concerned with heritage.

UNESCO was created as a gathering of the international intellectual community, altruistic and objective, for the good of mankind. It should be remembered that the United States entered its relationship with UNESCO as a "donor country" and did not expect to receive the same benefits as other countries. It was the United States goal as a leader country -- as an influential world power among others -- through UNESCO to enhance and elevate life throughout the world and to support intellectual cooperation.

What Has UNESCO Done for the U.S. Cultural Community?

1) U.S. Cultural Heritage Legislation. It was to Western and Eastern Europe that American officials went to study private and government practices prior to the drafting and enactment of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. This tour was conducted under the aegis of UNESCO's Cultural Heritage Division. Policies, techniques, methods and legislation were studied in Great Britain, Germany, Poland, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy and Czechoslovakia. The information that the delegation assembled was published in a book, With Heritage So Rich, and was used to support the 1966 Act. Recommendations and findings of the Special Committee are the basis of the United States preservation program today, having been adopted into the 1966 Act and into the United States preservation program since then.

The significant ramifications of this information exchange made possible by UNESCO did not stop with the enactment of the United States law. Several years later the Australian government studied the United States Act and its programs and procedures. New preservation legislation incorporating relevant concepts was enacted in Australia. Similarly, through many official personal visits and correspondence from individuals and organizations from other countries, the United States has contributed preservation information and advice to countries directly, through participation at conferences and on UNESCO advisory teams.

2) Education Programs and Information Exchanges. In the evolution of UNESCO cultural programs, communications between specialists is more frequently carried

out today through the aegis of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) than in the past. ICOMOS, ICOM and ICCROM receive subventions or contracts to help carry out some of their programs.

Americans have been accepted as participants in international conferences and meetings, some of whom have received UNESCO fellowships, grants and travel funds. One such conference was the International Conference on Historic Quarters held in Warsaw and Cracow, Poland, in 1980; another is the Seminar on Latin-American Heritage: the Fortifications, held at Cap Haitien, Haiti, September 1983. A conference was held last week in Washington, D.C., cosponsored by the Smithsonian Institution, US/ICOMOS, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and UNESCO for North American journalists on "The Challenge to Our Cultural Heritage: Why Preserve the Past?"

As one of the international programs cosponsored by UNESCO and ICOMOS, US/ICOMOS participates in a three-week study tour every other year for specialists on problems of preservation and rehabilitation of historic quarters. Specialists carry out individual study programs in host countries and participate in initial and closing meetings with other participants at the ICOMOS Secretariat in Paris. United States candidates may apply to study under the program in Europe, which resulted from Recommendations made at the UNESCO Helsinki Conference in 1975. Under the program Americans have gone to East Germany, Rumania and Yugoslavia, while an Hungarian and a Yugoslavian have come to the United States.

ICOMOS conducts a General Assembly and Scientific Symposium on Cultural Heritage once every three years in a different country. Americans have participated in England, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Russia, Italy and in 1984 East Germany. US/ICOMOS will host in 1987 the 8th General Assembly and Scientific Symposium to be held in Washington, D. C. It is anticipated that approximately 600 preservationists and conservationists from around the world will participate in an exchange of ideas and information.

The United States is looked to for leadership internationally because of the impressive impact of the dynamic historic preservation movement in this country, and because of the varied expertise of American professionals in the conservation of properties of architectural, historic and archaeological significance. Many of the participants will be in the United States for the first time, as has been the case for many of the Americans who went to General Assemblies of ICOMOS to Russia and East Germany. These gatherings provide an unusual opportunity for personal, professional and spiritual enrichment through cultural experience abroad.

UNESCO/ICOMOS Documentation Center at the ICOMOS Paris Secretariat is a clearinghouse of world technical preservation information. Its publications are entered into a computer, which is linked with similar programs at ICOM housed at the UNESCO Secretariat in Paris and ICCROM in Rome. Limited funds for staff and equipment are furnished to the UNESCO/ICOMOS Center from UNESCO through an annual subvention.

Americans receive UNESCO reports and publications, including Museum (US/ICOM), Courier (U.S. Commission members) and the World Heritage Bulletin (US/ICOMOS). UNESCO maintains high standards in publications, both in content and graphics, for the world, including the United States.

ICOMOS sponsors international specialized committees which meet approximately once a year with subsequent publication of proceedings. The subjects are Rock Art, Vernacular Architecture, Wood, Mud-Brick, Historic Gardens and Sites, Photogrammetry, Stone Seismology and Cultural Tourism. Americans serve as members of a number of these committees and others are corresponding members, attending conferences when possible and receiving documents. US/ICOMOS has recently accepted an opportunity to become the host nation for the Committee on Cultural Tourism.

UNESCO also helped establish the International Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), in Rome, Italy, which now has 68 member states. It has served to stimulate and coordinate research programs in conservation and six-month training programs in fields such as architect/restorer, mural painting, administration, etc. UNESCO makes contracts with ICCROM for specialized six-week courses. There is the Stone Course in Venice and the Wood Course in Norway, starting in 1984. These programs alternate, with one operating every other year. Americans have participated in the stone program, and 14 professionals have applied to participate in the Wood Course June 1984. Since more than 100 applications have been received from around the world and there are to be only 20 students, only one American can anticipate being accepted. Americans have profited from these courses, which have raised standards of conservation throughout the world.

Approximately 125 American professionals, primarily architects, conservators and archeologists have participated in the six-month ICCROM courses. 13 U.S. applicants were nominated by the U.S. Committee for these longer programs in 1984. Only 4 American were accepted because of the demand from other countries. An American served as a professor at ICCROM for several years and helped establish curriculum for the various programs.

Contributions from the international community of governments and private sources have been channeled to 27 international campaigns since the first one at Nubia. The success of the Nubia Campaign has helped to convey the idea of a universal human heritage to international public opinion. In 1983 Borobudur's restoration was completed. These UNESCO missions and their work are respected around the world for setting high standards and for being of the highest professional calibre. United States professionals have been involved in a number of these campaigns -- Abu Simbel and Philae, Egypt; Robert R. Garvey, Jr. and George White. Borobudur, Indonesia: W. Brown Morton, III. Others are currently involved in campaigns -- Moenjodaro, Pakistan, and Goree, Senegal; Paul Perrot. Istanbul, Turkey: Hiroshi Daifuku. Sukhothal, Thailand: Ernest A. Connally.

In 1982, the United States contributed a million dollars to the campaign for the preservation of the great Bronze Age site of Mohenjodaro, and will contribute a

American corporate gifts and private funds raised for projects, such as the preservation of Borobudur in Indonesia and historic sites and monuments in Venice, demonstrate widespread American support and interests in these UNESCO projects. It is anticipated that Americans will also contribute to the preservation of Roman, Byzantine and Islamic monuments found in Istanbul and Cappadocia, Turkey, the latest UNESCO campaign launched in 1983.

3. UNESCO Conventions and Recommendations. UNESCO has also drafted international conventions and recommendations. Up to the present, the American government has always been represented in meetings of governmental experts to review the final draft of the Instrument. Many of the clauses have been modified to take into account the American position. The United States government has ratified two of these conventions: 1) "...Means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property" and 2) "...Concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage."

The original proposal to establish the World Heritage Convention was formally advanced by President Nixon in 1971. In 1972 the World Heritage Convention was adopted by UNESCO's General Conference. In 1973 the United States was the first country to ratify the World Heritage Convention. It is ICOMOS through its Paris Secretariat which is responsible to the World Heritage Committee to review and make recommendations on all cultural nominations to the list from the 82 countries. This Convention established a system of international cooperation and assistance through which natural and cultural properties of outstanding universal value to mankind may be recognized and protected. Today there are 165 cultural and natural sites inscribed on the World Heritage List.

There are 12 United States sites on the List, 8 natural and 4 cultural sites:

Yellowstone National Park (Idaho, Montana, Wyoming) - natural site
 Mesa Verde National Park (Colorado) - cultural and natural site
 Independence Hall (Pennsylvania) - cultural site
 Everglades National Park (Florida) - natural site
 Grand Canyon National Park (Arizona) - natural site
 Wrangell-St. Elias National Park (Alaska with Kluane National Park, Canada)-natural
 Redwood National Park (California) - natural site
 Mammoth Cave National Park (Kentucky) - natural site
 Olympic National Park (Washington) - natural site
 Cahokia Mounds State Historic Site (Illinois) - cultural site
 Great Smoky Mountains National Park (Tennessee, North Carolina) - cultural site
 Historic Fortifications of San Juan (Puerto Rico) - cultural site

US/ICOMOS has a responsibility for World Heritage Convention programs in the United States. On April 18, 1984, US/ICOMOS sponsored in the United States the first World Heritage Day, declared internationally by ICOMOS. More than 600 persons attended the program on the restoration of the Statue of Liberty, which was nominated by the United States to the World Heritage List. The nomination will be studied, reviewed and voted upon, rejected or designated by the World Heritage Committee at its meeting in December 1984.

How Well Does UNESCO Perform Its Cultural Work? One of the founding principles of UNESCO is embodied in paragraph 2 of Article I of its Statutes in which it was to: "(c) Maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge; by assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary conventions...."

US/ICOMOS considers that UNESCO has been carrying out this aspect of its program successfully and that it is one in which Americans have had an active role and contributed to the formulation and execution of many of the projects in this field since UNESCO's inception. The potential of UNESCO's cultural contributions in the United States, however, have not been totally realized and could have been more effective if the United States had involved itself differently.

Americans have been actively involved, directly or indirectly, in UNESCO's cultural programs. They have contributed to and benefited from the developments that have taken place in the past 35 years of the organization's history. Unfortunately, this mutually beneficial situation has not received sufficient appreciation of the general public or, to some degree, by the United States government. This may be, in part, due to the fact that the United States government does not have a ministry or Department of Education and Culture, analogous to those found in other countries, through which contacts between UNESCO and universities as well as cultural institutions can be directly channeled. Neither do United States cultural programs have a focus similar to the relationship between the scientific community and the National Academy of Sciences, which deals with United States scientific matters.

The U. S. Commission for UNESCO has not been sufficiently funded and staffed for it to be a leader for UNESCO programs in the United States. The U.S. Commission does not have the role and status that commissions in other countries have. It should have met more than once a year. Its committee structure should be evaluated. There should be a committee on cultural heritage to be of assistance to the strong U.S. cultural heritage community. The U.S. Commission might be reorganized and reconstituted as an independent nonpolitical organization, with an association with the State Department.

A new look should be taken to determine United States responsibility for the World Heritage Convention. The United States held a six-year term of membership on the World Heritage Committee, beginning with its initiation in 1976, and served three consecutive terms as chairman and vice-chairman of the Committee. United States consultants have cooperated in technical assistance projects at World Heritage sites under the sponsorship and in support of the treaty. But the United States has not met its voluntary dues commitment to the World Heritage Convention through the State Department since 1981. The United States is in arrears for 1982, 1983 and 1984 at \$248,000 annually. The United States initiated the World Heritage Convention -- why has it dropped its leadership position and support of this program?

Would Withdrawal of American Leadership in UNESCO negatively affect the work of the U.S. Committee? Americans have been closely involved in the planning and

execution of many projects in the cultural programs of UNESCO. While it is possible that in spite of United States withdrawal, American citizens will be involved in future projects -- either through Non-Governmental Organizations or as individual specialists -- this move would exclude governmental participation. American contributions as well as gains from these programs would probably be affected by the withdrawal of the United States government as a member state of UNESCO.

Although the United States government will continue to observe the two conventions relating to cultural heritage that it has ratified (they have an indefinite life), withdrawal would mean that the United States would not be involved in the preparation and adoption of future instruments.

United States withdrawal may mean that UNESCO's cultural heritage budget for program and staff would be reduced by one fourth. Cultural heritage programs to be affected would include special international restoration campaigns, missions of experts and the unique exchange of information through publications, conferences and training programs.

United States withdrawal will impair the programs of ICCROM, unless other funding is found. There are no training programs for conservators and restorationists in the world with the breadth and depth of the program in Rome. Assistance to the UNESCO-ICOMOS and the UNESCO-ICOM Documentation Centers in Paris which are linked to the Rome Documentation Center would be reduced. These programs have not yet reached their full potential. The United States has no resource similar to these three Documentation Centers and has been unable to establish a linking Documentation Center in the United States. We in the United States are currently unable to use what is available in Paris and Rome and we have been unable to put United States materials into the Centers in order to share the United States experience. The library at ICCROM is the best in the world on its subject and should be maintained at this level.

Conclusion. UNESCO makes continuing contributions to the advancement of education, science and culture worldwide; it is also an instrument for peace through communications between people and nations. Cultural heritage programs of education, expert assistance and information exchange could be carried out on a bilateral basis by US/ICOMOS (with access to 65 other national committees of ICOMOS), with increased federal funding and private resources. Today, however, the three cultural heritage NGO's -- US/ICOMOS, US/ICOM and US/ICCROM -- do not provide a strong infrastructure. The three are poorly funded, have few staff members, minimal educational programs and low promotional activities to keep their professional constituency and the American public involved and informed.

There are a number of areas that relate to the current UNESCO budget that these three United States organizations can effectively and efficiently carry out, if funds were available. Some programs in these areas are: 1) the training of American

and foreign preservation and conservation specialists; 2) the sponsorship and distribution of United States and UNESCO preservation and conservation publications in this country and abroad; 3) increased participation of United States experts in the policies and programs of ICOMOS, ICOM and ICCROM; 4) involvement of American specialists in foreign sites, such as in inventorying and conservation programs; 5) the monitoring of World Heritage Convention sites through the strengthening of the ICOMOS Documentation Center; and 6) the expansion and promotion of the World Heritage Convention programs in the United States.

Increased contributions to these United States committees would make possible significant development of the programs of ICCROM, the World Heritage Convention and the two NGOs devoted to monuments and museums. Such program development would emphasize the American position that there are many aspects of UNESCO's program that deserve approval and that they are the types of projects upon which UNESCO should concentrate.

Working bilaterally with other nations could be effective but it would be different from the United States association or potential association with UNESCO, which is the principal means through which Americans can identify with all nations of the world concerned with cultural heritage.

Mr. MICA. My inclination would be to dismiss all the other witnesses and talk about the cultural programs, because I have some personal interest in the historic aspects.

Mr. ROSENBLITH. Science is culture, too, sir.

Mr. MICA. I knew I shouldn't have said that.

Mr. Sussman.

STATEMENT OF LEONARD SUSSMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FREEDOM HOUSE

Mr. SUSSMAN. Thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before you today.

In my prepared testimony I include two letters that Freedom House has sent, one to the President just prior to the formal announcement of the withdrawal decision. That letter called upon the President not to withdraw, and gave some reasons.

The second letter to the Secretary of State following the withdrawal announcement stated Freedom House's position that in view of that decision we hope that everything would be done in the interim before withdrawal became effective to produce reforms within UNESCO that would make it possible for us to remain.

You have asked me to testify today on the nature and value of UNESCO's programs in the fields of communications and human rights. Would this country's withdrawal from the organization negatively affect the work of American professionals in these areas?

It should be stated at the outset that I have been the most persistent American critic—for nearly 10 years—of UNESCO's activities in the communications field. My prepared statement describes my criticism in some detail.

Briefly, UNESCO's communications programs include research and analysis of the flow of mass communication within and between countries; and discussion of changes in the style and content of the flow of news and information of all kinds.

Examination of the information and communications revolution is entirely within UNESCO's mandate. Every aspect of human soci-

ety today is directly influenced by the changing modes of communication.

It is folly to expect that a global organization devoted since its inception to education, science, culture, and communication could evade the influences on all these sectors of new communications technologies and their uses in both domestic and international contexts.

The question, then, is not whether UNESCO has the mandate to examine news and information flows. It certainly has, since the earliest days when Americans made certain that communication was to be a concern of UNESCO.

The proper question is whether UNESCO has moved beyond investigating the problems and opportunities created by international communications, to the point of framing a normative or universal standard for the content of news and information flows. That issue has provoked bitter reactions from independent journalists, and their governments.

I have written extensively on this subject. I have pointed out that discussions at UNESCO by some delegates clearly indicated that their governments already control the news and information media under their jurisdiction. By criticizing independent journalists, those delegates gave the impression they wanted to extend their press-control systems worldwide.

On the same platform, free-press advocates were also heard, and effectively. So effectively that throughout the decade of bitter communications controversies there has never been a single resolution or program approved at UNESCO that supports press censorship, the licensing of journalists or other proposals to harm press freedom.

What, then, so blackened the name of UNESCO that the communications debate mainly prepared the way for the American withdrawal?

American press coverage has reflected the possibilities of press controls, not actualities, and that important distinction has never been made clear. For example, the Soviet Union's outrageous draft resolution of 1976 tying all the press to governmental oversight was defeated.

Yet the memory of that bitter debate remains and blackens the name of UNESCO more than the Soviets who introduced the draft. It was Director-General M'Bow who warned then the draft was unconstitutional under UNESCO's charter.

Two years later, another outrageous Soviet draft was personally killed by M'Bow's action, and a bland Western-oriented resolution on the mass media approved by acclamation.

But the memory of that bitter draft remains, and UNESCO—far from getting credit for defeating it—is still charged, in memory, with having proposed it. That, of course, was untrue.

Last November, at the latest UNESCO General Conference, the Soviets again introduced a draft to mandate UNESCO's monitoring of the press. Bold headlines in major U.S. newspapers again charged UNESCO—not the Soviets alone—with planning press controls.

That was not true. The fact was the Soviet draft never even reached the floor. I helped negotiate away the Soviet draft. Were

there sizable headlines in major U.S. newspapers hailing the defeat of the Soviet effort?

Was there even modest reporting of the killing of other press-control initiatives by delegates last November? Were there editorials hailing the new Western-oriented programs in communications approved then—programs such as UNESCO efforts now to study the watchdog role of the press, the effects of governmental censorship, and self-censorship?

You may have guessed the answer. There were no headlines in major newspapers reporting the killing of press-control measures, just small, colorless stories wrapping up the 2-week negotiations on communications. The blackened name of UNESCO stands undiminished.

I am not suggesting that UNESCO is blameless. The organization has stressed the importance of communications, and so must expect that subject to be spotlighted. Moreover, UNESCO has not actively separated the debates over sharing infrastructures, and improving news coverage, on the one hand; from governmental controls of the content, on the other. That is not to say UNESCO—the organization—has ever set press controls as an objective. But independent journalists were understandably suspicious of any ambiguity.

The U.S. press has, therefore, covered UNESCO's communications programs to the exclusion of every other program. That has been the decade-long record. Almost no coverage has been given the science, education, literacy, heritage-preservation, and scores of other programs at UNESCO. It must be remembered, the entire communications program spends less than 5 percent of the UNESCO budget.

Yet the communications sector, and the distorting coverage given it are responsible for setting the climate to withdraw.

What does this mean for American journalists and Americans generally?

Simply that press-freedom advocates will have a harder time making their case in the global forum at UNESCO once America leaves. And make no mistake, there is no other international forum for these diverse debates.

The discussions will go on—not to establish a universal standard—one continues to hope—but to engage everyone concerned—that includes American citizens as well as their journalists—in the opportunities as well as problems resulting from the information revolution.

And in many cases, American technologies and American news media will find themselves cut out from sales as well as discussions by virtue of our withdrawal.

Similarly, in the case of the human right issues. America has the most to contribute to debates on individual freedom and the proper definition of such new terms as "people's rights." These are not words to be feared.

They are terms to be filled with our content. The Soviets cannot possibly stand the spotlight of discussion on self-determination. That is another term for people's rights. People's rights must be properly defined to reflect full acceptance of individual rights for everyone included in a particular group. The authoritarians on the right or the left cannot abide such definitions.

Why, then, should the United States shy off, and attempt the self-defeating tactic—as has our delegation since 1982—of attributing the term to Marxist maneuvering—it is of African origin—and attempting the impossible task of killing the term, rather than defining it?

In the human rights area, the presence of U.S. scholars at UNESCO would make a difference. Americans provided much of the early scholarship and motivation for UNESCO's human rights program.

This participation, as most American involvement, has diminished in recent years. This parallels our experience in the field of communications research.

Americans have been largely absent from this discipline, and the Eastern Europeans have taken over the main channels of communications research in the international field. That is not the fault of UNESCO.

It is due to the failure of U.S. researchers to enter the field and of the U.S. Government to attract or assist them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has vastly improved and increased the staffing at UNESCO in Paris and in Moscow, and has expanded the USSR's National Commission for UNESCO even as this administration sought to eliminate its American counterpart.

The Soviets moreover maintain continuity in their representation at UNESCO, while the United States does not. An internal Soviet document reveals that the U.S.S.R. engages "dozens of Soviet ministries and organizations and hundreds of people."

The surprise is not that the U.S.S.R. has had some influence, but rather that it has had so little thus far in the communications and human rights fields.

So far, our friends in Western Europe, Africa, and Asia have responded haltingly to our announcement of withdrawal. Many are embarrassed.

The best they can say is they understand our reasons. So do I.

But I believe the tactic of withdrawing from UNESCO before it can be reformed is self-defeating. We should maintain pressure to reform UNESCO. It is too valuable to turn over to our adversaries, and it cannot be reformed from outside. We should stay the course, and if necessary, extend our notice of withdrawal.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I draw your attention to the very important issue of international copyright. This is managed by UNESCO's universal copyright convention.

If we leave UNESCO, as the State Department policy review acknowledges, the United States would no longer participate in the management of the universal copyright convention. This, says the State Department, could negatively affect the combating of cultural piracy.

State says "our influence may get weaker if we leave the organization." The issue of cultural piracy and the copyright is addressed in a rather important document I would like to have appended to my statement, if I may.

It is directed to the Executive Board of UNESCO, dated April 9, 1984, and it includes this discussion as well as many of the other

questions arising from the U.S. withdrawal and UNESCO's response to that letter.

Thank you.

[Mr. Sussman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEONARD R. SUSSMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FREEDOM
HOUSE, NEW YORK

I am Leonard R. Sussman, executive director of Freedom House. Our organization, in its forty-third year, monitors year-round the level of political and civil rights in every country, issues policy advisories, provides a platform for dissenters still oppressed in their own lands, and publishes a bimonthly magazine, newsletter, yearbooks and other volumes on diverse issues of human freedom. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman is Chairman of our Board of Trustees.

I have been asked to provide testimony on the announced withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO, with particular reference to the programs in communications and human rights of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

You should know, at the outset, the positions taken by Freedom House. Before the Administration decided last December to withdraw from UNESCO the President of Freedom House wrote President Reagan:

The Executive Committee has directed me to express the considered view of Freedom House that the United States should not only continue its full membership in UNESCO but expand and intensify our participation in the affairs of the organization. We address this to you because we know that your Administration is undertaking an extensive reassessment of the value of UNESCO to this country while weighing our continued membership in that organization.

* * *

We have often been a critical observer of the organization, and in UNESCO forums particularly defend all aspects of the free flow of information.

We believe, however, that the recent General Conference was demonstrably responsive to some American positions. That was a result of the firm position taken by your Administration on the budget issue, as well as the persistent effort made by your representatives on the permanent delegation in Paris, and in the delegation to the General Conference. This responsiveness, in our view, suggests that the United States can play an important role by remaining in UNESCO at this time.

We should examine with still more persistence and sophistication the programs in all sectors that are conceived at the Paris headquarters, and monitor regularly the objectives, development and conclusions of those programs.

We should, moreover, between General Conferences continually make known to the secretariat and other member states our assessments of such close examination of UNESCO's work program.

After the Administration announced the decision to withdraw, the President of Freedom House transmitted to the Secretary of State this resolution approved unanimously at our Annual Meeting, January 30, 1984:

* * *

We welcome the objectives sought by the President's action. UNESCO has, indeed, created some programs in recent years that project objectionable ideological and political bias in activities that traditionally advance science, education, culture and communications for the benefit of all peoples. The organization, moreover, has expanded its budget beyond reasonable limits, and is inefficiently administered.

We further support the President's decision to expend every effort during 1984 to effect meaningful changes to eliminate the problems in UNESCO's programs, structure, and administration. And we welcome the President's commitment to review the decision to withdraw from UNESCO should concrete changes materialize later this year.

Toward that end, Freedom House is eager to lend its support, and that of members who were active in helping create UNESCO, and who have assisted it and other intergovernmental organizations for many years. Since Freedom House highly values effective American participation in intergovernmental organizations that perform functions for which they were created, we believe it is essential for the United States to continue to play a constructive role in reforming those international organizations that require change. We regret that, for too long, under several U.S. Administrations our natural allies and those developing countries who regard us as a potentially creative force in the world, have been disappointed with American representation at intergovernmental agencies.

We hope UNESCO can once again provide a proper setting for the demonstration of our democratic values, and our compassionate assistance in the major areas of UNESCO's commitments. If it did, the U.S. could continue to profit from its participation in UNESCO through the specialized agencies of our government and, as well, many nongovernmental agencies.

Freedom House, for nearly a decade, has been deeply involved in UNESCO's activities, particularly in international communications and the free flow of news and information. If there is to be significant long-term improvement in UNESCO's programs in this and other fields, including budgeting and administration, a specific bill of particulars should be set forth at the earliest moment so that we who seek to reevaluate UNESCO's programs later in the year will have clear benchmarks of changes needed, and can appropriately judge the extent of UNESCO's progress, if any. We, therefore, ask the Secretary of State to provide us with a specific bill of particulars for changes sought. We believe the areas of objections only generally mentioned---politicization of programs, attack upon a free flow of information, and unrestrained budgetary expansion---now need elaboration.

If, on the other hand, the Secretary believes it would be more cost-effective and, on balance, better serve the cause of freedom by creating alternative programs, we would appreciate having the Secretary's description of planned movement toward that end. We also respectfully request from the Secretary his indication of how this country intends to develop alternative data, services, programs, sales contacts, and other activities for those now conducted by UNESCO, if our citizens no longer have access to these activities and services. This would affect nongovernmental as well as governmental agencies now profiting from UNESCO activities.

Whether or not the United States remains in UNESCO after this year, it will be essential to judge how American values are both expressed and perceived by friends and adversaries alike, and how we may help Americans generally to improve our participation in United Nations' organizations, and restrain the tendency to withdraw from them.

You should also know my relationship to UNESCO. For nearly ten years I have been the most persistent American critic of UNESCO's communications programs. I have consulted with journalists and government spokesmen in some 30 countries on six continents, and have written extensively on this subject ---most of it critical of UNESCO's communications programs. I am also vice chair of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO (I stress the word "for"). And I was selected by this Administration as a delegate to UNESCO's General Conference in Paris last November. There, I negotiated many of the most controversial communications issues.

I testify out of this diverse organizational and personal history. This diversity, however, reflects the highly complex issues addressed at UNESCO, and the still more complicated elements involved in the Administration's decision to withdraw from the organization.

Several fundamental aspects of the American relationship to UNESCO should be examined. These are:

1. The substantive programs.
2. The administration, including budgeting.
3. The tactical question, whether programs and administration can be positively influenced on behalf of American interests by the U.S. withdrawal, even if some alternative instruments can be found.

My summarized conclusions: UNESCO's communications programs have reflected Third World criticism of the news and information media not controlled by

governments. This criticism did not originate in the Soviet Union, though Moscow has tried to exploit it. The Soviets have been repeatedly rebuffed. Director-General Amadou Mahtar M'Bow has quietly helped block Soviet press-control initiatives. Yet discussions of the news media continue because three-quarters of the world's governments influence or control their media---and will, whether the U.S. remains in or leaves the organization. Indeed if we leave, the chances for greater use of UNESCO's considerable forum to debate press-control measures will increase, not decrease, as the State Department's official policy review acknowledges.

Tactically, therefore, I believe the United States should continue to apply pressure on UNESCO to change those policies and programs that run counter to its basic mandate; yet the U.S. should remain within the organization in order to bring this about, and help UNESCO remain true to its important commitments.

To do both, now, will be difficult. We have taken a course that seems to lead to withdrawal in eight months. Honest determination and sound negotiations are needed. More than that, realistic recognition of the inherent values of UNESCO to this country, and our loss through withdrawal, will dictate a course that maintains pressure while avoiding ultimate withdrawal.

To accomplish this it will be necessary for the American people to understand what has been happening at UNESCO, not only what has been reported to America through the distorted prism of the communications and human rights debates.

The Communications Debates:

The bitter debates over the flow of news and information (films, cassettes, books, computerized data) did not begin in UNESCO. Their origin was not in Moscow. The information controversies began in the Nonaligned Movement's meetings in the early 'seventies. In 1976, the term New World Information Order appeared at the Tunis meeting of the Nonaligned. The democratic Third World countries, along with authoritarians of the right and the left, actively supported the plea for a new world information order. The developing countries had three basic demands.

All wanted enlarged communications infrastructures to enable them to speak to one another and the developed world without continued dependence on communications systems still geared to colonial arrangements.

All wanted better balanced coverage of their events and personalities by the major world-news services headquartered in the developed countries.

And some, not all, Third World countries also wanted to control the content of news and information transmissions inside and outside their countries. Indeed, not only in the Third World but in the world generally, fully three-quarters of the governments today influence or control the news media under their jurisdiction.

Well before the Nonaligned introduced the concept of the new world information order, the Soviet Union had been attacking Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as an infringement on Soviet sovereignty. The USSR in 1970 and again in 1972 introduced resolutions at UNESCO to make governments responsible for such broadcasts. But these Soviet drafts were defeated, and further discussion put over.

When the new world information order was introduced as a slogan---and no more---it was not defined at UNESCO---the Soviet delegate loudly attacked it. As late as 1978, Leonid Zamyatin, soon to be the czar of all Soviet information for the Central Committee, said the world does not need a new information order. The present one was sufficient, he said, for it is based on national sovereignty. He found himself in agreement on the term, at least, with the American across the table.

But before long the Soviets changed their position. Months later they embraced the idea of a new world information order, though it still had not been defined. It was a good political ploy for the Soviets. They supported this vague term that meant different things to different people---communications aid for poor countries, better coverage of economic and social developments---who could oppose that?

The United States did, along with some allies.

We were not sure what the intentions were of those supporting the new order. Did they want better infrastructures and better coverage? Or did they really want governments to control the content of news and information?

The U.S. news media reported these communications debates at UNESCO as though the ultimate agenda was censorship--by licensing journalists, establishing codes of journalistic practice, monitoring reportage, and penalizing those who broke the code. Indeed, all of these elements were mentioned in the debates. Yet never have any of these elements been approved at UNESCO. Not a single resolution, not a single statement of a top official of UNESCO ever called for licensing, governmental codes for journalists, monitoring of journalistic output, or censorship. On the contrary, Director-General M'Bow and his deputy for communications repeatedly decry censorship, even as they call for improved communications infrastructures and better coverage of social and economic developments in the Third World.

The record of the Soviet Union being repeatedly rebuffed in the communications debates is clear:

In 1970 the USSR's mild communications draft was put off.
 In 1972 the USSR's stronger draft was put off.
 In 1976 the USSR's outrageous draft was defeated.

In 1978 came the showdown. The harshest Soviet draft of all was killed the night before it was to have been debated. It was killed by Director-General M'Bow's personal intercession. In place of the Soviet draft, a Western-oriented version was substituted. That was approved by acclamation---so relieved were the Western countries, and the Third World as well, that the divisive Soviet draft had been replaced. M. M'Bow cannot very well claim credit ---though his constructive role was privately acknowledged---because he regards himself an international public servant.

An examination of that 1978 Mass Media Declaration reveals no threat to press freedom. On the contrary, the declaration as approved calls for a "free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information." Though clumsily phrased, it is an unobjectionable goal.

The early articles call for "the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information recognized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms." The declaration then calls for "diversity of sources and means of information" available to the public. "To the end," says the declaration, "journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information." Further, the declaration states it is "essential that journalists...in their own country and abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession."

The declaration also calls upon the mass media to contribute to the advancement of human rights and peace.

Mere mention of protecting journalists, of promoting human rights, and encouraging a free flow raised ugly spectres in the U.S. press. Reporters recalled earlier debates over licensing as a prelude to protecting journalists. Use of the word in the declaration seemed to suggest a hidden agenda. Yet the declaration clearly avoided that controversy.

Nevertheless the declaration was roundly attacked in a major U.S. newspaper. By what right, it asked, do American delegates negotiate with other countries over the procedures of independent journalists?

Such response for ten years has clouded UNESCO debates over communications. The fact that the only UNESCO policy statement on the mass media is bland and not critical of independent journalism seems of little consequence. The further fact that the onerous-sounding New World Information and Communications Order has never been defined by UNESCO similarly seems not to influence critics of UNESCO. And when an effort was begun to define the NWICO in 1980 the resolution said that in any definition

this new world information and communication order could be based, among other considerations, on: (i) elimination of the imbalances and inequalities which characterize the present situation; (ii) elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private, and excessive concentrations; (iii) removal of the internal and external obstacles to a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information and ideas; (iv) plurality of courses and channels of information; (v) freedom of the press and information; (vi) the freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication media, a freedom inseparable

from responsibility; (vii) the capacity of developing countries to achieve improvement of their own situations, notably by providing their own equipment, by training their personnel, by improving their infrastructures and by making their information and communication media suitable to their needs and aspirations; (viii) the sincere will of developed countries to help them attain these objectives; (ix) respect for each people's cultural identity and for the right of each nation to inform the world public about its interests, its aspirations and its social and cultural values; (x) respect for the right of all peoples to participate in international exchanges of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit; (xi) respect for the right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively in the communication process.

This resolution approved by the 1980 general conference did not define the NWICO. It merely suggested possible ideas for a future definition. Most of these objectives should not worry press-freedom advocates. Some should be welcomed as enlarging human freedom. But in recalling earlier debates some terms seemed threatening. For example, the last concept may seem innocuous but in light of earlier discussions it could imply government-assured "access" to the news media for the government itself or others. "Elimination" of excesses also seemed threatening, as did "responsibility" of journalists.

It should be remembered that this 1980 resolution has had no implementation whatsoever. The NWICO has still not been defined. Yet the U.S. press repeatedly reports the UNESCO debates on communications as though there is a specific agenda for press control that includes the licensing and in other ways censoring of the news media. The U.S./UNESCO Policy Review flatly states (giving no evidence) that "the contemplated NWICO, in particular, would establish a program in which we cannot acquiesce." That program, says the U.S. document, but no UNESCO document, would establish "a restrictive NWICO."

To be sure, such possibilities are discussed by a few member states. And some have, indeed, adopted such policies themselves. Before the licensing question was ever discussed at UNESCO, four countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Colombia) were already licensing journalists. Subsequently, three more did (Honduras, Panama, Venezuela), and others are considering it. Similarly, when the Peruvian military nationalized all the country's newspapers, the government said it did so under a UNESCO "mandate." No such mandate existed, but it was

convenient to use UNESCO's wide-open debates for press-control purposes.

That reflects the danger of the UNESCO debates and the unsophisticated reporting by the independent news media. UNESCO---the organization---failed to distinguish for many years between the unobjectionable and the objectionable goals put forth by different proponents of the NWICO. No distinction was made between expansion of communications facilities and the improvement of the quality of the flow, on the one hand; and the desire of some to control the content of the flow, for authoritarian purposes. Further, when discussing all manner of news and information systems---the freest, along with the Marxist and rightist totalitarians---UNESCO did not make clear it was not seeking to support a single, normative system of news and information flow. Too often, it appeared that a universal standard for journalism was sought. UNESCO's secretariat, at middle levels, seemed to favor creating a normative system of journalism.

Yet it must be made clear, nothing has ever been approved to support that perception.

Further, at the UNESCO general conference in 1983 significant additions were made in UNESCO's communications programs to accommodate press-freedom advocates. Yet the U.S. press coverage again blackened the name of UNESCO. One major newspaper at the outset of the debate carried a story across the top of one news page reporting under a three-column headline that a Soviet draft demanded that UNESCO monitor the press. This draft never reached the floor of UNESCO. It was negotiated out of existence. As a member of the U.S. delegation I was one of those negotiating. Yet there were no large headlines for the killing of that Soviet draft; barely a one-sentence reference near the bottom of a story in the same major paper that had featured the earlier scare-story.

By any current definition of news, UNESCO communications debates last year were newsworthy. Of 49 communications resolutions introduced, 33 (including those of the U.S. and its friends) were not objectionable to free-press advocates. Of the remaining 16, the worst---introduced by the Soviet

Union and the German Democratic Republic---were withdrawn without ever reaching the floor. On the positive side, for the first time in a decade, the general conference approved programs to study the "watchdog" role of the press, examine governmental censorship, and self-censorship. Most important, UNESCO decided to treat the New World Information and Communication Order as an "evolving process," not a series of imposed regulations. Each of these programs represents a gain for free-press supporters and a loss for authoritarians of the left and the right.

This does not mean that the struggle over communications---its procedures and content---has ended. That tension will never end. Communications are too important a factor for all citizens in all countries for the implications of the information revolution to be ignored. Those in America---whether editorialists or officials---who think they can restrain the debate over the content and the procedures of communications are unrealistic at best and self-defeating at worst. They are destined to lose their preeminence to others who will share communications facilities and training with the developing world; and recognize that there are improvements needed in the style and content of reportage that should be undertaken without the pressure of governmental threats. All of us, in the developed and the developing world, need to know far more about one another than we can now receive from the mass news and information media, and receive it in greater depth and with better balance.

* * *

UNESCO in opening its forum to that question has suffered the antagonism of all who resist change for whatever reason. The communications debates have colored the entire perception of the organization in the United States.

The National News Council, the late monitor of the U.S. press, examined coverage of the 1980 UNESCO general conference. The NNC saw 448 news reports and 206 editorials from newspapers all over the country. "Not

one story emanating from the six-week conference dealt with any of the reports, speeches, or resolutions on UNESCO's basic activities in combating illiteracy, developing alternative energy sources, protecting historic monuments, broadening educational programs for scientists or engineers, sponsoring basic research in food production and ocean sciences, and scores of other fields," the NNC said. "By contrast," it continued, "there were 173 news and feature stories dealing with the debates over communications policy. This was also the central topic for 181 editorials."

What was the theme?

"Without exception, the editorials expressed apprehension about UNESCO's involvement in attempts to establish policy in matters affecting the worldwide flow of information." The Council concluded: "The imbalance that characterized most of the Belgrade news coverage in this country provided an inadequate foundation for independent judgment by Americans of the correctness of the editorial positions their newspapers were taking on the UNESCO communications issue."

UNESCO, to be sure, was not blameless. It signalled the key role it believes communications now play in world affairs, and challenged the communicators to change their content and style. By repeatedly raising this issue in an intergovernmental setting, UNESCO readily gives the impression---even if no UNESCO decision supports this view---that governments, not journalists, should determine news policies.

Undoubtedly, that perception influenced the Congress when in 1982 it passed the Beard Amendment to the State Department Appropriation Act. That amendment stipulated the U.S. would immediately cease funding UNESCO if it did anything that had the effect of licensing, censoring or in other ways

harming journalists. The amendment also called for an annual report by the State Department to Congress on whether UNESCO was, indeed, harming journalists. The February 24, 1983 report to Congress stated that "There are at this time no grounds to withhold funding for UNESCO." On the contrary, that report stated that "UNESCO expenditures which benefit the U.S....amount to about 40% of the value of the U.S. contribution" to UNESCO. A similar report was given early this year. UNESCO, indeed, has significantly improved its communications programs. As careful an observer, and as committed a free-press advocate as the World Press Freedom Committee's director stated after last year's general conference:

If anyone is looking for an assault on the media at this conference, serious enough to justify a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, they won't find it.

I agreed.

The official summary of the Department of State, published in support of the declaration to withdraw, also acknowledges that last year's general conference debate on communications "gave evidence of a new and welcome degree of moderation."

The Human Rights Debates:

The discussions of human rights at UNESCO should be examined in proper context---and not simply as another battleground for East-West controversies. Human rights became a Cold War issue in 1982 when the Extraordinary General Conference of UNESCO for the first time approved programs for 1984-1989 that would discuss "peoples' rights" along with human rights. The term peoples' rights aroused American suspicion and opposition. It was quickly assumed that a new hidden agenda was being unveiled---that peoples' rights would be interpreted to mean collectivist, or statist rights in the pattern of the communist definition of the supreme authority of government over the rights of citizens; indeed, of the rights of the group over the rights of the individual.

All of this could readily be perceived in the breadth of the term, and in the absence of any definition in any of the supporting papers.

The facts were that the term "peoples rights" did not originate in Moscow, or in a Marxist setting. An all-African conference in Algiers on July 4, 1976 proclaimed the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples. Three years later, African heads of state decided to formulate an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. This charter was adopted by the eighteenth assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1981 at Nairobi, and is distributed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

To be sure, this charter emphasized "duties" of citizens more than other human rights documents. And in the usage at UNESCO there was the suggestion that peoples' rights could somehow be equated with, if not supplant, human rights. But only a suggestion, not a clear statement.

The introduction of peoples' rights into the UNESCO debate could open a process of definition, and further description of the term. Should Americans regard that debate as threatening? Should we respond to this human rights debate in the same self-defeating ways we reacted to the communications debates at UNESCO? We failed to participate seriously in the communications discussions. We even withdrew from the debate in 1975 at a crucial moment, and by our absence, opened the field to the Soviet delegate who carried the day; we steadily reduced the size and quality of our American representatives at UNESCO/Paris and in Washington; we repeatedly cut the staffing of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO until the Administration last year completely ended all funding and removed all staff support.

This undeniably reduced our ability to represent American interests at UNESCO, and left us with a mainly polemical role, with little substance.

The U.S. position in the human rights debate from 1982 on was essentially to seek to kill the term "peoples' rights," not join the debate to effect a real improvement on the substance of the discussions.

Yet Americans, above all, have a stake in the proper defining of human rights. Which other country has a longer tradition of pressing for self-determination of peoples? Wilson's Fourteen Points are peoples' rights! The Soviet Union cannot possibly support such a traditional definition of the term. The USSR is the largest violator of peoples' rights: in the Baltic countries, Afghanistan, the Ukraine, among the Tatars, the Jews and in Eastern Europe.

Most important, peoples' rights, however defined, should encompass individual rights. They are not mutually exclusive. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, since 1948, has set the global standard of individual freedom. The task now is to mesh the prerogatives of groups, however large, with the fundamental rights of all individuals within those groups.

The United States should take a much more positive approach in the discussion. We should not, in other words, continue to be satisfied with a damage-limiting strategy in the human rights arena, as we did in communications for so long. The Helsinki accords and the Helsinki process that followed should be taken as a model for American human-rights initiatives. Admittedly in the Helsinki process we are often part of the majority, while in the United Nations we are often in a minority. Nevertheless, American representatives should present and defend clear-cut positions that project American values.

Rightly defined, peoples' rights should be seen as a central aspect of the democratic tradition. The term "peoples' rights" is admittedly ambiguous, but the ambiguity cuts both ways. On the one hand, it seems synonymous with the rights of states, particularly economic and security rights, but on the other hand, the new terminology seems to place the existence of "peoples" above and prior to that of states. It should be noted that most of the states supporting the concept are also faced with the present or potential demands of many submerged "peoples" that will only with difficulty be

defined away if the term achieves general acceptance. Thus, peoples' rights raises many of the same problems as the concept of self-determination, a concept that we have unfortunately not pursued with as much consistency as we might have in the U.N. because of our too-persistent attachment to the status quo. It is a continuing scandal that the U.N. has been allowed to see self-determination as applying only to the former colonies of European powers and the United States. "Peoples' rights" offer the West a needed opportunity to redress this mistake. The countries ruling over captive peoples today are generally communist tyrannies, and that point should be driven home. Were we to take this approach we would again place the Soviet Union and its satellites on the defensive as we have at Belgrade and Madrid, only this time we would place them in the company of the many petty tyrannies of the Third World.

Properly understood, peoples' rights can be seen as an integral part of the democratic tradition. We should not let the implication become accepted that because democracy begins with a consideration of the rights of individuals, it does not recognize as essential to their expression, collective institutions that secure these rights in a community or among communities composed of many individuals with necessarily conflicting rights.

UNESCO, moreover, provides a significant, little-heralded area of direct human rights performance. Through its Committee on Conventions and Recommendations, UNESCO hears in private the complaints of violations of human rights by member states. Quietly, this special UNESCO committee permits organizations such as Freedom House to bring particular cases of human-rights abuse before the defendant country's peers. This UNESCO committee is more effective and fairer than the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The UNESCO committee has been responsible for the release of individuals who suffered long and unjust imprisonment, and often torture.

Specific Questions Raised by the Department of State and this Subcommittee:

"Politicization" of UNESCO programs is charged. This, no matter how often repeated, is a meaningless term when applied to any intergovernmental

organization. The act of any government is a political act. So, too, every act of UNESCO from its inception---whether in education, culture, science or communications---has had political implications. "UNESCO," says the U.S./UNESCO Policy Review of February 27, 1984, is "heavily politicized, and answer(s) to an agenda that is often inimical to U.S. interests." It mentions Israel, yet that has been a dormant issue at UNESCO for some time. And, in fact, Israeli delegates to UNESCO pleaded with us last November not to leave the organization. The policy paper says UNESCO "develops a plethora of 'normative' instruments, sometimes anti-libertarian in concept." No evidence is cited of a single "normative instrument," libertarian or other. The policy paper mentions disarmament as an extraneous issue. Yet the original purpose for creating UNESCO was to secure peace by employing science, education and communications programs. Archibald MacLeish, the American who headed the first program-planning committee of UNESCO, used the substantive programs such as science and communications to rationalize support in nonmilitary areas for peace and security.

The Policy Review objects to the terms used to define disarmament. But there, as in the debates over communications and human rights, the U.S. has the opportunity to persuade. It should be noted that---despite the myths---the U.S. has the equivalent of a veto at UNESCO. For the past 6 years, virtually all debates were resolved by consensus, not majority votes. That gives every country a veto power over the contents of resolutions, and their final approval. No nation is entirely satisfied with all actions taken or programs approved. That is the price for participating in a global organization.

The Policy Review charges "an endemic hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press." Here, the New World Information Order is cited as though it proves the charge. It does not. The NWICO has never been defined. Approved references to it explicitly decry censorship, and support press freedom. When ambiguous statements are made they are just that---subject to several interpretations and, as all UNESCO

resolutions, in no way enforceable. Such ambiguous statements, nevertheless, call for continued vigilance. But the U.S. statement also contains a clear misrepresentation (page 31). It speaks of the passage of the "Soviet-initiated" Mass Media Declaration of 1978. The Soviet draft was killed and replaced by a bland, Western-oriented declaration that was unanimously approved.

One would hope to put behind us the scare tactics first introduced into UNESCO investigations by the late Senator Joe McCarthy. In 1953-54 he conducted the first probe of UNESCO after accusing the American delegates and State Department staffers of being communists. A full-scale investigation was conducted in 1956 and the charges found to have no validity. The McCarthy approach turned us against ourselves, reflecting our inability to influence the world as some would have liked.

This phenomenon will always be with us. Its opposite---accusing other countries of consistent anti-Americanism---is no less prevalent. The truth generally lies somewhere in between: recognizing that Americans do not always effectively support their own principles and positions, and other countries do indeed have differing national interests which cannot always be accommodated to ours.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick reported to the Congress, March 2, 1984, that the American people contribute over 1.4 billion dollars annually toward the UN budget. Less than 3 percent of that goes to UNESCO. She also said, "the U.S. weakness in UN arenas is of long-standing duration. It dates back to the 1960s." In the recent General Assembly, said the Ambassador, "the United States was the only major country singled out for criticism by name in several resolutions." That has never happened at UNESCO. On the positive side, Ambassador Kirkpatrick reported, "Experience has shown that when we let other nations know we are deeply interested in an outcome, those others are much more likely to take our values and interests into account in casting their votes." That has been the recent experience at UNESCO.

The Policy Review hints at the losses the U.S. would suffer from withdrawing from the communications debates at UNESCO. They would go on without us, possibly in a more polarized way. And UNESCO is the principal forum for engaging in the global discussions over news and information media issues. Our private sector groups would have to increase their surveillance at UNESCO, and that would be more difficult. Clearly, press-freedom advocates would be weakened by our withdrawal. The Policy Review makes that point strongly. It states, too, that "in recent communications meetings...a new, less contentious mood regarding communications issues was clearly evident."

The Policy Review also describes other positive programs in communications, and adds that after withdrawing

- The West would be less able to counter Soviet and other authoritarian efforts to legitimize their approach to media control in UNESCO's communications debate.

- UNESCO could more easily adopt programs which could lead to restrictions on the free flow of information and which would encourage state censorship and control of the press.

- Standards incompatible with U. S. hardware and software technology might be adopted which could prejudice the acceptance of U. S. telecommunications technology and equipment on the international market.

- U. S. multinational media corporations might come under increasing attack.

- UNESCO could (retract) U. S. -initiated program improvements in the communications sector (at the 22nd General Conference).

In the human rights area, the absence of U.S. scholars would make a great difference. Americans provided much of the early scholarship and motivation for UNESCO's human rights program. This participation, as most American involvement, has diminished in recent years.

This parallels our experience in the field of communications research. Americans have been largely absent from this discipline, and the Eastern Europeans have taken over the main channels of communications research in the international field. That is not the fault of UNESCO. It is due to the failure of U.S. researchers to enter

the field, and of the U.S. government to attract or assist them.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has vastly improved and increased its staffing at UNESCO/Paris and in Moscow, and has expanded the USSR's National Commission for UNESCO, even as this Administration sought to eliminate its American counterpart. The Soviets, moreover, maintain continuity in their representation at UNESCO while the U.S. does not. An internal Soviet document reveals that the USSR engages "dozens of Soviet ministries and organizations and hundreds of people" in supporting Soviet activities at UNESCO. The surprise is not that the USSR has had some influence, but rather that it has had so little thus far in the communications and human rights fields.

The Policy review provides the proper prognosis following our withdrawal from UNESCO's human rights sector:

The principal advantage of U.S. participation in UNESCO's human rights area is that UNESCO provides a forum for defining, explaining and advocating U.S. views on human rights. In the process, we have an opportunity to promote a better understanding among Third World countries of the central importance of fundamental human rights which are attached to the individual. U.S. participation in UNESCO General Conferences, experts' meetings, the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations, and related programs gives us the opportunity to influence these gatherings in line with U.S. goals and to oppose activities prejudicial to U.S. values and interests. Without U.S. participation, the Eastern bloc and determined advocates of "collective rights" would have a clearer field for the propagation of their ideas.

* * *

Additionally, the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations investigates in private session the merits of complaints received from individuals or groups alleging violations of human rights in education, science, culture and information, and is the only such organ in the UN system. The Committee accepted 316 communications for consideration during the period 1978-80, a large proportion of them dealing with alleged violations in the Soviet Union, Eastern bloc countries and Latin America. Although concrete progress in individual cases has been rare, particularly in Communist countries, the Committee has had its successes. At a minimum, it serves a useful purpose in revealing human rights abuses and in giving a forum and some hope to those who claim to be victims of abuses.

* * *

Because UNESCO has 161 member states and because of the immediacy of its contact with governments throughout the world, the Organization exerts considerable influence and constitutes an important platform. The main advantage of continuing U.S. membership in UNESCO as far as human rights are concerned is that our participation enables us to advocate U.S. ideas, viewpoints and goals, both in UNESCO's general programs and in the specific cases considered by the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations. Withdrawal would deprive us of this platform.

What are the Consequences of Withdrawal from UNESCO?

As in any sector of UNESCO activity, there will be significant losses to Americans once we withdraw.

There will be high dollar losses in some areas. Communications hard- and software manufacturers may suffer from loss of participation in tech transfer and other programs.

News media may find competitors selling alternative products in some areas.

An anti-American bias not before prevalent may surface in some countries, and in UNESCO generally.

Our best friends at UNESCO may not be grateful for the loner role we are playing, despite belated efforts to develop a common position within the so-called Information-Group countries. There is no unanimity there, and our loner role makes the IG's position more difficult.

We shall lose all the power and influence that presence at UNESCO meetings provided. Clearly, we have been the most influential single country at UNESCO when we chose to be so. Last November, we chose to exert our influence. The secretariat, from Director-General M'Bow down, and the member states, responded in many significant ways: in communications, human rights, transnational corporations, on the budget and in many other ways. Mr. M'Bow demonstrated he can effectively assist us---if we work together. If we leave, what can we expect? Certainly not movement in directions we favor.

That is the way intergovernmental organizations inevitably function. Our presence, when properly employed, reflects our influence. Our absence will reflect the absence of our influence. And the world will go on without us. The ideas we

dislike will take deeper root. And the so-called alternative programs, perhaps more expensive than the cost to us of UNESCO, will be little more than sops to our domestic debate. For we cannot produce an effective alternative forum for the analysis and discussion of international communications. Nor can we create another international channel for human rights that will have any credibility.

I believe that UNESCO must be reformed for its own good: administratively, and programmatically. The Administration has set the stage for negotiations within UNESCO over such significant reforms. But those changes can only be engineered by member states. If the U.S. leaves before reforms can be mounted (by virtue of the cumbersome machinery involving 161 countries and the administrative board structure), the U.S. effort will have been costly and unproductive for us.

The U.S. has already found some negative response; more will follow in the eight months ahead. We should now play the enlightened role of continuing to press for reforms from within UNESCO, even if it means extending our announcement of withdrawal. UNESCO is too valuable to the United States and, indeed, all the world's people, for us to be perceived leaving out of petulance. We should stay the course.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Sussman, for your statement.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, without objection, I would like to have that document entered into the record.

Mr. YATRON. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

9 April 1984

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

119 EX/14

COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO

1. On 28 December 1983 the Director-General received a letter bearing the same date by which the Secretary of State of the United States of America notified him, in accordance with Article II, paragraph 6, of the Constitution, of the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Organization with effect from 31 December 1984. The text of this communication is reproduced in Annex I.
2. The Director-General replied to the Secretary of State on 18 January 1984 in a letter the text of which is reproduced in Annex II. He also informed the President of the General Conference and the Chairman of the Executive Board of the communication from the Secretary of State of the United States and of his own reply, and requested the inclusion in the agenda of the Executive Board of an item entitled 'Communication from the Secretary of State of the United States of America concerning the withdrawal of the United States of America'.
3. The letter from the Secretary of State and the Director-General's reply were communicated to Member States and their National Commissions by circular letter CL/2897 of 31 January 1984. The Director-General likewise transmitted the texts of the two letters to the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of Unesco and to ministers with responsibilities in Unesco's fields of competence. These documents were also sent to the members of the Executive Board by the Chairman of the Board on 1 February 1984. Lastly, the Director-General communicated these texts to the international governmental and non-governmental organizations which are usually consulted on the preparation of the Organization's programmes, some of which also contribute to the execution of those programmes.
4. In his letter of 28 December 1983, Mr Shultz, after reaffirming the belief of the Government of the United States and the American people in the principles enunciated in the Constitution of Unesco, and while emphasizing his esteem and consideration for the Director-General himself, expressed the view that for a number of years the Organization had been moving away from the original principles of its constitution, that it had served the political purposes of Member States rather than its own international vocation, and that it had not fully demonstrated the effectiveness which had been hoped for.
5. In his reply of 18 January 1984 addressed to the Secretary of State of the United States, the Director-General, while pointing out that it was not for him to voice an opinion on a sovereign decision by a Member State, said he could not but express his regret at a measure which would deprive the Organization of the co-operation of one of its founding members; he emphasized that if it were to come into effect, the United States decision would affect the very principle of the universality of the Organization, the maintenance of which had been one of his constant concerns.
6. The Director-General also noted that in his letter the Secretary of State had expressed the point of view of the United States concerning 'trends in the policy, ideological emphasis, budget and management of Unesco'. He therefore felt it necessary to recall the efforts that had been made, including efforts made on his own initiative, to achieve the widest possible measure of agreement among the Member States, by means of consensus, especially whenever controversial problems arose in the course of debate at the General Conference. Thus, a drafting and negotiation group set up by the General Conference in 1976 has been able, every time a matter has been submitted to it, to bring the viewpoints closer together and to work out texts on which there has been unanimous agreement by all delegations, including the United States delegation, which has always taken an active part in the deliberations of that body. The Director-General also recalled the in-depth consultations that had been organized in preparation for the Second Medium-Term Plan, which was approved by the General Conference at its fourth extraordinary session by a consensus to which the United States was a party, the broad measure of agreement which he himself had helped

to achieve, at the twenty-second session of the General Conference, on the subject of the budget for 1984-1985, the total amount of which was substantially less, in current dollars, than that for 1982-1983; and the widely acknowledged validity of Unesco's budgeting techniques, the application of which would make it possible to refund substantial amounts to Member States at the end of the 1981-1983 biennium. Referring to comments by the head of the United States delegation at the twenty-second session of the General Conference, the Director-General emphasized the need to distinguish between 'the viewpoints expressed by Unesco's individual Member States or groups of Member States and the activities of the Organization itself', since 'the manner in which the lines of emphasis of its general policy and its programmes of activity have been determined in recent years excludes any possibility of it serving any interests other than those of the community of Member States as a whole'.

7. The Director-General added:

'Of course, no human institution is perfect and we ourselves are well aware of the need to be always improving the methods of planning, programming, executing and evaluating the Organization's activities. With this in mind, we have constantly sought the views of all those who, whether in the Member States or in the international governmental and non-governmental organizations, co-operate in the work of Unesco'.

8. The Director-General concluded by expressing the hope that the Government of the United States, 'after reconsidering the whole situation, [would] decide to remain in Unesco and continue to give the Organization its full and whole-hearted co-operation'.

9. In communicating to Member States on 31 January 1984, the letter from the Secretary of State of the United States and his own reply, the Director-General also enclosed the text of the Constitution of Unesco. He did this because, in his view, in order to assess the scope and implications of certain questions raised in the Secretary of State's letter, it was necessary to refer to the fundamental provisions of the Constitution. That text is also appended to the present document (Annex III).

10. The Executive Board will doubtless wish to undertake its discussion on the 'Communication from the Secretary of State of the United States of America concerning the withdrawal of the United States of America' within this broad context. The issue at stake appears in fact to be the very function of Unesco within the international community, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified by the international agreement which established it as an intergovernmental organization.

11. It is for the members of the Executive Board, as the representatives of the General Conference in its entirety and of the Member States of which they are nationals, and also on their own behalf, to state their views on this matter.

12. The letter from the Director-General to the Secretary of State of the United States of America dated 18 January 1983 already contains the essential observations coming within the province of the Director-General.

13. The present document sets out below certain items of information which may clarify for the Executive Board various questions, some legal, others relating to the programme.

The provisions of the Constitution governing the withdrawal of Member States

14. Article II, paragraph 6, of the Constitution makes the following provision for the withdrawal of Member States:

'Any Member State or Associate Member of the Organization may withdraw from the Organization by notice addressed to the Director-General. Such notice shall take effect on 31 December of the year following that during which the notice was given. No such withdrawal shall affect the financial obligations owed to the Organization on the date the withdrawal takes effect. Notice of withdrawal by an Associate Member shall be given on its behalf by the Member State or other authority having responsibility for its international relations'.

15. This provision was inserted in the Constitution by the General Conference at its eighth session in 1954 and has been in force ever since, without amendment.

16. Even before the eighth session of the General Conference, three Member States had decided to withdraw from the Organization: Poland (5 December 1952), Hungary (31 December 1952) and Czechoslovakia (29 January 1953). These three countries resumed co-operation with Unesco in the course of 1954.

17. After the eighth session of the General Conference, decisions to withdraw were notified to the Director-General by the Union of South Africa (5 April 1955), Indonesia (12 February 1965) and Portugal (18 June 1971).

18. The Indonesian Government stated on 30 July 1966 that it was cancelling its notification of withdrawal, which had not yet taken effect. Portugal, for its part, rejoined Unesco on 11 September 1974.

19. As notice of Poland's decision to withdraw was given during the seventh session of the General Conference, it was the General Conference which had to debate the matter. The withdrawals of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, were referred to the Executive Board at its 33rd session (1953) under an agenda item entitled 'Communications received from the Governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia'. The Board also considered the question of South Africa's withdrawal at its 42nd session (1955) and the proposed withdrawal of Indonesia at its 70th session (1965). The resolution adopted by the General Conference at its seventh session and the decisions adopted by the Executive Board following its various debates on the withdrawals of Member States are reproduced in Annex IV. The members of the Board may, if they so wish, consult at the Secretariat the working documents submitted on these different occasions to the General Conference or the Executive Board, setting out the reasons which prompted those countries to leave the Organization, and the records of the debates.

The United States' participation in programme activities

20. In his letter of 18 January 1983 to the Secretary of State of the United States, the Director-General referred to the contribution which the 'authorities, educators, scientists and intellectuals' of the United States have hitherto made to the work of Unesco and the benefit they had derived from that co-operation, the broad lines of which are set out below.

(a) Contribution to the design, orientation and evaluation of the programme

21. In addition to their participation in the consultations concerning the preparation of the Medium-Term Plan and the Organization's programme and budget and in the debates on those documents through their representatives on the Executive Board and their delegates to the General Conference, the United States makes a more specific contribution to the design, orientation and evaluation of several programmes by virtue of its membership in various intergovernmental councils, boards or committees made up of Member States of Unesco elected by the

General Conference. For the period 1984-1985, the United States is a member of the following bodies:

Council of the International Bureau of Education

Intergovernmental Council of the International Programme for the Development of Communication

Intergovernmental Committee for Physical Education and Sport

Interim Intergovernmental Committee for Informatics

Intergovernmental Council for the General Information Programme

Intergovernmental Council of the International Hydrological Programme

International Co-ordinating Council of the Programme on Man and the Biosphere

Executive Committee of the International Campaign for the Establishment of the Nubia Museum in Aswan and the National Museum of Egyptian Civilization in Cairo.

22. The United States also participates in the Assembly and Executive Council of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, to which any Member State of an organization in the United Nations system may belong (Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Statutes). It is also a member of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (which is made up of fifteen States Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, elected by the States Parties to the Convention meeting in General Assembly during the ordinary sessions of the General Conference of Unesco) and of the Intergovernmental Committee of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised in Paris in 1971 (composed of representatives of the eighteen States Parties to the Convention).

23. With regard to the International Geological Correlation Programme, a United States specialist is a member of its Board, which is not intergovernmental, its members being appointed in a personal capacity by agreement between the Director-General of Unesco and the Chairman of the International Union of Geological Sciences.

24. In addition, United States nationals have often been members, in a personal capacity, of various advisory committees (category V) which address advice and recommendations to the Director-General concerning the preparation and implementation of certain aspects of the programme.

25. Lastly, many United States specialists, and various United States institutions (universities, research institutes, professional associations), have been associated with the Secretariat's efforts leading to the preparation and development of various components of the programme. They have helped to inform the international community as a whole of the results of various activities carried out in the United States and the experience acquired by that country in Unesco's fields of competence, thus making ideas and concepts worked out in the United States of America known to a wide public.

Emphasis needs also to be placed on the important part which the non-governmental organizations of the United States play, directly or indirectly, in the life of the Organization by contributing to exchanges of experience among the world's educational, scientific, cultural and, in general, intellectual communities.

(b) Participation in activities involving consultation, exchanges of ideas and experience

26. (i) Through its official delegations the United States has regularly taken part in important international intergovernmental meetings such as the International Conference on Education (held in Geneva once every two years), the World Conferences on Cultural Policies (Venice, 1970, and Mexico City, 1982), the International Conferences on Adult Education (1949, 1960, 1972) or the Intergovernmental Conference on Strategies and Policies for Informatics (SPIN) (1978). Ever since the United States has been associated, for the execution of programme activities, with the Europe region, its delegations have taken part in European ministerial conferences on education and science policies. These meetings provide an opportunity for direct contacts between, on the one hand, the representatives of the United States and on the other, those responsible for policies within Unesco's fields of competence in the other Member States of the Organization, in particular, those of the Europe region. At present, within Unesco's fields of competence, there exists no other machinery for international consultation which has the same coverage and which makes it possible, in particular, to bring together within the same framework the representatives of all the countries of the Europe region.

27. (ii) Many United States specialists have taken part, in a personal capacity, in various non-governmental meetings organized in the context of the execution of Unesco programmes with a view to promoting exchanges of ideas and experience within the international community: international congresses, meetings of experts, symposia, working groups and informal consultations.

28. (iii) Generally speaking, Unesco, through the co-operative networks that it has established throughout the world, plays a vital role in the exchange of information: this not only makes it possible to disseminate data on work and projects carried out in the United States, but also enables the United States to gather data of the same kind and to keep itself informed on the present situation and future prospects in education, science and culture in most of the other countries in the world.

(c) Contribution to activities of study and reflection

29. At the request of the Organization, United States specialists have prepared a large number of studies which are often submitted as working documents to various meetings organized under the Unesco programme or published in various forms, in works produced by the Organization, or in its various periodicals (Prospects, International Social Science Journal, Impact, Nature and Resources, and so on).

30. Contributions made by American authors appear in several collective works published by Unesco.

(d) Contribution to training activities

31. (i) Many Unesco fellowship-holders are accepted each year by higher education and research institutions in the United States: 145 in 1979, 223 in 1980, 245 in 1981, 182 in 1982 and 151 in 1983. These figures include both the holders of training fellowships awarded as part of operational projects and fellowship-holders in receipt of study grants under the regular programme, the participation programme or UNDP. Their number varies, depending both on the nature of the projects being implemented and on the total amount of extra-budgetary resources administered by the Organization. In 1983, the number

of fellowship-holders studying in the United States represented 11.9 per cent of the total number of Unesco fellowships. Fellowships are administered by the Institute of International Education, with a financial contribution from the United States Information Agency.

32. (ii) The United States has been associated, in various ways, with a large number of training courses organized by Unesco. In some cases, the courses themselves are actually held in the United States, at an American university for example. In other cases, American specialists are included in the team of instructors who are responsible for the content of the courses, or among the experts who prepare methods for evaluating them. American participation in training activities is particularly noteworthy in the framework of the intergovernmental scientific programmes.

33. In the specific case of the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) - the United States was one of the countries on whose initiative this Programme was established - the American authorities are financing training programmes, for which they have allocated a sum of \$700,000 (for 1983-1985).

(e) International scientific research and co-operation

34. The members of the American scientific community are participating in the international scientific programmes, developing research projects in particular, managing them and contributing in various ways to their execution. It may be recalled, in this connection, that the establishment of the International Hydrological Programme and that of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission were largely due to the initiative of American scientists. It is noteworthy that twelve projects out of forty-eight under the International Geological Correlation Programme (IGCP) are directed by Americans, that some 250 American scientists are collaborating in this programme, that some fifty projects connected with the Intergovernmental Programme on Man and the Biosphere (MAB) are being implemented in the United States, and that several hundred other projects are being executed with the participation of the American scientific community.

35. It should be pointed out that there are 40 biosphere reserves in the United States out of a total of 226 reserves under the MAB Programme, distributed among 62 countries. Of some 600 current research projects listed in these reserves, more than half are taking place in reserves situated in the United States.

36. Furthermore, American scientists are participating in most of the international working groups whose purpose is to summarize the results of research and to make recommendations for the development of new research projects. American specialists are contributing to the compilation of various publications which are intended to disseminate the results of work accomplished as part of the research programmes organized under the auspices of Unesco.

(f) Standard-setting activities

37. The United States has participated in the preparation of various standard-setting instruments adopted by the General Conference; American experts have frequently been involved in the preparatory studies required for the drafting of such instruments, and the United States has taken part in the consultation procedures provided for by the regulations of the Organization. It has thus made an active contribution to the formulation of a good many principles, ideas and guidelines which, thanks to Unesco, have been acknowledged as international standards.

38. With reference to the conventions adopted under the auspices of Unesco, the United States is a party to the following instruments:

Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character (10 December 1948)

Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials (17 June 1950)

Universal Copyright Convention (6 September 1952) and its annexed Protocols 1, 2 and 3

Convention concerning the Exchange of Official Publications and Government Documents Between States (3 December 1958)

Convention concerning the International Exchange of Publications (3 December 1958)

Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (14 November 1970)

Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 and its annexed Protocols 1 and 2

Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms (29 October 1971)

Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (16 November 1972).

39. These conventions, it should be noted, include the Universal Copyright Convention and its annexed protocols, which constitute the only set of international instruments of worldwide scope in the copyright field to which the United States is a party. According to information from American sources, the United States exported in 1982 some three and a half thousand million dollars' worth of products covered by the Universal Copyright Convention. Indeed, that Convention was drawn up in the first place to enable the United States to participate directly in a universal protection system.

40. It may also be noted that the preparation of the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage was largely the result of an American initiative.

41. As for the Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character (Beirut Agreement), 130 million dollars' worth of cultural products were exported from the United States in a single year (1980) solely as a result of the existence of this Agreement.

(g) Consultative services to Member States

42. Numerous American experts have participated in missions organized by Unesco to Member States, particularly the developing countries, to offer advice of a technical character. The purpose of these consultative services has been to advise Member States in such fields as:

policy-making and planning in Unesco's fields of competence, including in some cases the preparation of new legislation or regulations;

establishment of research and training institutions, schools, cultural institutions, and information and communication services;

preparation and implementation of pilot projects;

planning and construction of buildings to be used for educational or cultural purposes;

development of educational and training programmes.

(h) Supply of equipment

43. Unesco's activities include, particularly in the case of operational projects financed from extra-budgetary sources, the supply of various kinds of equipment to Member States. Much of this equipment is acquired in the United States. Between 1979 and 1983, of the materials worth a total of \$99,230,000 acquired by Unesco, the share of orders placed in the United States was 17.2 per cent, which represents a total value of \$17,112,000.

(i) Some general facts

44. The scale of American participation in Unesco's activities cannot be summarized in figures. It is, however, worth noting that, in the period 1979-1983, more than 2,000 American nationals were directly associated in the Organization's programmes (over and above American staff members at Headquarters and in the Field):

Consultants	510
Experts	476
Participants in ad hoc groups	122
Authors of articles	267
Participants in a personal capacity in Unesco meetings	733

The issues

45. This rapid outline of the United States' participation in Unesco's activities, an outline which is far from exhaustive, shows that both the representatives of the American Government and the American intellectual, scientific and cultural communities have been extensively involved in the life of the Organization and have played an active part in shaping its policies and in preparing and implementing its programmes.

46. A systematic inventory of American participation would no doubt show that the United States has derived a great many benefits from Unesco activities, but it is for the United States' authorities and the country's intellectual, scientific and cultural communities to take stock of the situation and to gauge how valuable membership of Unesco has been and may still be for the United States.

47. It is, however, legitimate to inquire whether the question of a State's membership of an organization like Unesco can be seen solely in terms of national interest in the strict sense. Unesco was founded precisely because, immediately after the Second World War, it was seen to be necessary to establish a form of co-operation among States which might promote 'the intellectual and

moral solidarity of mankind' together with 'the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind' proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations (Preamble to the Constitution of Unesco; adopted in London on 16 November 1945). The duty of all the States in the world to participate in an institution with objectives such as these is as binding as ever, when contemplated from the broader vantage-point of mankind as a whole.

48. Some Unesco activities in which the United States or its institutions or prominent individual Americans co-operate might, upon the country's withdrawal, find themselves deprived of the active co-operation previously enjoyed, although it is conceivable that, in addition to the co-operation of other countries, private American institutions or American specialists, acting in an individual capacity, might continue to co-operate with Unesco.

49. With regard to funds, without the United States' contribution, representing as it does 25 per cent of the total contributions of Member States, and in the absence of other resources to compensate for it, the Organization would be obliged to reappraise its programmes thoroughly, in terms of both their scope and their implementation procedures.

50. The most obvious consequence for the international community would, however, be the blow dealt to the universality of Unesco, whose calling it is to be a forum where questions of education, science and culture can be dealt with on behalf of all nations and all peoples, a place where, in these fields, programmes can be devised and implemented which transcend the differences among its members, and on which the world community as a whole can reach agreement. The cause of mutual understanding among all human beings, essential to the peaceful future of mankind, would thus suffer a serious setback, whilst the possibility of concerted action to help those peoples that are in direst need would be seriously diminished.

51. Unesco can completely fulfil its calling only if it continues to be a body in which, both in reflection and in action, all schools of thought and all aspects of intellectual, scientific and cultural situations throughout the world are given due consideration, with no preferences and no exceptions, but with respect for the equal worth of all men and all cultures. Such was the grand design of the founders of Unesco, a design underlying the provisions which, in its Constitution, define its purposes, functions and structures and its role as a part of the United Nations system.

52. Members of the Executive Board will no doubt wish to take full account in their deliberations of these issues, out of concern that Unesco should be able to continue its work in an atmosphere of ever greater mutual understanding and in faithful compliance with those ideals and principles upon which the Organization was founded and which must continue to guide its action.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL
OF OTHER UNESCO MEMBER STATES

ANNEX IV

7 C/Resolutions

0.13 Communication from the Government of Poland

The General Conference,

Having taken note of the communication addressed to the Director-General by the Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the People's Republic of Poland in France, announcing, on the orders of his government, Poland's decision to withdraw from the Organization,

1. Declares that the allegations contained in the aforesaid communication are completely unfounded; and

Considering that the Organization was set up to ensure the co-operation of all the nations of the world in the field of education, science and culture,

Considering that the Member States of Unesco have, in consequence, recognized the universal character of the purposes and functions of the Organization, which has always faithfully observed the principle of universality in all its activities,

2. Invites the Government of the People's Republic of Poland to reconsider its decision, and to resume its full collaboration in the Organization's activities.

Twenty-fifth plenary meeting
11 December 1982

ITEM 9 EXTERNAL RELATIONS

9.1 Relations with Member States

9.1.1 Communications received from the Governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia (documents 33 EX/20 and Add.)

The Executive Board, having considered the texts of the communications addressed to the Acting Director-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary on 31 December 1952 and by the Ambassador in Paris of the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia on 29 January 1952, announcing that their respective countries no longer considered themselves members of Unesco, together with the further communication addressed to the Acting Director-General on 8 April 1953 by the Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris regarding the continued dispatch of Unesco documents and communications to the Czechoslovak authorities, adopted the following decisions on the report of the External Relations Commission (document 33 EX/34):

1. to refer the communications of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the General Conference at its second extraordinary session (see also item 6.1 above); and to recommend to the Conference that it adopt regarding these communications a position similar to that already taken at the

seventh session of the communication received from Poland (cf. 7 C/Resolution 0.13), refuting the allegations contained in the communications and inviting the governments concerned to reconsider their decision;

2. to recommend further to the General Conference at its second extraordinary session that it authorize the Director-General to approach the United Nations with a view to the countries concerned being urged by the United Nations to re-examine their relations with Unesco. The Director-General's approach to the United Nations might be made through the Economic and Social Council, after consultation, if he so desires, with the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination;
3. recalling resolution 18 adopted by the General Conference at its seventh session regarding the collection of Member States' contributions, to request the Acting Director-General to undertake the study, in preparation for examination by the Board at an early session, of all possible amendments to the Constitution which may appear desirable in the light of these communications. The Acting Director-General's study should not concern only the question of sanctions against Member States in arrears in the payment of their contributions, but should also embrace the whole subject of withdrawals of Member States. The Board will examine these possible amendments in sufficient time for their communication to Member States within the limits fixed by Article XIII of the Constitution;
4. regarding the Czechoslovak Embassy's communication of 8 April 1953, to authorize the Acting Director-General to inform the Czechoslovak authorities that all communications and documents intended for them will be held at their disposal at Unesco House, with the exception of those relating to the extraordinary session of the General Conference, which will be sent to them normally.

(33 EX/CX/SR.1; 33 EX/SR.6)

ITEM 4 REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ORGANIZATION SINCE 22 MARCH 1955 (document 42 EX/43 and Addendum)

A. The Executive Board,

Having heard the oral report presented by the Director-General and having considered the text of this report circulated subsequently as document 42 EX/43 and Addendum,

Notes with satisfaction the progress reported in document 42 EX/43 and Addendum;

Invites the Director-General to prepare his report to the 43rd session of the Executive Board in conformity with the proposals outlined in his oral statement on 26 November 1955 (42 EX/SR.27).

B. The Executive Board,

Having learnt, through the report of the Director-General (document 42 EX/43), of the communication whereby the Government of the Union of South Africa has announced its decision to withdraw from Unesco in accordance with the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 6, of the

Constitution, and of the statement made in the South African House of Assembly on 5 April by the Minister of External Affairs of the Union, regarding the reasons given for this decision,

Declares that, in the matter of race problems, as in all other spheres, the planning and conduct of Unesco's activities, as decided on by the General Conference, have never violated Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Constitution, which prohibits the Organization from intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Member States;

Deeply regrets the decision of the Government of the Union of South Africa;

Reaffirms its faith in the Organization's work of international co-operation in the cause of peace and social progress;

Urgently appeals to the Government of the Union of South Africa to reconsider its decision before it takes effect;

Instructs the Director-General to bring this resolution to the notice of the Government of the Union of South Africa, and authorizes him to take all steps that he may consider appropriate in order that the Union of South Africa may continue its participation in the work of the Organization.

(42 EX/SR. 1, 17, 18, 27)

ITEM 4 COMMUNICATION FROM THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF INDONESIA (document 70 EX/28)

The Executive Board,

1. Having studied the Director-General's report concerning the communication from the Indonesian Government concerning the withdrawal of Indonesia (70 EX/28),
2. Notes with regret the decision taken by the Indonesian Government;
3. Expresses the hope that Indonesia will, as soon as possible, resume its active participation in Unesco's work;
4. Approves the measures taken by the Director-General, particularly with regard to Unesco programmes and Unesco personnel working in Indonesia under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and activities financed through the Special Fund;
5. Expresses its gratitude to the Governments of the Philippines and Thailand for their generous offer to accommodate the Regional Centre for Science and Technology for South-East Asia;
6. Requests the Director-General to report to it at its next session on the measures he has taken, with due regard to the views expressed by members of the Board and in the light of his consultations with the Member States concerned, with respect to the Regional Centre for Science and Technology for South-East Asia and - having regard to the special conditions set out in paragraph 21 of document 70 EX/28 - the Institute of School Building Research.

(70 EX/SR.7)

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Mica, do you have some questions?

Mr. MICA. I take it that it is unanimous that the panel feels that we should stay in UNESCO. Any objection? You think the Soviets should withdraw, is that correct?

Mr. SUSSMAN. No, I think they have a proper place.

Mr. MICA. OK.

Mr. ROSENBLITH. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the answer is as simple as that. I think one needs to be able to give a more articulated answer.

Mr. MICA. Than what? All staying in?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. Just staying? I think all of us feel we should stay but with reforms. In terms of what these reforms should be, as far as science is concerned, at least, we would like to look not just at UNESCO, but at the whole problem of science in the international sector.

Mr. MICA. Dr. Rosenblith, I could not agree with you more, but downstairs we must vote yes or no. Here we will make some decisions that I think will affect, at least I hope will affect, our yes or no decision to get out of or stay in UNESCO indefinitely.

I could see an alternate position where the committee could recommend that we stay in at least for one more year through the general session. Or we can recommend that we get out totally right now and walk away from UNESCO. While I certainly understand what you are saying, you have to consider our alternatives.

The administration will appear here next week. First, I am trying to discover, before we get into all the details, how many of our panelists who all have interest, knowledge, and background in UNESCO, as well as in culture, communications, and human rights, feel that there is a problem or no problem, and if we should or should not stay in this organization.

So I take it while everyone here thinks we should stay; everyone agrees there are problems with the organization.

Let me give you my impressions this far from the hearings.

Yesterday the single largest concern raised, at least from this member's perspective, was the Director-General—his problems, his style, and his approach. It was stated that there was indeed some politicization involved at the General Assembly, the general meeting, where resolutions contrary to the interests of the United States, Israel, and our allies are presented.

But today we learn that there is very little evidence that this politicization goes into the direct programs.

You are saying, particularly in the scientific area, that the programs in and of themselves have not been politicized to any great extent, that they have remained aloof from the overall problem. Is that correct?

Mr. SUSSMAN. In my formal statement I make the point that the question of politicization is a meaningless question in an intergovernmental organization. Everything an intergovernmental organization does is political. It could not be otherwise. Which means, therefore, that all of its programs have political implications, whether it is science, communications, or human rights.

Obviously, there are political implications. One must then ask, therefore, the manner in which this impacts on the programs themselves.

I tried to suggest that in both communications and human rights there are indeed political issues. One cannot avoid the recognition of the fact that the vast outpouring of words and messages around the world originates in essentially Western communications media, and not in others.

Now, that, in addition to having the technological impact in many areas, has a political impact.

The question, therefore, is, what we do about it. Do we shut down the intercourse or do we try to improve it?

I don't regard that as a bad debate. I regard it as an essential debate, and by the manner in which the debate is conducted one then determines whether an organization such as UNESCO is fulfilling its role.

There have been times when communication debates have veered toward the censorious, but never so far in the conclusions, and I think this is an important distinction.

So I would say simply ask whether a program has been politicized is not to ask the right question.

The right question, it seems to me, is whether the effect of the debates produced an onerous response in terms of American national interests. I would say in the two areas I am covering that they have not.

Mr. MICA. Would all of you agree with that?

The so-called politics of the overall body have not influenced the programs in which you are involved to a point where the programs are not in the best interests of the United States or generally opposed to the best interests of the United States?

Mr. JACOBSON. I would agree with that in general with respect to the programs in the social sciences. If one examines the various projects that have come out of the division of the social sciences, one can see from time to time projects or papers that could be regarded as politicized.

It is inevitable, I think, that in the social sciences where we deal with the actions of governments, we are going to make statements that risk being politicized.

I would not say, though, that politicization is the problem with those particular projects.

I would say that the problem is that proper social scientific standards have not been applied because I think a proper social scientific standard applied to a project could result in a statement that might be critical of a particular government, but it would be critical on the basis of some factual evidence.

Criticism of public policy is inevitable in social science, I believe.

Mr. MICA. I am a novice at this. But in social science, would not an approach emanating from the leadership that statist concepts should be encouraged vis-a-vis individual rights concepts not skew any of the approaches that are taken in the studies?

Mr. JACOBSON. I think it is inevitable in the social sciences that we will examine the question of what role government plays in development, for instance, or in any of the number of tasks.

We should, I believe, come up with empirical evidence as to the benefits and disadvantages of particular governmental policies.

I think that this is something that we do as part of our enterprise, and I don't think that the Director-General has had an influ-

ence in saying that UNESCO programs should always come down on the side of more governmental intervention in public affairs.

Mr. ROSENBLITH. In the natural sciences the issues are not politics. The issues are management, administration, and things of that nature.

Mr. MICA. The picture emerging seems to be that the programs and program approaches may not be anywhere near the problems that the administration, the budget, and so forth are. You are kind of an unwilling victim.

But, in a sense you are a direct victim because if the politics don't put the money into your program and put it into another politically oriented program, you are the loser. Do you see that? Do you see that?

You don't.

I am thinking out loud here. What I am seeing develop from these hearings is that we have a worthy organization with worthy goals and some very worthy programs, but the administration may, with all good intent believe we should withdraw, since some of our questions have been very partisan and some of our witnesses have been partisan, and I will not take the approach at this time that the administration has done this for any inappropriate purpose.

I think the administration had the best interests of the United States at heart, but perhaps it focused on the Director General and the general political policies without looking, as it should have, at your programs and whether these programs have been able to escape, as you indicate they have, this political interference.

Did the administration—did Mr. Newell consult with any of you about the effectiveness of your programs, the work that you are involved in, before the decision to withdraw was announced?

Mrs. MORTON. U.S./ICOMOS is a new member of the U.S. Commission for UNESCO. As a member, we were requested to make a report, which we did.

The Commission met the middle of December, and the decision was voiced the end of December. There wasn't a lot of time there, but we were invited to make a report.

Mr. MICA. Were each of you requested?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. We were asked to participate in that review, but we stated only views with respect to the scientific programs and not any overall views. We took a strictly constructionist interpretation of what we had been assigned.

Mr. JACOBSON. On behalf of the social sciences, the Consortium of Social Science Associations did write to the U.S. National Commission and that letter, I believe, was transmitted to Mr. Newell, about the effects of the withdrawal.

Mr. MICA. I want to comment on that.

Mr. Sussman.

Mr. SUSSMAN. Freedom House was invited by the U.S. National Commission to express its views, and we did. In the letter of transmittal, Freedom House's name was mentioned, and I think a three- or four-sentence extract from our letter went to the Secretary from the U.S. National Commission.

Mr. MICA. Let me tell you that I have heard, and this is only a rumor, that the decision was made before any of your input was received or really judged. Do you have any feeling that the decision

had already been made, or was the timing such that you believe that the administration could have reviewed what you submitted? I don't know.

Mr. SUSSMAN. Well, there is that suspicion, I think—if one wants to trace it back, one can say that even before the administration came into office, there was the recommendation by—the about-to-be-chief of the budget, that the UNESCO line be cut from the budget. So obviously there was an early focus on withdrawing from UNESCO.

There were other suggestions of that along the way. For example, I am vice chair of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. Almost a year before the reassessment was asked for, the U.S. National Commission was totally cut from the budget and staffing removed. It was replaced by direct action of the Commission going back to the Congress, but certainly there is a suggestion of a policy continuity in that effort.

One could find other examples as well—the timing of course, too.

Mr. MICA. Dr. Jacobson.

Mr. JACOBSON. I think there is a serious problem structurally that relates to this and that is that the primary responsibility for the formulation of U.S. policy in UNESCO is within the Department of State.

It has an interest in some of the political activities that go on at the general conferences, but does not have very much interest in the substantive programs, which by definition are outside of the responsibilities of the Department of State.

Both those parts of American society which are interested in UNESCO's activities and which are very decentralized and those parts of the Federal Government that are directly concerned have very little input into policy, or into something like the review. Their testimony was taken, but the final decision was not made by people who actually participate in the activities of the program, but rather those who participate in the UNESCO conference, which is by definition very political.

Mr. MICA. You have a comment, Dr. Rosenblith?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. Well, we felt to do a serious job we would have wished more time, and who doesn't always, but in terms of the way in which it was laid out before us, I think we were given the impression that our testimony and even what happened in Paris at the General Conference would have more impact than I think it finally had.

Mr. MICA. Let me give you my impression.

Again, as I indicated in yesterday's hearing, I am the newest member of this panel, and I try studying to reach an assessment. I will just tell you my impression.

If the administration made a decision before they asked your opinions, I would consider that an insult to your organizations and your abilities and intelligence. I, as a Democrat, have supported this President, this administration, and the State Department as much as most Republicans in this country.

But I don't feel; that was the right way to go about it; indeed the administration had made up its mind even before consulting you.

I have concerns about UNESCO. I have real concerns about its Director-General. Maybe a great deal of the problems we face could be handled with one major change.

But I have heard the rumor more than once that the decision may have been made not only before you were asked, but even before that; and others have been used as a ploy to justify the decision, since your reports didn't reflect a recommendation to withdraw. So I am concerned about the decision.

I will continue to try to get more answers.

Mr. Chairman, I will stop here. I appreciate the opportunity of going first. My feeling is that these hearings have been very helpful for all concerned. I think we will be able to make a real contribution to this debate as we wrap these hearings up.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you. I would like to know, is it possible for UNESCO to make some meaningful reforms at a time when they are not meeting in the General Conference?

Mr. SUSSMAN. I don't consider myself a specialist on the structure of UNESCO, but certainly there is the Executive Board which is the working mechanism of the body. It meets in May and will meet again, I believe, in September. There will be opportunities on both those occasions for the Executive Board to respond, not only to the American letter, but as well to efforts such as the group of 24 that produced another instrument.

I would hope that Mr. M'Bow and others will take sufficiently seriously these two opportunities as being very urgent opportunities to demonstrate movement in the direction of some of the criticism. There will then, of course, be the General Conference in the fall of 1985, and prior to that, well prior to that, there will be another opportunity for the Director-General to submit a set of proposals, program proposals, of considerable length as he normally does, and in those we should be able to tell well in advance of that conference how he is responding and how he suggests the Executive Board and the organization generally respond to the various criticisms.

These I think are very telling opportunities and it is another reason why it seems to me it is very important for the United States to remain in at least long enough to have this process produce some effect and to enable us to determine whether indeed there is responsiveness on the other side of the negotiation.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Dr. Jacobson.

Mr. JACOBSON. To the extent that the U.S. problems are with the General Conference, I believe the next General Conference is not until 1985. It is very difficult for me to see how we can see whether or not the General Conference has changed or is behaving as well as it did at the last General Conference until after that meeting.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Dr. Rosenblith, how long will it take to conduct the review that you mention in your testimony? When will it be available?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. We see the review in two phases. The first one, which will respond to the questions I listed earlier this morning, we hope to have completed in the summer, and the second part will look at the longer term needs of science and the complemen-

tarity of science and intergovernmental machinery, which is a longer task.

One thing that I think the preliminary—the first stage of the review—will address, is some feeling for how long will it take to design alternatives, and what kind of interim steps need to be taken. At this point, I would like to stress the fact that the International Council of Scientific Unions, for instance, which has been mentioned several times this morning, is a body that is composed of 20 unions and 70 nations, and we cannot assume that we can just design something that they will say, well, that is just fine. So there is a question of working with colleagues abroad and with people who are our partners in these international scientific programs in order to see how it fits their needs when we design alternatives.

Mr. YATRON. I have two questions for all of the witnesses.

The first question is, in your view, what are the two or three most critical problems in UNESCO in the program area that you are representing here today and, second, what reforms should be made in UNESCO in your view? Whoever wants to begin first may do so. I would like each of you to comment briefly.

Mr. SUSSMAN. In the communications area, I would say there are a number of changes that ought to be made in the research program and in some of the programs for meetings and at various levels.

Too many of the programs and meetings are given over to the kind of detailed discussions of content that lead almost automatically to recommendations for controls, for the influence of government over independent communications and so on.

There are reasons to discuss some of the issues in the international field, but too many of them, it would seem, get into these highly controversial areas that become automatically unproductive.

One clear example was the February 1981 seminar on protection of journalists. This is a very hot issue. It automatically leads to dissension. It is the kind of discussion that really should no longer be on the agenda. It is not on at the moment. It should not be added.

There are others that could be suggested, but this is the kind of thing that ought to be avoided.

Mr. YATRON. Mrs. Morton.

Mrs. MORTON. I don't know that we have suggestions.

One of our members who is a fellow at U.S./ICOMOS is retired. He is a Hawaiian-American and he was on the Cultural Heritage staff of UNESCO for 24 years. I think we know through him, he lives in Washington, the Cultural Heritage Program very well. I think the United States can be proud that an American has been involved in that program all those years. We hear this program from all directions is very successful.

I would like to think he was a part of the reason that it is, and I had hoped he might be here today, but he is in Singapore with the Aga Khan's program there.

I think that—all of us I am sure could say this—the greatest problem in the Cultural Heritage area is the need for funds because to restore these landmarks around the world, it is a very expensive undertaking, and U.S./ICOMOS hosted last Wednesday the

first Cultural Heritage Day in the United States, and we were able to bring out 620 people.

I think it was an exciting evening. We presented the restoration of the Statue of Liberty. This has been nominated by the United States to be a Cultural Heritage site.

The next day I had a call from Dr. Luke Lee and he asked how I could help the Chinese get the Forbidden City put on the Cultural Heritage list. It is a long process.

China, although a member of UNESCO, is not a member of the World Heritage Convention yet. It is a 2-year process to become a member. Then it takes more years to get your site, once nominated, onto the list. And just think of the money that is probably involved in one more of these great sites around the world.

So maybe our financial needs aren't any greater than other areas, but I think they are horrendous.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Dr. Rosenblith.

Mr. ROSENBLITH. As far as the scientific area is concerned, I think what we need is more coherent management of some of the programs, for instance, the Man and the Biosphere Program. We need to fill the vacant posts with competent scientists and science administrators, and I would be remiss if I did not say we also need a strengthening of the U.S. support mechanism for UNESCO.

Otherwise we cannot really contribute and exercise the responsible and competent leadership that is needed.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Dr. Jacobson.

Mr. JACOBSON. I think there are two things that could be done in the social sciences. One is that more of the programs should engage actively the interests of U.S. social sciences as they did at one time much earlier. This would involve making part of the UNESCO social science program more like the program in the natural sciences where there is a large scale project, the Man and the Biosphere, that involves data collection all over the world that could not be gained otherwise, and we in the social science commission of the U.S. Commission for UNESCO have suggested that perhaps migration might be a topic that could be looked at that is of concern to all countries.

The second thing, I believe, is that the program oriented towards the development of social science globally, and especially in the Third World, needs to be much more concentrated on high priority activities, so that enough money is devoted to projects that will actually have an impact rather than being fragmented on a lot of little projects that don't have much impact.

The reforms stem rather naturally, at least one of them, from that, and that is that there should be a greater concentration in the budget and an alteration to some extent in the distribution of the funds.

The other reform in UNESCO, I think, is stronger leadership in the social science sector. There hasn't been a permanent assistant director general there for now almost 2 years, and I think that has been a serious problem for the development of the program.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Do any of the programs exhibit bias against Israel?

Mrs. MORTON. I think there was some problem with Palestine excavations. I think it was a political situation. I really do not know it well enough to discuss it here. I am sure there are adequate reports at the State Department, and I could help obtain those for you if the committee is interested.

Mr. YATRON. We would appreciate it if you could provide that for the subcommittees.

Would anyone else care to comment?

I now call on the gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

During the testimony yesterday we heard from some of the witnesses who had been working closely with UNESCO and taking a look at the entire UNESCO process, that the chairman has pretty much moved into a vacuum created primarily because the Executive Committee meets infrequently and does not really have enough power or doesn't utilize the power it has to fulfill the responsibilities of administering properly the affairs of UNESCO. They stated also that the General Conference only meets, once every other year, and leaves pretty much the work of the day to day functioning to the Executive Committee, and to the Director. Thus the Director is left in pretty much of a very powerful position and a lot of the mismanagement and poor administration could be placed on the shoulders of the Director.

What are your thoughts? Having observed and worked with UNESCO, do you feel that the Director maybe has too much power and the Executive Committee and General Conference do not do enough oversight? I would welcome your comments.

Mr. SUSSMAN. Well, as I said earlier, I am not a specialist on the administration, but I can give you one observation. Having been at several General Conferences, I would say very generally that when you enlist the assistance of the Director-General on behalf of something that interests you, you generally get a favorable response.

When you do not, and when something goes awry, it is convenient to blame him for what has gone wrong.

His problem, I think, is that he obviously has to deal with 161 governments. In addition, we have found at the last General Conference—I say we have, I mean Americans who were part of the delegation—when there was a specific request put to him for rather specific purposes, he fulfilled those requests, even though it meant that he had to manage the machinery. He is very good at that.

Obviously, there are other times when he is doing it for other purposes and for other countries.

I say this without a favorable or unfavorable comment. I simply am suggesting that it is a very difficult piece of machinery, UNESCO.

Mr. GILMAN. Is it the tail wagging the dog here?

Mr. SUSSMAN. I think on some occasions that is true, but I also believe that almost anyone put in charge of that kind of an operation, with that diverse set of objectives, has to be a strong personality.

Mr. GILMAN. Is there a proper balance?

Mr. SUSSMAN. I really cannot comment on that, except to say that there are times when I think yes and there are times when I

think no, and those times usually coincide with whether I agree with what he has done.

It is a difficult call, and I think this is one of the problems. It is not a simple story by any means. I think one of the sad facts of life was reflected in the CBS "60 Minutes" program last Sunday night, which very simplistically, in ten minutes tried to show all of this complexity and laid it all essentially on the Director-General and on the relationships with him.

It is a very difficult thing to try to describe in ten minutes at best, and I would say that was not one of our better efforts in American journalism.

Mr. GILMAN. Do the rest of the panelists have any comments on this matter?

Mr. JACOBSON. I don't have a comment based on experience, but one based on principle.

We do have a permanent mission in UNESCO that is in fact housed in the UNESCO Building, and they ought to be in a position to exercise oversight on an almost daily basis.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, that premise is rather rash, when you sometimes closely examine the kind of oversight some of our missions do, and when you take a good hard look at what Congress does in oversight, when they have the responsibility.

Dr. Rosenblith, do you want to comment?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. I don't have the technical background or perhaps the experience, but I have interacted with a variety of director generals of UNESCO and have noted that all of them found this a very difficult job.

I think Mr. M'Bow seems to enjoy more than other people the role that he is playing.

My interactions with him were carried out in French and that makes it a little easier for him. To some extent also he cannot say "I don't understand."

So I have the feeling that he understands pretty well what the scientific community wants from him.

Mrs. MORTON. I think Dr. M'Bow is involved in the cultural program.

Mr. GILMAN. Based on your experience, how effective are the dollars being spent in UNESCO? There has been some criticism too much of it is spent in administration, that 90 percent of it is spent in Paris, and not enough out in the field, and that we don't have competent people working in the agency.

I would welcome any comments you might make on what you have seen regarding any of the effective programs, or how the dollars are being spent.

Mrs. MORTON. The Cultural Heritage people with whom I am involved, and there are not very many, I think are very capable people.

Dr. Ann Riadl, who is the UNESCO contact for the World Heritage Convention, will be in the United States for the month of July. She is a lawyer and I think brilliant, and the people that I see when I am over there, they seem to be working very long hours and are efficient and knowledgeable people.

I cannot say that we don't all think there is a lot of money tied up in the bureaucracies. But the U.S. Government is a big bureauc-

racy too and our own organizations have bureaucratic problems where we like to think money could be used more efficiently from time to time.

I don't think I have the best experience to reply to your question.

Mr. ROSENBLITH. I think in the area of the natural sciences, the dollars could clearly be spent more effectively, but I would not give this a bad rating. The fact is that part of it comes from the close coupling of the International Council of Scientific Unions with UNESCO and so, in some sense, that nongovernmental body can play a role which is there all the time as a consultant, and that gives some oversight.

I would, however, suggest that in the future we think of mechanisms that have been very effective in our own institutions of higher education—international private blue ribbon visiting committees that would on an annual basis or something of that nature come and look at various areas, such as their management and the use of funds.

Mr. GILMAN. Is the scientific community consulted with regarding the budgeting for UNESCO's scientific projects?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. Yes; there is some form of consultation. In some instances—as I mentioned earlier about the way in which the Man and the Biosphere Program is being managed—we have pointed out it is too fragmented. Dr. M'Bow has agreed to that verbally and we are looking for improvement.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that fragmentation due to administration, lack of planning?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. Yes, administration.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you care to comment, Dr. Jacobson?

Mr. JACOBSON. My observation is that there are some capable people in the social science sector, but the overall quality of the staff certainly could be strengthened. It is hard to say how effectively the money is being spent without a careful review of the budget.

My general impression is that too much of the budget, though, is spent on publications of marginal interest and low quality.

Mr. GILMAN. You mentioned the lack of quality in the social science sector. Do you have any knowledge of why Rudolfo Stavenhagen resigned, and is that position still open?

Mr. JACOBSON. It is my understanding that position is still open. I don't know why he resigned. I understand he circulated a letter explaining the reasons for his resignation at the time that he did. That is probably available.

Mr. GILMAN. Since we have made our decision known in December, have you seen any improvement in the quality of the programming or any reforms in UNESCO? Would anyone care to comment?

Mr. SUSSMAN. I think it would be very hard in this time span to notice changes. I believe that in a conversation I had several weeks ago with the Deputy Director for Communications, he indicated that the changes that were voted at the last General Conference in the communications field, several of which I mentioned in my paper, are indeed being put into operation now, and that the countries that put forth those resolutions are being asked to participate in the formulation of the programs.

These were all Western-oriented programs.

Mr. GILMAN. Does anyone else want to comment?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. I think it is too early to see in our field, but we are keeping our eyes open for the things we have specifically requested.

Mr. GILMAN. If we don't see any improvement at the end of the year, I assume that from what I have heard about your testimony, you all are pretty much in agreement that we should not pull out. Is that the thinking of the panel, or that we should pull out at the end of the year?

Mr. ROSENBLITH. We have been polled once before and some of us feel that while a yes and no answer is probably the way you have to vote, we can avoid it, since we don't have to vote. We would like to say that there is a question of quantity that one needs to assess. I think it is very hard when one talks only about dollars and budgets and things of that nature to assess role that American human resources play in UNESCO, and the damage that would be done to us in the area of natural sciences is a very significant factor.

On the other hand, that doesn't mean that we do not need to continually exert the necessary pressure, and we need the help from our side—from the State Department and from the U.S. Government.

Once that help disappears, I think we have very little to push in terms of who we are.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Anyone else want to comment on that issue?

If not, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

Now I will call on Chairman Mica for a final question or closing statement.

Mr. MICA. I would say again that for better or for worse, you are participants in an organization whose future is not in your hands. It is aside and apart from what you do on a day to day basis. From what I have heard, you all conduct very important business, projects, scientific research, and so forth. Therefore, whether we withdraw or not you will be affected, obviously.

But, the decision is not yours. I am pleased to hear, at least from what I understand that there is not the politicization of the various programs at your working level which we have heard described about at the top level of the organization. I was interested in your comments, Mr. Sussman, as to the effectiveness of the Director General, because I think that can work both ways. If he is that effective and can make things happen, then I think this ought to be a call here today that we want him to make some things happen that would allow us to stay. And I say again, as I said yesterday, that I think the United States at the end of the year unless we see some major changes.

If Mr. M'Bow he can indeed bring about important changes, we had better put him on notice right now.

Mr. SUSSMAN. That is the key to it, I believe.

Mr. MICA. That may be the key indeed. I thank you very much. You have participated in an extraordinary manner, been very helpful and contributed to my education and that of this panel.

Do you have a comment?

Mr. JACOBSON. I had rather hoped someone might ask me a question about arms control and disarmament since that is regarded as a social science field.

Mr. MICA. Dr. Jacobson, what do you think about UNESCO's position on arms control and disarmament?

Mr. JACOBSON. I am quite surprised that the United States objects to this because we have by far the largest arms control community in the world.

As social scientists, I think we have made the most fundamental contributions that have been made to this area as a discipline and it seems to me that this in fact ought to be an area where we were taking the leadership.

I am also surprised and troubled by the fact that peace studies is a problem because many universities have courses in ways of reaching to peace. We regard such courses as an important part of some social science curricula. It is much more important in Europe than it is here, and I think for us not to have contact with those communities, in fact not to exercise leadership in the definition of peace and disarmament as we are uniquely qualified to do is a serious problem.

Mr. GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

On the disarmament issue, while UNESCO is doing some educating on disarmament, shouldn't that appropriately be done in the group in the United Nations that is in charge of disarmament and is conducting all the negotiations?

Why shouldn't that educational process be part of their responsibility? Why do we have to bring it over to UNESCO?

Mr. JACOBSON. I certainly think that the debate about the negotiations and so on properly goes on in the United Nations, and there is within the United Nations a research center on disarmament, which also has its own role to play.

But, quite apart from that there is the issue of education about disarmament. We have a course at the University of Michigan, for instance, in arms control and disarmament. Consideration of these issues is a major component in several other courses. The whole question of educational materials for such courses is an appropriate concern of UNESCO.

The question of bringing research about arms control and peace into the curriculum is something that is quite in the forefront of the concerns of social scientists in this country.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that the extent of the debate in UNESCO on disarmament, of just what course we should include in the curriculum?

Mr. JACOBSON. I think, as I understand the debate, it is about what the UNESCO program should do, and the problem with resolutions from the United States point of view is that there is an effort to try to define the content of those programs so that the content will be slanted.

We ought to be in a position, because of the size of our arms control and disarmament community, to insure that those programs are objective, and fit appropriate social science criteria.

We have to exercise leadership to do that though and we cannot simply say that that is an illegitimate topic. Most U.S. social scien-

tists think it is a very legitimate topic and an important one for inquiry and for teaching.

Mr. MICA. Will the gentleman yield?

Dr. Jacobson, we were about to close here, and I want to do that, but I can understand the United States would have some fears or concerns when we pay 25 percent of the budget of an organization whose leadership has frequently has shown a very biased approach in many resolutions.

Now, some of these resolutions have not passed, but since we don't have veto power, a weighted vote, or any of such controls that we have in the United Nations, when these types of questions come up in a highly politicized atmosphere, you have, in fact, a loose cannon determining nuclear policy.

I understand that. I don't know whether I agree with it. If we could have a situation where they did debate it, where they discussed it, and where we agreed on some approaches on it, I think that would be one thing. However, I, with all due respect to your position, can understand the concerns of our Government on that issue.

I agree with you totally that when we say that one of the reasons we are withdrawing from UNESCO is that they are talking about disarmament and we don't want to talk about it, it does sound a little ludicrous.

I recognize the validity of your approach, but on this issue I think there should be a kind of balancing.

Mr. JACOBSON. I share that feeling. I may not have the facts of this correct, but there was a proposal from U.S. social scientists to have a conference on perception as a factor in arms control agreements, which is a perfectly legitimate topic.

Mr. MICA. We ought to have that in my district.

Mr. JACOBSON. I think UNESCO had agreed to fund this. As I understand the situation, this was killed within the State Department because of the general opposition to having UNESCO deal with disarmament and arms control issues. So it seems to me that if we are not in there exercising leadership, the programs are inevitably going to go in ways that we will not like.

Mr. MICA. Again I would close by saying that I thank you very much. It has been most helpful. I wish we could go on for several more hours.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YATRON. I want to say thanks to all of you for appearing here today and giving us the benefit of your views.

The subcommittees stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO

WEDNESDAY, MAY 2, 1984

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met in joint session at 3:17 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations) presiding.

Mr. YATRON. The subcommittees will come to order. This afternoon the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcommittee on International Operations hold their third hearing on U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.

Last week the subcommittees heard testimony from various private witnesses on this subject, including those from UNESCO principal program sectors: Education, natural sciences, social sciences, communications, and human rights and culture.

We learned of reforms that need to be made in UNESCO and improvements that could be made in U.S. relations with UNESCO. Today we welcome the administration, as well as several witnesses representing the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, the United Nations Association of the United States of America, and the League of Women Voters.

We are also pleased to have with us a former Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs in the Department of State. Because of the large number of witnesses, I suggest that you summarize your statements so that we can move on to the questions.

Before we begin, I would like to ask Mr. Mica, the cochair, if he has an opening statement.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been waiting to see Ed Derwinski to be at that microphone since he left the Congress. We are glad to have him here as a representative of the State Department.

I think that our hearings on UNESCO have been as productive as anyone could have hoped. We are going to try to find the answers to all the questions on people's minds about how the decision to withdraw was made, when it was made, why it was made, is the decision appropriate, should we get out, shouldn't we get out, when should we get out.

Ed Derwinski, I am sure has all the answers. So we should get all of this worked out today. I would say this: These hearings have served a very useful purpose even without a recommendation and

there will be a recommendation. They have given us a great insight into what UNESCO does and doesn't do.

This chairman has formed some opinions which I think are very helpful. This committee, I hope, will make some recommendations. We are looking forward to hearing your testimony.

While we would like to get to it as quickly as possible, I would add one point, Mr. Chairman. I don't know what your intentions are, but most of the subcommittee chairmen today have a meeting with the full committee at about 4. We might be able to delay that to 4:15.

If we can summarize statements and get right to the questions, it would be very helpful.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Chairman Mica. Without objection.

Mr. MICA. I want to set the record clear. I have the greatest respect for Mr. Derwinski. I was just kidding. If we leave these problems in his hands, he will solve them all.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you. I would like to call on the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Mr. Leach, for an opening statement.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a very lengthy opening statement and also a memorandum which has been prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.¹ I would like unanimous consent to put it into the record.

Mr. YATRON. Without objection.

Mr. LEACH. Let me summarize in 1 minute by saying that I share the view of Chairman Mica and yourself that these have been very helpful hearings. My own view is that the Congress has been put in a very awkward situation. On the one hand, there is no doubt that changes are needed in UNESCO if that institution is to perform, to the fullest, its duties as most of us believe they should be.

On the other hand, my view, based upon the testimony we have received, is that we ought to be upgrading our representation rather than withdrawing it. In this regard, I personally find no graceful exit for either the Congress or the administration. My sense is that the administration has made, in effect, a social compact with the new right and what we have here is a situation where a decision has been made which will be very difficult to reverse even if the UNESCO makes some changes.

Therefore Congress should seriously consider whether it wants to intervene in this process. As the statement from the Library of Congress which I have introduced into the record points out, there are certain constitutional and legal options that are open to the Congress if it wishes to exercise them.

I have introduced a bill which is similar to an amendment I introduced earlier before the committee that simply says that the United States should not withdraw its membership from UNESCO without authorization by the Congress. I would hope that members would give that proposal serious consideration.

As you will recall, we entered UNESCO not by a treaty arrangement, but by an act of Congress in which the House, as well as the Senate, played a role. In my judgment, there ought to be congressional participation in a decision to withdraw.

¹See appendix 1 for copy of Congressional Research Service report.

With that, let me say I look forward very much to the testimony of Mr. Newell and of course our former colleague, Mr. Derwinski. [Mr. Leach's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF IOWA

Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment you and Chairman Mica on the two days of hearings we have already held on the Administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO. The witnesses at both of those hearings were extremely helpful in preparing us for our session today with the Administration.

I might add that I am frankly uncomfortable with the dilemma in which Congress at the present finds itself. On the one hand, nearly all of us are in unanimous agreement that there are serious problems at UNESCO which must be addressed if the organization is to fulfill the purpose for which it was founded.

On the other hand, the testimony we've heard to date from a wide variety of organizations in the educational, scientific, cultural, and human rights sectors, as well as the information which has been provided by the Administration's own US/UNESCO Policy Review leads inescapably to the conclusion that those problems do not necessarily require withdrawal and might, to the contrary, be more effectively addressed if the U.S. upgrades—rather than withdraws—its representation at UNESCO. It is difficult to conclude anything except that the impetus for withdrawal derives as much from an ideological, anti-U.N. bias as a pragmatic concern for certain institutional problems attendant to our participation in UNESCO.

In any regard, there is no graceful exit from the dilemma in which we find ourselves. My own view is that the prospect of the President reconsidering his decision at the end of the year is not great even if certain changes occur in the methods of operation of the UNESCO Secretariat. The enthusiasm for withdrawal of certain narrow political groupings within the U.S. is of such magnitude as to preclude the likelihood of serious political review. The irony of this phenomena, I must stress, is great because there is strong public support within the U.S. for the U.N. and its affiliated institutions. What appears to have occurred is a decision of the Administration to sacrifice UNESCO as one of an array of social compact issues with the so-called New Right. This is unfortunate not only for advancement of U.S. national interests within UNESCO, but for the implications it carries for similar U.N. institutions. If no serious dissent is registered against the Administration's decision, a precedent will be established whereby one by one other international institutions are likely to be targeted by narrow interests groups and a similar approach instigated.

The question therefore arises as to the appropriate response of Congress when and if there is a differing perspective with the Executive of how America's national interests are best served in international organizations of this nature. Earlier in Full Committee markup on the foreign aid bill I offered an amendment, which has been reintroduced as H.R. 5082, that would amend the original UNESCO authorizing legislation, passed by Congress in 1946. The approach I advocate would require the Executive Branch to seek statutory authority from the Congress before taking action to suspend our participation in or payments to UNESCO or to actually withdraw. The proposed legislation (H.R. 5082) notes the two provisions already in law which require the Executive Branch to suspend payments to UNESCO if it tampers with a free press and to suspend both payments to, and participation in, UNESCO if Israel is illegally expelled.

It is important to note here that Congress, by earlier action, has demonstrated its willingness to provide the Administration with powerful leverage to advance U.S. interests within UNESCO on these two important issues, but that, as Administration witnesses have recently testified, the U.S. perspective on these issues prevailed in recent UNESCO debates. It would appear therefore that we have placed ourselves in the awkward position of being ingracious visitors rather than disheartened losers in a righteous cause.

Nonetheless, for the record it should be clear that from a legal perspective, Congress has not passed legislation that would trigger actual withdrawal of membership, even if our perspective on these two issues failed to prove compelling to UNESCO decision-making. The Administration is thus in the tenuous position it is today in part because it failed to fully consult with and draw upon the strong political backing of the Congress in taking the steps it has in recent months.

I have reviewed the Constitutional and legal issues raised by H.R. 5082 with the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service, and would like to request unanimous consent that a paper outlining the Constitutional issues at stake

be inserted in the record at this point. Let me stress here that in this scholarly presentation David M. Sale, a legislative attorney for the Congressional Research Service, outlines a substantial legal and Constitutional case both for and against Congressional involvement.

In support for the approach I advocate, it is important to point out that under U.S. law, the international agreement embodying the UNESCO Constitution is considered to be a Congressional-Executive Agreement, not a treaty. President Truman, in accepting membership for the U.S. in UNESCO pursuant to specific statutory authorization passed by both the House and Senate in 1946, cited that law (Public Law 565, 79th Congress) as the basis of his authority in depositing the U.S. instrument of accession at UNESCO.

Second, it should be noted that the Constitution makes no express provision for the making, let alone termination, of international Congressional-Executive agreements. Even where the Constitution does speak to the making of treaties themselves, it makes no mention of their termination or whether the Senate, whose advice and consent is required on their making, is similarly required to concur with their termination. Since the Constitution contains no explicit authority for the making of agreements which are not treaties, it is difficult to assert with total precision that the President maintains unchallengeable authority in this area. Interestingly, it does not appear that our Forefathers ever debated this issue in drafting that document.

Third, if for the purposes of analogy the role of Congress or the Senate with respect to termination of treaties were to be examined, there would appear to be no definitive judicial rulings on the matter. In the 1979 *Goldwater v. Carter* case, the District Court held that the President's unilateral termination of our defense treaty with Taiwan was unconstitutional in the absence of the concurrence of either the Senate or both Houses of Congress. However, the Court of Appeals reversed that decision largely, it seems, on the basis that the President has the authority to recognize foreign governments. In the final analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the complaint. Thus, there are contradictory and inconclusive judicial pronouncements to which we might turn in the case before us. What is clear, however, is that there has been no judicial resolution of this question.

Fourth, actual practice with respect to the termination of treaties does not offer a clear guide to the situation before us. There are examples where the President has acted to terminate treaties pursuant to prior authorization by Congress, where he has acted but later received legislative approval for his actions, and where he has acted and received no response one way or another from Congress. However, in reviewing the record of practice up to 1979, the District Court in the *Goldwater v. Carter* case concluded—even in the face of some 13 instances cited by the Executive Branch in support of the President's alleged right to act unilaterally on treaty termination—that as a whole, the “historical precedents support rather than detract from the position that the power to terminate treaties is a power shared by the political branches of this government.” *Goldwater v. Carter*, 481 F. Supp. 949, 960 (D.D.C. 1979). The Court of Appeals observed, however, in reviewing the same historical record, that in no case was a treaty continued in force over the President's opposition.

Fifth, turning to situations much closer to the one before us, it is instructive to consider the U.S. withdrawal from the ILO. However, the situation is not altogether analogous in that there was little Congressional opposition and no legislative challenge that I am aware of to the Administration's authority like that posed by H.R. 5082.

Thus, in the absence of guidance from the Constitution, case law, or practice, broader, more theoretical arguments become particularly germane. For example, Article II, Sec. 3 of the Constitution cites the duty of the President to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. If the Congress were to pass H.R. 5082, the President would presumably be bound by the Constitutional requirement to honor the law and would be skating on thin ice to proceed with withdrawal from UNESCO prior to obtaining the required statutory authority from Congress to do so. In a frequently cited concurring opinion in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, Justice Jackson said: “When the President takes measure incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . .”

In addition, Congress possesses a residual foreign affairs power under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 18) under which legislative competence could be asserted with respect to international agreements authorizing U.S. membership in international organizations. In the past, Congress has authorized U.S. participation or membership in various international organiza-

tions pursuant to joint resolution and has exercised a great deal of authority in the foreign affairs area, as in the War Powers Resolution and Case Act.

The Supreme Court has affirmed the power of Congress to terminate a treaty for purposes of domestic law by enacting inconsistent domestic statutes at a later time. Logically, the same rule could be applied to Congressional-Executive Agreements. Thus, if it can be argued that Congress has the authority effectively to compel the President by statute to stop adhering to certain international treaties, might not Congress have the power through statute to compel the Executive to continue adherence?

Finally, in principle, logic, if not effective administration, would dictate that these organs of the federal government that participate in the legal authorization for an international agreement ought to be jointly engaged in decisions to terminate such agreements.

Messrs. Chairmen, there are obviously ambiguities in this area but I feel strongly that Congress must, in the national interest, consider seizing the initiative to ensure that a poorly made decision does not needlessly jeopardize important U.S. interests in the global arena.

Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Mr. Leach. Does any other member have an opening statement?

[No response.]

Mr. YATRON. All right. Then we will begin with the administration. It is a pleasure and honor to welcome our former colleague, Congressman Derwinski, who is accompanied today by Assistant Secretary of State Newell. We welcome you gentlemen. Please proceed, Congressman Derwinski.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD DERWINSKI, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. GREGORY NEWELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a complete statement which I would ask to insert in the record. I will be very brief.

Now that I understand you have a 4 o'clock meeting, I intend to filibuster. But that would not be proper.

However, you appreciate the fact I was not trained to be a Foreign Service officer like some distinguished gentlemen I know and, therefore, I intend to approach subjects rather pragmatically.

And while I don't want to get into an instant rebuttal with my friend, Mr. Leach, I do think I would emphasize at the start that I did not detect—had not detected in the State Department a narrow band of the far right operating. In fact, I detected what I would call the broadest band of the dead center and sometimes emphasis on "dead."

But the State Department is ideologically pure. And I find myself already accused by the narrow band on the far right of having been co-opted. To pick up this subject, however, I worked very closely with Mr. Newell—I should add, Mr. Chairman, former colleagues, that I am sort of a jack of all trades and master of none in the Department.

Therefore, I move in and out of different bureaus, depending on their needs. In this particular case, I worked very closely with Mr. Newell and the others who have had an input. And I can assure you there has been a very, very thorough, study made of this

matter before the administration reached the conclusion that it did.

However, your interest, the committee interest, I think, is especially important since it gives all of us a chance to continue the public discussion which hopefully will provide a better understanding of this important issue. Now, the administration's position basically is that it now serves our national interest to take a good, hard look at our participation in UNESCO.

And that was the motivation for the decision. I believe that in this case Mr. Newell covered every possible contingency. He consulted widely, went into this in a very thorough fashion. And I think no stone was left unturned to get the documentation and the information needed to reach the final conclusion.

I personally think that the last 4 months, since the administration announced its decision, in the very practical and most appropriate fashion, the attention has shifted away from the decision itself and the legitimate controversy to the question of UNESCO and the need for reform. And that was the motivation for the decision.

What we want most of all is reform of UNESCO. We think that reform is long overdue. The members know that there is a committee of 24 Western countries called the Information Group in UNESCO working to propose reform measures. And this group will be producing concrete and specific report proposals which will have active U.S. participation and presumably support. And in the upcoming executive board sessions and elsewhere we hope to achieve progress.

So far, however, there has been very little positive response from the UNESCO establishment, the UNESCO bureaucracies. Therefore we are continuing our search for alternatives to our UNESCO participation. We are ready. If the organization proves indifferent to real reform, to work with the domestic users and beneficiaries of UNESCO—scientists, educators, and so on—to get their views on how to best utilize our resources which have been previously committed to UNESCO.

Now, we have all heard of the classic phrase, "being in a no win situation." It is the considered judgment in the Department of State and the administration that we are in a no lose situation here. If UNESCO does accomplish serious reforms, we are still in a position to reconsider our withdrawal decision.

If UNESCO does not achieve true reform, then we are prepared to continue our international cooperation in UNESCO's core fields in other existing ways. I would hope that members of the committee would not only use this hearing, but stay in continuous touch with us, and with our allies on concentrating on the real problem, which is constructive reform efforts within UNESCO.

The change we have set in motion by our withdrawal decision we hope will be positive. And as I say, we stand to move either way, depending on the final outcome. I should add at this point—emphasize the point I first made. Assistant Secretary Newell has worked on this probably with as much effort as any Assistant Secretary has given any assignment under his jurisdiction.

He has really utilized the broad network and staff ability of the Bureau of International Organizations to reach this conclusion. I

have had the opportunity to work with him. He and I are here together to respond to your questions.

[Mr. Derwinski's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairmen: Four months have passed since the United States announced its decision to withdraw from UNESCO effective December 31, 1984. The Administration believes that events since our announcement confirm that that decision is a correct one. I would like to use my testimony to dwell on some of those events, with special emphasis on the unprecedented reform effort among UNESCO member states which the U.S. action has provoked.

Before discussing the results of our withdrawal announcement, however, I feel it is useful to review the thinking that went into our withdrawal decision, and the background against which that decision was taken.

GENERAL APPROACH TO MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

This Administration's approach has been to make full use of the multilateral organizations via a set of five policy priorities. They are:

To reassert American leadership in multilateral affairs;

To implement, for the first half of the decade, a budgetary policy of zero net program growth and significant absorption of non-discretionary cost increases;

To obtain greater U.S. representation within the secretariats of multilateral agencies;

To reduce the financial burden imposed on member states by an excessive number of lengthy international conferences; and

To advocate a role for the private sector in international organization affairs.

We have systematically applied these policies to the multilateral organizations to which the United States contributes. In so doing, several problems surfaced which were widespread: politicization of the specialized agencies, an unproductive statist approach to problem-solving, and unacceptably high levels of budget growth.

Beginning over a year ago, we approached the leadership of several of the more offending agencies, including UNESCO, to recommend solutions in these problem areas. In general, we have been encouraged by the results. One agency, to which we presented a detailed list of recommended reforms, not only accepted and implemented the lion's share of those changes but asked if we would continue this kind of constructive activity in the next cycle as well. In the financial area, the recent budgets of most of these agencies show an acceptance of the zero net program growth policy which we and our Western group friends have been urging.

U.S./UNESCO REVIEW PROCESS

The sole exception in all this was UNESCO. Consequently, in June 1983, the U.S. began an in-depth policy review of our participation in the Organization. We involved in the review 12 other government departments and agencies as well as users and beneficiaries of UNESCO, including the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. Their views were incorporated in the review, which was released to the Congress and public at the end of February.

The review confirmed our prior impression that UNESCO had deep-seated problems. We found:

Politicization of UNESCO's traditional subjects in the introduction of programs, resolutions and debate on disarmament, "collective rights," and other extraneous themes;

An endemic hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press;

The most unrestrained budgetary expansion in the United Nations system; and

Poor management throughout the organization, prime reasons for which were a top-heavy, over-centralized bureaucracy and a structure wherein excessive authority had flowed to the Secretariat and away from the governing bodies and member states.

During this review process, there occurred UNESCO's 22nd General Conference. We told UNESCO's Director-General in June of last year that we would be scrutinizing the Conference's results for signs of change. He was informed that the review underway would determine whether the U.S. would remain in UNESCO or withdraw from the Organization. The U.S. actively participated in the General Confer-

ence, and was pleased, as Ed Hennelly has reported, at its relatively moderate tenor and at some of its conclusions. When we examined the outcome more closely, however, we concluded that there had been little basic, programmatic change. Since UNESCO knew of our possible departure and had presumably been on its best behavior, we also concluded that this performance represented transitory and behavioral rather than permanent change. The General Conference did not engage the Organization in any fundamental changes, and we did not consider such changes likely to occur in any reasonable future timeframe.

During our review of UNESCO, we also asked ourselves whether our leaving UNESCO would deprive us of any benefits that were both invaluable and irreplaceable. If we withdrew, would our national interest be adversely affected in any significant way? We concluded that the answer to these questions was no. Where there were useful programs, we could either continue participating in them or we had reasonable prospects for finding alternate means to realize their objectives. In the light of all this, we recommended to the President that the U.S. withdraw from UNESCO.

Consequences of U.S. withdrawal announcement

Let me now proceed to what has occurred in the wake of our decision to withdraw from UNESCO. As I already noted, we believe that events subsequent to our announcement at once confirm that our withdrawal notice was justified and show that a constructive process has been set in motion. Whether that process ultimately brings about the kind of basic change in UNESCO that prompts us to reconsider our withdrawal decision, or fails to do so and thus indicates the Organization's imperviousness to reform, U.S. interest will have been served.

The Western working group on reforms

Perhaps the most significant, and dramatic, result of our withdrawal decision has been the effort by likeminded countries to bring about reform in the Organization. It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that our previous criticisms of UNESCO, over a number of years, failed to incite either in UNESCO or in many other member states the will to bring about changes that many states recognized to be necessary. This has now changed. Put simply, we have clearly caught the attention of UNESCO and of its membership; and serious, constructive thought is now finally being given to how the institution can be returned to its basic principles.

The major effort to change UNESCO is being carried out by a working group of western countries, chaired by Ambassador Maarten Mourik, the Permanent Delegate of the Netherlands to UNESCO. The group's first effort was a paper, presented to UNESCO's Director General March 14, describing problem areas in the Organization. In general terms, it represented a consensus view of countries accounting for 75% of UNESCO's budget that serious defects now plague the Organization. As such, the March 14 paper shows clearly that UNESCO's problems and malfunctions exist not just in the eye of the United States. These problems are widely recognized, and other states are now speaking up about them. Consistent with our pledge to participate actively in UNESCO through 1984, the United States is playing its full role in the working group's efforts.

To speak out firmly and publicly about UNESCO's problems is already, in our view, an advance; the working group, however, is going further. It has divided itself into seven sub-groups whose task it is to propose concrete reforms in the various areas where reform is needed. The sub-groups cover the areas of Planning and Management, Communications, Programs, Peace and Disarmament, Human Rights, Structural and Institutional Problems and Budget. Their recommendations will assume the form of proposals to be put before UNESCO's membership—at Executive Board meetings, for example—for possible adoption. Since the first of two Executive Board meetings this year will take place from May 9 through 23, we will soon have an indication of the kind of reforms the Western group is proposing, and their degree of acceptability to the membership as a whole. Complementing the efforts of the Western Group, in fact going beyond it, the United Kingdom has sent a letter to the Director-General outlining problem areas which in large part echo our own concerns.

We have also consulted with a large number of other countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Almost without exception, the 126 countries whom we approached and who have responded recognize that UNESCO has deep-seated management and programmatic problems. While most of these countries prefer the US to remain a member of UNESCO, their acknowledgement of problems in the Organization could help advance the efforts for reform. Some developing countries have set up a working group in UNESCO to study the question. The Western Working Group

has been in contact with that group, and will continue to work with similar groups throughout the year.

The UNESCO monitoring panel

The Administration will be attentive to any changes that UNESCO undertakes. It will not, however, be doing this alone. A UNESCO Monitoring Panel, similar to the type of panel recommended by the Chairmen of these subcommittees along with full committee Chairman Fascell, has been appointed to assist in this effort, and will be reporting to the Secretary of State near the end of the year. Chaired by the Chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Dr. James Holderman, the Panel is made up of a group of eminent private citizens expert in UNESCO's various areas of specialization. They will meet in formal session May 3, and they will have ample occasion to monitor UNESCO's activities throughout 1984. Their purpose is to report to the Secretary on any change (managerial, substantive or other) which may occur in 1984 with a view to judging whether a reconsideration of our decision to withdraw is warranted.

UNESCO's reaction

We hope, of course, that change of the kind that we would consider significant does occur. So far, however, with four months already passed, there is little sign that UNESCO's Secretariat, as opposed to its member states, is taking any initiative to effect change. The GAO team which you have asked to review U.S. participation in UNESCO has started its work. This is a positive sign. There are other indications, however, that the Secretariat has adopted a business-as-usual attitude that is disappointing.

As indicators of this attitude, let me point to several facts. First, the Secretariat has yet to endorse, encourage or respond constructively to the work of the so-called Mourik group. Rather, we continue to hear from the Secretariat that various of its officers do not understand what this group represents, nor what the criticism of UNESCO is all about. Close cooperation by the Secretariat with the western group would not only offer the Secretariat a detailed reading of countries' complaints but could assist their efforts to make the Organization more effective.

Secondly, it appears to us that UNESCO may be forgoing the chance to make the May 9-23 Executive Board meeting a constructive review of UNESCO's problems. An agenda item on the U.S. withdrawal, introduced by the Director-General, casts our intended departure in defensive, pugnacious terms that seek to focus attention on U.S. motivations and interests rather than on UNESCO's poor functioning and what can be done about it. This strikes us as preparation not for a constructive examination of common difficulties but for a stubborn defense of the status quo.

Third, UNESCO management had a chance recently to signal change in the Organization in the selection of a long-awaited new Deputy Director General, UNESCO's number two person. Despite persistent criticism of the fact, the DDG position has been vacant for almost three years. We have for some time considered that the naming of a new, forward-looking, reform-minded DDG—following a procedure that allowed member states to submit their best candidates and then gave the membership a chance to make recommendations—would be a sign that criticisms were being heard. What has now occurred, unfortunately, is the abrupt designation of one candidate only by the Director-General, who has submitted his name to the Executive Board on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Regardless of the qualifications of the individual, this method of decision-making is wrong. It is not a sign of change, but of business as usual.

We recognize that time for change is short. On the other hand, we have been advising UNESCO of its problems for well over three years. If the Organization wishes to correct the serious deficiencies that the western group has brought to the fore, there are ample opportunities to signal the will to do so. I have named some, and there are many others. Sadly, they are not, as far as we can determine, being exploited.

Alternatives to UNESCO

As things stand, therefore, the Administration's intent to withdraw from UNESCO at the end of 1984 remains absolutely firm. In preparation, we are seeking to identify existing alternate mechanisms to participate in international education, science, culture and communication. In certain important areas, such as copyright and oceanography, we can continue to participate in UNESCO's activities despite our withdrawal. Other activities, such as efforts to impose on the world new information or economic "orders," we will, of course abandon.

There will remain a number of other programs and activities—in literacy training, cultural preservation, scientific research, and other priority areas—that we must continue supporting. The Department has requested the formation of private sector working groups in these various fields to advise us on priorities. These groups now exist and are actively pursuing their work. The National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences, for example, are both engaged in coordinating responses from the science community. Other prestigious institutions will give us the benefit of their counsel in UNESCO's non-scientific fields. We expect that, by the end of July, we will have these groups' recommendations, and we will keep the Congress informed of them.

Conclusion

These are the activities in which we are engaged. As you see, they constitute a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, we are working in a constructive manner with our allies to reform UNESCO, and we hope that our common efforts achieve results. Since we have little reason so far to be optimistic about UNESCO's receptivity to change, we are also looking to a future without U.S. membership in UNESCO. With proper preparation, that future will bring more effective and genuine international cooperation and more efficient programs in the developing world.

The choice is now up to UNESCO's member states and, to an even more important degree, to the UNESCO Secretariat. We hope UNESCO chooses not to defend the status quo but to purge itself of the extraneous politicization, anti-western behavior, unacceptable budget growth, and atrocious management that have caused us to tender our withdrawal. If UNESCO accepts reform, we will be gratified; if it does not, we will be prepared to continue our international responsibilities in the important fields of education, science, culture and communication—outside of UNESCO.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Counselor Derwinski. I would like to ask you, prior to the U.S. decision to withdraw from UNESCO, did the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs seriously consider the report of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO to be a critical assessment of UNESCO?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. YATRON. Did the Bureau discuss the report with the chair of the U.S. International Commission for UNESCO or send an official acknowledgment of receipt as well as consideration of the report?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, let me make it easier for the two of us. Let me ask, those questions that related to the type of detail that Mr. Newell handled, I think he will automatically answer. And those broader matters that I was involved in, I would respond to.

Mr. YATRON. OK.

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we did consult with the chairman of the U.N. National Commission for UNESCO. In fact, when the initial report came to my desk I reviewed it and then went back to Chairman Holderman indicating I thought the report, in fact, could be strengthened in terms of balance which would give it more credibility.

Now, this, of course, did not strengthen the position which the administration eventually took. But I felt in being objective that it would be best that that report reflect some balance, which the Chairman then did take back.

Mr. YATRON. Why does the policy review and policy decision, then, not reflect the suggestions for changes forwarded by the National Commission report?

Mr. NEWELL. The policy review does reflect the criticisms and the compliments of UNESCO, Mr. Chairman. We would add, however, that with the Commission and with the 13 departments or agencies which participated in this review, as well as the 83 foreign

posts which participated, and the private sector, were requested to list for the administration the positives—the strengths of UNESCO and also what alternative mechanisms might exist if we were no longer participants in UNESCO.

Their input was not to advise the administration as to whether the administration should stay in or get out, but rather a balanced view of the value of UNESCO.

Mr. YATRON. Did the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs seriously consider proposing constitutional amendments to the UNESCO constitution?

Mr. NEWELL. We have looked at the structural questions and determined with the majority on the opposing side that it was an unrealistic approach.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Chairman Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Newell, do you think we should get out of the United Nations?

Mr. NEWELL. No, definitely I do not.

Mr. MICA. Do you have any other multilateral international agencies on a list or in your mind that you believe we should get out of?

Mr. NEWELL. Absolutely not. In fact, we began 24 months ago reviewing each of the 96 organizations in which we participate. We took the problems uncovered by those reviews to the organizations. We visited six or seven organizations over a period of 6 or 9 months, with the Secretaries General or Directors General, including Perez De Cuellar.

Mr. MICA. So 95 out of 96 are home free.

Mr. NEWELL. At this point in time, we feel they are in fairly good health and doing things appropriate to their constitutions and charters.

Mr. MICA. The tenor of the charges before this committee has been that you have made the decision to withdraw from UNESCO before all the facts were in.

Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Chairman, that is false. There are certainly those I know who have said that and felt that.

Mr. MICA. Did you consult with the folks who work with UNESCO in the National Education Association?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, they had input into this panel review.

Mr. MICA. Did you consult with the folks who work with UNESCO in the National Academy of Sciences?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, we did and continue to do so.

Mr. MICA. Did you consult with Freedom House?

Mr. NEWELL. Widely.

Mr. MICA. Did you consult with the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars?

Mr. NEWELL. I didn't personally.

Mr. MICA. Did you consult with the Committee for International Commission on Monuments and Sites?

Mr. NEWELL. I believe we did.

Mr. MICA. Did you consult with former Ambassador Hennelly?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes.

Mr. MICA. And the delegates who accompanied him?

Mr. NEWELL. Very closely.

Mr. MICA. I just wonder, for my personal information, did you consult with Mrs. Barbara Newell, by any chance?

Mr. NEWELL. We corresponded with her once.

Mr. MICA. Well, now, I will tell you, everyone I mentioned indicates that we ought to stay in and fight from within; every single one of them. Who said we should get out?

Mr. NEWELL. The administration.

Mr. MICA. Then, the decision was not made by you to get out. Who in the administration made the decision? I can tell you we have heard names of those in the administration who might have ordered we should get out.

Was that decision made at the White House level?

Mr. NEWELL. I have not seen a directive at all, Mr. Chairman. That is new to me. The decision was made by the President.

Mr. MICA. The President made the decision on his own, without any recommendation.

Mr. NEWELL. There was a recommendation from the Secretary of State.

Mr. MICA. Secretary Shultz recommended we should get out?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes; he did.

Mr. MICA. And you had no input in that decision?

Mr. NEWELL. Surely, we did, in terms of conducting the review and then forwarding the results of those reviews to the Secretary.

Mr. MICA. I think we are going around in a circle again. All of the people that I just mentioned were consulted by you and your various representatives for their input.

As I understand it, these organizations said that we should stay in and fight. Correct me if I am wrong. I am the newcomer on this panel, but didn't the United States battle out an issue with regard to licensing journalists? I have heard it said that if we had not been there, we would have lost on that issue.

Mr. NEWELL. We have argued that issue since 1974.

Mr. MICA. Wasn't it dropped at the last session?

Mr. NEWELL. It was not. In fact there are five specific areas.

Mr. MICA. You and I have a misunderstanding. I understood that had we not taken the action we had taken from within, that it would have come up indeed. Did not our efforts and our presence make the difference?

Mr. NEWELL. We certainly had influence, but we determined that based on the results of the last General Conference in November, that we merely postponed the inevitable.

Mr. MICA. All of the delegates who came back felt we should get out?

Mr. NEWELL. Not all of the delegates.

Mr. MICA. Some of the delegates?

Mr. NEWELL. Some of the delegates, yes.

Mr. MICA. Any hazard on a guess as to how many?

Mr. NEWELL. I don't recall. I could go through the list and certainly list some of them.

Mr. MICA. Do you have a list of the recommendations from the delegates?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, we do. I asked for a followup report from each of the 22 delegates and advisors and received, I believe, 18 or 19.

Mr. MICA. I don't know if the committee has been provided with a copy of that report. If it is in accordance with regulations, I would like to request a copy because I will tell you again that we continually hear comments that the majority, if not all of the delegates, have said stay and fight.

The Ambassador indicated that we should stay and fight. I want to tell you that, I came to these hearings thinking maybe it would be a good idea to get out. And I still have real concerns about the basic issues you have raised. I think there need to be changes. Also I agree that if there is not change, the decision may have to be enforced fully and, in fact, it probably will be.

But I am concerned when I hear testimony before this committee time after time that people were asked for their opinion and received the very strong impression, because of timing and followup, that these opinions were never taken into consideration. So if you say Secretary Shultz made the decision, then I would have to conclude that he made the decision not on the information from the major groups that made recommendations.

You answered my question. Let me get back to it; the administration made the decision to withdraw. And you said it was based on the Secretary's recommendation.

Mr. NEWELL. That's correct.

Mr. MICA. Tell me the process. You gave him a memo saying we should get out?

Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Chairman, let me say two things. No. 1, I respect the input of those who have appeared here. I would point out, though, that these who have presented themselves here are users or beneficiaries of UNESCO resources. Consequently, they do have interests which are significant.

Mr. MICA. Let me stop right there and ask you if the U.S. Navy is not a beneficiary of UNESCO?

Mr. NEWELL. They are a participant.

Mr. MICA. Do you have any idea how much it is going to cost to replace Navy materials and information that will not be provided once we leave UNESCO?

Mr. NEWELL. I understand that if we withdraw from UNESCO in December, the concerns that we had before the decision was made are overcome by the fact that the countries which presently participate in that information sharing will continue to participate in spite of not being members of UNESCO.

Mr. MICA. That is not quite right according to the information I have. And I can give you some more examples.

For instance, in some of your documents you indicate that we can participate in the copyright commission, but we cannot participate on the council that makes the rules for copyright.

Mr. NEWELL. That's correct.

Mr. MICA. Sure, we can get what is left over as the results, but we have no ability to have any input in changing the actions or making those actions better suited to our needs. Is that correct?

Mr. NEWELL. It is true we will not sit on governing boards or in decisionmaking bodies.

Mr. MICA. If anybody objects I will yield until a later time. I would like to go back to the process a moment. You asked individuals and groups involved—you term them user groups—for recom-

mendations. They gave you their recommendations. You then prepared a summary of this and sent it to Secretary Shultz.

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Could we get a copy of your summary?

Mr. NEWELL. I believe—you certainly have copies of it.

Mr. MICA. All right. I thought I had read everything staff had given me. I don't know how I missed that one.

Mr. NEWELL. That is the most important document.

Mr. MICA. I have read some of your rationales, but again these rationales are counter to what was given to you and to this committee.

Mr. NEWELL. We think not if you look at the totality of the information, Mr. Chairman. If we look at the science sector, this is where UNESCO does its most valuable work. It is here that we will have the highest price to pay. We believe, however, that there are existing mechanisms which are available to us to take those concerns to be addressed in creditable, valuable ways to the U.S. Government.

Mr. MICA. I did read your memo. That is the one I disagree with. I am sorry, go ahead.

Mr. NEWELL. I think we need to go back to June 1983 when we began this review—after having met with the Director-General on five separate occasions indicating the problems of politicization, No. 1, the statist approach to problem solving, and No. 3, the budget management questions.

Regardless of the mechanism which is in place to carry forward a program, if it is not properly managed one cannot achieve the desired end results, which for us is genuine and effective international cooperation in these five sectors.

Now, if UNESCO were the only international organization that we belonged to, then we might have to agree that life is different now than it was 35 or 45 years ago, but we deal with these same member governments effectively, I might add, in these other multi-lateral organizations.

So we ask ourselves why is UNESCO so very different in all three of these areas. No. 2, why is UNESCO so unresponsive to the concerns, not only of the United States, but of the 126 countries that have responded to us since this withdrawal notice.

We undertook a review indicating to the Director General and to member states that we would ask our users, if you will, these 13 departments and agencies, the commission, the private sector, the embassies, for evaluation abroad, et cetera, to list for us, No. 1, what UNESCO is mandated to do; No. 2, what is UNESCO doing in the range of that mandate; No. 3, what are they doing outside of the range of that mandate; No. 4, what is the cost of that; No. 5, what is the effectiveness of that given program or sector; and No. 6, are there other mechanisms that exist that could pick up the slack if we did not participate in UNESCO.

When all of the reports came in, none of them, except one, had recommendations as to whether the United States should remain or withdraw. Recommendations on the subject came after the decision was announced. Their input was a judgment of their own, in terms of their own sectorial interests. And when we put all of that together, understanding the problems which we have listed here,

the three major problems, we determined that there were no significant problems that we could not resolve by going to other existing mechanisms outside of UNESCO.

And given the longstanding problems that we have had with UNESCO, dating back many years, we determined it was in the best interest of the United States, given our concern in international cooperation and development in these five sectors, to take those resources, politically and financially elsewhere.

Mr. MICA. For how many years do you feel these programs have gone on?

Mr. NEWELL. Probably 10, 12 years.

Mr. MICA. You know, what you are saying sounds excellent and, in fact, much of this material is in your letter or memo. But we have not been hearing what you are saying.

For instance, many of these organizations say that from your statement we ought to get out and that we can do it another way is in effect a smokescreen. It sounds good, but in reality we, organization after organization, have said that we can't operate effectively from without UNESCO.

Now while you asked them to report to you, you tell us that they are user groups so we should not really consider their testimony. You infer that their testimony is biased. Obviously it is biased in some way.

But they know because they are involved, and group after group and after group has come here and said withdrawal is wrong. We should not do it this way. As I indicated, I understand our Navy is one of a number of agencies that are now coming forward with reports. And I didn't mention the figure because I wanted you to mention how much it is going to cost the Navy if we get out.

I came to the basic conclusion that you did a surface review, without taking into consideration the input of the people you asked for their recommendations. I have read all of the information and, believe me, I have been reading it. I come up with a somewhat different conclusion—not that the problem does not exist, but what is the best way to attack that problem.

Somehow this leads me to believe that somebody else didn't read all this information or take it for what it really was. I have started meeting with a lot of these people you asked, the delegates and ambassadors. I am getting quite an interesting story.

I will stop here.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to pursue a number of subjects, but would like to begin first, with a question for Mr. Newell. In your letter to Congress, you stated that the approach that UNESCO consistently takes to disarmament, which is not the proper concern of that body, too frequently coincides with that of the Soviet Union.

Can you give some examples?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes. First of all, there are several programs in the peace and disarmament area which we have complained about which are based on resolutions put forward by the Soviets. I will list some specific peace and disarmament programs that we find unacceptable.

Paragraph 13,119, calls for an analysis of international relations in their political as well as other dimensions. Paragraphs 13,119 and 13,123 have UNESCO doing studies on the effects of arms races, on regional and international conflicts.

Paragraph 13,124 calls for work dealing with alternatives to military strategic doctrines, et cetera. Let me say here, as we have publicly before, that these subjects are legitimate, but for an appropriate forum. We have the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We have the U.N. General Assembly First Committee in New York. Both deal with these questions constructively.

We believe that peace and disarmament should not be dealt with in 96 different organizations even though it is a legitimate subject. And when we look to the funds which UNESCO is spending, according to peace and disarmament initiatives, it is in the area of \$978,000, and contrast that to a legitimate sphere of work, the education of illiteracy for the refugees and we count 10 million of them, being in the neighborhood of \$62,000, we say we have our priorities mixed up, No. 1.

And we have taken a subject which is harmful to the West, No. 2, and superimposed it.

Mr. LEACH. Your statement to the Congress is that too frequently the approach of UNESCO coincides with that of the Soviet Union which is a very strong statement. I think people in this body might have a different perspective on whether UNESCO should or shouldn't take up these issues, although I would add that UNESCO is a bit on the spot because the U.N. General Assembly, of which we are a part, has urged UNESCO to intensify its efforts in the disarmament area.

I have gone to the Library of Congress in an effort to find out what sorts of dangerous pro-Soviet publications UNESCO has put forth on the disarmament issue. I came up with a book called "Armaments, Arms Control and Disarmament." In the table of contents, one of the "dangerous" things we don't want the world to read about is a chapter consisting of excerpts from a report by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Another chapter that is very dangerous is by the Stanford Arms Control Group. Another article is the Final Document adopted by the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. Another is by a distinguished American political scientist, Charles Osgood, whom I studied under at Johns Hopkins.

Another chapter is a speech by Lord Mountbatten. Another is by a distinguished former rear admiral of the U.S. Navy. The point I am making is that when you use very loose terms, implying a pro-Soviet perspective, you have to be prepared to define that very succinctly. I don't think an argument that UNESCO shouldn't be involved in these areas is good enough.

Now, I personally happen to think your argument that it shouldn't be a priority, deserves consideration. In the educational area, if we are going to deal with the arms race, maybe the implications of those programs are something which all of us ought to look at. But even if one did take your perspective that it is inappropriate for UNESCO to be involved, that is a very different thing than saying that UNESCO takes a pro-Soviet position on these issues.

My concern on the one hand is that the United States could well be perceived as a country which can be preempted, by implication, by the other side on peace and disarmament issues. And, on the other hand, if we are not represented in this international forum and discussions of these issues come up, I am not convinced that UNESCO will want to take a document by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or a document by the Stanford Arms Control Group.

The fact of the matter is we are going to have a very difficult time putting forth our perspective from an empty chair. We might just as soon not have UNESCO address these issues, but as long as they are going to and as long as they are mandated by the U.N. General Assembly to do so, I have a hard time not believing we are better off being represented than otherwise.

I would like to move on to several other issues because there are a number that I think have to be addressed. One relates to something that I think is very important because it has become an issue of major concern in the conservative community of the United States and which I think has to be addressed by the administration.

The Heritage Foundation has recently suggested that one reason to justify the United States staying in would be the resignation of Mr. M'Bow. Now, I don't mean to suggest that I concur with the Heritage Foundation's position, but I think the administration ought to be put on strong record on whether that would be sufficient for the United States to stay in.

Mr. NEWELL. If I could, Mr. Leach, answer two questions here, the first on the Soviet question. Those pages which you list here represent, I would guess, 50 or 60 pages of the total. In a year's time, we put out 300 million pages from UNESCO and that might not be a very balanced representation.

Mr. LEACH. I just took one book.

Mr. NEWELL. That is one book, but that represents 300 pages out of 300 million. And a second point, in terms of the U.N. mandating, the United Nations does not have that authority to mandate specialized agencies. They can recommend. This is what concerns us with UNESCO as UNESCO picks and chooses what the United Nations recommends.

In terms of Soviet influence, we would point to the 47 KGB agents recently expelled from France; 9 were in the permanent delegation to UNESCO and 3 were on the UNESCO staff. These three remain on the payroll and just had their contracts renewed.

Mr. LEACH. We know the Soviet Union and can assume about half of their representation is in all likelihood KGB oriented. And we have swallowed that fact as a function of life. If you make that argument, there is no U.N. agency that I know of we can stay in. Can you list one?

Mr. NEWELL. I cannot answer that question. But let me say in terms of the Secretariats, it is true, we know that that presence is there, as you state. To what extent I don't know.

The problem with UNESCO is that the Secretariat is controlling the organization. This is not the case in other organizations. Member states have a stronger voice. And it is they who guide the organization.

If I can, then, go to the M'Bow question, our quarrel has not been with this Director-General. The problems we are talking about have been building for many years, and they predate Mr. M'Bow.

We have told him, however, that we do have specific criticisms that we can lay at his feet. We have given them to him publicly as well as privately.

We do not seek the resignation of M'Bow, and we would not join in an effort to seek his resignation.

Mr. DERWINSKI. May I interject at that point?

I have looked through a number of the internal documents Mr. Newell's bureau has worked with, and I am convinced there is no personal issue here. This is not a vendetta against the Director General. I think that is a natural subject for press speculation perhaps. But it is not the fact.

Mr. LEACH. I am pleased to have our distinguished counsellor disagree with the Heritage Foundation.

I have many questions, but in the interest of time, let me just ask one more if I could. It relates to an assessment that you made in your introductory remarks that we had done a thorough examination of all the implications of withdrawal prior to making that decision.

Ambassador Hennelly has testified to this committee that no assessment has been made to date of the potentially enormous implications for U.S. commercial interests. Can you provide for this committee your assessment or any study that the Department has done assessing implications for U.S. commercial interests of withdrawal?

Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Leach, we would be pleased to furnish that. And let me say that we have disagreed on this position for several months.

Mr. GILMAN. Could you also add in your assessment any scientific or military advantage that may be lost as a result of our lack of involvement in UNESCO?

Mr. NEWELL. I would be pleased to.

[The information was subsequently submitted:]

There are three areas in which the activities of UNESCO can be said to have an identifiable impact on United States commercial interests: copyrights, transnational enterprises, and procurement by UNESCO.

Total export earnings of the U.S. copyright industries plus royalty payments approximated \$3.5 billion in 1982 (books, \$650 million; periodicals \$393 million; film/theatricals \$569 million; television productions \$375 million; music \$1.5 billion). In addition, there is a large category of other products based on copyrighted works. Exports of these products, which include video games, other games and toys, advertising, and architectural services, amounted to approximately \$3 billion in 1982.

These revenues are covered by the Universal Copyright Convention, for which UNESCO serves as a secretariat. Withdrawal from UNESCO will have no effect on these revenues, since even after withdrawal, the United States will remain a party to the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) and will remain eligible for reelection to the International Copyright Committee, the governing body of the (UCC).

There are two further agreements for which UNESCO acts to some extent as a secretariat: the Beirut and Florence Agreements for the duty free importation of visual, auditory, and related materials of an educational, scientific and cultural character. These are virtually self-implementing agreements, and access to the duty free status that they provide is in no way contingent on membership in UNESCO.

As non-members of UNESCO, we would not be able to participate in the decision-making related to UNESCO's own programs in copyright. It is the opinion of our copyright experts that there would be little impact on United States interests because of this.

The real struggle in copyright affairs concerns the continuing effort of the developing country members of the Intergovernmental Copyright Committee to change the rules of the UCC to wrest control of it from the industrialized Western democracies. The United States will need to oppose this effort whether from within or outside of UNESCO, but our ability to carry out such opposition will not be measurably affected by our withdrawal from UNESCO.

UNESCO procurement of items of American manufacture varies according to the procurement goals of the year in question, but may amount to as much as \$4 million. The basis on which UNESCO makes procurement decisions, however, is the best return for the dollar spent. We presume that it will continue buying where it gets the best value. On that basis, we believe that procurement of American goods will continue, although it could be reduced. The total value of American goods procured by UNESCO, however, would rarely amount to as much as 10% of our annual assessment.

The UN Centre on Transnational Corporations is the focal point within the UN system for studies and programs on transnationals. We do not think that UNESCO should involve itself in the subject, and we do not think that UNESCO will have any significant impact on the matter. The subject of transnationals is irrelevant to UNESCO's mandate, and we do not believe that what UNESCO does in this field will have an effect on the profitability of United States companies doing business abroad.

American commercial interests, over the last ten years at least, except for the copyrighted industries, have exhibited little interest in UNESCO. They have not pressed to be represented on our delegations to UNESCO meetings, nor have they taken the initiative to inform the Department of State of their views on UNESCO activities. We presume this lack of interest in UNESCO on the part of American business reflects the fact that American business did not regard UNESCO's activities as having any relevance to its operations.

The American science community, thus far, has described certain UNESCO programs as useful or even valuable, but has not made a claim that any UNESCO science program is both crucial to our science community's interest, and irreplaceable outside of UNESCO. Although the science community is still in the process of making a detailed examination of UNESCO's science activities, the preliminary views that we are hearing is that some of UNESCO's science programs are so poorly administered as to be of little value; others are well conceived and executed, but could be duplicated outside the organization, perhaps better and cheaper; and others that are of interest to us could be duplicated outside the organization although the cost would be greater. The Administration has acknowledged that some UNESCO science programs are well conceived and well executed, and we realize that the benefits of a few of them may not be obtainable from outside of the organization. This loss, however, has to be weighed against all the other relevant factors, including not only the cost of our participation but also the intellectual and political disadvantages of remaining in UNESCO as it is now constituted.

With reference to military implications, these questions appear to arise from an early misunderstanding on the part of the United States Navy that our withdrawal from UNESCO would require our departure from UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). The Navy has an interest in the findings of the IOC. However, the statute of the IOC provides that states that are not members of UNESCO can be full, participating members of the IOC. When the Navy was satisfied that continued United States membership in the IOC is legally provided for, and that the Administration intends to maintain United States membership in the IOC, the Navy withdrew its objections. No other element of the United States armed forces, either before or after our announced withdrawal from UNESCO, has ever expressed any interest in any of UNESCO's activities. We do not, therefore, believe that there will be any military advantage that will be lost because of our withdrawal from UNESCO.

Mr. LEACH. Do you have, at this time, a careful study that has been done?

Mr. NEWELL. On the multinationals?

Mr. LEACH. On the implications for U.S. commercial interests?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes; we do, although I must say it is not terribly extensive, given the time.

Mr. LEACH. Ambassador Hennelly, who in private life represents a major U.S. corporation—who has a distinguished position with

one—asserts no such study existed prior to the decision and that he is calling for such a study to be made under the assumption in his own mind that we will find our commercial interests may be badly damaged by withdrawal.

I just want to be very clear on this point. At what point in time does the Department have a study of the implications for U.S. commercial interests and how extensive is it?

Mr. NEWELL. We will have to follow up on that, Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. With respect to the point I am making and your followup response, you do not have such a study; is that correct?

Mr. NEWELL. I cannot answer that. I don't know.

Mr. LEACH. I just want to make this point, because we made the decision, after some consultation. Certainly the consultation occurred with this member. I was informed a few days prior to the announcement of the decision that you intended to make that decision at which time I indicated certain concerns and, I think, in fairly clear terms.

But that is a very different consultation than a serious give and take. My feeling is that effective consultation involves listening to the other side. With respect to a whole series of groups that Chairman Mica has mentioned, I know of very few that support our withdrawal, particularly among those which have been active in UNESCO affairs.

I don't want the implication left for the record that extensive give and take consultations occurred. I do acknowledge that the perspectives of various people were listened to in the sense that they were taken in. But I don't think they were heard in the sense of being taken very seriously by the administration.

Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Leach.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Levine.

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Newell, I was interested in the exchange between you and Chairman Mica with regard to the process by which this decision was made. I am not sure that I understood your answers correctly.

And I would like you to let me know whether I did or not.

As I understood his questions, it sounded to me like when he was seeking information from you as to who recommended that this decision to withdraw be made, your answer was straightforwardly, the administration; is that correct?

Mr. NEWELL. That is correct. And I represent the administration, Mr. Levine.

Mr. LEVINE. Was it also correct that the first recommendation taken within the administration was yours?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, it was my recommendation to the Secretary of State.

Mr. LEVINE. And then it went from you to the Secretary and from the Secretary to the President.

Mr. NEWELL. Yes. There is one part I think that might be valuable to add here. That it went through Under Secretary Eagleburger.

Mr. LEVINE. So it was initially yours, through Eagleburger to Secretary Shultz and from the Secretary, on behalf of the Department, to the President.

Mr. NEWELL. That is correct.

Mr. LEVINE. Now, in terms of the input that you received from these various organizations that Mr. Mica was asking you questions about, can you identify for the record those organizations that urged that we stay in UNESCO and those organizations that urged that we withdraw from UNESCO?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes; I would be pleased to furnish that.

[The information requested follows:]

The following nongovernmental organizations have sent written communications to the Department of State urging that we remain in UNESCO:

American Association of University Women; Florida Native Plant Society; Freedom House; Illinois Women's Agenda; Massachusetts Audubon Society; National Education Association; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; Sierra Club; United Nations Association of the United States of America; United States National Commission for UNESCO; and Wisconsin Governor's Commission on the United Nations.

The following organizations have sent written communications to the Department of State urging that further study be made:

League of Women Voters; and National Audubon Society.

The following nongovernmental organizations have sent written communications to the Department of State urging that we withdraw from UNESCO:

Milliken and Company; and National Council for Jewish Education.

Mr. LEVINE. Do you know offhand approximately how many organizations of those that were consulted urged that we withdraw, and how many urged that we remain in?

Mr. NEWELL. Offhand, I do not.

Mr. LEVINE. Do you know what the preponderant recommendation was? Did the majority suggest that we withdraw, or did the majority suggest that we stay in?

Mr. NEWELL. After the decision was announced, I feel confident that the majority recommended that we stay in.

Mr. LEVINE. And do you have a sense as to whether that majority was large, small, overwhelming, or what?

Mr. MICA. Would the gentleman yield on that point?

You said after the decision was announced a majority said we should stay in?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes; the majority came back, I would guess again, I am guessing here——

Mr. LEVINE. As I understand what you said, the administration recommended we get out, then went to these various organizations for input, and it was at that point that the input was obtained; is that correct?

Mr. NEWELL. The input was obtained from June to the end of November.

Mr. LEVINE. Let's go back to the sequence. Was a recommendation to withdraw made prior to seeking input from the organizations?

Mr. NEWELL. It was not.

Mr. LEVINE. I think that is what triggered Mr. Mica's question. Your response seemed to imply that a recommendation was made to withdraw and subsequent to that recommendation the majority of organizations with whom you consulted urged that we stay in.

Mr. NEWELL. No; if you will recall my words of a few moments ago, Mr. Levine, when we talked about outside input, they were not asked in that review process to determine whether the United

States should stay in or get out. That is a foreign policy decision which these associations are not responsible for.

Mr. LEVINE. Let me ask you. Did any of them volunteer an opinion as to whether or not we should stay in or get out?

Mr. NEWELL. Only one I am aware of.

Mr. LEVINE. Which one was that?

Mr. NEWELL. The National Science Foundation.

Mr. LEVINE. What was their suggestion?

Mr. NEWELL. That we stay in.

Mr. LEVINE. And subsequent to the determination, when you received input from various organizations as to whether or not we should stay in or get out, do you know the number of organizations that provided input, which organizations they were, and what their input was with regard to staying in or getting out?

Mr. NEWELL. As I have stated, I don't know. I could only hazard a guess.

Mr. LEVINE. Would you guess?

Mr. NEWELL. I would prefer not to discuss it here. But I will be pleased to follow up with you another time.

Mr. LEVINE. You will provide that for the record. I have been told only one organization that you consulted urged we get out, and the overwhelming majority urged we stay in. Does that sound close to accurate to you?

Mr. NEWELL. I don't know.

Mr. LEVINE. You will provide that for the record.

Mr. NEWELL. I certainly will.

[The subsequently submitted information follows:]

The organizations have been identified earlier. With respect to total number of inquiries, the overwhelming proportion of communications that the Department of State received on withdrawal came from individuals who were stating their personal views. To date, the Department of State has received a total of 421 letters from all sources, personal and institutional, of which 222 approved of withdrawal and 199 opposed it.

Mr. LEVINE. In the process within the administration in terms of this decision that you outlined, that went from you to Eagleburger to Shultz and then to the President, was there any disagreement within the administration, within the State Department?

Mr. NEWELL. Absolutely none.

Mr. LEVINE. Were others within the State Department consulted for their opinions?

Mr. NEWELL. Surely. Counselor Derwinski being one.

Mr. LEVINE. And of those consulted there was no disagreement?

Mr. NEWELL. Absolutely no one.

Mr. LEVINE. Now, Mr. Derwinski indicated—and maybe I should best address this to you, Mr. Derwinski, you indicated that it was a plus-plus situation, because either there would be reform, which would be positive, or we would get out, which would be positive if there were not reform.

Could you let the committee know what the nature of the reform would be that you would feel would be satisfactory in terms of enabling us to stay in?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Well, the reforms will be based on the success or lack of success of the 24 nations who have taken the lead and have

been inspired by the U.S. position to give overdue attention to UNESCO reform.

Now, that is why I made the point that we feel if they should be successful, and we are fully cooperative in this reform effort, then we have time to reconsider the withdrawal decision.

If they are not successful, there will be efforts made, and Mr. Newell's shop is well into it, to develop the alternative procedures, including those specific UNESCO fields where we retain participation.

Mr. LEVINE. The one point that I am just trying to clarify is what does succeed mean, what does successful mean. Are there any specific criteria you could provide to the committee other than just generally being successful?

Mr. DERWINSKI. My understanding—Mr. Newell, I believe, would have more information—we are not giving a shopping list, we are not giving a list of demands saying you must meet every one or a majority of these demands. That is not the procedure.

We are not trying to, in this particular case, extract precise concessions, if I may use that term.

Mr. LEVINE. On the one hand, you could say that is not trying to extract precise concessions. On the other, if the assumption is correct that we are simply looking for an excuse to withdraw, and I certainly don't ascribe this to you, Counselor Derwinski, but there has been an assumption that has been theorized by respectable theories on this issue, that in not providing anything specific, we are simply developing sliding, shifting, subjective imprecise criteria that by definition cannot be met.

I think it would be useful to provide at least some guidelines or suggestions so that somebody, the committee, the State Department, UNESCO, or other observers, might have some idea precisely what is at least in the administration's mind viewed as adequate in terms of reforms.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I think the point is that the Western Information Group is pursuing a broad effort at reform, and certainly it would not be fair to them or accurate if they were somehow labeled as a group going in carrying the precise U.S. burden, or the precise U.S. demands.

I think in terms of ultimate effectiveness, there is far more to be gained by the procedure that is developing than there would be if the United States would have a take it or leave it kind of shopping list.

Mr. LEVINE. I don't want to belabor this. The only thing that concerns me is that every time an objection is raised with regard to UNESCO and its activities, whether it pertains to Mr. M'Bow or whether it pertains to a particular procedure, I then hear from somebody, well, that really isn't what is going to determine whether or not reform has been acceptable.

And I hear a shopping list or a laundry list or some form of a list of objections, problems, opposition, and then I hear these really are not the problem. And I must tell you that after having reviewed a number of the written statements and listened to some of the testimony, I don't know what the administration wants. And I am baffled.

On the one hand you say, Mr. Newell, that this wasn't a preconceived judgment. You sought input from a variety of people and organizations. But on the other hand we certainly don't have any clue as to precisely what it is that would amount to adequate reform to satisfy you and your colleagues.

And it is somewhat frustrating. Maybe you do not feel you can provide it in open session because it would look like something the United States is trying to extract. If that is the case I hope you think about providing it in an executive session so we could have some idea whether the specific problems you spell out, in fact, can be remedied in your opinion and what an adequate remedy might be.

Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Levine, I believe while we have not formulated a list, it is very clear as to what the United States and the Western countries are after—and that is an organization that can work effectively.

The Maurich paper represents the thinking of 24 governments who contribute 75 percent of those resources.

When we look to politicization, what are we looking for? We are looking for the peace and disarmament resources to be transferred over to illiteracy programs. We have stated that time and time again.

In terms of resolutions on southern Africa, the resources that are devoted to those should be put into another mechanism. In terms of the statist theory approach, we ask that we take the moneys and resources for the new world information and communications order and put them into a viable mechanism, something on the order of an IPDC which can discharge real developmental objectives.

In terms of zero net program growth, that is a very simple one to understand. The only one—excuse me—there are 2 out of the 96. The way to satisfy this requirement would be to reduce its budget to zero net program growth and significant absorption of other costs.

In terms of personnel, the United States should have around 12, or 12.5 percent of the number of nationals hired by UNESCO. We are at 8.1. That, again, would be an easy point to satisfy.

When we are talking about executive board authority, that could be restored structurally and procedurally. We are asking for those sorts of things to be changed.

We have been specific without giving an item-by-item list to preserve flexibility on UNESCO's side and on the U.S. side.

Mr. DYMALLY. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEVINE. In a second, Mr. Dymally. I have a 4 o'clock meeting at the Speaker's Office. I have been prolonging this.

I have also passed beyond my time. I would simply say in closing, on my time, that I frankly find this testimony very, very frustrating. I came here understanding that there are some very severe problems in UNESCO, and I do understand that there are.

And I certainly am not a fan of a lot of what UNESCO does. I think that a lot of what it does is inefficient and, from a policy point of view, inappropriate.

But having heard this testimony, Mr. Newell, I must tell you that you have in response to questions and in your testimony thus far convinced me that you are acting on this issue with ideological

blindness, and that you are not seeking a solution, but imposing, if you can, a will that was prejudged from the outset and in which you wish your facts to conform. And I must tell you that I believe an objective reader of the record, somebody who comes to this issue without preconceived notions, will come to that conclusion based on what I have heard from you so far.

My mind will not be entirely closed, but I have got to tell you the response that I have, having sat through an hour of this so far this afternoon. And I would be happy to yield to my colleague from California.

Mr. DYMALLY. Just one comment, Mr. Newell. What you said of UNESCO can also be said of the State Department or Congress. What you are looking for is perfection.

It doesn't exist. You have not given one single good reason why we should pull out of UNESCO. Why don't you put your complaints in writing so someone can see what you are talking about. Because you are doing a tap dance, I am afraid, on this issue.

Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Dymally, I would respectfully disagree there. I would say two things here. No. 1, we are not alone in this decision, nor in our concerns.

We are joined again by 23 other countries.

Mr. DYMALLY. You don't jump out of the plane because you have concerns about the pilot taking off.

Mr. NEWELL. We are not asking for perfection, either in our Government nor the State Department, nor UNESCO. It is frustrating, I think the word Mr. Levine uses is correct here, because it seems to me we are debating on how a decision was made and not why it was made.

And it seems to me that we should be looking at the concerns which 126 countries happen to agree with in terms of the gravity of the problems in UNESCO.

Mr. DYMALLY. They are not all leaving UNESCO.

Mr. NEWELL. There are some who are considering it, Mr. Dymally.

Mr. DYMALLY. One of your vague comments—there are some. Name the "some."

Mr. MICA. The Chair would call on Mr. Pritchard. But before I do, for the record, Mr. Levine asked about each of the organizations that I named. And I would like the record to indicate that all but one of those organizations testified at that table that they had asked that we stay in UNESCO, and rather vocally.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, could I for the record also indicate that it is my understanding that Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Newell, received a letter, dated November 8, 1983, from Dr. James B. Holderman, president, University of South Carolina and Chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, reporting a series of comments from 20 national associations regarding whether we should stay in.

And in that letter there are a whole series of institutions, such as International Reading Association, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the National Education Association, which generally opposed withdrawal.

I am a little bit perplexed about how you can tell us that prior to withdrawal we only got one comment suggesting we should stay in. Here is a very serious assessment of what we should do indicating a wide spectrum of support for U.S. participation in UNESCO from a large number of associations, and it was provided prior to the withdrawal decision.

Now, certainly after the fact governmental institutions are likely to climb onboard a Presidential decision. But as we all know in this committee, intriguingly, the U.S. Navy raised some concerns about the decision, and the commercial interests of this country were not very thoroughly examined. Yet this is an administration that stands for national security and for commercial free enterprise. I apologize for taking the time.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, point of order.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Is this out of my time?

Mr. MICA. No; it is not coming out of your time.

Mr. SOLOMON. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. The Chair will explain what is happening here.

Mr. SOLOMON. I would like to get my time in.

Mr. MICA. The committee chairmen have been called out for a meeting that had been scheduled. We had indicated we would try to wrap up at 4 o'clock.

I can assure everyone that they will get their time. We don't have to wrap up now. We are rotating in and out of the meeting so we can have every member have a chance to have time and ask as many questions as they want.

Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say that I have more than average interest in this, because I went to the United Nations, was one of the U.S. delegates, had the responsibility that Mr. Derwinski had when he was in Congress.

I was no expert on the United Nations. As you know, you go up there, and you learn quite a bit. Because of the decision by the administration on UNESCO, when I came out of New York, I was continually asked was that a right decision, where are we going, what is the story on UNESCO?

I must say that my answer has been this. That UNESCO had some very serious problems and they should have been addressed by a number of the member nations. And now they are being addressed, as a result of our action. At this point, I don't think it has been a mistake.

However, if we get the changes that I believe we can make, and we are not relying on preconceived ideas, we can make some progress, and then stay in the organization. Then UNESCO can be a successful activity.

However, if it is predetermined that we pull out of the United Nations, or UNESCO, it would be a tragedy. And the concern of many people I think, is that there is a lack of faith in those who are making judgments on this issue in the United Nations. I guess this rests with you, Mr. Newell, there is just a lack of faith that you are going to make this judgment in a balanced way.

People feel you have a preconceived bias, and that withdrawing from UNESCO is a foregone conclusion. When people tell me that,

I say I don't know. But obviously the Western nations have picked up the ball now, and they might not if we hadn't taken this action.

Mr. SOLOMON. Would the gentleman yield at that point just for a question?

Mr. PRITCHARD. All right.

Mr. SOLOMON. You say people feel——

Mr. PRITCHARD. I feel. We hear it all the time. I can start in the audience, what have you.

Mr. MICA. Would the gentleman yield?

Almost every organization that testified said that they felt that there was no real consideration.

Mr. SOLOMON. I am talking about the American people.

Mr. MICA. Well, they are Americans.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I want to get back to this.

All right. I am encouraged if the thrust is that the 24 nations which have now picked up the cudgel are going to work on the issues which I think need working on, which is the budget.

I made the budget speech at the United Nations this time. And certainly UNESCO didn't respond like the other agencies and like the rest of the United Nations. UNESCO failed in their budget. Not only in their process, but also in their response.

There is always going to be a great deal of politicization in the United Nations. But there has been an excessive amount of it in UNESCO.

And we can make progress there. And certainly in their priorities of how they spend their money, they can make progress.

Now, the 24 nations that are working on this, I just hope that our administration—I guess I am asking you—I just hope that we are working with them, and when we get done and if they have made some progress, we don't say, well, it is not progress enough, or, that, because time is going to run out before the general body can vote on these, or we have no proof, et cetera. You know, there is just no limit to the things you can find if you are looking.

If the 24 nations come to the point that they feel rather satisfied with the results of their work, do you feel there is a good chance we will stay in?

Mr. NEWELL. If there is progress in these areas, progress and not just good intentions listed, yes. We are a member of that 24. And for the record, I think it is important, if we are talking about faith, to also rely on the experience that we have had in the past couple of years, where, in fact, we have strengthened our participation in multilateral affairs.

We increased our representation in Paris 9 months ago. We have increased our representation and now have Ambassador Fenwick in Rome. We have upgraded our representation in the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal.

The President himself has met on five separate occasions with the Secretary General of the United Nations, which is unprecedented. When you look at the record of what we have done in multilateral affairs, one has to conclude that we are working to make the system effective.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I want to come back to this again.

Is it a rather safe assumption that if the other 23 feel they have made real progress, wouldn't the 23 Western nations say we ought

to stay in and say we have made progress? Wouldn't we have to change our position if we are really going to be a part of the 24-nation effort?

Mr. NEWELL. We are talking hypothetically here. If there is progress, we will consider having the President rescind the withdrawal notice.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Obviously, the decision would be made after the election, which I think makes sense. But also we have to make this decision before the next meeting, when they really will ratify these changes. Is it in your mind that maybe we will delay this decision?

Mr. NEWELL. In my judgment, honestly and frankly speaking, no. We feel that the mechanisms are available for change.

Mr. PRITCHARD. The executive board?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes; not dramatic changes necessarily. We recognize that. But for those who argue we must stay in until the 1985 meeting, we are talking really about staying in until 1986. By waiting for the 1985 conference, which is in November, to be intellectually honest, one must stay in yet another year to see if those recommendations actually take hold.

It was our judgment that that change would not come about, hence our decision. During this next year, we have the Executive Board meeting from May 9 to 23, we have a September-October meeting. The Executive Board does have the ability, if they choose, to take the initiative for the changes that we are all talking about.

I must say that we have been dismayed that 4 months have passed and the debates still going on in UNESCO are those of whether the United States should have withdrawn or not, and not getting on to the required reforms. As you know, the Director General was here a few weeks ago.

Unfortunately, in my judgment, he has still not understood the gravity of the situation that is before us, and has made little if any effort to reform UNESCO.

I have been working here for 2 years on the UNESCO issue. Ed Hennelly was there for the conference. That was his first experience with the conference.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Is Mrs. Gerard supporting this?

Mr. NEWELL. Ambassador Gerard strongly supports the administration.

Mr. PRITCHARD. We will have to talk to her.

Mr. NEWELL. I think that would be very useful.

Mr. PRITCHARD. All right. I think we have a problem in that the feeling is that there is a mixed decisionmaking process, that this didn't come out of the State Department with very strong support, but by narrow support, and that there is mixed feeling in the White House on it.

I would only hope that we could have some rather unified decision, and it would be, of course, very helpful to this country if Congress could join in that decision.

Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Pritchard, those who have authority, and are in positions of responsibility in the State Department were in unanimous agreement with this decision. And I would name again Counsellor Derwinski, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Assistant Secretary McCormack, Assistant Secretary Abrams. Obviously the Secretary. Under Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Diana Lady

Dougan, Ambassador Gerard, the other three Ambassadors in the United Nations who work in multilateral affairs. Ambassador Gene Douglas. One can argue they are all Republicans.

But it is a Republican administration that happens to be well staffed at the State Department.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, may I just add I think it would be easier for me to address one point than it would be Mr. Newell. The comment was made that the motivation might have been ideological. From my vantage point, it is not so. He had the staff do a tremendous amount of research.

He gave it an exhaustive look. He recognized the controversy he would be stepping into, the "heat," if I might use that term, and I think he did it calmly and dispassionately.

As a longstanding U.N. supporter, after I reviewed the material prepared by his bureau, and the recommendations, I saw no inconsistency in supporting his recommendation, and my usual view of strong support of the United Nations.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Will you be a part of the recommendation on this?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I will have a continued relationship as a so-called principal officer on the procedures and reviews that he is conducting, yes.

Mr. MICA. Would the gentleman yield?

Just a question for Mr. Derwinski. When you were given the recommendation, were you given all the backup data?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. MICA. All of the data that we have mentioned here today?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes; and prior to that, the material that Assistant Secretary Newell's staff was working on was available to us. There was cable traffic from various posts. Ambassador Gerard came in to see me.

In fact, Ambassador Gerard came by to ask if I could spend some time in Paris during the sessions and help hammer out some of these problems. Unfortunately, I could not accommodate my schedule to her needs.

But she was very concerned and discussed the matter with me before Mr. Newell even sat down with any great details.

Mr. MICA. I would like to follow up on that, but I will do it on my own time.

Mr. Weiss.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you very much. I am going to ask a couple of questions. In going through the testimony that is under your name, Ed, I notice a statement which says that the recent conference apparently came off fairly well.

You liked its moderate tenor, and some of the its conclusions. And then you go on to say, but, of course, they were on their best behavior, so you cannot really say—"We also concluded their performance represented transitory and behavioral rather than permanent change."

Well, now, if that is going to be the kind of standard that is applied to achievements that you are looking for in the course of the next 6 months, it is a no-lose situation as far as you are concerned.

No matter what UNESCO does, you can conclude, well, that is nice, but they are under the gun, and it is not permanent, it is just transitory.

What basis do you have for simply throwing out the achievements or the tone of that conference on the basis of what—lack of good faith, your own intuition. Where are we coming from?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I think that was the consensus of many of the professional observers and the key people on Mr. Newell's staff.

I should point out that I don't see anything in that comment other than what I think is an accurate assessment of human nature and instinctive self-defense in a bureaucracy.

I don't consider that an unfair assessment. When people are under a special spotlight, or under the gun, they are on better behavior than when they are without any form of supervision or constraints. And that is the big problem with UNESCO.

As I understand it, of all the U.N. special agencies, it is the one that unfortunately has shown the greatest tendency for consistent mismanagement.

Mr. WEISS. It would be one thing to say, OK, we have had a good conference, we are pleased with the way that it worked out, and if things continue in that fashion, then maybe we have some reason to be cautiously optimistic about how things will be and what we are going to do. But that is not what it says.

It says, OK, it is great, but it is a phony. It seems to me that if you go in with that kind of attitude, it is a fix.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I would rather put the emphasis on the fact that recognizing the numerous defects in UNESCO that were pointed out, we would not expect them to make an instant and total adjustment.

I think we are entitled to a certain amount of skepticism in the full year of review, which is why, as you also note, I made the point that we do have an open mind.

In fact, the specific statement that I actually read from, and I will quote it back to you, is that: "We believe we are in a no-lose situation as far as American interests are concerned. If UNESCO does accomplish serious reform, we will be in a position to reconsider our withdrawal decision. If not, we will be prepared to continue international cooperation in UNESCO's core fields and other existing ways."

A full year, you might recall—a little before your time in the Congress we had the ILO period, when the rules were different, the procedures for withdrawal from the ILO were quite different.

But it wasn't until the very end of the period when the ILO leadership understood the intensity of U.S. interests that the real meaningful and deep-rooted reforms were undertaken. I should add that the U.S. spokesman at that time was Mr. George Meany, who was a good man to take seriously.

Mr. WEISS. I don't want to get into ancient history. We are having a tough enough time understanding what it is that you fellows are up to today.

Let me just try to stick with this one.

On page 12 of your statement there is a line which I do not understand. And it is probably my failing. But you are talking about the kind of actions which you are going to have to forgo in some

situations, if you are going to be able to get the information from elsewhere, and then you say "other activities such as efforts to impose on the world new information or economic orders, we will of course abandon."

I thought the other guys were trying to impose new information or economic orders. Were we also trying to do that?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I think that refers to UNESCO's efforts. The previous sentence reads: "We can continue to participate in UNESCO activities in spite of our withdrawal." Other activities, meaning UNESCO activities. Such as efforts to impose on the world new information or economic orders, we will, of course, abandon. The phrase "other activities" refers to UNESCO.

Mr. WEISS. Isn't one of our great successes the fact that we were able to beat back the effort to impose the so-called new information order? Isn't that something that you guys ought to be proud of?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Well, yes, in the sense that if one might have assumed that there had been an absolute steamroller. However, I should point out that we were not alone in that. You understand that the effort to—especially the information control effort was aimed at the entire Western world, the free press, and is something—

Mr. WEISS. You think the action would have been exactly the same, whether we were there or not.

Mr. DERWINSKI. No one can really tell that. It is hard to tell.

Mr. WEISS. You think we played a significant role?

Mr. DERWINSKI. No, I would say that the best judgment—we played a necessary role, probably the country that best, along with the British and one or two others, as an example of freedom of the press.

Mr. WEISS. It was a major achievement to have, in fact, stopped that effort.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I am not so sure I would call it a major achievement. I would say it is an example of the dangerous developments that we helped avert, yes. That is an achievement. But it always puts you in the position of having a success only by having to take a negative position against extreme proposals.

We would like to take the initiative. And we often do in many international organizations in positive ways.

Mr. WEISS. I don't see how you achieve that by quitting the field.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. The Chair would like to announce that the order following a 15-minute recess will be Mr. Solomon, Mr. Dymally, and Mr. Gilman.

The subcommittee will recess for a vote for 15 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. MICA. The chairman calls on Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I promise to take it easy on the witnesses. At last Thursday's meeting there was testimony given by such a large number of witnesses that I would hope the record could be kept open to questions individual members might want to submit. Therefore, I have a couple of questions to ask—

Mr. MICA. Before you begin, without objection, the record will be left open. We invite any members to submit additional questions.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, let me just say in the beginning that a number of statements were made saying that the administration already had some preconceived idea of what they were going to do here, that they were wearing blinders.

That may very well be true. I think it is true of a lot of other countries, too. There were also several statements made about input. I just want the record to show that when it comes to foreign policy, this committee insists on putting its finger in the foreign policy where I don't think they should be.

Foreign policy is vested by the Constitution in the President of the United States of America. And he ought to set the foreign policy. This committee doesn't feel that way. And, therefore, Members of Congress do have their own input in setting foreign policy.

There are a number of us who have given our input to the President, that we ought to get out of UNESCO for any number of reasons, one of which would be a reason like the following.

I wanted to interrupt Mr. Levine of California and my colleague from New York, Mr. Weiss, and a number of others. Here is a report that says UNESCO will spend \$120,000 of its education funds for a political activity, to keep permanent watch over Israel's compliance with UNESCO conventions regarding the occupied territories, when no other country is singled out for this kind of scrutiny.

It goes on and on. Well, that is one of the things that I object to.

There are other things in here. A \$105,800 grant to study the educational uses of leisure time.

Now, I suppose that that might conceivably come under the original, principal mandates of UNESCO. As I understand the principal mandates, UNESCO was for the eradication of illiteracy, the preserving of historical monuments, and the pursuit of scientific exchange.

Most of the questions that have been offered here today to you two gentlemen seem to be along the lines of what happens to the United States if we drop out, instead of what happens to UNESCO if we drop out.

Now, what are the disastrous effects on us, the American people, if we drop out? None. We will survive.

We have more than 200 years of national experience. In listening to the testimony last week, particularly the hearings on Thursday, from a selected group of individuals to testify before this committee because we questioned some of the people who are on record as not wanting us to withdraw from UNESCO.

I would like for the record to see a list of all of the people who asked to testify before this committee for these hearings who take the other side of the question.

Now, I have at least 15 different organizations and groups of people that I would like to hear from.

Mr. MICA. The chairman will respond.

It was my directive from the day that I became chairman of this subcommittee, and I believe concurrently the other chairman agreed, that we would make these hearings as balanced as possible.

Now, the gentleman knows that I set up every single hearing on an open basis.

I personally thought that most of those that would be testifying would testify the other way. But, we have had testimony that surprised me.

I might add that the \$120 million is one of the reasons I think we should get out of UNESCO or make some changes.

But after several days of hearings, I wonder about the best way to effect some of these changes.

If you have anyone else, we would be willing to try to accommodate everybody from every side, as we have tried to do.

Mr. SOLOMON. Let me just say this, particularly to the chairman, Mr. Mica, for whom I have the greatest admiration and respect, that I believe in everything that you just said, and I think you have done it fairly. But as we have progressed through these hearings, I somehow get the idea that we are going to try to ram through some kind of legislation based on this thing instead of leaving it up to the administration. Because of that, I am becoming a little bit concerned about some of these witnesses.

I make the observation that we could sit here all year receiving testimony from UNESCO's clients, who most of these people seemed to be, that are in this room, and that have come before us to testify. I don't think that we would really get anywhere.

I guess what I am saying is, does that really represent an objective attempt to get to the root of the problem that we have, that we, the U.S. Government, and these other countries, have about UNESCO?

It seems to me we are missing the point. In listening to the witnesses last Thursday I was struck by the baleful assessments that were made concerning what the effects of the withdrawal would be on the United States.

Well, Mr. Chairman, let's get this thing straight once and for all. The United States does not need UNESCO. UNESCO needs us, and the people that derive benefits need it.

We, the United States of America, the American people don't derive any usefulness from UNESCO. Since the end of World War II, our country has won 113 Nobel prizes in the sciences alone.

We don't need UNESCO in that respect. Our scientific prominence is unchallenged, not to mention the cultural impact that our country has had wherever other countries have opened themselves to the free exchange of ideas and information.

The real question before us is whether or not UNESCO is fulfilling the purpose for which it was founded. The corollary question asks how well UNESCO can survive a withdrawal of American support both financially and technically.

That is what I think we are here for. As important as our financial support is, UNESCO depends to an even greater degree on our technical expertise and our scientific support. So let's put the shoe on the foot wherever it fits, where it belongs, and let's quit kidding ourselves.

I just read to you the mandate of UNESCO. And I will read it again: "the eradication of illiteracy, the preserving of historical monuments and the pursuit of scientific exchange."

Now, if they want to get into all of this peripheral business like the Cuban troops in Angola, and get involved in all of these other

things, that is fine. If they do, they are not going to get any support from the United States.

I am going to tell you right now. Sooner or later, we will have our opportunity on the floor of the House and we may have a test vote on the issue. So the message we are trying to send is what the administration is doing: Clean up your act, get back to doing what you were supposed to be doing, fighting illiteracy.

But keep your fingers out of politics, or else you are not going to have our support. And that is about what it amounts to.

Let me just ask one quick question. And I think maybe Mr. Mica or one of them touched on it. Can you give us an idea of what the 24 Western nations, like ourselves, are thinking concerning the reforms at UNESCO?

In other words, how does their critique compare with ours? Might they follow our example and leave the organization altogether if substantial changes are not forthcoming?

I personally think we are going to get those changes.

Are they concerned about the same things we are?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes they are, Mr. Solomon. And if there are not such changes, we know of some countries who are considering taking the same actions that we did. We know that the United Kingdom has already sent forward a letter to the Director General indicating that if there are not substantive procedural changes that are brought about, that they will seriously consider withdrawing.

And their list of complaints, both the U.K. letter and the Maurich paper, indicate the specific concerns of all these member states, which parallel very closely to ours.

Mr. SOLOMON. Let me just thank you, because one other member said that we don't want to talk about ancient history, that it was tough enough trying to figure out what you fellows are up to now, as if you were up to some kind of no good.

I don't like these little implications members throw out sometimes. But whatever it is you are up to, I like it. The American people like it, and so keep it up. If we continue the way we are, I think we will get UNESCO to clean up their act, and we can then participate.

Mr. MICA. Would you yield?

Let me just add, the gentleman knows I have supported a number of actions that he has taken with regard to international actions in foreign policy. I came at this—with a brand new slate. Do you agree with Mr. Solomon's assertion that we don't get anything from UNESCO?

Mr. NEWELL. I believe that what we derive from UNESCO we can derive from other mechanisms. And let me go further, if I can.

Mr. MICA. While I don't want to take the other gentleman's time, I would disagree with that.

And I will tell you that, on my time I will read a letter signed for the President by Mr. McFarlane, which I think indicates a very strong desire to be a part of UNESCO with some changes. It lists the benefits and so on.

Mr. Dymally.

Mr. DYMALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Newell, we opposed the selection of an African for the Secretary General of the United Nations. We wanted to get out of UNESCO which is headed

by an African. We want to get out of UNCTAD which is headed by a Third World person. You are upset about UNESCO's criticism of South Africa. Do I see some racial implications?

Mr. NEWELL. If we look at the 96 organizations we have strongly supported many whose chief executive officers were from the Third World. We just recently, as you may be aware, supported O'Bossee with World Meteorological Organization. We strongly support what he is doing.

We have just given support to Dr. Tolba, head of UNEP. We did not work against an African there. With UNCTAD, that is headed currently by Mr. Corea. His replacement at the end of the year will inevitably be from a Third World country, not only somebody we support, but whom we encourage.

So, no; that would be an incorrect reading, Mr. Dymally.

Mr. DYMALLY. You have some concerns about UNESCO's criticism of South Africa. I would hope UNESCO would criticize South Africa, considering the fact that this nation, America, is opposed to apartheid, I was somewhat amazed to hear you use that as one of the reasons why you wanted to get out of UNESCO.

Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Dymally, our concerns with the South African issue is, No. 1, the initiatives through UNESCO have been unhelpful. No. 2, our concern through UNESCO is that there have been ever increasing financial contributions to arm national liberation movements such as SWAPO [South West African Peoples Organization], such as ANC [African National Congress], and, of course, the PLO.

We disagree with funding such operations.

Mr. DYMALLY. If we are so unhappy with UNESCO's conduct, why is it we only voted no twice at the meeting last fall to two issues, one very insignificant, the location in Sofia. I would rather have it in the 31st district, but fine. And the other is on the budget.

They came within \$10 million of the U.S. no-growth budget. We don't have a no-growth budget here. The budget increased over the last 3½ years despite all of the cuts, but even with that unrealistic approach we came closer.

So, just two no votes last fall and 6 months later we withdraw. What was so bad about UNESCO or so good that we only voted twice during last fall's deliberations?

Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Dymally, what is wrong with UNESCO——

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Newell, are you a lawyer?

Mr. NEWELL. No; I am not.

Mr. DYMALLY. If you ever get in trouble, I want you to defend me, I tell you. I mean you are very good. I hope you never come to the 31st district and run against me. You are very good. You never answer the question.

Mr. NEWELL. What is the question again, Mr. Dymally?

Mr. DYMALLY. That is the problem. Because you never answer, I forget now what I am asking, because I get confused with your answers. Your answers throw me off because they are not directed to the question anyone asks. You know, you do a very, very good number on not answering the questions. But I want to ask the tough questions because of my great respect for Mr. Derwinski and my embarrassment that he is even sitting out here.

You said there was no division in the White House or State Department. Let me read some of this and see if you consider this strong anti-UNESCO language. The President wishes us to continue to expend every effort to effect meaningful changes over the next year to eliminate the suppression of minority views and political diversions and restore fiscal integrity in pursuing the effort. He wishes you to consider significant upgrading of our representation in UNESCO and appointment of a panel consisting of senior representatives of the academic community, the media and the corporate world to advise us over the next year.

He is prepared to review the decision to withdraw, should concrete changes materialize. Do you consider that negative language? Do you know where that letter came from?

Mr. NEWELL. I consider that very constructive language.

Mr. DYMALLY. Where do you think the letter came from?

Mr. NEWELL. It came from Robert McFarlane for the President.

Mr. DYMALLY. Do you consider that negative?

Mr. NEWELL. No, very positive.

Mr. DYMALLY. But you are not saying that. Mr. McFarlane is saying, if I am privileged to read between the lines as you answer out of the lines, he is saying, in effect, "Look, let's look at this thing." In other words, he is not taking a hard line position that you are taking. I mean this is a very conciliatory memo in my judgment.

This is not a foot in concrete situation such as you have indicated.

Mr. NEWELL. Perhaps Mr. Dymally could read further.

Mr. DYMALLY. Sure, it gets stronger. I don't want to read anymore. I mean I don't want to kill your case. It gets stronger.

Mr. NEWELL. Where the indication is that there is basic agreement, that change probably will occur. If I could further answer—

Mr. DYMALLY. In addition, recognizing the original worthwhile goals of UNESCO, he requests we continue to pursue international cooperation in education, science, culture, and communications.

Mr. NEWELL. That's right, Mr. Dymally. Reading between the lines that means alternative mechanisms.

Mr. DERWINSKI. That is not inconsistent with what Mr. Solomon—I mean I don't want to bring you and Mr. Solomon together.

Mr. DYMALLY. We are good friends.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Unusual combination.

Mr. SOLOMON. He and I sponsored a bill together several weeks ago. What are you talking about?

Mr. DERWINSKI. It must be a lulu.

Mr. DYMALLY. Let's proceed to another point I want to make. The difference with withdrawal from ILO and UNESCO is this: In a number of U.S. organizations, people are opposed to the policy of ILO. In this case a number of U.S. people are in support of UNESCO.

The decision came to withdraw from ILO from organizations. This one came from the State Department. So there is a difference. It is not fair to compare withdrawal from ILO with withdrawal from UNESCO because in ILO there were people coming in that say "Let's get out."

We have people coming here saying let's stay in. So there is a difference and the comparison is not a fair one. Let's talk to my friend, Mr. Derwinski, for a little bit.

The decision to leave UNESCO is a very blunt one. The national commission has recommended staying in; 13 agencies have recommended staying in. How then do you justify the decision of December?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I think Mr. Newell made it clear earlier, this was a judgment reached after very serious study in his bureau at the Department, reviewed and approved by Mr. Eagleburger, the Under Secretary. And then again reviewed and approved by the President after having been transmitted to him by the Secretary of State as the recommendation of the Department.

I think Mr. Newell made it clear that the opinions were received, but the judgment they reached and in turn was sustained, if I may use the term, above him in the hierarchy, sustained the conclusion that this will be our best course of action at this time.

Mr. DYMALLY. All right. Mr. Newell stated that over the last 2 years or so we have strengthened our positions with international organizations. How do you then account for the fact we refused to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty, we temporarily withdrew from International Atomic Energy Agency. We have cut back our funds to World Bank. We refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court on the mining of Nicaragua's Harbor.

Are you suggesting that strengthens our position in world organization?

Mr. NEWELL. If we are to take these isolated cases we must add others where we have strengthened them. Law of the sea, several nations have not——

Mr. DYMALLY. Let's take it in context. You did not say we strengthened some. Who said that? I would not have brought this up.

Mr. NEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Dymally. We have strengthened, we believe, our participation——

Mr. DYMALLY. In some organizations. If you say that, I will withdraw my questions.

Mr. NEWELL. We would certainly agree that we have strengthened our participation in the majority of the international organizations.

Mr. DYMALLY. Fine. Very good. I have no arguments with you. But that is not what you said. That is the frustration that some of the members here are having, that you are not answering questions directly.

Let's take another question. What have we done since you came to the conclusion that we ought to get out, to strengthen our position to present our issues, to rally our friends in the Western World, to stop abuses as we see in the controversy surrounding the press? What have we done?

Mr. NEWELL. In terms of UNESCO?

Mr. DYMALLY. Yes.

Mr. NEWELL. We have increased our staff in Paris to follow these issues. We have increased our staff in the bureau in the UNESCO office. We have put those arrangements under a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. We have recently appointed a panel of

15 eminent Americans in the sectors of science, cultural education, communications, to monitor UNESCO's activities over the course of the next calendar year.

We have met on two or three occasions directly with the Director General. We have fully participated in the Maurich group and are fully participating in the Executive Board May and September sessions. We are doing all we think we can do to see if there cannot be reforms in UNESCO during this calendar year.

Mr. DYMALLY. One of the big critics is the former representative of Australia who has been rescued by the Heritage Foundation with a very large stipend. Is Australia supporting UNESCO now?

Mr. NEWELL. What do you mean, are they members?

Mr. DYMALLY. No; have they submitted any statement in support of UNESCO?

Mr. NEWELL. I don't know whether they have given a statement in support of, but I do know they are part of the western group that is demanding reforms in UNESCO.

Mr. DYMALLY. That was not the question.

Mr. NEWELL. I don't know, Mr. Dymally, whether they have submitted a letter supporting UNESCO. It would seem to me if they have joined the western group, Maurich group, and attached their name to that paper, that they are probably not supporting UNESCO in terms of continuing its behavior.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit for the record a statement from the Australian National Commission for UNESCO.

Mr. MICA. Without objection.

[The information follows:]



AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

Mr A M'Bow
 Director-General
 Unesco
 7 place de Fontenoy
 75700 Paris
 FRANCE

CAB N° 43343
Date 29.3.84 (P.S.)

CAB
 EP
 P.S.
 CAB(E)

21 MAR 1984

Dear Mr M'Bow

At its meeting on 15 and 16 March 1984 the Australian National Commission for Unesco issued a resolution and media statement on the subject of the US withdrawal from Unesco. A copy of each is attached for your information.

Yours sincerely

E L FISHER
 SECRETARY

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 P O Box 826
 Woden, A C T 2606

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 6th Floor, MLC Tower,

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AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

The Australian National Commission for Unesco

Believing that Unesco's mission today is even more important than when it was formed

Noting the intention of the United States of America to withdraw from Unesco from 31 December 1984

Further Noting that the United States action has been taken because of its stated concern at some of the administrative, political and program activities of Unesco

Acknowledging that, along with its strong support of the United Nations system, Australia has expressed a number of concerns about the functioning of the UN system

Further acknowledging that Australia has expressed interest in improving some of the programs and working methods of Unesco

Stressing the great value of United States membership of Unesco and the essential principle of universality of membership of the Organisation

Urges the Australian Government to take an active part in consultations with all Member States of Unesco, and cooperative activities with such Member States, designed to bring about changes in the Organisation which will lead to a more efficient Organisation and one to which the United States will wish to belong in the future

Expresses the support of the Australian National Commission for Unesco and its members in the design, initiation and implementation of initiatives which might be taken to bring about improvements in Unesco.



media release

The Australian National Commission for Unesco today issued the following statement after its meeting in Canberra

The Commission regrets that at this critical time in the search for world peace the United States should announce its intention to withdraw from Unesco.

Unesco provides the only continuing international forum for the discussion of many world issues.

We urge the Australian Government to do everything it can to persuade the United States to reverse its present stated intention.

For the United States to maintain a position of intellectual isolation would be a world tragedy.

The United States played a significant role in Unesco since the organisation's formation in 1945. Its scientists, educators, artists, communications specialists and academicians have contributed much to its programs since then.

The Commission is concerned at the way in which criticism of Unesco has become personalised. Unfortunately, critics are too willing to emphasise failings while ignoring significant achievements by Unesco and its Director-General, Mr Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, in international scientific programs, cultural restoration projects and programs delivering basic education and literacy skills.

Mr M'Bow deserves commendation for his part in initiating the present planning and programming techniques of Unesco. These were praised by the Comptroller-General of the United States in his report to Congress in 1979.

Mr M'Bow's efforts to make the organisation's program delivery more effective through decentralisation have special significance for Australia in view of our wish

to be recognised as a full member of Unesco's Asia and Pacific Region.

The Commission strongly endorses the comments of our Ambassador to Unesco, the Hon E G Whitlam, that the organisation's budget is small compared with the tasks its members wish to be carried out.

The United States' own contribution of \$43 million involves a reduction in money terms (because of international currency fluctuation) compared to the amount for the previous year. This stands beside a reported White House proposal to increase defence spending by more than 10 per cent.

The people of the United States have a great contribution to make to the work of Unesco. We join other National Commissions in hoping that it continues.

The Commission also notes that there have been many criticisms of the collective decision of Member States authorizing Unesco to extend its work in the general field of communication, and that this has been given as one reason for the United States' withdrawal.

Most of these criticisms have come from the print media in a few Member States with well established international media outlets and communication technologies.

However, Unesco's program of work in this area was approved without dissent at the 22nd General Conference in 1983.

The fears of the established western media have not been realised and the contribution the program is making to a more balanced flow of information has been recognised internationally.

CANBERRA 15 March 1984

Mr. DYMALLY. I am frustrated in my dialog with Mr. Newell, I shall conclude by stating that there has been an allegation that the Soviets have greater influence than we do. Are you suggesting that the 83 representatives that the United States has on UNESCO's staff are less influential than the 55 Soviets?

Mr. NEWELL. Influential in terms of UNESCO's work, or influential in terms of responding to Government instructions? I don't understand the question.

Mr. DYMALLY. We have a large number of professionals within UNESCO and it has been suggested that the Soviets have too many staff people and have too much influence in the decisionmaking process.

My question to you is that, is our 83 contingent force there less effective than the Soviets? Are you suggesting Americans are not effective in the United Nations considering our large numbers?

Mr. NEWELL. The Americans, Mr. Dymally, are there to do UNESCO work, not to do U.S. Government work. We are mixing, I think, apples and oranges.

Mr. DYMALLY. Not at all. Are you suggesting the Americans there would subvert America's interests for Soviet interests and wouldn't have a sense of loyalty to the United States even though they work for UNESCO?

Mr. NEWELL. I guess we would have to ask them.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time. I am not a member of either of these subcommittees. I appreciate your giving me this generous amount of time to ask these questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our former colleague, Mr. Derwinski, back before the committee again. We certainly miss him up here in the back row. We certainly welcome the views of Mr. Newell before us on this very important issue.

Mr. Newell, I believe there are many of us who agree that there are reforms certainly needed in UNESCO and that probably our initiative in stating that we were going to withdraw helped to bring about a change in attitude and hopefully will bring about some needed reforms.

Have you seen any progress at all that you would consider worthy of consideration since the letter went to the UNESCO indicating our position?

Mr. NEWELL. We have seen none, Mr. Gilman. In fact we have seen continued obstruction by UNESCO since the decision.

Mr. GILMAN. There has been nothing constructive then in your opinion?

Mr. NEWELL. Nothing that I am aware of.

Mr. GILMAN. You said you were going to be doing everything possible to see if there can be some reforms undertaken this year. Then do I take that to mean if there are some worthwhile reforms, that we will change our position and decide to stay in?

Mr. NEWELL. If there are significant procedural and structural changes, we would then request that the President review his decision.

Mr. GILMAN. Have you set up some criteria for those changes you would like to see accomplished?

Mr. NEWELL. We are using as our touchstone the Maurich paper which is supported by 24 Western governments.

Mr. GILMAN. You indicated that you had made your decision after consultation with a number of agencies and number of groups. Did you also consult with your U.S. delegation that went to the last general conference?

Mr. NEWELL. Oh, very, very closely, yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. You consulted with Mr. Hennelly?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir, we did.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you consult with him following the completion of the conference?

Mr. NEWELL. On three or four occasions.

Mr. GILMAN. You were briefed with regard to the conference?

Mr. NEWELL. Thoroughly and I participated in the conference myself.

Mr. MICA. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield.

Mr. MICA. Would you describe those as give-and-take sessions?

Mr. NEWELL. One was a ham and egg breakfast in his suite. We met for breakfast to talk out the conference. He indicated to me that he would support whatever the administration decided.

Mr. MICA. I won't use the gentleman's time, but we will proceed. We have had different interpretations of those meetings. We have checked them out as closely as we can.

Mr. NEWELL. Very good.

Mr. GILMAN. Does Mr. Hennelly agree with your position that we should withdraw?

Mr. NEWELL. He does according to his public record here last week.

Mr. GILMAN. I note that there was an administration memorandum urging a clear action plan with certain milestones regarding monitoring the progress of UNESCO and that there was urging that the plan be adopted and submitted by March 9, 1984.

Was such a plan adopted and provided?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes; it was and it has been forwarded to the White House. It was a little later than March 9.

Mr. GILMAN. Would we be able to obtain a copy of the plan?

Mr. NEWELL. I would have to check with the Department.

Mr. GILMAN. If it is possible to supply a copy to the committee, Mr. Chairman, I ask such a copy be made available to the committee and made a part of the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, we would appreciate your replying as quickly as possible.

[The subsequently submitted information follows:]

The Department is proceeding with a two-track approach which addresses the preservation of U.S. interests when we leave UNESCO, but allows for, and indeed encourages, reform in UNESCO of the kind which might induce us to reverse our decision.

Alternatives.—We are setting up domestic groups in each of UNESCO's sectors to advise us on which alternatives to UNESCO's current activities would be most in our interest to fund. We have met so far with some 16 such groups, including the Social Science Research Council, the U.S. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and the American Association of Newspaper Publishers. In the science sector, we are seeking funds for a National Academy of Sciences study coordinating the views of various science institutions. We are shooting for reports from these groups by July 31, which we will analyze and hone into budget proposals for FY 1986. We

are also considering a supplemental request for FY 1985, in order not to leave the first three quarters of CY 1985 unfunded. We are counting on strong White House support for these requests, which will allow our continued participation in international cooperation in UNESCO's fields.

UNESCO Reform.—We are also working actively for UNESCO's reform both via consultations with member states and, more pointedly, in the 24-member Western group in Paris. That group has already submitted a paper describing problem areas to UNESCO's Director General, on March 14, and has now split into subgroups to treat specific problems like human rights, peace and disarmament, and other contentious issues.

Although we have consistently refused to state explicit conditions for a reversal of our decision to leave, the Western group's conclusions and the interest surrounding the Western effort are generating much discussion, and the beginnings of agreement, on what can and should be done in UNESCO. We believe that tactically it would be an unfortunate mistake to indicate—for example by publicizing a list of conditions—that we might reconsider our decision. This could well induce in UNESCO's leadership a sense of complacency and thus remove or attenuate the very strong incentive now present to accept deep-seated change of the kind we believe necessary.

Examples of such change would be procedural curbs on discussion of extraneous political issues, an end to majority voting on sensitive issues like the budget, and acceptance of zero net program growth. We believe that, with two Executive Board sessions, other important intergovernmental meetings, the possibility of an extraordinary General Conference, and numerous other generators and indicators of change, we will know in 1984 whether or not the will to effect real reform exists.

The UNESCO Monitoring Panel, announced March 23, will help in the task of assessing the significance of any reform which occurs. The Panel held its first formal meeting May 3, and has already decided to follow closely the activities of the Western working group and its sub-groups as a way of gauging progress. Panel members will also attend various UNESCO meetings; e.g., the semi-annual meetings of the UNESCO Executive Board in May and September/October, in order to observe UNESCO operations firsthand. The Panel will report to Secretary Shultz late in the year on the degree to which it believes UNESCO has shown itself to be engaged in significant structural and programmatic change of the kind we have been urging.

Mr. GILMAN. It was also urged by Mr. McFarlane and I am paraphrasing what he had to say, that he felt there should be significant upgrading of our UNESCO representation and urged that a panel be appointed of senior representatives; some from the academic community, some from the media and corporate world, to advise with regard to UNESCO over the year.

Has that been accomplished?

Mr. NEWELL. That has been accomplished, yes, in Paris, Washington, and the panel has been established.

Mr. GILMAN. What do you call that panel?

Mr. NEWELL. UNESCO Monitoring Panel.

Mr. GILMAN. Who is on the panel?

Mr. NEWELL. Chairman James Holderman of the U.S. Commission is chairman of that panel as well; we have Marta Istomin, Artistic Director of the Kennedy Center; George Haley, who is an attorney here in town who participated in the conference. We have Wendy Borchardt who has served on several UNESCO conferences.

We have James Michener, the writer, who has participated in UNESCO conferences. I could furnish the rest.

[The following information was submitted in writing:]

MEMBERS OF THE MONITORING PANEL

CHAIR

Dr. James B. Holderman, Chairman of the United States National Commission for UNESCO; President of the University of South Carolina.

VICE CHAIR

Mrs. Wendy Borchardt, former Deputy Under Secretary for Education; member, United States delegation to the 21st and 22nd General Conferences of UNESCO.

MEMBERS

Harold W. Andersen, President, Omaha World Herald; Chair, World Press Freedom Committee; past President, International Federation of Newspaper Publishers.

William R. Bricker, National Director of the Boys Clubs of America; member of the President's National Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives.

W. Glenn Campbell, Ph. D., Director, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.

Linda Chavez, Staff Director, United States Commission on Civil Rights.

George Haley, attorney; member, United States Delegation to the 22nd General Conference of UNESCO.

Marta Istomin, Artistic Director, John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.

Leonard Marks, attorney; former Director of the United States Information Agency.

Ursula Meese, Director, William Moss Institute; member, United States Delegation to the 22nd General Conference of UNESCO.

James Michener, author.

Michael Novak, author and columnist; former United States Representative to the UN Human Rights Commission; member of the Board of International Broadcasting; resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Arthur Ross, economist; member, United States Delegation to the 22nd General Conference of UNESCO.

Frederick Seitz, President Emeritus, Rockefeller University; past President, National Academy of Sciences.

Jacques Torczyner, Director, Theodore Herzl Institute for Adult Education; member, United States National Commission for UNESCO.

Mr. GILMAN. Do they submit periodic reports? What sort of consultation do you have with the monitoring panel?

Mr. NEWELL. The monitoring panel is under the direction of the chairman. They report to him, and he reports to the Secretary of State on the ongoing activity of UNESCO.

They will be participating and observing, at this upcoming May executive board meeting. They will also be participating in the September meeting.

They will each have different assignments in terms of an educational sector, budget management, human rights, women's issues, et cetera.

Mr. GILMAN. What have you done about upgrading it? Can you tell us?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes; in Washington we have hired three senior consultants. Two of them were senior Foreign Service officers who are familiar with UNESCO, one having spent 2½ years there. One is dealing with alternative mechanisms and that area of concern.

Another is the executive secretary of the UNESCO monitoring panel. A third is responsible for special issues such as communication.

We have also added staff support in the UNESCO area here in the bureau. In Paris we are adding a special assistant to Ambassador Gerard.

We have continued having support from an extension of individuals from the Department of Education. We are also adding two other individuals in Paris on a not totally full-time basis, but a budget officer and political officer.

Mr. GILMAN. There was a recommendation made by our staff that had reviewed the problems, and there was also some testimony indicating that a full time budget officer would be extremely important since one of the major concerns was the budget, and since it was a very complicated budget, and required considerable expertise. You say you are putting on a part-time budget officer. Does that fulfill the need here?

Mr. NEWELL. We certainly believe it does, Mr. Gilman. We are working, of course, with the budget office for international organizations and will participate on all budget activity that we have access to in UNESCO.

Mr. GILMAN. This budget officer you are appointing, what sort of background does he have?

Mr. NEWELL. The individual who is in charge of that activity right now has had experience and is a civil servant within the Department of State.

Mr. GILMAN. What sort of budget experience?

Mr. NEWELL. She is a budget officer and has been for I would guess 15 years.

Mr. GILMAN. With what department?

Mr. NEWELL. Well, with the Department of State.

Mr. GILMAN. Will she also be performing political officer responsibilities?

Mr. NEWELL. She will not. Purely budgetary.

Mr. GILMAN. But that will only be on a part-time basis?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, it will.

Mr. GILMAN. What sort of part-time arrangement?

Mr. NEWELL. Whenever UNESCO is working on the budget we expect her to fully participate in the executive board meetings. We would anticipate that on an average, she would spend probably 2 weeks a month there.

Mr. MICA. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield to the chairman.

Mr. MICA. Will anyone be working on the budget before UNESCO starts their meetings?

Mr. NEWELL. Surely; Mr. Chairman, we work on all international organization budgets.

Mr. MICA. But a different person will be dealing with it on a daily basis?

Mr. NEWELL. It will be the same individual who has been dealing with it all along although she will definitely give her major attentions to UNESCO now and the rest of her budget portfolio will have to be assigned to others.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Newell, has there been any review of the proposed budget for the coming fiscal year, for the coming biannual conference?

Mr. NEWELL. That is just getting underway for 1986-87. I have seen no figures on it.

Mr. GILMAN. Now again, I ask you, in all of your reviews with the prior delegation, national commission, monitoring people, you have found nothing constructive by way of change or reform?

Mr. NEWELL. We have not. I have not spoken with any of those who have appeared here who recognize any change that has occurred.

Mr. GILMAN. I understand Mr. M'Bow agreed to reduce the budget by \$10 million. Is that so? The last budgetary process?

Mr. NEWELL. Are we speaking of the general conference?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes; that was the general conference.

Mr. NEWELL. There was a reduction, but the reduction from the general conference was purely because a strong dollar, had nothing to do——

Mr. GILMAN. Nothing to do with the recommendation by our delegation that he——

Mr. NEWELL. We think not. This was the caution we gave Mr. Hennelly before he went to Paris, that he may be working with a budget that is not a clear budget, an accurate reading of what was really happening.

They did cut the budget significantly initially going into the conference but it was purely because of currency rate fluctuations.

Mr. GILMAN. It had nothing to do with our recommendations.

Mr. NEWELL. It did not. You may be talking about a budget agreement which the Nordics put forward to reduce the program growth from 9.8 percent down to 3.5, I believe it was.

Mr. GILMAN. Was that adopted?

Mr. NEWELL. It was agreed to, yes. The actual figure was 5.8 percent when it was concluded.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you consider that constructive?

Mr. NEWELL. It is in the right direction, but the zero net program growth starts from zero, not an increase of 14 or 15 percent, and working downward.

Mr. GILMAN. Wasn't that a reduction from about a 10-percent figure?

Mr. NEWELL. It was a reduction from a proposal, but it was not a reduction from the budget. The budget stood at about \$362 million. So the budget increased to 374.

Mr. GILMAN. You don't consider that a step in the right direction?

Mr. NEWELL. It is a step in the right direction. It was not sufficient.

Mr. GILMAN. Were there any other steps in the right direction that you observed?

Mr. NEWELL. As I indicated, earlier, we were pleased initially with the general conference. I participated and came away feeling pretty good. When we got back and analyzed what actually occurred in the conference, program by program, and paragraph by paragraph, there were some parts of that that were more offensive than before the conference.

So we concluded that the change we saw in UNESCO was behavioral. It certainly didn't affect the programmatic side. We look again and we have talked about this already, continued excessive spending and for armed national liberation movements. Continued work in the communications issue. In fact, I will underscore here again that the new world information order is not dead.

We have not minimized damage there. The Director-General himself stated in New Delhi, December 14, that NWIO is alive and

well and moving forward. The assistant director general of communications stated at the conclusion of the general conference that it is going forward.

So we see that we have made no progress. We have minimized damage but we have made no progress in the communications sector.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Newell, that analysis you made following the conference when you returned back home, was that made in consultation with the delegation?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, it was.

Mr. GILMAN. They had an opportunity to have input into your review and analysis?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir, and out of 22, I believe 18 responded which we are providing for the record.

Mr. GILMAN. Responded to what?

Mr. NEWELL. Eighteen responded to the request of their analysis of the UNESCO conference and their various sectors.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you have a meeting at all with the U.S. delegation where you presented to them your analysis and they had an opportunity for input?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes, we did. It was in mid-December.

Mr. GILMAN. Where was that meeting held?

Mr. NEWELL. The State Department.

Mr. GILMAN. With the U.S. delegation to the conference?

Mr. NEWELL. Most of them who were able to attend. There were probably 15 or 16 of the 22.

Mr. GILMAN. I ask you once again, then, if there are some steps forward, something substantial, are you going to be in a position then to make a recommendation that we either extend the period of time for consideration with regard to our withdrawal, or to withdraw our withdrawal letter?

Mr. NEWELL. If there is change, we will recommend the President review his decision.

Mr. GILMAN. And the criteria for that change is based on the report?

Mr. NEWELL. That is where we are taking our general thrust, yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Newell.

The Chair has come to this decision. There are still a number of additional questions. With all due respect, Mr. Newell, I need to review some of the answers. So I have asked staff to get a transcript as quickly as possible, and we would like to schedule another hearing and have you come back. We will go over some of these answers. There are so many questions.¹

You have been most patient. You have spent the time that was required. I don't want to cut this short, but we do have other witnesses.

Let me just say congratulations. I understand today that you became the father of a fourth child. I have four too, so you better get home.

¹ Another hearing has been tentatively scheduled for mid-July.

We will dismiss you for now, and we would like to call the other witnesses. Thank you very much.

Mr. NEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Let me tell you how the Chair intends to proceed. We would like to call all of the remaining witnesses, Dr. James Holderman, Mr. Samuel DePalma, Mr. Edward C. Luck, and Ms. Ruth Robbins.

What we will do is ask each to present 5 minutes of testimony, a summary. Their complete testimony will be inserted in the record. I understand several have come from fairly long distances.

I will use the little timer there. At this point I will have to enforce the timer. We will have each come up for 5 minutes and then we may either have to ask you to return, if necessary, or ask your indulgence in letting committee members submit questions in writing.

Could we ask you to come forward? I think you understand the members were very anxious to ask questions and get information from the Department of State.

It in no way reflects on our desire to hear your testimony but time constraints often do this to us and we apologize. I would ask Dr. Holderman if you will proceed.

I am going to enforce the light warning because I have a long-standing appointment.

Dr. Holderman.

STATEMENT OF JAMES HOLDERMAN, CHAIR, U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNESCO, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. HOLDERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Again please accept our apologies.

Mr. HOLDERMAN. No apologies necessary.

As one who deals every day with faculty committees, I understand perfectly well how delays can occur.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me first express that I am grateful for the opportunity to put on the record the position of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. I am speaking as National Commission Chairman, not chairman of the monitoring panel because I do have two hats.

That monitoring panel has not yet met. Tomorrow is its first meeting. We will be glad to meet with the committee later, Mr. Chairman, should they desire to do so on that relationship.

The National Commission, as you know, was created by the Congress in 1946. It has been concerned for some time about deterioration of relationships with UNESCO. The Commission also recognized for some time weaknesses in United States participation in UNESCO which have contributed to the poor return on our investment in that organization.

Weaknesses we believe include low level of public interest in UNESCO, high level of policy inattention, and these trends are apparent for a decade or more.

The National Commission has conducted several assessments, Mr. Chairman, one of which you referred to earlier this afternoon, the critical assessment.

A special meeting of the commission at the University of South Carolina in June 1982 produced a report, findings of which are published in the report, "Critical Assessment of U.S. Relation with UNESCO."¹

In short, the commission's conclusions were that the United States should stay in UNESCO but increase the level of our participation to ensure better results.

Second, the Department of State asked us in the summer of 1983 to contribute to their own review. We contacted all commissioners and some 40 NGO's at their headquarters. The replies we received formed the basis of our report to the State Department.

In short, all 20 respondents pointed to weaknesses in UNESCO and problems with our participation, but the bottom line for all 20 was that we should stay in UNESCO.

Finally, we debated the issue thoroughly at our annual meeting last December. Some commissioners argued that UNESCO was beyond redemption, its programs were too diffuse and unfocused to be effective, and it was fundamentally hostile to U.S. interests.

The majority argued, however, that the basic program remained worthwhile, that it would be harder to defend our interests from outside UNESCO than within, and finally, UNESCO could be turned around if we made the effort.

The commission adopted a resolution by an overwhelming majority to the effect that there were, indeed, problems in UNESCO, but it was in the national interest to remain a member. The administration came to a different decision.

The decision to give notice to leave at the end of the year provides us with an opportunity; first, we are already seeing signs of international pressure building up for UNESCO to improve its management and the effectiveness of its programs.

The American decision to leave should increase the importance of UNESCO responding to these international demands for improvement.

Second, the decision to give notice to quit has triggered a debate in this country about membership of UNESCO and the whole question of international cooperation in education, science, culture, and communications.

We welcome this debate. We have urged just such a discussion for some time. Looking to the future, we do not know at this point whether or not UNESCO will reform itself sufficiently to enable the United States to decide to stay in.

Whether or not we stay in UNESCO, we must make some basic decisions in this country about international cooperation in UNESCO's sectors.

We, therefore, hope, Mr. Chairman, that these hearings will provide an opportunity for some careful thought about future policy in these fields. One of the nobler ideas of UNESCO was the effort to try to bring together directly the international fields of interest in education, science, culture, and communications.

Congress recognized this objective in creating the commission. There is still a need to involve the private sector directly in inter-

¹ Copies of the "Critical Assessment" are available from the office of the University of South Carolina, 1750 K St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

national cooperation in these fields. There must be a suitable mechanism to manage American investment in the areas of UNESCO's concern.

I doubt if the Department of State or any other Federal agency is quite geared to the task. I would urge the Congress, therefore, to give serious attention to the need to restore to the National Commission or some similar body, a substantive role in managing our international cooperation in these fields whether we stay in UNESCO or not.

An institution like the National Commission must be professionally staffed and adequately funded to reach out to the professional and intellectual communities in the United States and act as an effective liaison between them and our colleagues overseas, as well as with the Government.

[Mr. Holderman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES B. HOLDERMAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, AND CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

Mr. Chairman,

I am grateful for this opportunity to put on record the position of the United States National Commission for UNESCO, of which I have been Chairman since January, 1982.

I must emphasize that I am speaking today in my capacity as Chairman of the National Commission, and not as Chairman of the entirely separate Monitoring Panel on UNESCO, which is being appointed by the Secretary of State to monitor UNESCO's performance for the remainder of this year and to advise him whether or not there are changes substantial enough to justify a review of the President's decision to leave UNESCO. The Monitoring Panel has not so far met in formal session, and it would clearly be wrong at this stage to make any public comment in that capacity, before the Panel has had a chance to consider any evidence or even to organize itself for business.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the National Commission for UNESCO was established in 1946 by Congress (P.L. 565) in fulfillment of Article VII of the UNESCO constitution, to provide liaison between UNESCO and the major United States organizations interested in education, science, culture and communications. Two thirds of the members are non-governmental organizations, and one third are appointed by the Administration from federal, state and local governments as well as members at large. The 97 members of the present Commission represent a broad spectrum of major organizations in this country including the National Academy of Sciences, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Freedom House, and many, many more.

The role of the Commission is to:

- 1) advise the State Department and other federal agencies on UNESCO policy and programs;
- 2) inform the interested American communities about UNESCO programs and serve as a liaison between American academic, professional and other private sector interests and their international colleagues in the areas of UNESCO competence; and

- 3) provide briefing and delegates for general and specialized UNESCO conferences.

Given those important functions, the Commission is an authoritative source of advice and experience on UNESCO affairs. Many of the member organizations have had long-standing associations with UNESCO programs and therefore naturally have tended to develop a deeper understanding of UNESCO -- both its strengths and its weaknesses -- than most. Over the years, moreover, the Commission has undertaken a number of conferences and other projects on specialized and general UNESCO topics as well as providing participants for a wide range of UNESCO international projects. As a body, therefore, the Commission is well placed to give advice on a matter which all agree is complex, namely the future relations of this country with UNESCO. We therefore greatly appreciate and fully support the decision of your two Subcommittees to hold these joint hearings.

For some time the Commission has been concerned about the steady deterioration of American relations with UNESCO. As a result, we have conducted several assessments of the situation over the past two years.

In June, 1982, a two-day special conference of the Commission was held at the University of South Carolina to undertake the first overall assessment of United States participation in UNESCO in 20 years. The Commission arranged for the preparation of a well-researched background paper and invited over 150 participants representing the academic, business and governmental communities to take part in the meeting. Ninety-three individuals participated. The findings were published in a Department of State publication, #9297, in October, 1982, under the title "A Critical Assessment of United States Participation in UNESCO". The summary report of the conference is attached as an annex to this statement. In short, the major work of that conference was conducted in five separate working groups. On the question of the future of United States participation in UNESCO, the groups were unanimous in recommending that the United States should continue to remain a member of UNESCO and that the effectiveness of United States participation in the work of the organization should be increased.

The following year, the Department of State asked the Commission to contribute to the Administration's own review of relations with UNESCO which, as you know, was launched in June, 1983. We then contacted all 97 members of the Commission as well as the headquarters of some 40 non-governmental organizations. Replies were received from 20 individuals and

organizations. Most of the replies contained criticisms of UNESCO along the lines of those the Administration has cited, and many also pointed to weaknesses in the handling of United States participation in the organization. All 20 respondents, however, concluded that the United States should stay in UNESCO and fight for reform from within.

These findings were discussed by the Executive Committee, and conveyed in a report to the Assistant Secretary, the text of which was discussed and agreed by that Committee.

After receiving our report, Assistant Secretary Newell called me to ask if there weren't some negatives that we could add to our report, to give it what he termed "credibility". We accordingly gave him the full text of all the replies, so that he could see the nature of the criticisms that had been raised as well as the context in which all had arrived at their bottom line. We shall be glad to make available our report and the full text of all the documents on which it was based for the Subcommittees' use.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, at the Commission's annual meeting on December 16 in Washington, the question of United States membership in UNESCO was debated fully and openly. Some members of the Commission argued that UNESCO had become fundamentally hostile to United States interests and that we should therefore leave. Others argued that the management and budget problems of UNESCO were irremediable, and that UNESCO's programs were too diffuse and unfocused to be effective.

The great majority of Commission members, however, argued that, in spite of UNESCO's undeniable problems, the basic work of the organization remained valuable and that if the United States were to exercise strong leadership and professional commitment there was every reason to expect that UNESCO could be reformed. The fundamental objectives of UNESCO, they argued, remained valid, and much of its valuable work towards eradicating literacy, promoting scientific cooperation, and preserving the world's cultural heritage, was overlooked or obscured by the noisy debates and unbalanced press coverage of the relatively small proportion of UNESCO's program and budget devoted to controversial projects. It was further argued that it would be a tragedy if the United States, with its overwhelming leadership in intellectual, cultural and scientific resources were to withdraw from the major world organization devoted to international cooperation in these fields, at least without an all-out earnest effort to reform UNESCO, and that it would be harder to defend critical United States interests from outside UNESCO than from within, when they came under attack.

The Commission accordingly drew up a resolution describing the problems in our relations with UNESCO, but concluding that it was in the national interest to stay in the organization and fight for reform and defend United States interests from within. The text of this resolution is attached to this statement as annex #2. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 41-8. Subsequently, the Commissioners who were not present for the vote were polled, and the final vote remained overwhelmingly in favor of the resolution, 57-17.

Interestingly, we have since learned that a parallel debate on strikingly similar lines took place at the same time in Britain. As the British Foreign Office Minister Baroness Young described it:

"Mr. Timothy Raison, the Minister for Overseas Development, who is responsible for United Kingdom relations with UNESCO, held a meeting last December with the United Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO (an advisory body consisting of some 70 people eminent in the fields covered by UNESCO) to consider the outcome of the Conference and to seek the views of members of UNESCO.

"The meeting was frank and revealing. A few members argued for United Kingdom withdrawal, but the clear majority of those who spoke were in favor of our staying in on the grounds that to leave would be to turn our back on an important channel of communication and cooperation with developing countries. Most argued for continuing to fight for improvements from within. The point was made that we had had a fair measure of success over the years, both in defending British interests -- that is, in communication and media issues -- and also in obtaining better value for money. But there was widespread recognition that much remained to be done. There was much trenchant criticism of such issues as the growth in overall resources, budgetary techniques and practices, political aspects of certain programs -- for example, communication and human rights -- staffing, management, effectiveness, and the need for more and better evaluation.

"In the light of all this, Ministers gave careful consideration to the possibility of United Kingdom withdrawal. The balance of argument was a fine one. On the one hand, there were the sums of

money we spend on UNESCO... We recognize the sums of money that we spend on UNESCO, which we feel could be better spent in other ways, and the misuse of UNESCO for political purposes. On the other, there was a natural reluctance to breach the principle of universality, particularly for an organization which, rightly or wrongly, is highly valued by many Developing Countries, and a recognition that most of UNESCO's activities remain in principle worthwhile.

"We eventually decided that the right course for the United Kingdom, at least for the time being, was to stay in UNESCO and fight for reform from within. We indicated this decision to the United States authorities before they decided to withdraw. We fully understand the reasons which led the United States to take its decision."

The British statement highlights the fact that UNESCO is an organization linking a good deal more than national governments. It is, in fact, unique in attempting to bring together directly the professional and intellectual communities involved worldwide in the fields of education, culture, science and communications. This is one of the reasons why the provision for National Commissions in each country was built into the UNESCO constitution -- a unique provision, incidentally, among UN organizations. In the United States, where we pride ourselves on cultural pluralism to the point where the very concept of a ministry of culture is anathema, the private sector should naturally be involved in major decisions relating to UNESCO.

The United States decision to give notice to leave UNESCO at the end of this year offers a two-fold opportunity. First, it provides like-minded countries an opening and leverage to exert international pressure to restore sound management and direction to UNESCO. Second, it is stimulating national discussion, and hopefully some high level policy-making attention, on the issues surrounding our relations with UNESCO and indeed on the future of United States international cooperation in education, science, culture and communications. This is a debate the National Commission welcomes, and has indeed advocated for some time. We hope in particular that careful thought will now be given to the best means of managing our future participation in such programs.

In this connection, it would be desirable for the Congress to consider restoring to the National Commission, or a body very much like it, the more prominent role originally intended for the Commission in the management of our international cooperation in the fields of UNESCO's competence, whether or not we remain in UNESCO. It is essential that the Commission or any successor body should be professionally staffed and adequately funded to perform this role. Only by this means can we hope to effectively manage our international cooperation in the fields of education, science, culture and communications. Important as they are, the strictly foreign policy considerations can only be one part of the picture. A balanced, properly considered policy must involve a pluralistic, multifaceted approach.

If the United States continues to invest \$50 million in international cooperation in education, science, culture and communications -- whether in UNESCO or not -- it is essential to establish the small but effective institutional machinery necessary to manage that investment productively. The Department of State is not geared to the task, nor is any other federal agency. That is why the Congress created the National Commission. A body such as the National Commission, with credibility and outreach capacity to the professional communities, is an essential component of such investment. A major reason for the decline of this country's interest in UNESCO and the consequent decline of our capacity to protect our interests there lies in the fact that the professional backup in the National Commission and the Permanent Delegation in Paris has been gradually eroded under successive administrations, to the point where the National Commission staff was effectively eliminated altogether last year.

At the request of the Department of State, the National Commission has drawn up plans for a successor body, on the basis of a careful study over the past year, and we urge the Congress to give careful consideration to this important aspect of this nation's overall approach to UNESCO affairs. Our report on the future of the National Commission is now in preparation.

Mr. Chairman, we all share a strong desire to re-establish effective international cooperation and development in education, culture, science and communications. It remains to be seen whether UNESCO will be sufficiently responsive to the demands for change which the United States and other countries have declared as the prerequisites for our continued membership. But whether or not we stay in UNESCO, it will remain important for the United States to develop a thoroughly coherent policy towards international cooperation in these fields, and above all, for the Congress to ensure that effective institutional arrangements are put in place to manage our future investment in such programs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Summary Conference Report

The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO's special meeting on the subject of "A Critical Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO" on the campus of the University of South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, was the result of an initiative taken by Commission Chairman Dr. James B. Holderman and approved by the Commission's Executive Committee at its March 1982 meeting. Section 5 of Public Law 565, which established the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, specifically provides that the Executive Committee may call "special conferences of experts and consultants to consider specific matters relating to UNESCO."

In selecting this topic, the Executive Committee took account of two central concerns. First, although the Congress had examined specific aspects of UNESCO and the relationship of the United States to the Organization, such as the communications and media issue, an overall assessment of U.S. participation in UNESCO had not been organized by and for the American public since 1960. And, second, the American professional communities upon whose resources the U.S. Government must draw to participate in UNESCO's work are well placed to render a judgment on this matter.

The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO invited over 150 participants representing the academic, business, and government communities (including the U.S. Congress). Ninety-three individuals participated in the meeting (see Appendix II).

In preparing for the meeting, the Commission considered it necessary to place U.S.-UNESCO relations in an historical context. To do so, the Commission contracted with the International Studies Association for the preparation of a background paper to serve as the principal conference document (see Appendix I). This paper, *The United States and UNESCO: Is the Past Prologue?*, was prepared by Dr. Lawrence Finkelstein, Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, a member of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and a long-time student of UNESCO.

In addition to the paper prepared by Dr. Finkelstein, the conference benefited from the presence of Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Gregory Newell, and U.S. Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Ambassador Jean Gerard, who made a major address on the evening of

June 1. The conference also played host to UNESCO's Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, who addressed conference participants at an evening banquet held on Tuesday, June 2.

The work of the conference was conducted in two plenary sessions and smaller working group sessions.

At the opening plenary session, Dr. Finkelstein presented his paper which was followed by commentary provided by a panel of prominent UNESCO experts. The panel consisted of:

- Dr. Gene Lyons, Professor of Government, Dartmouth College, and a former Commissioner and Director of the UNESCO Division for the International Development of the Social Sciences.
- Dr. Seth Spaulding, Professor of International and Development Education at the University of Pittsburgh and former Director of the UNESCO Division of the Department of Education.
- Mr. Arnold Kramish, a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies, a technology consultant to the Heritage Foundation, and former Science Attache to the U.S. Permanent Delegation to UNESCO.

The participants at the meeting were divided into five working groups that met during the afternoon of June 2 and part of the morning of June 3. Each working group prepared a report which was presented at the final plenary session on June 3.

What follows is a summary of the comments and recommendations that form the working group reports (see Appendix III). It is not meant to be all-inclusive, and specific recommendations in the individual group reports may not be reflected in this summary. Nevertheless, the summary does represent many of the basic themes and recommendations of the working group.

On the basic question of the future of U.S. participation in UNESCO, the groups were unanimous in recommending that the United States not only continue to remain a member of UNESCO but that the effectiveness of U.S. participation in the work of the Organization be increased. In arriving at this conclusion, some of the groups pointed out the tangible benefits of U.S. par-

ticipation in UNESCO, particularly in the fields of education and the natural sciences. These benefits, it was noted, are not only tangible in the form of UNESCO funds spent in the United States for equipment and services, but are political and psychological as well. One group noted that there is a widespread misperception in the United States that the U.S. role in UNESCO is primarily that of benefactor, not beneficiary. A specific recommendation was made that the U.S. National Commission undertake a systematic inventory of present and potential benefits to be derived from active U.S. participation in UNESCO. Such an inventory should emphasize the benefits relevant to the broad constituencies represented on the Commission (e.g., educators, physical scientists, social scientists, cultural interest groups, and communication and information specialists).

Another set of comments arguing for greater U.S. involvement center on the visibility, credibility, and influence the United States could exercise through more active participation. One group noted that the United States has (potentially) more influence than the one country, one vote system might imply, because of its human resources and financial contributions and the appeal of the American way of life. Relevant to this point, several groups noted that the United States has been remiss in not being sufficiently active in initiating program proposals. Taking the initiative to develop program proposals can be instrumental in shaping the character of the Organization and its activities. Moreover, the United States should try to influence the debates within UNESCO because, even if they do not result in legally binding actions, the discussions themselves have an effect on the character of international affairs.

In line with a more active posture, all of the working groups commented on the status of both the U.S. Permanent Delegation to UNESCO in Paris and the composition of the various delegations to UNESCO meetings. In general, the groups were of the view that greater emphasis should be placed on selecting highly qualified individuals to staff the Permanent Delegation and that continuity of this representation needs to be assured. Selection of individuals to the various UNESCO conferences and experts meetings also needs to be made on a timely basis with a view toward sending highly qualified and competent representatives.

Another theme running throughout the group reports is the need for the Department of State to interact more effectively with the private sector and particularly with those communities most concerned with UNESCO and its program activities. Recommendations in this area were of a double-edged variety being directed both toward the U.S. Government and toward the Na-

tional Commission whose members are urged to play a more active role with respect to the nongovernmental organizations and the professional constituencies they represent.

Underlying much of the discussion were several comments and recommendations concerning the role of the National Commission and its relationship to the overall management of U.S.-UNESCO relations.

All of the working groups made reference to the need for greater dissemination of information concerning UNESCO and its programs. Recommendations ranged from reinstitution of a formal Commission newsletter to sending copies of UNESCO's major documents (e.g., the Program and Budget Document—C/5 and the Medium Term Plan—C/4) to all commissioners.

Several working groups noted that the resources of the Commission should be used to develop long-range planning and strategies that would assist the U.S. Government by allowing for early identification of issues and trends and the development of initiatives that would help shape these trends in ways consistent with our long-term interest. Such an approach, it was argued, would enable the Commission to engage in a more systematic manner the nongovernmental organization community and thus provide for expert input and the identification of individuals and organizations that would insure high-level and qualified participation in subsequent UNESCO activities.

The working groups recognized that in order for the National Commission to accomplish these purposes, additional resources, most notably increased staff for the Commission, would be required.

Several working groups noted that in order to change the present situation, consistent, high-level attention on the part of the Department of State would be needed. Also, one group noted that this high-level attention would need to come from a number of government agencies that are involved in UNESCO's work. A specific recommendation dealt with the need for at least one highly qualified program specialist for each of UNESCO's program areas (i.e., education, science, culture, and communications), and for overall program guidance to be vested in the Commission.

A final recommendation that was raised on the floor at the final plenary session dealt with the need for the Commission, as a congressionally mandated organization, to report back to the Congress on the substance of this meeting. The officers of the Commission were requested to seek a hearing before the relevant committees of the Congress to report on the activities of the Commission and to seek congressional support for the lines of action recommended by the participants at the meeting.

Annex #2

Resolution on US-UNESCO relations, passed 41 to 8, at the annual meeting of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, December 16, 1983.

The U. S. National Commission for UNESCO assembled at its 47th session:

Reaffirming its support for the objectives set forth in the Constitution of UNESCO;

Believing also that UNESCO best fulfills its mandate when it helps all nations benefit from advances in education, science, culture, communications and the humanities;

Concerned that the human resources available to UNESCO, both in member state delegations and in the secretariat, have diminished over the past decade;

Convinced that the Organization's effectiveness has been impaired by discordant debates on extraneous political issues and by the proliferation of contentious programs which have contributed to an unreasonable increase in its budget;

Noting that strong American leadership and a certain spirit of accommodation shown by the 22nd General Conference of UNESCO made possible the development of a consensus more consistent with U.S. views on important aspects of several contentious issues, especially in the field of communications;

Considering that, however imperfectly, UNESCO as a world forum does reflect the reality of world conditions and attitudes;

Having conducted its own thorough review of U.S. relations with UNESCO at the request of the Department of State, in the course of which the Commission received the views of a representative cross section of non-governmental organizations; and

Having conveyed the results of the review to the Department of State in a letter from the Chairman dated November 8, 1983;

1. Concludes that continued U.S. membership in UNESCO is in the national interest;
2. Calls for the exercise of positive American leadership in UNESCO affairs in place of the reactive, damage-limiting stance we have so often adopted;
3. Urges the Department of State to develop regularized channels of consultation with the Director General of UNESCO in order to make continued U.S. participation mutually valuable and productive.

Mr. MICA. Thank you very much.

The record should indicate that Dr. Holderman is the Chair of the U.S. National Commission on UNESCO, and the president of the University of South Carolina.

We truly appreciate your understanding.

Next, the Honorable Sam DePalma. Mr. DePalma, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Thank you very much. We also thank you for your understanding. I hope we have your understanding. But we thank you anyhow.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL DePALMA, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. DePALMA. I understand, Mr. Chairman. I have been before committees many times.

I won't go through my statement. You have it before you. I want to mention only two points.

I think that the decision to withdraw from UNESCO, if it were implemented, would constitute what I would consider to be another breakdown in our communications with other governments and people.

And I think this would be deplorable, because at a time when we are raising our voice in international affairs, and becoming much more assertive, we ought to be listening more attentively, too.

Otherwise, we are bound to create misunderstanding and put a serious strain on our international relations.

Mr. MICA. If the witness would stop.

This is beyond the chairman's control.

I am going to have to divide the next 10 minutes between the three remaining witnesses—about 2 or 3 minutes each.

We may just have to ask you to come back and work something out.

I offer this with the committee's deep regrets. But a vote is about to take place on the floor of the House that will go far beyond the time when we could come back.

Could you make a few comments, submit your statement for the record, and we will reschedule?

Mr. DePALMA. I wasn't intending to go on for long. I will be even briefer.

I have tried to suggest in this paper that the concerns that have been expressed about UNESCO are exaggerated. They are not entirely misplaced, but they are exaggerated. And that dealing with them has to be a task for people who are working in the organization, that our withdrawal would only make the very things we deplore worse.

It would leave a clearer field for the development of policies which we don't like.

I have also tried to suggest several measures that could be taken. I believe we ought to insist on the appointment of a committee of the executive board. The executive board of 51 members is entirely too large to undertake the job we see before them now.

They have got to appoint a small committee, and it has got to tackle the kinds of reforms that the Western group has in mind, and the reforms that may come out of the findings of the GAO investigation.

I believe that we must also increase our participation. We have heard about the increased effort made in regard to our participation.

But, Mr. Chairman, at the same time the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, which is supposed to advise the Department and provide input on program policy for UNESCO, has been effectively hobbled, because, as you know, our funds were withdrawn. We appreciate the fact that the Congress has restored an authorization, though I don't know whether an appropriation has been requested.

As matters stand, we have no staff that is responsive to our needs and our demands. The only staff we have, the staff that is in the IO Bureau, is responsible to the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Assistant Secretary.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, one more point.

Let me say that I am not a user or a customer of UNESCO. But I find it strange that people who know the organization, who work with the organization, are finding that their opinions are being devalued because of that fact.

I point out one little fact, and I will conclude. I know of no Government, no Government, which is less directly responsible for the educational, scientific, and cultural activities of its citizens than our Government, although there are many such activities our Federal Government engages in. But less than any other Government I know.

And yet the Government is asserting that the people who work with UNESCO and know UNESCO have no real right to speak on withdrawal. The Government has a right to consider the foreign policy implications.

But I think it is also important to consider the views of those who understand the organization and who benefit and through their benefiting help the foreign policy of the United States. I will stop there.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Again, I apologize.

[Mr. DePalma's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. SAMUEL DEPALMA, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

UNESCO - A Shot Across the United Nations' Bow?

I welcome this opportunity to comment on the Administration's intention to withdraw from UNESCO because it has serious foreign policy implications. I propose to discuss how we arrived at this state of affairs and what it suggests about our attitude toward the United Nations and multilateral cooperation generally. Coming at a time when we have become more assertive in our international dealings, the decision to withdraw from UNESCO is another breakdown in our communications with other governments and peoples. I submit that to raise our voice without also listening more attentively is to invite misunderstanding and to put a serious strain on our international relations.

But let me begin with UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. You have read many denunciations of the Organization during the past few months. Some of the most scathing were written by commentators who displayed an abysmal ignorance of what UNESCO is and how it functions.

From their accounts one would never know that UNESCO provides teacher training and educational materials for elementary schools on up through graduate studies, and for adult literacy programs; that it has established international networks of scientists to monitor environmental and meteorological conditions; that our scientists play a leading role in those activities and value most of them highly; that it sponsors cultural exchanges and facilitates international cooperation in the preservation of the world's cultural heritage; that it issues publications on

human rights, new technologies and the management of natural resources; and that it protects intellectual copyrights and facilitates duty-free imports of educational, cultural and scientific materials.

I could cite many more worthy UNESCO activities which enjoy our support and about which there is little or no controversy. But obviously that is only one part of the UNESCO story. The other, the contentious side of UNESCO, was summarized in a State Department release of December 29. It stated that the Administration's decision to withdraw "is based on our experience that UNESCO:

"Has extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with; has exhibited a hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press; and has demonstrated unrestrained budgetary expansion." I find those charges grossly exaggerated and aimed at the wrong target. They are exaggerated because they deal in part with speeches and proposals which dissipate in the hot air of conference rooms and leave little or no trace on UNESCO's program. Moreover, the indictment is largely misdirected. It is aimed at the Organization as such when our disagreement is mainly with the views expressed at its General Conferences by representatives of many member governments.

The charge of extraneous politicization is a case in point. It appears to recognize that all sorts of subjects are likely to be politicized when representatives of every political tendency and ideology meet to discuss a program of action. The problem is to determine which political issues are germane to

UNESCO's work and which are not. Obviously they are objectionable if they are contrary to UNESCO's purpose or if they would inject a tendentious bias in its program.

An example of unacceptable politicization was the attempt made some years ago to prevent Israel's participation in several UNESCO activities. It was based on disputable allegations concerning Israel's actions in occupied territory and it violated the principle of universality of membership in UN bodies. But that attempt was defeated, largely as a result of strong objections by the United States, and it has not been repeated.

However, an Administration official also accused UNESCO of "politicizing the South Africa question." Since UNESCO is involved in the promotion of respect for human rights, can we object when it sponsors studies critical of that government's apartheid policy, a policy which has been universally condemned? Would we object if the General Conference could be persuaded to take the same approach to human rights violations in the Soviet Union or Iran? The real problem, of course, is the double standard that originated in the United Nations' consideration of human rights violations. That is a practice we must oppose.

The Administration is also critical of UNESCO's advocacy of so-called "people's rights." This emphasis on collective economic and social rights also originated in the United Nations. It was there that the Western-inspired Universal Declaration of Human Rights was later transformed into two treaties - The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - neither of which has been ratified by the United States.

The two Covenants reflect a melding of concepts from East and West, North and South, brought about by the growth in membership from less than 60 nations, with a pro-Western majority; when the Universal Declaration was drafted in 1948, to about 130 nations when the Covenants were drafted in the early 1970s. UNESCO now has 161 members.

We are certainly justified in our critical attitude toward such "peoples rights", particularly if they are seen as superseding or derogating from the rights and freedoms of individuals. But we have ourselves moved far toward considering the satisfaction of the basic economic and social needs of our citizens as politically and morally justified (if not as a right) and self-determination is one right of peoples we have long supported.

In any event, the concept of "peoples rights" is not an invention of the Soviets, much as they exploit it. Many societies which lack our heritage of individual freedoms, particularly those which are still struggling for a national identity and a viable existence, are prone to think of peoples rights ahead of individual rights. This attempt to redefine human rights is one of the major ideological battles of our time. I cannot see how it would be in our interest to opt out and leave it to others to define such rights for future generations.

The Administration has also called on UNESCO to leave the consideration of disarmament and peace issues to the United Nations and other bodies directly concerned with such questions. That would obviously constitute a more efficient distribution of work. However, it was an American, Archibald MacLeish, who drafted the memorable statement in the Preamble to UNESCO's

Constitution: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." Education for peace and disarmament is seen in UNESCO as carrying out that mandate.

What is objectionable, however, is the amount of time wasted at UNESCO meetings on self-serving and simple-minded proposals of the Soviet bloc to make education for peace and disarmament a part of UNESCO activities. Most are turned aside or withdrawn, but too many have found their way into the UNESCO program, contributing to its lack of focus and excessive cost.

Another complaint is that the UNESCO program is replete with references to a New International Economic Order. There is indeed much to criticize in this United Nations declaration. It is loaded with simplistic and economically questionable recommendations for achieving a more equitable distribution of industry around the world, higher prices for exports of raw materials, and similar notions. But these recommendations have no legal force nor machinery for implementation. What we cannot ignore, however, is the fact that they express the aspirations of most developing countries. Since UNESCO, like all UN agencies, is deeply committed to their economic development, it cannot avoid reflecting the majority's views on these matters.

We are on much firmer ground in our concern about a UNESCO declaration calling for a New International Information and Communications Order. Conceived as a program to help underdeveloped countries expand their mass media facilities and to enable them to disseminate more information about their needs and accomplishments, it has become a tempting vehicle for Soviet

and other proposals to regulate the press and to impose a code of conduct on journalists.

It is important to note, however, that UNESCO has not taken any action on such proposals. Most have been rejected, though some are still under discussion. Many other recommendations for improving the communications facilities and for training the journalists of developing countries are supported by the U.S. and other Western countries, which have exerted increasing influence on the draft program. At the last General Conference, for example, U.S. representatives were instrumental in pushing through recommendations to study the "watchdog" role of the press and the effects of government censorship. Far from justifying our withdrawal, this draft program needs our continued participation to assure that it does not legitimize restrictions on the free flow of information.

Those are some of the more troublesome political issues. Let me turn now to the matter of excessive budgetary growth, a subject on which the United States Government - as the largest contributor - had expended more time and attention than on any other. Last year the United States made a major effort to limit budgetary growth throughout the UN system, arguing that in the midst of a world-wide recession there should be no increase at all, after allowing for inflation.

That effort was largely successful in the UN and in several other specialized agencies. However, the Director General of UNESCO chose that inopportune moment to propose another substantial increase in the UNESCO budget. Under strong pressure from the US delegation, which had the support of most of the large

contributors, the Director General was persuaded to accept a Scandinavian compromise for a reduction of some \$12 million from his proposal. The reduced budget was adopted by a large majority at the last General Conference, with only the US casting a negative vote because it did not meet our target of zero growth. Other large contributors abstained or voted in favor, as did the USSR.

Finally, there are persistent allegations of financial mismanagement and even possible financial irregularities in UNESCO. As you know, the Director General of UNESCO has agreed to allow a team of GAO investigators to look into these matters. The accounts of all UN bodies are certified by outside auditors and to date the UN system has been remarkably free of financial malfeasance. However, if there are any financial problems in UNESCO they must be exposed and corrected.

I hope the GAO investigators will also look at administrative problems created by the Director General's highly personal style of management. The Director General, Mr. Mbow, a Senegalese intellectual and a political figure, has managed to dominate the Executive Board, which is supposed to oversee the execution of the program. The quality of the Secretariat has declined in recent years. There are some 200 vacancies in the authorized manning of the Secretariat and a number of experienced and competent officials have either resigned or not been reappointed. Clearly there are management problems in UNESCO which must be addressed if confidence is to be restored in the Organization.

Nevertheless, I am hopeful that in the end we will not act on our notice to withdraw. Under the UNESCO constitution it

cannot take effect until the end of this year. Anxious to prevent our withdrawal, a number of Western members are calling for many of the reforms we have demanded. With our help they may make enough progress this year to enable us to rescind our notice.

We have every right to press for administrative reforms, for an end to unnecessary politicization and for a more coherent and less costly program. Among the changes I would urge the Administration to pursue are the following:

1. We should insist on the establishment of a small committee of the unwieldy Executive Board to follow up on such management reforms as are indicated by the findings of the GAO investigation. We need a stronger UNESCO Mission to monitor this process.

2. We should continue to press for budgetary reductions. But in so doing we must first achieve a tighter management structure and a pruning of obsolete and unrewarding program activities. As it is, we have gone about this problem backwards, having first joined in a consensus to adopt the program (despite our objections to specific projects) and then sought to reduce the funds requested to implement the approved program.

It will not be easy to achieve such reforms, but I hope we have now managed to persuade our friends and allies to join us in pressing for them. Even so, we cannot expect to see all implemented in the course of this year.

3. But there is another set of reforms which does not depend on the support of other members and which we should institute without delay. They have to do with the quality of our participation in UNESCO, which has steadily declined over the past 20 years

or so. To strengthen our participation, I would suggest the following measures:

a) First of all, we must again take UNESCO seriously, as we did in the early years of its existence. We must recognize that, like the United Nations itself, UNESCO is a major arena for ^{the} global battle of ideas and ideologies. Yet we have treated it with disdain.

b) One indication of our disdain is the strangely assorted delegations we have sent for many years to represent us at UNESCO meetings. Some have been overloaded with political figures and short of experts who could be expected to understand the UNESCO program. Even when strongly and ably led, as was our delegation to the last General Conference, such delegations are at a disadvantage in dealing with the more experienced and professional delegates representing other members, including the USSR.

c) Another indication of our Government's disdain for the Organization is to be seen in its treatment of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. It has ignored the Commission's opinion, . . . adopted by an overwhelming majority, that continued US membership in UNESCO is in the national interest. As you know, the Administration did not even request an appropriation for this year's funding of the Commission. I am grateful to the Congress for restoring the authorization for at least partial funding of the Commission, pending its reorganization, but I do not know whether the Administration has requested an appropriation for this year.

Such an appropriation is vital. As a member of the Commission I can tell you that we have been effectively hamstrung. We have no staff which we can consider as responsive to our needs. Our former staff has been amalgamated with the International Organization's Bureau of the Department of State where it is responsible to the head of that Bureau.

Yet, as mandated in Public Law 565 (1946), the Commission is supposed to provide liaison between UNESCO and the private and public organizations in this country which are concerned with educational, scientific and cultural activities. It is supposed to advise the Government on the UNESCO program.

As a former Assistant Secretary in charge of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, I can attest to the fact that the Department of State needs all the help it can get in dealing with the UNESCO program. Much of that help must come from the non-governmental organizations represented on the National Commission because it is hard to think of a national government less directly responsible for the educational, scientific and cultural activities of its citizens than is the Government of the United States. Even the Western European governments, which exercise much more responsibility in those fields, rely far more on their national commissions than ours does.

Achieving a few reforms will not put an end to our problems in UNESCO, however, because most originate in the United Nations itself and, indeed, in the real world beyond the UN system. UNESCO was chosen as a target because it is the least understood

UN agency. It deals with intellectual pursuits which are of interest mainly to scientists, teachers, scholars, artists, museum curators and the like, and its many valuable programs are unknown to the general public. Nevertheless, the notice to UNESCO should be seen as a shot across the United Nations' bow - a warning it would do well to heed. If it persists in overriding the views of the minority which provides the bulk of funds for UN and UNESCO, the majority of less developed countries must recognize that it will destroy the unwritten compact which underlies the principle of an equal vote for all members large and small and that, in so doing, it will put the Organizations at risk.

We in turn must recognize that whatever happens, the UN and UNESCO will remain difficult forums for us because, in their own distorted ways, they reflect world tendencies which we find disagreeable and because the political dynamics that distort their operations will continue to exacerbate our differences. These problems will not soon go away, but we would do well to adopt a more realistic view of their impact on our interests.

The transformation of the UN and UNESCO from Western-inspired and Western-led institutions to ones dominated by the Third World and the developing countries, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union when it suits its purpose, has given them an outlook shaped by a lack of experience with democracy and free enterprise and a general suspicion of the motives of many Western governments, especially as they relate to economic matters. Those who share that outlook are preoccupied with a desire to hasten the economic

development of their countries, many of which are still struggling to create a nation out of tribal or sectarian factions, and they are prone to look for foreign scapegoats for their poverty. Their own very recent emergence as independent countries leads them to attack what they regard as the remaining vestiges of colonialism - hence their support for so-called "freedom fighters" - such as the PLO, and the South-West Africa Peoples Organization. On the other hand, we have made enemies of too many revolutionary leaders whom we now encounter as heads of governments and as representatives in international organizations.

Too often we are inclined to regard displays of the majority's outlook as anti-Western and even Anti-American when in fact they are largely expressions of a deep sense of frustration. Moreover, the political dynamics of the UN and UNESCO work to distort votes and to sharpen misunderstandings. Like other deliberative bodies, they are prone to log-rolling. Thus, Africans and Latin Americans support Arab positions on the Middle East, even when they have little sympathy for them, because they want Arab support on economic development or anti-colonial issues. The Soviet bloc often supports both groups in order to gain a certain immunity for its own behavior and leverage against the West. And so it goes. Add to this the tendency (again true of most deliberative bodies) to politicize technical and economic issues and you have the mishmash of motives and tactics which distorts so many votes.

While we cannot ignore the underlying message, we would do well to take such votes less seriously when they do not materially affect our interests. Most of our friends and allies take a much

more relaxed view of UN proceedings. Indeed, they sometimes add to our discomfort by keeping their distance from us when we seek their support - even when they agree with us in private. Of course it is easier for them to overlook matters which we, with much more extensive foreign involvements, find difficult to ignore. In the main, however, I believe their reaction is based on a more sophisticated assessment of the real significance of these voting procedures and results.

On the other hand, we ought to display more understanding of the economic and social problems of the underdeveloped countries and of the frustration that underlies much of their behavior in international organizations. Much more than altruism is involved here. We have a large stake in the economic development of these countries. They already take about a third of our exports. At a time when we are running a massive deficit in our balance of trade, we must realize that most of the foreseeable increase in world trade will be with the developing countries and not with European or other industrialized countries, which are now our competitors. Our friends and allies never lose sight of that fact. They are willing to overlook many verbal provocations in the UN in order to maintain the best possible relations with their customers.

Let me make it clear that I see no reason why we should tolerate any abuse in these organizations. I believe we should be forthright in defending our principles and candid in letting others know when we are unfairly attacked. What I do suggest is that we not make matters worse by responding in kind or by using these forums as a place to pander to benighted elements of our domestic constituencies.

I am concerned by the increasingly unilateralist posture we are adopting in our foreign relations. At the same time we are not paying enough attention to world trends which threaten the welfare of all nations. These threats are generated by unrealistic expectations, by unstable economic and demographic conditions, by environmental problems and, of late, by a recrudescence of militant religious movements in some societies. Such threats are largely beyond the control of individual governments and beyond the reach of traditional bilateral diplomacy - to say nothing of military force.

With all of their shortcomings, the UN and UNESCO are important forums where nations can meet to assess global threats and to search for cooperative ways to deal with them. I would suggest that we can make a better contribution to that process if we strengthen our participation and make a greater effort to communicate with both friends and adversaries. Above all, we should not give way to our own frustrations and impatience.

To be more assertive, both in our rhetoric and in the display of military strength, without also working harder to cultivate a better understanding of our intentions and of the aspirations of other nations, strikes me as an unacceptable strategy. It certainly is not an effective way to exercise the leadership that is the responsibility of the world's most powerful democracy.

As for UNESCO, a responsible exercise of such leadership is not to run away, but to regain the confidence and to summon the will to confront our problems there because they are inescapable in our troubled world.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Edward Luck, Executive Vice President of the United Nations Association. Could we get a comment?

And may I ask you to submit your complete testimony for the record?

**STATEMENT OF EDWARD C. LUCK, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA**

Mr. LUCK. I will certainly be happy to. I will just make a few brief comments.

First, from our perspective we believe that it would be tragic if this is allowed to become a precedent for U.S. relations with other organizations in the U.N. system. While we have heard repeated statements that that would not be the case, many of the problems of politicization and budget growth could potentially be problems with other U.N. agencies.

And we really wonder where the line will be drawn.

Second, it seems to us that so far the debate has produced much more heat than light. It has been a debate about whether or not the United States should have made the decision, rather than what we should do now to allow the United States to remain in a stronger UNESCO more devoted to its original purposes.

We should be debating what is going to happen in the next 8 months, not only what happened 4 or 5 months ago.

Third, we think there would be real costs in withdrawing from UNESCO, political and functional. I think you have expressed that point very well yourself.

We also think that the problems within UNESCO are very serious. They are not inventions just of this administration or any single political perspective. They are recognized by 23 other OECD countries, have been voiced for years, and we should try to use this as an opportunity to make reforms in UNESCO.

The problems within UNESCO, however, I don't think justify a U.S. withdrawal. But we should be making these changes for the good of UNESCO and the good of the U.N. system; not just for ourselves.

Also, it seems to me that neither the U.S. Government nor the UNESCO leadership have really reacted very well to this crisis. We see nothing but stonewalling from UNESCO's side and little more than vague generalities from the administration.

We need a list of particulars about what the United States wants to see changed, and we need initially some symbolic movement and then a general direction of real change and reform in UNESCO.

Finally, we have a number of specific suggestions about what might be done over the next 8 months. I think this committee would do well if it would look toward some specific things that could be done now as well as some longer term directions that could be undertaken.

Those are listed in my written testimony.

Finally, I would like to discuss this analogy to the ILO situation, which is often cited. In that particular case there were four specific things the United States wanted, and we were able to achieve

them. We did not say we basically did not like the nature and management of the ILO as an organization.

We had some specific requests. They had a 2-year period rather than 1-year period after ratification to make some reforms, and eventually some changes were made that allowed the United States to return to the organization.

Finally, I hope this committee will take the lead in trying to find a middle ground, in showing a way to compromise between UNESCO and the U.S. Government this year, because we have not seen much movement from either side.

[Mr. Luck's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD C. LUCK, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
PRESIDENT-ELECT, UNA-USA

I very much appreciate this opportunity to testify before these two distinguished Subcommittees on the announced US intention to withdraw from UNESCO. This decision -- which will take effect in less than eight months unless something is done quickly to ease relations between UNESCO and its most important member state -- could have far-reaching implications for US involvement in other international institutions. It would be tragic if this action is allowed to become a precedent foreshadowing a gradual US pullback from its traditional leadership role in global institutions just when our national interests and aspirations require strengthening multilateral cooperation to deal with the world's toughest challenges. For our part, UNA-USA has launched a major Multilateral Issues and Institutions Project to take a hard, objective look at the operations and functions of a series of UN agencies in order to identify ways of improving their effectiveness and of reasserting American leadership in their work.

We believe that your two Subcommittees are doing a considerable public service by holding these hearings on UNESCO, which is no doubt the most troubled and controversial organization in the UN family. In the four months since the US announcement, the controversies surrounding the decision have produced far more heat than light. There has been much more debate about whether the US decision was wise than about how this situation can be used to promote positive changes both in UNESCO and in US relations with the agency. It is high time, we believe, to shift the debate from what has happened to what should now

happen, especially during the crucial eight months before us.

Our analysis, bolstered by the rich array of testimony you have already heard, leads to four basic conclusions:

First. The US can better advance and protect its interests, values and objectives (and those of its friends) from within UNESCO than from outside it. There would be real costs, both political and functional, to withdrawal which could not be fully or easily compensated through other avenues. UNESCO has had many under appreciated success stories, including its literacy programs, the Universal Copyright Convention (which protects US book and film exports), the international research programs on the oceans, the climate and the geology of the globe, technical assistance for book publishing and production, and the preservation of dozens of monuments and historic sites of world significance.

Second. The management, political and budgetary problems of UNESCO are very serious and would have required remedy even without the American action. They are not the invention of any single administration in Washington, since many of these complaints have been raised, with varying degrees of intensity, for years and have been voiced by 23 other OECD countries as well as independently by the United Kingdom since the US announcement. These problems are bad for UNESCO, not just for US interests in the organization.

Third. The US action has provided an opportunity, and an incentive, for constructive changes in UNESCO and in the way the US conducts its relations with UNESCO. It is crucial to seize

this brief opportunity, before it is lost, to take steps that are in the interests of both sides of the controversy. It takes time, skill and patience to turn around a 161-member organization, but unless a long-term effort is begun now, the difficulties will simply get worse from the perspectives of both the US and UNESCO.

Fourth. To date, neither the US nor the UNESCO leadership deserve much credit for the way they have handled the impasse. Neither side -- at least in public -- has demonstrated the degree of flexibility, imagination and foresight required to begin to bridge the gap that divides them. The US has refused to offer a specific list of steps it expects of UNESCO or to indicate the threshold of conditions necessary for it to remain in UNESCO. So far it has only produced a general laundry list of complaints. The leadership of UNESCO, on the other hand, has done little more than to stonewall, offering repeated defenses of the organization with little indication of a willingness to review its operation and to undertake real reforms. Unless these attitudes are changed, the US will withdraw from UNESCO at the end of the year out of simple inertia.

These four conclusions underline the need for forward movement in both the US and UNESCO positions along the following lines:

US Actions

First, the United States must recognize that it has a leadership role to play in this as in all international organizations, which cannot be exercised if this country becomes a critic from the outside. Many of UNESCO's problems appear directly traceable to its current leadership, but they have been compounded by the

inadequate level of representation and high-level attention given to this important agency by the US over many years. American influence at UNESCO's policymaking and substantive levels and the credibility of its current concerns among other members would gain enormously by a strengthening of US representation both at the General Conferences and in the permanent delegations. Equally necessary for strengthening US influence is a reinstatement of funding for the US National Commission for UNESCO.

Second, and of greatest immediate importance, the US should present a specific bill of particulars to the UNESCO leadership and to other member states listing its expectations for changes that can feasibly be accomplished in 1984 and those that will require longer-term efforts. It is not constructive to voice superficial complaints without offering suggestions for specific remedies. At the same time, the US needs to clarify which of its complaints stem from the actions of other member states and which from the policies and practices of the UNESCO Secretariat. In this regard, it is crucial that the advisory group established by the State Department issue its preliminary findings and recommendations as soon as possible, certainly by the beginning of October as recommended by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

UNESCO Actions

Third, while it is impossible to turn around a 161-nation organization in a few months, it is essential to get the process under way immediately. This will provide the crucial litmus test of Director General M'Bow's leadership abilities and will indicate whether he will become part of the solution rather than

being, as it appears from our vantage point, part of the problem.

There are several measures which UNESCO could usefully adopt this year:

- 1) At its semi-annual meeting this May the Executive Board could call an Extraordinary Conference for late summer which would create a plenary forum in which to deal with the current crisis. Such a conference could propose the following steps to be responsive to the concerns of the US and 23 other major donors by:
 - a) Setting up an Executive Board Commission to draft a plan for streamlining the UNESCO Secretariat. The Commission should make use of outside management consultants as well as the findings of the current GAO study. Its investigation should include: personnel practices and recruitment; concentration of authority; cooperation between sectors and departments; and coordination with the activities of other UN bodies.
 - b) Establishing guidelines for enhancing the supervisory and oversight role of the Executive Board with particular emphasis on monitoring the implementation of programs.
- 2) The Executive Board's guidance to the Director General for the 1986/87 budget biennium should include instructions for zero budget growth. The zero growth target should be achieved by reducing expenditures on programs which do not enjoy a strong consensus and by reemphasizing those functional activities which unite the member states and which provide concrete benefits rather than simply ful-

filling rhetorical or ideological urges.

Over the longer term, in 1985 and beyond, several areas of UNESCO policy and management deserve attention:

- 1) The structural problem of skewed power relationships underlying budget debates should be addressed in order to increase the influence of major donors in budget planning and program expenditure.
- 2) The Executive Board, under the aegis of the Director General, should exercise more vigorously its policy guidance role over the agenda and the parliamentary procedures of General Conferences. Specifically, guidelines should be established and enforced which limit the scope of political debates and resolutions, and which prohibit challenges to the established rights of any member.
- 3) The steadily increasing size of the Executive Board, which now has 51 members, has seriously handicapped its ability to conduct effective oversight. Measures should be taken to reduce the Board's unwieldiness, possibly through delegation of authority to committees or outright reduction in membership.
- 4) In the allocation of program funding UNESCO should make a permanent practice of emphasizing programs likely to attract the most international support and cooperation and deemphasizing those which are most contentious. As a first step, the current Medium Term Plan should be reviewed, particularly in the areas of communications, disarmament, and human rights to insure that it will contribute to the

building of a broader international consensus on these divisive issues.

- 5) UNESCO should redress personnel imbalances at senior levels within the organization, with an eye to neutralizing any national, regional or ideological biases.

The ILO Analogy

If this country does pull out of UNESCO, it will not be the first time that we have withdrawn from a UN agency. In 1977 the United States left the International Labor Organization after concluding that excessive politicization was impeding its ability to fulfill its original principles. But there was a crucial difference compared to the current situation with UNESCO which makes it impossible to predict a similarly salutary result. The United States presented the ILO with a bill of particulars listing specific, feasible steps that would return the ILO to the purposes envisioned in its Charter. Once these were accomplished, the US returned 27 months later to a strengthened and more effective ILO.

Conclusions

Given the current impasse, in which neither the US Administration nor UNESCO has publicly indicated a willingness to resolve their differences, Congress and private organizations can play a crucial role in moving the issues off dead center. They can serve as intermediaries, prodding both sides to adopt more forthcoming attitudes. Working together, Congress and private organizations can generate fresh ideas for practical steps to improve the functioning of UNESCO and to allow the US to remain an active, constructive participant in its programs. These hearings, we believe, are an important step forward in instituting such a process.

Mr. MICA. Ms. Robbins.

STATEMENT OF RUTH ROBBINS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS IN THE UNITED STATES

Ms. ROBBINS. Mr. Chairman, in addition to my other duties, I am also the League's representative on the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, and my written statement includes a lot of the things that Dr. Holderman and Mr. DePalma have said about the commission.

I think the criticisms they have leveled against the administration are very serious and they should be taken seriously.

Now, to the league's position; you know the league strongly supports international cooperation. So let me just read three sentences from my statement and hope you will read the rest at your leisure.

The League of Women Voters is opposed to the administration's proposed withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO. Withdrawal would undermine our Nation's fundamental interests in the U.N. system. It would abdicate an important leadership role the United States could play in world affairs, and it would undercut vital work on science, culture, and education throughout the world.

Mr. MICA. Thank you very much.

[Ms. Robbins' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RUTH ROBBINS, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Good afternoon. I am Ruth Robbins, a member of the Board of Directors of the League of Women Voters of the United States. I am the League representative of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO.

The League of Women Voters is a nonpartisan political organization that influences public policy through education and advocacy. Our network includes over 270,000 members and supporters organized in 1300 state and local Leagues in fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

We welcome this opportunity to comment on the critical issue of United States participation in the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The League of Women Voters is opposed to the Administration's proposed withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO. Withdrawal would undermine our nation's fundamental interest in the UN system. It would abdicate an important leadership role the United States can play in world affairs. And it would undercut vital work on science, culture, and education throughout the world.

League members believe that in an increasingly interdependent world no nation can fulfill its goals in isolation or impose them unilaterally on other countries. We believe the United States needs the UN system. The UN system still offers the best chance for the impartial settlement of disputes before they escalate into threats to regional and global security. The UN system helps enable all countries to enter into the mainstream of international economic life and counteract the poverty and unrest that often contribute to political instability. And the UN system promotes the harmonious coexistence of different social and cultural values.

It is the League's firm belief that the United States should support the United Nations and its specialized agencies and should provide financial contributions commensurate with our ability to pay. The United Nations should be an important component of U.S. foreign policy and the United States should work actively and constructively within the UN system, to further our vital interests, exercising diplomatic leadership at every stage of the decision making process. Above all, the United States should work to create an atmosphere which will lessen confrontation by encouraging all member states to consider the needs of the world as a whole. U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO would undermine U.S. participation in the UN system.

UNESCO itself is a vital part of the UN system and one which the United States energetically campaigned to create. Its mandate touches on some of the most fundamental activities of people in every corner of the globe: learning, communication, cultural expression and scientific advancement. These fields of endeavor transcend

national boundaries and have the potential to serve all people equally, regardless of political beliefs or economic status.

Like the UN system in the entirety, UNESCO has experienced growth and change, as its membership increased from 28 states in 1946, to 124 in 1968, to a current 161. Consequently, the organization has come to reflect many of the special concerns of developing nations, which represent a numerical majority. One must be careful not to blame UNESCO or the other specialized agencies for reflecting the shifts in power or differences in values and priorities that have emerged over their long history.

The United States has been and must continue to be an integral part of the debate over the formulation of policies, norms, standards and international agreements that deal with the flow of ideas in the areas under UNESCO's mandate. We should welcome the opportunity for all nations to participate in the exchange of their concerns. But we should also be prepared to take a leadership role. We must begin by defining what is important to us—goals such as universality and the protection of the dignity and freedom of the individual—and work to mold these goals into a consistent policy.

Over the past few years, the United States has proven that it is possible to achieve reforms within the UN system by making our interests clear, working to build support for our viewpoints among member nations, and assigning priority to the task of improving efficiency and management. Such appeared to be the case with respect to the most recent UNESCO General Conference. As Ambassador Hennelly said December 16, 1983, at a meeting of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO: "The 22nd General Conference was among the least politicized and most constructive from the U.S. point of view in recent memory." More than 95 percent of the resolutions passed at the Conference were approved by consensus, with the U.S. joining in this positive vote.

The League of Women Voters is not alone in our belief that the U.S. should not withdraw from UNESCO. Leaders in the U.S. scientific, cultural and education communities, including the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, affirm that continued participation in UNESCO is in the U.S. national interest. The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO did not reach this conclusion lightly. A special meeting was held at the University of South Carolina from June 1 through June 3, 1982, at which I was a participant. The purpose of the meeting was to conduct a thorough review and assessment of U.S. participation in UNESCO. The participants were divided into five working groups, each reporting its recommendations in plenary session. I would like to quote the main recommendation from the summary report: "On the basic question of the future of U.S. participation in UNESCO, the groups were unanimous in recommending that the United States not only continue to remain a member of UNESCO but that the effectiveness of U.S. participation in the work of the organization be increased."

The Administration's announcement of intent to withdraw from UNESCO appears to disregard the positive accomplishments of U.S. actions to improve management and efficiency and to curtail unproductive programs within UNESCO. Moreover, it fails to provide constructive terms to which the organization's leadership and member states can respond or by which others can measure its progress in addressing U.S. concerns. Having taken the regrettable step, however, the League of Women Voters believes that the United States is now obligated to justify the terms of a final decision—whether or not it is in the affirmative. Therefore, the League of Women Voters calls on the Administration to undertake a good faith effort to assess UNESCO's problems in the context of U.S. interests and possible long term solutions.

In making a final determination, the President should at least take into account the following reviews:

The audit of UNESCO budgeting practices by the General Accounting Office. The League supports efforts to improve UNESCO management and budget practices and is hopeful that the GAO audit will provide some specific information on areas that need attention.

Congressional committee actions. The League supports efforts by Congress to consider and evaluate the proposed withdrawal. The depth of constituent interest and the potential foreign policy implications of this decision are ample reasons to involve appropriate congressional committees in the review process.

The recommendations of the UNESCO Monitoring Panel established by the State Department. The League of Women Voters regrets that the mandate for this panel is limited to analysis of substantial structural and programmatic changes within UNESCO during the remainder of 1984. Since the multi-year, mid-term plan and two-year budget for UNESCO were adopted in 1983, there will be little or no oppor-

tunity for the organization to undertake major program or management changes in response to U.S. concerns. Therefore, in considering the recommendations of the panel, the Administration and Congress should be mindful of these barriers to a complete study and evaluation. It was our hope that the panel would assess the problems, monitor progress, consider reactions of our allies and determine ways of working within the organization to achieve U.S. objectives.

Recommendations of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO in opposition to the U.S. withdrawal. The League is disappointed that the Administration has continually sought to truncate the role of the Commission by cutting staff and budget and by rejecting its recommendations opposing U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO. As a member of the Commission, I am appalled that a commission established and supported by congressional mandate could be effectively destroyed by actions of the Administration. By reassigning Commission staff to other duties within the State Department, the Commission has been left completely disabled.

The League strongly urges that the President consider the long-term consequences of a decision to withdraw from UNESCO. Many of the issues that politicize UNESCO and the UN system in general are endemic to a deeply divided world of rich and poor nations. Issues of economic and monetary reform and special political struggles involving the Middle East and South Africa must be dealt with through the development of a consistent and coherent U.S. foreign policy that takes into account the interests and needs of developing countries. Retreat from multilateral institutions will not serve this much needed shift in U.S. policy. U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, combined with a decrease in emphasis on multilateral development assistance in favor of bilateral foreign aid, only intensifies the level of confrontation between the United States and developing countries within the United Nations.

The League believes that the proposed U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO raises vital foreign policy questions that demand thorough and reasoned consideration. For that reason, we believe the U.S. should suspend its notice of withdrawal to allow time for a careful examination of the situation and to allow UNESCO to make whatever reforms might be necessary to meet legitimate concerns.

In summary, the decision to withdraw from UNESCO is a short-sighted solution to a complex set of issues that will continue to face the United States in the foreseeable future. It is the League's contention that U.S. interests are better served by cooperation with other nations, and we regard withdrawal as an abdication of world leadership. The United States has the leverage and political clout to press its views by working within the UN system. If the United States will make a sustained effort to build support for its goals through the United Nations, it can help make the UN a powerful catalyst for change to meet the challenges of global interdependence.

Mr. MICA. I truly appreciate your understanding. We are going to consult on how soon we can reschedule a hearing, and whether or not it would be too much of an imposition to have you come back.

I would like to say to my colleague, Mr. Solomon, we are going to do everything possible to try by the time these hearings are over, to have an equal number on each side of the issue.

Mr. SOLOMON. I might ask the chairman, before we adjourn, about our resident UNESCO Ambassador, Ambassador Gerard, who has served for 2½ years. I understand that she is in favor of the withdrawal.

Since her colleague, Mr. Hennelly, is also, in his statement given to us last Thursday, in favor of the withdrawal, and since the majority of our delegates at the fall conference last fall supported withdrawal, I think those are the kind of people we also would like to hear from.

I thank the chairman for his fairness.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

The subcommittees stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m. the subcommittees were adjourned.]

APPENDIX 1

REPORT PREPARED BY DAVID M. SALE, LEGISLATIVE ATTORNEY, AMERICAN LAW DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LI- BRARY OF CONGRESS, ENTITLED CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION PROHIBITING UNILATERAL EXECUTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MEM- BERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC, AND CUL- TURAL ORGANIZATION [UNESCO]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On December 28, 1983, the Executive branch unilaterally gave notice of the intention of the United States to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), effective December 31, 1984. On March 8, 1984, Congressman Jim Leach introduced legislation (H.R. 5082) seeking to prohibit the United States from terminating its membership in UNESCO. Accordingly, the proposed legislation, if enacted prior to December 31, 1984, and if coupled with a refusal by the Executive to comply with the statutory directive contained therein, would raise a constitutional question concerning which branch of the federal government--the Congress or the President--is empowered to terminate existing legal relationships established under international agreements to which the Nation is a party. Inasmuch as the international agreement establishing the UNESCO Constitution was expressly approved by Congress in 1946, the narrow constitutional issue presented by H.R. 5082 seems whether the President or the Congress is authorized to terminate a Congressional-Executive agreement.

Resolution of this issue is complicated by the silence of the text of the Constitution concerning the proper domestic procedure for terminating international agreements, as well as by the absence of controlling case law and authoritative practice. An analogous issue was recently presented in Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vac. and rem. with dir. to dis. complaint, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), in connection with President Carter's unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. However, as the Supreme Court disposed of the case without reaching the merits, the constitutional question regarding the proper governmental organ for terminating treaties and other types of international agreements remains judicially unresolved. Moreover, although the Executive has claimed some thirteen instances from past practice involving unilateral Presidential terminations of international agreements in the form of treaties, this claim was factually challenged in the course of the Goldwater case. A recent instance of unilateral withdrawal by the Executive from an international organization, in which United States participation was also originally sanctioned by Congress, is the Nation's termination of membership in the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1977. However, the precedential value of this action for present purposes may be questioned if H.R. 5082 were enacted, inasmuch as Congress did not adopt any legislation mandating continuing national membership in ILO prior to the formal rejoining of the Organization by the United States in 1980.

Arguments that might be made favoring the validity of H.R. 5082, if enacted, include those relating to 1) the President's constitutional duty to "take care" that the laws are faithfully executed (Art. II, § 3); 2) the constitutional burden faced by the Executive where action is taken incompatibly with the will of Congress; 3) Congress' residual foreign affairs power under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 18); 4) Congress' power for domestic law purposes effectively to regulate the international legal status of Congressional-Executive agreements for the United States; 5) the degree of actual legislative participation in the termination of international agreements in past practice, including those instances alleged to constitute unilateral Executive terminations; 6) the principled logic of acknowledging the competence to terminate international agreements as residing in those organs of government that participate in the authorization for such agreements.

Arguments that might be urged against the validity of H.R. 5083 relate to 1) the independent constitutional power of the President to terminate international agreements as a consequence of his status as the "sole organ" of the government in the field of foreign affairs; 2) the nexus between the Executive's notice of United States withdrawal from UNESCO and the President's recognized authority to conduct international negotiations without direct Congressional intrusion; 3) the absence of Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 18) to take action unrelated to any actual implementation of Executive powers for the purpose of circumscribing the independent authority of the President; 4) existing judicial precedent deferring to Executive determinations regarding the continuing effectiveness of international agreements in light of Presidential appraisals of various international circumstances; 5) the want of any precedent from past practice confirming the continuation of international agreements over Presidential opposition; and 6) the failure of past practice authoritatively to confirm any role requiring the concurrence, for termination purposes, of the same governmental organs that may have originally authorized a particular international agreement.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION PROHIBITING UNILATERAL EXECUTIVE WITHDRAWAL
OF UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION
(UNESCO)

The impetus for this report lies in the notice given by the Executive branch on December 28, 1983, of the intention of the United States to withdraw from UNESCO^{1/} and in pending legislation (H.R. 5082) introduced by Congressman Jim Leach on March 8, 1984, prohibiting termination by the United States of its membership in, or suspension of its participation in and contributions to, the Organization.^{2/} If enacted during the Ninety-Eighth Congress, the mandatory nature of the proposed legislation would effectively require the Executive to rescind its prior notice of withdrawal, and, in the event of an Executive

1/ Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, November 16, 1945, 61 Stat. 295, T.I.A.S. 1580. The United States notice of its intent to withdraw is reflected in a letter from Secretary of State George Schultz to Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, Director General of UNESCO, December 28, 1983, and also in a letter to Javier Perez de Cuellar y Guerra, Secretary General of the United Nations, Dec. 29, 1983. 84 Dept. State Bull. 41-42 (Feb. 1984). In his letter of December 28, 1983, the Secretary of State indicates that the United States withdrawal is being conducted under the terms of Article II (6) of the UNESCO Constitution and is to be effective December 31, 1984.

2/ H.R. 5082, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984). Under H.R. 5082, which seeks to amend the 1946 law authorizing American membership in UNESCO, 60 Stat. 712, the specified prohibition is expressly rendered inoperative where termination of United States membership or suspension of American participation or contributions is otherwise mandated by section 115 of the Department of State Authorization Act (FY 1984 and 1985), Pub. L. 98-164, 97 Stat. 1017 (relating to suspension of United States participation in the United Nations if Israel is illegally expelled) or by section 109 of the Department of State Authorization Act (FY 1982 and 1983), Pub. L. 97-241, 96 Stat. 273 (relating to the imposition of restrictions by UNESCO on freedom of the press and the free flow of information), or unless such action is specifically authorized by law.

refusal to comply with the statutory directive, would raise a familiar but long unresolved constitutional question regarding the locus of governmental power to terminate United States legal relationships under international agreements to which the Nation is a party.^{3/}

Preliminarily, it should be noted that, owing to the existence of explicit legislative authorization in 1946 for American participation in UNESCO, the international agreement embodying the UNESCO Constitution may be deemed a Congressional-Executive agreement for purposes of the domestic law of the United States.^{4/} Although it has been stated that in approving an international agreement that depends on Congressional authority Congress may impose a condition that Presidential termination of the agreement will require legislative consent,^{5/}

3/ Although "withdrawal" by the United States from the international agreement establishing the UNESCO Constitution would not "terminate" the agreement internationally for the other member States in the Organization, for purposes of American domestic law a withdrawal under the terms of the agreement would effectively terminate the benefits and obligations of the agreement vis a vis the United States.

4/ H.J. Res. 305, July 30, 1946, 60 Stat. 712. President Truman's notice of United States acceptance of the UNESCO Constitution, August 26, 1946, expressly notes the authorization granted by this enactment (copy of notice supplied by the Department of State).

A Congressional-Executive agreement, the legal basis of which lies in the joint action of the President and both Houses of Congress, may be distinguished from an agreement concluded under authority of an existing treaty and from an agreement effected solely pursuant to the President's independent powers under Article II of the Constitution. See generally, L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (1972), Chap. VI, and S. Crandall, Treaties-Their Making and Enforcement (1916), Chaps. VIII and IX.

5/ American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law-Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Tentative Draft No. 1, § 352 (April 1, 1980), Comment a [hereinafter cited as Restatement (Revised): Tentative Draft No. 1]. See also the conditions accompanying Congressional approval of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement, 61 Stat. 756, 758 (1947); and of the International Refugee Organization, 61 Stat. 214 (1947).

the text of the 1946 law is silent in this regard.^{6/} Broadly, therefore, the issue addressed in this report can be viewed as one of determining whether the basic policy decision concerning continued participation by the United States in UNESCO devolves upon the President or the Congress. Strictly, however, the narrow constitutional inquiry seems properly focused upon whether the President or the Congress is empowered to terminate an international legal relationship established for the United States by the terms of a Congressional-Executive agreement.^{7/}

Resolution of the foregoing issue is greatly hindered, of course, by the complete silence of the Constitution concerning the proper governmental organ to terminate the Nation's international agreements.^{8/} Moreover, the Constitution contains no explicit authority for the making of agreements that are not in the form of treaties, let alone the termination of such agreements.^{9/} It has been

^{6/} Under the 1946 enactment, however, legislative approval is required for "any amendment under article XIII of the constitution of the Organization involving any new obligation for the United States." Pub. L. 565, § 7, 60 Stat. 712, 714.

^{7/} Once the proper locus of decision-making authority regarding this question is found, it would seem indisputable that the actual communication of a notice either to withdraw from UNESCO or to rescind a previously issued notice of withdrawal is an Executive function. As indicated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as the representative of the nation."

^{8/} The Constitution merely provides that treaties are made by the President and two-thirds of the Senate (Art. II, § 2, cl. 2), that treaties form part of the Supreme Law of the Land (Art. VI, cl. 2) and create a basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts (Art. III, § 2, cl. 1), and that the states are absolutely prohibited from entering into any treaty (Art. I, § 10, cl. 1).

^{9/} While the Constitution expressly references the treaty mode of agreement making four times (see n. 8 *supra*), only once does the text seem to acknowledge the existence of other types of international instruments in the prohibition against the states from concluding any "Agreement or Compact" with a foreign

noted that with respect to the termination of treaties "the matter was not discussed in the debates of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia"^{10/} and elsewhere suggested that "the Framers were concerned only to check the President in 'entangling' the United States; 'disentangling' is less risky and may have to be done quickly, and is often done piecemeal, or ad hoc, by various means or acts."^{11/}

Further impeding resolution of the question regarding the proper organ for terminating international agreements under the constitutional scheme is the absence of a definitive judicial ruling, notwithstanding recent attempts to force this issue in connection with President Carter's unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan.^{12/} Thus, in Goldwater v. Carter^{13/} it was held by the District Court that the President's unilateral termination of the treaty was unconstitutional in the absence of the concurrence of either the Senate or both Houses of Congress. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and upheld the President's unilateral action in terminating the treaty, in part as an incident to his admitted authority to

(continued) power in the absence of Congressional approbation (Art. 1, § 10, cl. 3). The constitutional validity of agreements that are not in the form of treaties is, however, well-established in American case law and practice. For reference to the relevant authorities, both judicial and practical, see Constitution of the United States of America-Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 92-82. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 505-19 (1973). See also Henkin, supra n. 4, chap. VI.

^{10/} 14 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 461 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Whiteman's Digest].

^{11/} Henkin, supra n. 4, at 169.

^{12/} Mutual Defense Treaty, United States-Taiwan, December 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. 3178.

^{13/} 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vac. and rem. with dir. to dis. complaint, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

recognize the People's Republic of China. The Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the complaint. Four justices predicated this action on the political question doctrine, one justice maintained that the question was not ripe for review in the absence of official Congressional action in response to President Carter's termination, one justice did not indicate his views, and two justices would have set the case for oral argument and plenary consideration. Only one justice reached the merits of the case and would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals "insofar as it rests upon the President's well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign governments."^{14/}

The actual practice of the Nation presents similar difficulties in establishing an authoritative guide to decisions regarding the question at hand. With respect to the termination of treaties the practice has been summarized as follows:

1. Executive action pursuant to prior authorization or direction by the Congress.
2. Executive action pursuant to prior authorization or direction by the Senate.
3. Executive action without prior specific authorization or direction, but with subsequent approval, by the Congress.
4. Executive action without prior specific authorization or direction, but with subsequent approval, by the Senate.
5. Executive action without specific prior authorization or direction and without subsequent approval by either the Congress or the Senate. ^{15/}

^{14/} 444 U.S. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

^{15/} 14 Whiteman's Digest, *supra* n. 10, at 462. For illustrations of each of these modes of termination, see Celada, "Who is Empowered to Terminate a Treaty," in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Termination of Treaties: The Constitutional Allocation of Power, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-44 (1978) (Committee Print) [hereinafter cited as Termination of Treaties]. See also Bite, "Precedents for U.S. Abrogation of Treaties," *id.* at 44-60.

While the varied nature of existing practice seems to belie the existence of a settled rule regarding termination, there is an ancillary problem in characterizing the precedential effect of specific terminations, especially those involving apparent unilateral action by the Executive. Thus, the District Court in Goldwater v. Carter, after reviewing the historical record (including some 13 instances cited by the Executive in support of the President's alleged right unilaterally to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan), concluded that "[t]he great majority of the historical precedents involve some form of mutual action, whereby the President's notice of termination receives the affirmative approval of the Senate or the entire Congress. Taken as a whole, the historical precedents support rather than detract from the position that the power to terminate treaties is a power shared by the political branches of this government."^{16/}

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, having been apprised of the same history, indicated that "it is not without significance that out of all the historical precedents brought to our attention, in no situation has a treaty been continued in force over the opposition of the President."^{17/}

^{16/} 481 F. Supp. at 960. In his dissenting opinion to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Judge MacKinnon concurred in the District Court's conclusion regarding the actual practice and, with respect to the 13 alleged instances of unilateral Presidential terminations, stated that--

In five instances Congress by direct authorization, or inconsistent legislation supplied the basis for the President's action; in two instances the putative abrogation was withdrawn and no termination resulted; one treaty was already terminated by the demise of the country; one treaty had become void by a change in the basic facts upon which the treaty was grounded; four treaties had already been abrogated by the other party; and of the two that were non-functioning the Trademark Treaty was not terminated. 617 F.2d at 733.

^{17/} 617 F.2d at 706. In amplification of this point, the Executive argued before the Supreme Court that--

One instance from recent practice that was not cited by the judicial opinions in Goldwater v. Carter, but which provides an instance of unilateral withdrawal by the Executive from an international organization in which United States participation was originally sanctioned by a Joint Resolution of Congress,^{18/} is the Nation's withdrawal from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1977.^{19/} If H.R. 5082 were enacted, however, the precedential value of the Executive's

(continued) [P]etitioners have not pointed to a single example of a congressional attempt to veto a Presidential decision to terminate a treaty. None of petitioners' historical precedents bears on the proposition fundamental to this case: that the United States cannot maintain treaty relations without the continuing concurrence of the President. The only relevant historical precedents are the instances of unilateral Presidential treaty terminations. While petitioners attempt to distinguish these instances from the present case on grounds such as changed circumstances, ineffectuality, or impossibility of performance, they do not explain why the Constitution gives the President, acting alone, the power to terminate treaties in some circumstances, but not in others, nor do they explain by what standards a court is to determine what the crucial circumstances are.

Construed most favorably to petitioners, the historical record demonstrates only that Presidents have long acknowledged their practical and political dependence on congressional acquiescence or concurrence as a prerequisite for the successful maintenance of a treaty obligation. Past practice also shows that the President and Congress have often reached political accommodations to terminate treaties. The most important lesson of the past, however, is the one that is dispositive here: treaty obligations cannot survive, and have never survived, a President's decision to terminate. Brief For The Respondents In Opposition at 22-23, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

^{18/} S.J. Res. 131, June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1182.

^{19/} The United States notice of its intent to withdraw is contained in a letter from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Francis Blanchard, Director General of ILO, November 5, 1975. 14 Int'l. Leg. Mat 1582 (1975). The United States withdrawal was effective November 5, 1977. 77 Dept. State. Bull. 912 (Dec. 26, 1977). In 1980 the United States rejoined the Organization. 80 Dept. State. Bull. 65 (April 1980).

independent action regarding ILO might be questioned inasmuch as Congress did not enact any legislation mandating continued national membership in ILO prior to the formal rejoining of the Organization by the United States in 1980.^{20/}

In the absence of explicit constitutional text and controlling case law or practice, the validity of H.R. 5082, if enacted, may turn largely upon theoretical arguments buttressed where appropriate by reference to the foregoing sources. Among the contentions that might be urged favoring the validity of the bill, the following seem noteworthy:

1. Under Art. II, § 3, of the Constitution, the President has a duty to "take care" that the laws are faithfully executed. This duty is arguably breached where, contrary to an enacted statute expressly mandating the Nation's continued membership in UNESCO, the Executive refuses to rescind the notice of United States withdrawal from the Organization. While the provisions of the agreement embodying the UNESCO Constitution specify the proper international legal procedure for a Member State to withdraw from the Organization,^{21/} such procedure does not govern the domestic law issue in the United States concerning which branch of the federal government is constitutionally empowered to make the basic policy decision regarding withdrawal.

2. As a failure by the Executive to rescind its notice of withdrawal in the face of a statute requiring continued United States participation in UNESCO would

^{20/} In this regard see Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952), quoted in text accompanying n. 22 supra.

^{21/} In 1954 an amendment to the UNESCO Constitution was adopted specifying that any Member State of the Organization may withdraw from the Organization pursuant to notice addressed to the Director General and that such notice shall take effect on December 31 of the year following that in which notice was given. UNESCO Constitution, Art. II (6), 6 U.S.T. 6157.

be contrary to the will of Congress, the Executive would seem to bear a heavy legal burden to sustain the constitutionality of its independent action. In his often cited concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson reminds that--

When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.^{22/}

3. Congress arguably possesses a residual foreign affairs authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution (Art. 1, § 8, cl. 18) permitting the assertion of legislative competence with respect to international agreements authorizing United States membership in international organizations.^{23/} Congress' general authority in this subject area is manifested in the Joint Resolutions approving American participation in UNESCO and in other international organizations^{24/} and is bolstered by Supreme Court cases recognizing legislative power even to implement the Nation's treaty obligations which, unlike Congressional-Executive agreements, do not trace their legal authority from an authorization by the whole

^{22/} 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

^{23/} The Necessary and Proper Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power...To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [i.e. expressly delegated] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof" (emphasis supplied).

^{24/} H.J. Res. 305, July 30, 1946, 60 Stat. 712 (UNESCO); S.J. Res. 131, June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1182 (ILO); H.J. Res. 192, March 28, 1944, 58 Stat. 122 (UNRRA); S.J. Res. 77, July 1, 1947, 61 Stat. 214 (IRO); H.J. Res. 145, July 31, 1945, 59 Stat. 529 (FAO); and S.J. Res. 98, June 14, 1948, 62 Stat. 441 (WHO).

Congress but from the President and Senate only.^{25/} Moreover, the Necessary and Proper Clause has been invoked in recent years as a constitutional justification for legislation in subject areas that implicate the foreign relations power of the Executive.^{26/}

4. It is well-settled under the Constitution that Congress has the power to terminate a treaty for purposes of domestic law by enacting an inconsistent statute of later date.^{27/} The same rule would also apply to Congressional-Executive agreements and subsequently enacted laws that are incompatible with such agreements.^{28/} If Congress possesses a constitutional competence that effectively requires the Executive, in obedience to a domestic statute, to discontinue adherence by the United States to treaties and Congressional-Executive agreements,^{29/}

^{25/} In Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901), the Court indicated that the latter part of the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress "to enact such legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations which it is competent for the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty with a foreign power." See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

^{26/} See H.R. Rep. No. 92-1301, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972) (transmittal of executive agreements to Congress). See also H.R. Rep. No. 93-287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973) (War Powers Resolution of 1973).

^{27/} Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). The Supreme Court has affirmed this rule in numerous cases. See Constitution of the United States of America-Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 489-91 (1973).

^{28/} Henkin, supra n. 4, at 424, n. 11.

^{29/} In Van der Wyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114, 118 (1935), the Supreme Court, in connection with section 16 of the Seamen's Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 1164, 1184, which "requested and directed" the President to give notice of termination of treaty provisions in conflict with the Act, stated that "[f]rom every point of view, it was incumbent upon the President charged with the conduct of negotiations with foreign governments and also with the duty to take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed, to reach a conclusion as to the inconsistency between the provisions of the treaty and the provisions of the new law."

Congress' power arguably should be no less in effectively requiring the Executive by law to continue national adherence to such agreements.

5. Actual practice under the Constitution reflects the competence of Congress in the termination of treaties concluded pursuant to the joint authority of the President and the Senate.^{30/} Indeed, as found by the District Court in Goldwater v. Carter, "the great majority of the historical precedents involve some form of mutual action, whereby the President's notice of termination receives the affirmative approval of the Senate or the entire Congress."^{30a/} A fortiori the constitutional propriety of Congress' role is amplified where it seeks to regulate the termination of an international agreement originally sanctioned by legislation adopted by the whole Congress.

6. In principle, those organs of the federal government that participate in the legal authorization for an international agreement ought to be jointly enabled under the Constitution concerning the termination of the agreement. There is judicial dictum supporting this proposition in the context of treaty termination^{31/} and the applicability of the asserted proposition arguably is equally compelling where an agreement is sanctioned by the joint authority of the whole Congress and the President.

^{30/} Relevant precedents are presented in Termination of Treaties, supra n. 15, at 35-60. It may be noted that the first instance of treaty termination in United States practice was the direct abrogation by Congress, under the Act of July 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 578, of various treaties with France. The validity of this legislation was approved by the United States Court of Claims in Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 425 (1887). Concerning this termination generally, see Termination of Treaties, supra n. 15, at 44-46.

^{30a/} 481 F. Supp. at 960.

^{31/} In Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 243; 128 N.E. 185, 192 (1920), cert. den., 254 U.S. 643 (1920), Judge Cardozo stated that "the President and Senate may denounce the treaty, and thus terminate its life."

In contrast to the preceding points, the following contentions might be urged against the constitutionality of H.R. 5082:

1. Although the text of the Constitution is silent regarding which branch of the federal government is empowered to terminate international agreements, the existence of this power may be inferred in the Executive inasmuch as the Supreme Court has acknowledged the President as the "sole organ" of the government in the conduct of foreign relations. As stated by the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.--

It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing...with...the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations--a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment--perhaps serious embarrassment--is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. 32/

In the context of the Executive's pending notice of United States withdrawal from UNESCO, an action which is predicated inter alia upon the Organization's ineffectiveness in attaining the principles embodied in the agreement establishing the UNESCO Constitution,^{33/} it seems arguable on the basis of Curtiss-Wright that "[i]t is quite apparent that if...embarrassment...is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved... [Congress] must...accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction."

32/ 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

33/ See Secretary of State Shultz's letter of December 28, 1983, to the Director General of UNESCO in 84 Dept. State. Bull., supra n. 1, at 41.

2. The United States notice of withdrawal from UNESCO arguably should also be viewed in the context of the President's exclusive authority under the Constitution to conduct international negotiations on behalf of the Nation. Thus, in his letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations concerning American withdrawal from UNESCO, Secretary Shultz, while stating that the decision to withdraw was "firm," nevertheless indicated that the United States will remain a "full member" during 1984 and that "this year will give UNESCO a potential opportunity to respond to the serious concerns that have caused our withdrawal. We remain open to indications of significant improvement."^{34/} In this connection, it may be recalled that the United States, after withdrawing from the ILO in 1977, subsequently rejoined this Organization in 1980 following "significant progress" made by ILO on the issues that had prompted the Executive's action in 1977.^{35/}

To the extent that the Executive's unilateral notice of withdrawal is deemed a component of international negotiations, it is arguable that Congress is without constitutional competence to circumscribe this action. Again the language of the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright is instructive:

Not only...is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate

^{34/} 84 Dept. State. Bull., supra n. 1, at 42.

^{35/} See 80 Dept. State. Bull. 65 (April 1980).

and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as the representative of the nation... he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it...The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at a very early day in our history (February 15, 1816), reported to the Senate, among other things, as follows:

"The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the Constitution. The Committee consider this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of his duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations calculated to diminish that responsibility and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety. The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch."...(emphasis supplied.)36/

3. While the Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I. § 8, cl. 18) enables Congress to enact legislation implementing the Nation's international obligations contained in treaties and executive agreements, resort to this Clause is arguably not "Proper" when invoked to circumscribe independent Presidential authority to withdraw from an Organization established by an international agreement. In short, there seems to be a fundamental distinction for constitutional purposes between 1) the authority of Congress under this Clause "to carry into Execution" through

36/ 299 U.S. at 319.

implementing legislation powers vested by the Constitution in the President and 2) reliance upon the same authority to assert a general legislative competence, factually unrelated to any actual "Execution" or implementation of Presidential powers, concerning a subject area lying within the Executive's independent domain. Moreover, in two recent instances where Congress has sought to rely upon the Necessary and Proper Clause in support of legislation affecting the President's foreign relations power, such reliance has not gone unchallenged by the Executive.^{37/}

4. Although the existing case law does not squarely resolve the issue at hand, the courts have deferred to the Executive for determinations whether existing treaties remain in force owing to various interational circumstances pertaining to the status of a party to the treaty or in the event of breach by another nation of its obligations under the instrument.^{38/} If the President possesses the authority under the Constitution to make the basic policy decision regarding the continuing effectiveness vel non of international agreements in these circumstances, there is arguably no compelling justification for denying this authority where, as in the present instance, the Executive determines that the principles contained in the constituent agreement of an

^{37/} See President Nixon's Veto Message concerning the War Powers Resolution, 9 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1285-87 (1973), and H.R. Rep. No. 92-1301, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1972), regarding the transmittal of executive agreements to Congress.

^{38/} See Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285-88 (1902); and Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 474-76 (1913).

international organization are not being effectively implemented by the organization itself, and, accordingly, withdraws United States membership under the terms of the agreement.

5. Past practice confirms a number of instances of unilateral action by the Executive in terminating the Nation's obligations under international agreements.^{39/} More recently, the Executive withdrew unilaterally without formal objection by Congress from the ILO, an organization established on the same basis as UNESCO, i.e. pursuant to an agreement sanctioned by the joint authority of the President and Congress.^{40/} Arguments endeavoring to diminish the import of these independent Executive actions by positing the existence of inferential legislative approval or extenuating international circumstances, merely obscure a critical legal reality noted by the Court of Appeals in Goldwater v. Carter -- "in no single situation has a treaty been continued in force over the opposition of the President."^{41/}

6. The argument that those organs of the federal government which participate in the conclusion of international agreements ought to be constitutionally competent in the termination of such agreements is not authoritatively confirmed by actual practice as an exclusive procedure. It is particularly difficult to affirm the asserted proposition in light of demonstrable instances involving Congressional participation

^{39/} See Termination of Treaties, supra n. 15, at 42 and 57-59.

^{40/} See nn. 18-19 supra.

^{41/} 617 F. 2d at 706.

in the termination of treaties which, by definition under domestic law, are concluded solely by the President and Senate.^{42/} Indeed, the argument seems valid only to the limited extent that on previous occasions a legislative role regarding the termination of particular agreements may have reflected a practical or political accomodation between the President and the Congress.^{43/}

CONCLUSION

As observed at the outset of this report, the question regarding which branch of the government is constitutionally empowered to terminate the Nation's international agreements seems to lack definitive resolution in the text of the Constitution and in the existing case law and practice thereunder. It would seem, however, assuming arguendo the enactment of H.R. 5082 and the absence of a jurisdictional bar to a judicial test of the legislation on the merits, Congress' legal position would be stronger vis a vis the Executive than in Goldwater v. Carter. Specifically, a refusal by the President to rescind the existing notice of withdrawal from UNESCO would be against the officially declared will of Congress, thereby not only increasing the Executive's constitutional burden under Justice Jackson's separation of powers analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

^{42/} See Termination of Treaties, supra n. 15, at 39, 41, 42, 46-52, and 55-56.

^{43/} See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 23, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

^{44/}
supra, but also presumably avoiding an objection to judicial jurisdiction for want of "ripeness" of the dispute.^{45/} Moreover, unlike Goldwater v. Carter, Congress' position seems bolstered by the fact that the agreement at issue here was initially authorized by the whole Congress rather than by the President and the Senate only. On the other hand, to the extent that the Executive's notice of withdrawal from UNESCO is deemed incidental to his exclusive authority to conduct international negotiations, the President's legal case appears to enjoy an additional supporting argument that was perhaps less germane in the specific context of Goldwater v. Carter.

While this report presents a number of propositions that might be asserted either for or against the validity of H.R. 5082 and that possess varying degrees of cogency depending largely upon a decision-maker's predilections toward the legislation, the following comments serve to remind of the broader constitutional context in which this issue rests:


What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer on the President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain other powers of the same general kind on the Senate, and still other such powers on Congress; but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining the course of the American nation is left for events to resolve.

^{44/} In presenting its case to the Supreme Court in Goldwater v. Carter, the Executive noted the absence of any definitive legislative action contrary to the President's unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Brief for Respondents in Opposition, at 13-14, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

^{45/} See, for example, the concurring opinion of Powell, J., in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 997-98.

All of which amounts to saying that the Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.^{46/}

The constitutional understandings are based on the distinction between the possession of a power and discretion in the exercise of that power. The law of the constitution decides what organs of the government possess the power to perform acts of international significance and to make valid international commitments, but the understandings of the constitution decide how the discretion or judgment, implied from the possession of power, ought to be exercised in given circumstances. The powers given by law to various organs often overlap. Even more often, two or more organs must exercise their powers in cooperation in order to achieve a desired end. In such circumstances, were it not for understandings, deadlocks would be chronic. The law is the mechanism, the understandings the oil that permit it to run smoothly.^{47/}



David M. Sale
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
April 30, 1984

^{46/} E. Corwin, The President-Office and Powers 171 (4th rev. ed. 1957).

^{47/} Q. Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 8 (1922).

APPENDIX 2

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS AND THE
U.S. NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF
MUSEUMS [AAM/ICOM]

Museums in the United States have always promoted an international perspective as a vital component of their role in society. Such a perspective enriches the lives and broadens the horizons of Americans and leads to increased knowledge and understanding. Museum collections, educational programs and the professional activities of museum staffs all reflect this fundamental international concern. For this reason, the American Association of Museums, which represents more than 5,650 individual museum professionals and 1,700 institutions, is pleased to discuss the contributions being made by UNESCO to the museum community and museum-going public.

The AAM also constitutes the U.S. National Committee of the International Council of Museums (ICOM). Founded in 1946, ICOM is a worldwide non-governmental organization of museum professionals, independent of national governments and international agencies, dedicated to the advancement of museums throughout the world. Including institutions of every discipline -- science, technology, ethnography, natural history, art and archaeology -- ICOM has approximately 8,000 members in 118 countries. One thousand of these members are in the U.S. Among its various activities, ICOM advises on the establishment of new museums and the improvement of existing ones, and promotes professional concerns such as training, programming, ethics, security, conservation, documentation of collections, display techniques and education in museums. It also issues numerous publications, arranges for the exchange of personnel, and holds a triennial General Conference at which museum professionals from all over the world can participate in discussing new concepts, ideas and methods. ICOM is constantly seeking ways to implement the museum's responsibility toward the public, and is demonstrating that museums are not just repositories, but play an active role in serving society.

ICOM is governed by its General Assembly which meets every three years, and in the interim all business is handled by an elected Executive Council and an Advisory Committee. It has 77 National Committees (Appendix A) which serve as administrative units; the professional projects are carried out by 22 specialized International Committees, which bring together experts in particular fields (Appendix B). ICOM's Secretariat, located in Paris, consisting of a Secretary General and a small staff, oversees the day to day operation of the organization.

UNESCO's charter authorizes it to seek the assistance of non-governmental international organizations to carry out its program in fields of mutual interest. Since its beginning, ICOM has acted in this advisory capacity and has established close working relationships with UNESCO's Division of Cultural Heritage in a number of areas. This arrangement is based upon the common objective to preserve and present the world's heritage. Written agreements since 1947 have formalized this cooperation.

UNESCO and ICOM jointly operate a Documentation Center, a unique information resource for museologists, researchers and students. The Documentation Center collects information of all kinds related to museums -- including monographs, catalogs, guides, posters, periodicals and photographs -- and provides its reference services either by mail or in person to any interested person. It compiles specialized bibliographies on every conceivable practical and theoretical aspect of museum activities, from architecture to zoological specimens. The Center can also provide, for

example, lists of museums and of particular kinds of collections, files on sources for supplies and equipment, a survey of methods and experiences in museum programming, and a roster of experts and specialized consultants available for technical assistance missions. These services are carried out with no funds allocated for acquisitions: holdings are generally donated or obtained by exchange for UNESCO or ICOM publications. At the present time, the UNESCO-ICOM Documentation Center is being computerized through the use of the UNESCO computer system and a grant of \$10,000 from UNESCO to augment the staff. When completed, computerization will facilitate rapid up-dating of information and increased specialization of the information disseminated, as well as improving worldwide access to the Center's holdings.

UNESCO publishes a wide range of directories, manuals, books and pamphlets useful to museums and specialists around the world, most of which are prepared through consultation with ICOM, or with direct ICOM involvement. Foremost among these is the quarterly periodical, Museum, "an international forum of information and reflection on museums of all kinds," now in its thirty-sixth year of publication. Published in four languages, it is distributed to all ICOM members worldwide and is held in high esteem for its content and production. One of Museum's most important objectives is to focus attention on the problems common to museums worldwide, as was done in a recent special issue addressing conservation needs. American museums share these problems and benefit from participating in the international network seeking solutions.

UNESCO is actively involved in providing technical assistance to museums, most of it carried out by the expertise of ICOM members under contract. It

aids in the establishment of new museums, as well as providing professional diagnosis and assistance to improve existing museums. It also enlists experts to assist in museum operations. Much of the most significant work in this area recently has taken place in the Arab countries, particularly in Egypt: the reorganization of the Islamic Museum in Cairo, the planning and building of the Nubia Museum in Aswan, and development of plans for a new National Museum of Egyptian Civilization in Cairo.

Other professional assistance is provided by studies and technical reports. One example is a 1981 field mission of ICOM experts to Turkey which prepared a report for the Turkish government on the reorganization, restoration and conservation of the Topkapi Palace and Museum in Istanbul. The report includes a survey of the buildings, collection, equipment and administration, and recommended further action, now being implemented in UNESCO's International Campaign for Istanbul and Goreme. ICOM experts have also been actively involved in other UNESCO International Campaigns, such as those for Moenjodaro (Pakistan) and Egypt, which have included the development of museums as major components.

Specialized meetings also assist museum professionals, such as the conference on "Museum Planning: from Methodology to Reality," held in Paris, and the Third Asian Regional Assembly, held in Seoul, Korea, and co-hosted by ICOM, both in 1982; and the recent (April 1984) conference on preservation held in Washington, D.C., and co-sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution. Conference proceedings are published for wide distribution. UNESCO also supports ICOM-organized training programs, such as a two-year course for

African museum professionals conducted in Niger. The UNESCO-ICOM Documentation Center also supports regional training centers (a notable example is one in Baghdad) by providing required basic materials.

As a complement to technical training, UNESCO and ICOM are collaborating closely in the development and promotion of improved professional standards and ethics in the museum field. UNESCO international conventions and resolutions, particularly those concerning the illicit traffic in cultural property and the return and restitution of property of exceptional significance to a nation's heritage, have increased awareness of the responsibilities of museums throughout the world, and have aided in the development of an orderly framework for negotiation and mutual cooperation. UNESCO also supports such practical measures as compiling national inventories (for example in Africa and Oceania) and in collecting and diffusing information on national laws and other measures intended to curb illicit traffic.

A correlary of the close collaboration of ICOM and UNESCO in programs is a financial relationship as well. Only about one-quarter of ICOM's annual \$900,000 budget derives from membership dues, an amount which serves to cover only the cost of regular services to members. The remainder of the regular program is financed by subsidies and other external subventions, a large segment of which is provided by UNESCO. Beyond the regular program, ICOM provides additional technical service to UNESCO under separate contracts. UNESCO provides ICOM with free space for the offices of its Secretariat and Documentation Center, and other services such as computer data processing.

Under the current arrangements, straitened financial circumstances within UNESCO can be expected to have a detrimental effect on ICOM.

American museum professionals are deriving many benefits from ICOM and UNESCO-supported programs of ICOM. They have access to a vast array of unique publications and the unprecedented information resource of the UNESCO-ICOM Documentation Center and can consult with the expertise of the Secretariat and International Committees. They are professionally enriched and informed by active participation in the work of the ICOM International Committees and the General Conference, and have the opportunity to serve as consultants on the many specialized projects throughout the world. Through these activities they also help bring American methods and perspectives to the worldwide community.

Moreover, Americans have an important and influential role within ICOM: the U.S. Committee is the largest of the National Committees, and sent 200 delegates to the 1983 General Conference in London. Americans were instrumental in the original formation of ICOM, and have regularly served as officers and on the Executive Council. Americans frequently hold leadership positions on the International Committees, and are regular contributors to the ICOM and UNESCO publications. Such participation helps Americans develop their own expertise and experience, while they become more aware of differing regional needs and approaches. ICOM's emphasis on the need for museums to serve the public ultimately insures that these professional and individual gains will be transformed into benefits for the American people and enrichment of U.S. museums.

In addition to the increased goodwill and understanding which results from international cultural exchanges of all kinds, there are foreign policy benefits to be gained from U.S. involvement in the area of museums. ICOM's and UNESCO's technical assistance programs are most active in developing countries in all parts of the world -- Asia, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and the Arab countries. Such assistance helps these countries identify their problems and then utilize their resources more effectively. U.S. involvement in these projects demonstrates respect for the local cultural heritage, thereby building friendship and trust among the population, outside the purely political arena. A positive image of the U.S. is also enhanced by participation in efforts to improve international standards and ethics: for example, U.S. ratification last year of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property has attracted widespread international attention and recognition as a sign of moral leadership. (The Soviet Union has not ratified the Convention, but is now reportedly expressing interest in doing so.)

The State Department's U.S./UNESCO Policy Review (February 1984) concluded that no serious problems exist in the programs within UNESCO's cultural sector. The American museum community hopes that the benefits derived by the entire world from these valuable programs will not be lost through the withdrawal of the United States. Furthermore, it hopes that any U.S. efforts to conduct international cultural activities unilaterally or bilaterally will avoid the very problems of politicization and bureaucratic inefficiency now being cited in other program sectors of UNESCO.

APPENDIX A
ICOM NATIONAL COMMITTEES

ALGERIA	GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
ANGOLA	GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
ARGENTINA	GHANA
AUSTRALIA	GREECE
AUSTRIA	GUATEMALA
BANGLADESH	HAITI
BELGIUM	HUNGARY
BRAZIL	INDIA
BULGARIA	INDONESIA
CANADA	IRAN
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	IRELAND
CHILE	ISRAEL
CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	ITALY
COLOMBIA	JAPAN
CONGO	KENYA
COSTA RICA	KOREA
CUBA	LEBANON
CYPRUS	LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	LUXEMBURG
DENMARK	MALAYSIA
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	MALI
EGYPT	MEXICO
ETHIOPIA	MONACO
FINLAND	NEPAL
FRANCE	NETHERLANDS
	NEW ZEALAND

NIGERIA	SWITZERLAND
NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
PAKISTAN	TANZANIA
PANAMA	THAILAND
PHILIPPINES	TUNISIA
POLAND	TURKEY
PORTUGAL	UNITED KINGDOM
RUMANIA	UNITED STATES
SIERRA LEONE	URUGUAY
SINGAPORE	USSR
SPAIN	VENEZUELA
SRI LANKA	YUGOSLAVIA
SWEDEN	ZAMBIA

APPENDIX B

ICOM INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEES

APPLIED ART	GLASS
ARCHAEOLOGY & HISTORY	LITERATURE
ARCHITECTURE AND MUSEUM TECHNIQUES	MODERN ART
CONSERVATION	MUSEOLOGY
COSTUME	MUSEUM PUBLIC RELATIONS
DOCUMENTATION	MUSEUM SECURITY
EDUCATION & CULTURAL ACTION	MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS
EGYPTOLOGY	NATURAL HISTORY
ETHNOGRAPHY	REGIONAL MUSEUMS
EXHIBITION EXCHANGE	SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
FINE ART	TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

APPENDIX 3

STATEMENT OF CHADWICK F. ALGER TO THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION

MAY 3, 1984.

To all IPRA members.

DEAR COLLEAGUES: As you all know, controversy is now raging about the programs and performance of UNESCO. While controversy in international organizations is nothing new, and is to be expected, the UNESCO situation is in a very dangerous stage because the United States has declared its intention to leave the organization at the end of 1984. This has caused some other governments to hint that they might consider a similar move. I hope that you will give this situation your careful attention, evaluate the importance of UNESCO to international collaboration in social science in general and in peace research in particular, and act energetically in the light of this evaluation.

As you all know, IPRA has been supported by UNESCO for some years. We have had sustained financial support through a subvention to the International Social Science Council for the support of international social science organizations. While this support only provides a small part of money required to keep IPRA afloat, it is indispensable. IPRA research contracts with UNESCO have made it possible for many members of IPRA to carry out significant research. UNESCO has consistently made it possible for Third World colleagues to attend our meetings. The development of our regional affiliates in Asia and Latin America have been significantly supported by UNESCO. Our efforts to strengthen peace research in Africa have received indispensable help from UNESCO.

At the same time, UNESCO has not only supported other international social science organizations but has also provided an arena for exchange and cooperation among international social science organizations by its support for the International Social Science Council. This has provided IPRA with important opportunities to stimulate the interest of these other associations in research on peace-related problems.

Certainly all of us who have been involved with UNESCO have come away with frustrations. The same occurs in our relations with our own national governments and with our national social science organizations. But I strongly believe that resignations from UNESCO, and threats to leave, are not constructive ways to deal with problems that do exist. Organizations such as UNESCO are new on the world scene. Indeed, they are still experiments in worldwide collaboration and problem solving. Rather than leaving them, those who disagree with their policies and procedures should increase their efforts to help these organizations to strengthen their programs. This cannot be done by weakening UNESCO through withdrawal.

It is abhorrent for any member to use the threat of withdrawal in order to bring about change in policies in an international organization. In particular, it is to be regretted when a country tries to use its financial power to circumvent constitutional procedures for decision-making and program development. I would make a special appeal to IPRA members from the United States to become intensely involved in the UNESCO debate in the United States.

It goes without saying that in this appeal I am speaking only for myself, and not for the IPRA council or IPRA members. But I am sure that all members would agree that UNESCO is very important to the international social science movement of which IPRA is a part. For this reason it is important that all IPRA members be informed about UNESCO and be actively involved in shaping the UNESCO policies of their own country. Too many peace researchers who have an interest in this issue have been silent.

Sincerely,

CHADWICK F. ALGER.

APPENDIX 4

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES REGARDING KEITH GEIGER'S TESTIMONY
FOR THE NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

We would like a description of the work of the International Institute for Educational Planning. What is its budget? How big is its staff? What kind of publications are prepared? How many people are trained every year in the educational training, planning and management? How are they selected? How is the program evaluated? And, how is the Institute related to the International Bureau of Education of UNESCO that is based in Geneva?

We have no connection to IBE in the NEA Office of Peace Programs and International Relations. The World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) deals with IBE. Therefore, I cannot respond to the above questions.

Does the NEA get reports from UNESCO educational programs through its membership in the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Professions?

The WCOTP keeps its Executive Committee informed of UNESCO programs which affect the outreach activities of WCOTP. We review the program plans of UNESCO as they deal with international education programs and discuss them at irregular intervals with WCOTP. Bob Harris, the North American Regional Program Officer of WCOTP, had been the Vice President of the UNESCO Standing Committee for non-governmental organizations with consultative status to UNESCO for the past five years. He was elected President in June 1984. We therefore are provided with as much detail as we want concerning UNESCO programs and operations. We find the consultative relationship with WCOTP on UNESCO satisfactory.

How frequent and how informative, how detailed are these reports?

Through WCOTP, we have been provided opportunities to consult members of the UNESCO Secretariat and staff on matters of concern to us. We have met with the Director General and Paris-based staff as well as U.S.-based personnel in Washington and at the United Nations. We are provided whatever documents we have requested in the past.

Do you have any input into the UNESCO policies and programs dealing with education?

We have an opportunity to provide input to the UNESCO Secretariat and its committees through WCOTP and have used this connection to provide input regarding such things as the *Education for All* programs within the current medium-term plan for 1985-89 and for the programs dealing with education of women and vocational-technical education. Similarly, we have discussed with WCOTP the need for teacher union involvement in educational planning on a regional and global level. We find UNESCO receptive to these interventions.

And finally, a question that won't be on here. I would like to know what you are doing in a grass roots way to make the American public, the teaching profession, NEA, and so forth, for both of you, aware of the problems with UNESCO, your position and whether or not we should or should not withdraw.

We have provided separate reports on UNESCO to members of the Board of Directors, Officers, and Executive Committee of NEA. We have provided information to the activists in Peace and International Relations through a briefing memorandum. We have distributed copies of special reports on UNESCO to the delegates of the NEA Representative Assembly composed of some 8,000 NEA members. We intend to continue to do more of the same in the future. The matter of UNESCO programs is an order of business at the coming Board of Directors meeting and an information piece will be distributed to the delegates at the 1984 Representative Assembly in Minneapolis.

APPENDIX 5

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JEAN GERARD, U.S. PERMANENT DELEGATE TO UNESCO DURING A MEETING WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, JUNE 26, 1984

Six months have passed since Secretary Shultz notified UNESCO Director General M'Bow of the United States' decision to withdraw from UNESCO. I believe it would be useful for me to inform you of what has happened at UNESCO headquarters during that period.

The Western Information Group, a caucus of developed democracies who are members of the OECD, met on January 10, a date when the shock of our withdrawal notice was still reverberating in the halls of UNESCO. After considerable debate, the Information Group concluded that our action was not the cause but a symptom of the crisis at UNESCO. It decided to work vigorously to attain two objectives: substantial reform within UNESCO and U.S. reconsideration of its decision to withdraw on the basis of the nature and extent of this reform.

I stated our position unequivocally. Our decision to withdraw was reasoned and firm; we would not, however, be insensitive to significant procedural and structural reform that might be forthcoming before the effective date of withdrawal, December

31, 1984. I pledged that we would work vigorously for such reform.

By mid-February, an Information Group Committee on Reform, chaired by Dutch Ambassador Maarten Mourik, had produced the first draft of a working document on reform, the so-called Mourik paper. After two revisions, it was presented in mid-March to Director General M'Bow as representing the views of a "large majority" of the Information Group.

The Mourik paper identified problems of three kinds: structural and institutional; political; and managerial, budgetary, and program-related. To deal with the specifics of these problems, the Western Group set up sub-committees on human rights, communications, peace and disarmament, management, program, and structural and procedural reform. My staff played and continues to play a central role in the work of each of these sub-committees, and in fact, played the pivotal role in setting into motion the Western reform efforts.

In the meantime, representatives of the Western Information Group met with spokesmen from the other regional groupings of

UNESCO Member States. During the early months of this year, each of these groups had made formal declarations of confidence in the Director General, support for UNESCO and its programs, and regret at the action taken by the United States. In conversations with members of the Western group, however, all regional spokesmen, including the Soviet representative, agreed that change was needed at UNESCO. They also insisted, however, that the UNESCO Constitution not be amended and that past agreements, in particular the Medium-Term Plan and the Program for 1984-85, not be challenged. The Arab group, the Soviet Union, and the Philippines produced written statements of their position on reform and our action.

Pressure for change increased considerably on April 2, when the British Permanent Delegate to UNESCO delivered to Director General M'Bow a letter from Mr. Timothy Raison, Minister of Overseas Development. Mr. Raison identified areas where the British Government believed change was necessary, stated that his government expected to see significant improvement by the end of 1984, and said that, unless such improvements were forthcoming, it would become increasingly difficult to justify British membership in UNESCO.

At this time there was general puzzlement and disappointment at UNESCO that the Secretariat had made no visible move toward reform, despite the ferment for renewal among the major contributors and many other Member States. In fact, the signals from UNESCO were not at all encouraging. They were summed up in a background document prepared by the Secretariat for the Executive Board discussion of our notice of withdrawal (Document 119 EX/14). It was a petulant and defensive document which, in a letter to the Director General, I rejected as an unsuitable basis for discussion.

There was little or no reaction from the Secretariat to the reform movement until mid-May when, at the 119th session of the Executive Board, the Director General announced that he was setting up working groups on personnel, evaluation, budget, public information, and program. These, he said, were reform issues that fell within his realm of responsibilities. The working groups are to meet during the summer and report to the Executive Board at its 120th session. "Outside experts," including several well-qualified Americans, have been invited to serve on each working group, except the one devoted to program.

The Executive Board, itself, set up its own temporary committee on reform. It will meet twice and possibly three times during the summer, and will also report to the 120th session of the Board. It is chaired by Dr. Yvo Margan of Yugoslavia, a man of integrity and competence, and includes Board Members from each of UNESCO's regional groupings: Japan, India, Nigeria, Guinea, Tunisia, Algeria, Brazil, Jamaica, the Soviet Union, Iceland, France and the United Kingdom. In addition, France was given a place on the committee in its capacity as host country of UNESCO.

Our strategy was not to seek a place on the committee, itself, but to influence it through active work within the Western Information Group, which will act as a kind of staff for Western representatives on the committee. By continuing to work in close cooperation with the Western Group, the indispensable impetus we have given the reform process acquires wider support. At the same time, we preserve complete independence to make an objective assessment of the magnitude of change effected by the end of the year, and we avoid the danger of leading others to believe that we are signing on in advance to whatever issues eventually from the committee's deliberations.

In addition to setting up these mechanisms, which could lead to real reform, the 119th session of the Board made two other noteworthy decisions. Beginning at its next session, Assistant Directors General responsible for program will appear before the Board for "program hearings." During these sessions, they will be questioned on the planning, implementation, and evaluation of their programs. The Board requested also that the Secretariat increase and expand its consultations with Member States during the process of drafting the Program and Budget. Such consultations began in mid-June. I am pleased to say that both of these initiatives originated in the U.S. delegation.

You are aware, I am sure, that all was not sunshine and roses at the Board Meeting. The Soviets were rude, contankerous, and, at times, nearly obstructionist; the Group of 77 was, by turn reform-minded and defensive; and the Director General unpredictable. You will recall that, in a most inappropriate comment, he said publicly that, his legal adviser's opinion notwithstanding, he believed that the United States owed a payment for 1985 even though it would no longer be a member of the organization. I immediately expressed my firm disagreement and my surprise that he would raise such a matter publicly without first discussing it with me in private.

I should like to emphasize that during the entire Executive Board meeting, I explained our government's position with candor and clarity. I said that, although our decision to withdraw from UNESCO had been made, we would not be insensitive to significant reform, and that, should such reform be forthcoming, we would advise the President to review his decision. I said also that, in my view, UNESCO's surest path to reform and renewal is for it to give absolute priority to those few core elements in education, science, culture, and communication where consensus for international cooperation is

real and unambiguous. I am convinced that action of this nature--the core areas strategy--would, by definition, prioritize and concentrate the program, depoliticize it, focus the image of UNESCO, and increase its chances of making a real impact within its fields of competence. I called for reform of the working methods of the organization's governing bodies, better management and personnel practices, sound evaluation, and a careful assessment of the use of the consensus procedure. I will not burden you with the details of these important issues, but, instead, will attach to this statement copies of my principal speeches at UNESCO during the recent Board meeting. I shall attach also a list of the fifteen best and the fifteen worst UNESCO programs as assessed informally by 16 members of the Western Information Group. You will note that the programs that provide fundamental services to the developing countries enjoy the greatest support while those most removed from UNESCO's core areas receive the least.

My staff and I continue to work vigorously within the Western Group to formulate strategies for effective change.

At a meeting of the group in Paris tomorrow, in fact, we will put forward additional suggestions for changes to be considered for possible support by the group as a whole. One such suggestion is for the creation of a drafting and negotiating

committee of the Executive Board to which contentious proposals, which lack broad support, could be referred at the request of several members, and which would not be returned to plenary in the absence of agreement within the committee. Another recommendation is a broadened mandate for UNESCO's external auditor requiring him to reply to inquiries from member states on a variety of financial questions. A third recommendation is for some kind of agreement on concentration of resources in core program areas whose central importance is universally recognized, and where the will for cooperative international action truly exists.

We also meet regularly with Secretariat officials at all levels and with permanent delegates from every region of the world to explain our position and work for renewal. We shall continue to do so while carefully assessing the outcome of the reform committees. We are neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but we are certain about one thing. There would have been no reform movement at UNESCO had Secretary Shultz not written, on the instruction of President Reagan, a decisive letter to Director General M'Bow last December 28. Now, talk of change is respectable and even commonplace. What response it evokes remains to be seen. But the change of attitude, itself, represents progress.

APPENDIX 6

AGENDA OF THE UNESCO EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING, MAY 9-23,
1984United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization

Executive Board

Hundred-and-nineteenth Session

(9-23 May 1984)

119 EX/1
PARIS, 10 May 1984
Original: French/English

AGENDA

<u>Item</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Document</u>
1	ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA		119 EX/1
1.1	Replacement of a member during his term of office		119 EX/NOM/1
2	APPROVAL OF THE SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 117TH AND 118TH SESSIONS		117 EX/SR.1-25 118 EX/SR.1-3
3	METHODS OF WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION		
3.1	<u>Executive Board</u>		
3.1.1	Organization of the session: Report of the Bureau on questions which do not appear to require debate	103 EX/Decision 3.2.1, paragraph 2(c) 113 EX/Decision 3.1.2	119 EX/2
3.2	<u>Reports of the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit</u>		
3.2.1	Fifteenth report on the activities of the Joint Inspection Unit (July 1982- June 1983) and report of the Special Committee thereon (119 EX/7)	Article 11, JIU Statutes, 20 C/Resolution 39.1	119 EX/3

<u>Item</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Document</u>
3.2.2	United Nations system co-operation in developing evaluation by governments (JIU/REP/82/12) and report of the Special Committee thereon (119 EX/7)		119 EX/4
3.2.3	Progress report on the implementation of recommendations on regional programmes in the conservation and management of African wildlife (JIU/REP/83/3) and report of the Special Committee thereon (119 EX/7)		119 EX/5
3.2.4	Contribution of the United Nations system to conservation and management of cultural and natural heritage in Asia and the Pacific (JIU/REP/83/10) and report of the Special Committee thereon (119 EX/7)		119 EX/6
3.3	Methods of strengthening the process of consultation relating to the preparation of the Draft Programme and Budget for 1986-1987 (23 C/5)	Item proposed by Mr Ian Christie Clark (Canada)	119 EX/33
4	EXECUTION OF THE PROGRAMME		
4.1	<u>Reports of the Director-General</u>		
4.1.1	Oral report on the activities of the Organization since the 118th session	103 EX/Decision 3.2.1	
4.1.2	Studies in depth to be carried out by the Special Committee on the basis of the Director-General's Report on the Activities of the Organization in 1981-1983: Selection of topics and appointment of rapporteurs Report of the Special Committee (119 EX/7)	107 EX/Decision 4.1.2(18)	119 EX/SP/INF.1
4.1.3	Measures proposed by the Director-General to absorb within the 1984-1985 budget the global reduction of \$10,483,000 authorized by the General Conference	(Item proposed by the Director-General)	119 EX/29

<u>Item</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Document</u>
4.2	<u>Education</u>		
4.2.1	Invitations to the fourth International Conference on Adult Education	Regulations for the classification of meetings, Article 21	119 EX/8 and Add.
4.2.2	Draft Statutes of the Advisory Committee on the Renewal of Science and Technology Teaching in Africa		119 EX/9
4.2.3	Amendment to the Statutes of the Advisory Committee of the European Centre for Higher Education (CEPES), Bucharest, and of the Advisory Committee of the Regional Centre for Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean (CRESALC), Caracas		119 EX/10
4.2.4	Additional invitations to the 39th session of the International Conference on Education	Regulations for the classification of meetings, Article 21	119 EX/32
4.3	<u>Natural Sciences and their Application to Development</u>		
4.3.1	Invitations to the Conference of Ministers responsible for the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Latin America and the Caribbean (CASTALAC II)	Regulations for the classification of meetings, Article 21	119 EX/11
4.3.2	Invitation of observers to the session of the Interim Intergovernmental Committee for Informatics	Regulations for the classification of meetings, Article 21	119 EX/31
4.4	<u>Copyright</u>		
4.4.1	Invitations to the meeting of the second Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain	Regulations for the classification of meetings, Article 21	119 EX/12
4.4.2	Invitations to the meeting of the second Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Folklore	Regulations for the classification of meetings, Article 21	119 EX/13

<u>Item</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Document</u>
5	RELATIONS WITH MEMBER STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS		
5.1	Communication from the Secretary of State of the United States of America concerning the withdrawal of the United States of America	(Item proposed by the Director-General)	119 EX/14
5.2	Recent decisions and activities of the organizations of the United Nations system of relevance to the work of Unesco	103 EX/Decisions 6.1, 6.2	119 EX/15 and Corr.
	5.2.1 Second Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination		
	5.2.2 Return or restitution of cultural property to its countries of origin		
	5.2.3 International Year of Peace		
	5.2.4 Thirty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: International co-operation for the promotion and respect of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights		
	5.2.5 International Conference on the Question of Palestine		
	5.2.6 Questions relating to information		
	5.2.7 International Year of Shelter for the Homeless		

<u>Item</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Document</u>
5.3	Review and appraisal of the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade	116 EX/Decision 7.1.1, paragraph 6	119 EX/16
5.4	Recent developments in the operational activities of the United Nations system	117 EX/Decision 7.2, paragraph 8	119 EX/17
5.5	Assistance to Lebanon: Report of the Director-General	116 EX/Decision 7.2	119 EX/18
5.6	Damage caused to Palestinian and Lebanese educational and cultural institutions: Report of the Director-General	116 EX/Decision 7.3	119 EX/19
5.7	Classification of international non-governmental organizations and report of the Committee on International Non-Governmental Organizations (119 EX/21)	61 EX/Decision 15.2(II)	119 EX/20
5.8	Draft agreement between Unesco and the Gulf States Information and Documentation Centre (GSIDC)	117 EX/Decision 7.6	119 EX/22
5.9	Draft agreement between Unesco and the Eastern African Centre for Research on Oral Traditions and African National Languages (EACROTANAL)	115 EX/Decision 7.6	119 EX/23
5.10	Draft agreement between Unesco and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO)	117 EX/Decision 7.7	119 EX/24
5.11)	Communication from the United Kingdom Minister of Overseas Development to the Director-General concerning UK policy on Unesco	(Item proposed by the United Kingdom)	119 EX/30

<u>Item</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Document</u>
6	ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS		
6.1	Proposed transfers between appropriation lines within the budget for 1984-1985	22 C/Resolution 16	119 EX/25
6.2	Gifts, bequests and subventions, and report on the establishment and closure of Trust Funds and Reserve and Special Accounts	Financial Regulations, Articles 6.6, 6.7 and 7.2	119 EX/26 and Add.
6.3	Report of the Director-General on the adjustments made prior to the closure of the accounts concerning the 1981-1983 budget	118 EX/Decision 10.1, paragraph 3	119 EX/27
6.4	Ninth Annual Report (1983) of the International Civil Service Commission: Report of the Director-General	114 EX/Decision 8.5, paragraph 8, 22 C/Resolution 37	119 EX/28
(6.5)	Questions regarding personnel recruitment and management at Unesco	Item proposed by Mr Takaaki Kagawa (Japan)	119 EX/34
7	OTHER BUSINESS		
7.1	Report of the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations: Examination of communications transmitted to the Committee in accordance with 104 EX/Decision 3.3	104 EX/Decision 3.3	119 EX/35 PRIV.
7.2	Celebration of the centenary of the birth of Sir Alexander Bustamante, National Hero of Jamaica	(Item proposed by Jamaica)	
7.3	Celebration of the centenary of the death of Bedřich Smetana, Czech composer	(Item proposed by Czechoslovakia)	

APPENDIX 7

MEMBERSHIP OF THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE SET UP BY THE
EXECUTIVE BOARD FOLLOWING ITS RESOLUTION

GROUP I: Messrs Dodd (UK), Isaksson (Iceland) and Cot (France).
GROUP II: Messrs Ermolenko (USSR) and Margan (Yugoslavia).
GROUP III: Messrs Vargas (Brazil) and Wynter (Jamaica).
GROUP IV: Messrs Kagawa (Japan) and Kaul (India).
GROUP Va: Messrs Olaniyan (Nigeria) and Keita (Guinea).
GROUP Vb: Messrs Rahal (Algeria) and Messadi (Tunisia).

APPENDIX 8

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JEAN BROWARD SHEVLIN GERARD ON
AGENDA ITEM 5.1, 119TH UNESCO EXECUTIVE BOARD, MAY 17, 1984

Thank you, Mr. Chairman: I have asked to take the floor now in order to give Board members our general approach to this item. Before I do so, however, I would like to reply briefly to the remarks made this morning by Mr. Abellan, the distinguished Board member from Spain, who questioned the commitment of my Government to multilateral cooperation. I will request, as you might expect, the floor again later if it seems appropriate in light of other members' comments.

Let me begin by saying that the distinguished member's intervention was an example of the kind of free discussion we in the West value so highly. The freedom of expression he exercised was, in fact, doubly noteworthy—not only did he speak out in criticism of the action of the government of a fellow Board member—a prerogative he has every right to exercise—but he did so without necessarily having synchronized his views with those of his own government, as he himself indicated, quite properly, that he was speaking in his personal capacity.

Mr. Chairman, we do believe fully in international cooperation, but we believe that this is not an unconditional commitment—such cooperation must be carried out by organizations which do what they are supposed to do, and do it well.

The United States, in fact, belongs to many multilateral organizations—almost 100 of them, in fact. But we will not belong to a multilateral organization just because it exists. We will not lend our support to an international bureaucracy with no regard for whether or not it is efficient. Furthermore, we expect multilateral agencies to concentrate upon their specific purposes—in UNESCO's case, its core areas—and not to encroach upon the functions of other entities. We do not believe, for example, that UNESCO should be a forum for political discussions whose proper place is in the United Nations General Assembly. Finally, Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my letter to you, we most decidedly do not believe that UNESCO need consider all social systems without preference. We all, for example, rejected racism and fascism—even though lamentable traces of both remain in too many countries. UNESCO should instead be promoting freedom by enlarging the opportunities of peoples everywhere in education, science, culture, and communication. That is UNESCO's vocation, and we support it wholeheartedly.

In this too, it will be promoting genuine respect for fundamental individual human rights, as well as for an ever greater free flow of information which is often acquired from a free and independent press. As I said, UNESCO was founded by those with a profound belief in freedom, in free world values, by those who wanted, and still want, to share the benefits of freedom and opportunity with everyone, so we can all develop to our fullest potential together. Instead of throwing stones, instead of degrading those values, let us get down to work and cooperate so that UNESCO fulfills its important mandate to expand opportunities for all in science, education, culture and communication.

May I now turn, Mr. Chairman, to the main point of my intervention. I would like, as I said, to give Board members our general approach to this agenda item. I do this because I believe that it is important to explain, even if it requires me to repeat some points the United States has previously expressed, just exactly how we see the work of the Board from this point onward in our session.

We did not, as you know, inscribe this item on our agenda. We had no particular view about the Director General's decision to do so, it being entirely within his prerogative to propose agenda items.

When we received the document which the Director General presented on this item—119 EX/14—we studied it carefully. We then, took the unusual step of presenting our views of the document in a letter to you, a letter which has now been circulated as Board document 119 EX/INF 6.

Having done that, we gave careful attention to the Director General's oral report. Because that report seemed to us to offer some promise of progress in the direction of change and improvement in some of the areas of great concern to us, we responded to it in a way which we believe stressed its constructive elements. Words, of course, must be translated into deeds, but we had the sense from the reactions of other Board members that they, too, believed that reform and improvement were necessary, and that it needed to be done in a timely manner.

Thus, we believe the Board must choose whether it is to discuss our announced withdrawal in great detail, or whether it will instead use its limited time primarily to discuss those actions which it can take to bring about the improvements in the

Organization which virtually everyone has agreed are desirable, even if there are still very great differences as to just what constitutes improvement.

For our part, that is a choice between debate and action. We can debate the matters raised in document 119 EX/14, and our response thereto, or we can let that exchange of views stand on its own merits, and move along promptly to discussion of action, which is in a general sense related to item 5.11 of our agenda. This is up to the Board to decide, of course. Some very useful suggestions have been made here today.

We believe that it is best to concentrate our time and our energies on action, on the future, on the positive steps we can take. The course of our discussion thus far suggests that many members agree. We have, as you know, expressed our position with respect to UNESCO exhaustively and in the greatest possible detail, first in the letter which Secretary of State Shultz addressed to the Director General, and which you have before you. We have further expressed our views and concerns in individual demarches to the Governments of member states; to the information media; to the Congress of the United States, on the public record; and in countless individual meetings with representatives of member states, national commissions, and interested organizations.

We have, frankly, nothing to add to those expressions of our view. We believe that the Board has made a promising start in facing the problems which it has a responsibility to face, and we pledge our best efforts to making those efforts reach a successful conclusion. We stand ready to respond to serious questions from members of the Board, and to give our careful and continuing attention to points of view expressed here in the months ahead. Above all, we look forward to a full and candid exchange of views about change and improvement in the discussion of item 5.11, and in the private meeting of the Board with the Director General.

Thank you.

APPENDIX 9

U.S. RESPONSE TO DEBATE ON ITEM 5.1, (CONCERNING U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO) BY AMBASSADOR JEAN GERARD, 119TH UNESCO EXECUTIVE BOARD, MAY 9, 1984

I have requested the opportunity to speak at the end of this debate because, obviously, this is a rather unusual occasion, among other reasons because the entire discussion has been focussed on an action of my government.

To those members of the Board, and there are many, who have expressed regret at the United States decision to withdraw from UNESCO, I offer both our understanding, and our appreciation of their sentiment. It will not surprise those who have followed the various statements we have made on this issue, here in Paris, in Washington, and elsewhere, to know that we share the feeling of regret. As we have said, it was a decision taken far more in sadness than in anger—sadness that an Organization which we helped to found, and to which we believe we have contributed much, materially and intellectually, no longer seemed to use the best method of carrying out the kind of international cooperation in education, science, culture and communication in which we believe so strongly.

To those who have asked whether our withdrawal might be postponed, I must say in candor that, at this moment, we have no reason to consider that possibility. Many things have been spoken of at this Board meeting which offer some promise for the future, and it may be that matters will develop in such a way as to make the question an appropriate and timely one. For now, it is not.

To those who have shown concern and worry about the future of the Organization, and a genuine interest in knowing how and why the present situation came about, so that they might better understand what might be done, we commend the forthcoming discussion under agenda item 5.11. We believe, as I have said, that action best meets the need of the present circumstances, and we will contribute to whatever positive opportunities present themselves to the best of our ability.

But other points have been raised during our debate, as well, and I feel compelled to respond to some of them. I do so in the interest of explanation, of clarification, and above all in the positive spirit which has, fortunately, characterized our debate thus far.

Some aspects of our debate have a quality of sameness, of familiarity, of *deja vu*. It is as though we have said nothing here over the past few years, as though we had never expressed any concern or disagreement with any developments in UNESCO, as though we had done nothing since December 28 of last year to explain our decision and the reasons for it. Let me list just a few examples:

We hear that we are turning away from the entire UN system, away from multi-lateral approaches toward bilateral. We have said from the beginning that that is not the case. It is not. Our problems are here, with UNESCO. Our decision, as we have informed governments of member states, does not presage a wider disengagement from the UN system. That is simple, clear, and written in black and white—and it has been said repeatedly, from the highest levels of my government. What can we say to make it clearer? Let him who has ears to hear, hear—as St. Mark writes in his gospel.

We hear that everything UNESCO does has been agreed to by consensus, which includes the United States. That is simply not true. We have frequently in the past expressed our view of consensus—that, on some occasions at least, it has not conveyed our wholehearted support, but has simply been an agreement not to disagree. We have, moreover, specified in a number of those cases that we did not agree to a given outcome.

In other cases, we have been told a resolution will be brought to the floor, so that we can be voted down, if we refuse to join consensus; and that is pressure for a false consensus. Moreover, items objected to in subgroups are often passed by consensus in a report to a plenary, and all distinctions and reservations are lost. That then is no longer a true consensus, especially if it is referred to later, devoid of those distinctions. In still other cases, we have called for a vote on specific issues, usually receiving widespread criticism from many for insisting on such a vote.

What are we to do, when we are told that consensus is the only option, when we are thus pressed to never call for votes, and then are told later that we agreed with all other member states? A true democracy has checks and balances, and respects minority views.

Let me make it clear: our participation in consensus agreements with which we have specifically taken issue does not preclude us from a later expression of con-

trary views. More important, perhaps much more important, the cumulative effect of the consensus proceeding over a period of years has produced some results which we cannot support.

In our view, agreement to a consensus is binding in the circumstances to which it applies; but some of what we have heard here suggests that other members states believe that our participation in consensus is an abdication of our right to ever again think about the issue, to ever assess or evaluate its effects, or to consider the overall impact of such decisions. Consensus in that view would simply render us, and other member states, deaf, dumb and blind, having completely surrendered out faculties of judgment and evaluation. That is not the case, as far as we are concerned.

Our withdrawal decision was based on examination of the record, including the existence of consensus on many key issues, but it was also based on examination of the results of such consensus, on the specific conference contexts in which consensus was achieved, and on the cumulative effect of such consensus over the years. We believe that there must be a place for views based on such examination, and we believe that views must be honestly expressed, as they have been during this board meeting, taking account of, but not subservient to, previous consensus decisions.

Beyond that, we specifically object to the representation of consensus as something equivalent to an affirmative decision. It is a popular habit to quote the history of past consensus in this way, but endless repetition of an inaccurate historical record does not somehow create a binding commitment.

This does not mean we necessarily disagree with the consensus procedure. It is simply to emphasize that consensus is not to be confused with full agreement. In fact, true consensus can serve important purposes.

We are told that it is not proper to judge UNESCO by the criterion of whether or not it supports our national interest. Of course it is proper to do so, when, as in the case of the United States, such national interests include the promotion of international cooperation, massive support for economic and social development, and an unshakeable determination to do everything possible to bring about a just and lasting peace, based on the right of each country to freely choose its form of government, and to live in peace with both its neighbors and with the world at large. Of course, that is what the Secretary of State referred to in his letter when he spoke of U.S. interests. Surely everyone knows that is what was meant. What else would it be?

Several members referred to what they called "orchestration" of a press campaign against UNESCO, following the announcement of our decision. I, of course, can understand, as an intellectual matter, how they might view things in this way. We all see events and phenomena in the terms with which we are familiar. In some countries, the press is, of course, part of the "orchestra" of the state, and it is not surprising that individuals familiar with such a system would tend to see whatever happens elsewhere in those terms. In my country—and I presume the other countries in which this so-called "orchestration" took place are in the same category—the press plays its own tune. It is not part of anyone's orchestra, certainly not that of the government.

Now it just happens that that distinction is at the heart of one of the major concerns which we and others have with UNESCO, so perhaps it is useful to have had this very vivid clarification of the principle involved. As I said earlier, I strongly uphold the view that a free, independent press is crucial for true democracy and freedom.

We are told that we must specify our concerns, and define in more detail our desires and objections. One member indeed mentioned several times that we had presented no new proofs, no new evidence to the Board. He is new to our Board, so, perhaps, he thinks of it as court of law, in which member states are called upon to account for themselves, to offer a defense, and so on. I do not suppose that I need to tell the Board how alien any such concept is to the true function of the Board.

Nor, I suppose, do I have to explain at any length that the United States does not consider itself the defendant in this case, if there is any defendant. Of course, that whole image, and that whole approach, is totally wrong. No one is, no one can be, accused of wrongdoing here. What we are trying to do is to discuss and determine the best method of dealing with a set of real circumstances which exist. More to the point, we will not define terms of negotiation, when we are not negotiating. How quickly we would be accused, were we to do so, of "pressuring" UNESCO, of "black-mail," or, as one member has said, of "threats." No, Mr. Chairman, we have made our concerns known endlessly and in detail over the years. We are not going to join in such a process now, we are not going to dissect each and every past problem, and then discover whether others happen to agree with our recollections or views. A phrase we often hear around this table is the phrase, "As is well known." In fact,

one member of the Board used it this morning in describing his own views: "as is well known," he said, and went on to refer to statements made by his government. I will take his example. Our views are well known.

Mr. Chairman, that is enough discussion of small points. Let us return to the positive, to the future, to the possibilities for action which remain to us. We appreciate, and we take very seriously, the views which have been expressed in the debate of the Board. We admire, we respect, and we appreciate those who have taken the opportunity to make themselves heard, and I can assure them that they have been heard, and that their convictions and views will be heard by my government.

Above all, we have heard the call for cooperation and dialog. We, in response, will, at the remainder of this Board meeting, and throughout the year, do precisely what Secretary Shultz has from the beginning said we would do: We will work with all of our energy and imagination toward the kinds of improvements and changes which we believe would serve the Organization. Everyone here, to one degree or another, shares our view that change and improvement can and should be made. We have that common ground. Let us work to expand it, to make the most of it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

APPENDIX 10

RESPONSE TO UNESCO DIRECTOR GENERAL'S ORAL REPORT DELIVERED BY HON. JEAN GERARD, U.S. PERMANENT AMBASSADOR TO UNESCO, MAY 10, 1984

I shall come quickly to my main point:

I was impressed by the attention which the Director General gave in his oral report to ways of improving the work of the organization. He has added to the body of ideas for change which this session of the Board must consider in detail, and we appreciate that.

For in our view—when all is said and done, and the matter is reduced to its simplest terms—improvement, if it is sufficiently wide-ranging and profound, could resolve most of the problems facing the organization today.

Since no one is perfect, we can always hope to improve. Having said this about the item we are now considering, I believe I owe it to members of the Board to provide some general context of our views. To do that I must briefly refer to other matters on our agenda, but I assure you that I do so with full respect for the organization of work upon which we agreed yesterday.

We are, as I wrote you separately, Mr. Chairman, concerned by the discussion of our notification of withdrawal which is presented in document 119 EX/14. My letter to you commenting upon that document will shortly be available to members of the Board, and I shall let it stand on its own.

But I do want to say that document 119 EX/14 is primarily a discussion of history, and of various interpretations of it. There are different views of such matters as the principle of universality. We believe that these are important matters, and deserve the attention they will receive under item 5.1 of our agenda. But such discussions, it seems to me, are essentially backward-looking, or are concerned with principles which have little direct bearing on whether this Board will or will not meet the challenges facing the Organization today. My government's disappointment, as outlined in my letter to you, was primarily rooted in that sentiment—that no matter how well or eloquently we discussed and reflected upon the meaning of various historical events or principles, such discussion would have little effect upon the very real matters of the Organization's program, budget, institutions, and procedures which were at the heart of our decision to withdraw.

Now, today, we are facing a serious discussion of those matters which can influence the future, and which do affect the program and the direction of UNESCO. It is that which is encouraging about the oral report of the Director General. We have a long way to go, and there is no guarantee that progress will be either rapid or sufficient. But, at least we are now talking about the future, about the real issues, in a way which offers some promise. So we take the oral report, as indeed we take your opening remarks of yesterday, Mr. Chairman, in that spirit, and we pledge to do our utmost to bring our deliberations to a successful conclusion.

I will discuss some of the issues to which I have referred here under later agenda items, but I thought it important to give members of the Board this overall framework of our thinking.

Returning to the oral report, the Director General's attention to the problems of evaluation; the structure of the organization; decentralization; improved budgeting techniques; and the personnel system touch on many of the issues which we and others believe need attention. Certainly they are appropriate issues for the initiative of the Director General and we shall give them the serious consideration they deserve. We shall comment elsewhere, in detail, on some of the issues raised, including the question of the disposition of the funds from Part VIII of the Budget for 1981-1983.

There are, of course, other matters of improvement and change which we believe need to be addressed and which must primarily be the initiative of the member states. Even here, the Director General's leadership and guidance can be extremely valuable. In all of these areas, there must be genuine reform.

We shall listen attentively to further elaboration of the Director General's ideas, and to the Board's response to them and to other suggestions for improvement which we shall consider at this session. We shall work to ensure that concrete actions result therefrom, for there must, in our view, be genuine reform, as I said, not simply a change in tone.

Hope is very much alive in UNESCO that UNESCO can respond to the constructive criticism which has come from all over the globe. There are vast and important areas of international cooperation in education, science, culture and communica-

tions for which widespread—I am tempted to say universal—agreement exists. We would serve the goals of this organization, and the organization itself, to a much greater extent if we concentrated on fulfilling the great unfilled needs in these areas, and left the peripheral and contentious problems which divide us to one side.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

APPENDIX 11

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GERARD TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
EXECUTIVE BOARD OF UNESCO REGARDING ITEM 5.1 OF THE AGENDA

U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION [UNESCO],
Paris, France, May 9, 1984.

His Excellency PATRICK SEDDOH,
Chairman, Executive Board, UNESCO, Paris.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have carefully read document 119 EX/14, relating to Executive Board agenda item 5.1 concerning the withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO. I wanted you and other members of the Board to have my views on this document before our discussion of item 5.1 begins.

First, I think it important to emphasize that the United States Government had been encouraged, upon reading the Director General's letter of January 18 to Secretary of State Shultz, to note that he was ready to lend his full support to efforts that might lead my Government to reconsider its decision to withdraw from UNESCO. We had hoped and expected that our discussion in the Board might lead in that direction, and that we might have a forward-looking, constructive document to set the stage for our deliberations.

Unfortunately, 119 EX/14 provides little basis for productive discussion. It states that "the essential observations coming within the province of the Director General" have already been stated in his letter to Secretary Shultz. This seems to us to overlook the Director General's demonstrated capacity to lead and to influence opinion. The document also states that "the issue at stake appears to be the very function of UNESCO within the international community." We do not share this pessimistic assessment. We believe the organization is capable of reform and renewal; and we most sincerely regret that document 119 EX/14 does not lay the basis for Executive Board discussion and debate that could lead to constructive change. Such discussion and debate might, *inter alia*, consider the issues raised in Secretary Shultz's letter, namely: strategies to redirect the organization to its founding purposes; to manage itself in a way that rewarded efficiency, promoted effective program evaluation, and set real priorities; and to concentrate its program in those core areas of education, science, culture, and communication where all Member States agree that international cooperation is necessary and desirable.

With regard to the U.S. decision, we must point out that, while the Director General stated in his letter to Secretary Shultz that it was not for him "to voice an opinion on a sovereign decision by a Member State," document 119 EX/14, in fact, does so in paragraph 47. It questions, in that paragraph, the legitimacy of a determination of national interest as the sole motivation for withdrawal from UNESCO and suggests that Member States have a binding duty to maintain membership in UNESCO. We reject categorically this interpretation of the duties of sovereign states. The Constitution of UNESCO, itself, provides for the withdrawal of Member States from the organization, without in any way stating or implying that they have overriding obligations of any nature.

Moreover, while Secretary Shultz clearly stated that the Government of the United States continues to believe in the principles set forth in the UNESCO Constitution, he also said it no longer believes that the organization, as it now functions, promotes those principles effectively and that the responsibility to act upon the regrettable conclusion was inescapable. In withdrawing from UNESCO, we object to its inefficiencies and its deviation from its original goals. We continue to embrace the principles upon which it was founded.

The concept of universality, to which the document refers in paragraph 50, does not compel the membership of all sovereign states. The principle, in our view, simply encourages such membership. We do not believe that the principle of universality is violated if a sovereign state freely chooses not to belong; it would of course be violated if action were taken to prevent a free choice from taking effect. We support the principle of universality as vigorously as we have in the past. As for the setback to mutual understanding and the sapping of energies devoted to helping the world's neediest peoples, it is precisely because UNESCO does not respond as effectively as it could to such challenges that we shall seek other avenues of action.

We are profoundly disturbed by the implications of paragraph 51. The equal dignity of all men is self-evident. The assertion, however, that the grand design of the founders of UNESCO was that, "both in reflection and in action, all schools of thought and all aspects of intellectual, scientific schools of thought and all aspects

of intellectual, scientific and cultural situations throughout the world (be) given due consideration with no preferences and no exceptions," is highly questionable, especially the latter phrase.

The founders of UNESCO gave very definite preference to those schools of thought that would "further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations." It was precisely to combat "schools of thought" that threatened to destroy such rights and freedoms that a great war was fought, and millions of lives were sacrificed, some forty years ago. The UNESCO Constitution itself notes that this war was "made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality, and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, . . . of the doctrine of the inequality of men and of races." The organization has the duty to forward and strengthen those principles which its Constitution defines. These are quite concrete. They certainly do not include every existing or conceivable philosophy, point of view, or "school of thought."

Finally, Annex IV appears to be a primer for the Executive Board to help it formulate suitable draft resolutions on my Government's intention to withdraw from UNESCO. As such, we believe its inclusion is objectionable and its content unnecessary.

In brief, we are disappointed in document 119 EX/14. You are aware that my Government is prepared to reconsider its decision to withdraw from UNESCO at the end of 1984 if there is significant improvement in the organization. The presentation in document 119 EX/14 is not encouraging in this regard. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I assure you of our full cooperation in the efforts of the Board to improve the organization. I request that you distribute this letter as an Executive Board document in the working languages of the Board.

Sincerely,

JEAN BROWARD SHEVLIN GERARD,
Ambassador, Member of the Executive Board.

APPENDIX 12

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JEAN BROWARD SHEVLIN GERARD, PERMANENT DELEGATE OF THE UNITED STATES TO UNESCO ON AGENDA ITEM 5.11: "COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM'S MINISTER OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL CONCERNING U.K. POLICY ON UNESCO," MAY 22, 1984

Mr. Chairman,

In his letter to the Director General, Minister of Overseas Development Raison said that the issues before us call for plain speaking and concrete action. I agree.

As members of the Board know, the United States has closely linked its decision to withdraw from UNESCO to a maximum effort for significant reform during the one-year waiting period prescribed by the Constitution of the Organization. Both elements of our policy will be pursued with equal determination and in a positive spirit, and only time will tell whether the second objective will proceed sufficiently to have a bearing on the first.

I have, incidentally, been surprised in recent days to hear some, in and around our organization, saying that we will leave, no matter what action is taken here. Others say we shall stay, in the long run, no matter how little action is taken, no matter how little reform is undertaken. That is not so, as I mentioned to the Board last Friday. Let me say it again, and add some advice. Many purported to be surprised by our decision to withdraw. Yet we had clearly said, beginning last June, that withdrawal was under active consideration. It seems obvious that among those who were surprised, there must be many who were just not listening. I think we all must make an effort in these complex and difficult issues to avoid hearing only what we want to hear.

I want to assure members of the Board there will be no lack of effort on the part of the United States to contribute to change and reform. To assist us during this year, Secretary Shultz has named a committee of distinguished Americans prominent in the fields of education, science, culture and communication. This panel will monitor the changes which may take place during 1984 and report them to the Secretary of State. Several members of that panel and a member of the U.S. Congress Foreign Affairs Committee staff are assisting at the work of this session of the Board. Others will observe the 120th session and selected UNESCO intergovernmental conferences. For my part, I have carefully studied and faithfully reported to Washington the comments on our decision to withdraw, made by members of the Board during the debate on agenda items 5.1 and 5.11. Finally, we have a number of specific ideas and propositions to put forward, and will pursue these in the months ahead, most especially in the context of the working group which it now seems clear a wide majority of the Board is in favor of establishing, in one form or another. Let us now look to the future and to the possibility of change.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that UNESCO's surest path to reform and renewal is for it to give absolute priority to those few core elements in education, science, culture, and communication where true consensus exists for international

cooperation. The training of literacy teachers, the teaching of science and technology, the work of the major scientific commissions, the preservation of cultural monuments, and the building of communications infrastructures are examples of such programs. Effective action of this nature would, by definition, prioritize and concentrate the program. It would, if executed in the politically neutral manner expected of international civil servants, depoliticize it by leaving aside those issues that divide us, and would bring us together in a common effort to attain a limited number of fundamental goals. It would focus the image of UNESCO, diffused by a program that is too broad, too thin, and too controversial; it would increase UNESCO's chances of making major contributions within its fields of competence and, very likely, would motivate staff and Member States to vigorous efforts in pursuit of important and achievable goals. More importantly, through such core programs, UNESCO would make a more effective contribution to peace and security, to the rule of law, and to the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples of the world. This idea, Mr. Chairman, is central to our thinking, and I note that Minister Raison also insisted on this point in his letter of April 2 to the Director General. We may have reached the point, Mr. Chairman, where we must make a fundamental choice. UNESCO must either decide to implement a few centrally important programs that have the unequivocal support of the world community, or risk losing the moral, intellectual, and financial support of a significant part of that community.

A number of interesting ideas on this important issue of program formulation and implementation are already emerging. Mr. Isaksson's proposals are of particular interest. I endorse the proposal made by Mr. Dumont, in the opening session of the Program Commission that the Assistant Directors General appear before the Commission on a periodic basis for question and answer sessions on their respective programs. This can only enhance constructive dialogue and cooperation between Board members and the Secretariat. I support the Program Commission's view that consultations between the Director General and Member States be continued and intensified while the C/5 documents are being prepared. I believe, in particular, that every effort should be made to establish closer contacts between Member States and the Director General during the period between the submission of Member States' written proposals for the C/5 and the elaboration of the document's "main themes," and also during the period between the Executive Board discussion of the "main themes" and the actual drafting of the program.

The Director General's proposal to establish a working group to identify duplication and to set priorities in the current work plan is also promising. We await details of the proposal, but wonder, even now, if it would not be useful to associate Member States in some appropriate way in this work. Should the Board establish a working group to discuss structural and procedural reforms at UNESCO, as has been proposed, I would suggest that it consider this idea.

Mr. Chairman, paragraph 4 of the United Kingdom's proposals states that serious attention needs to be given to the working methods of the Executive Board and the General Conference. Again, I agree. I am particularly concerned about the role these bodies play in the formulation of the work program. If both have become too unwieldy in their present form to serve as effective forums for the discussion of program formulation and supervision -- and it is possible that they have -- other arrangements must be made. I can envision a system to strengthen the consensus process whereby contentious program activities or significant new program departures would be submitted to a Drafting and Negotiating mechanism within the Executive Board. It is possible that they should emerge from that body only by unanimous consent. This is another idea that I suggest the working group consider, and we will be glad to contribute to that debate on this and other structural and procedural issues, including the need for true democratization, a system with checks and balances.

As for specific program content, Mr. Chairman, I endorse the ideas on Major Programs I and XIII put forth by the United Kingdom in paragraphs 1 and 2 of its proposals, and I restate my government's concern about certain parts of Major Programs III and VIII. I also endorse the United Kingdom's comments on "general program matters," as stated in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the proposals. I support, in particular, the caveat adopted at the 113th Session of the Board on UNESCO's standard-setting

activities. In our view, a time out, a cooling-off period, is in order to distance ourselves from the issues that divide us and to work together on those that unite us.

Mr. Chairman, Minister Raison raised the question of evaluation in his letter and its annex. My government has strong views on the need for effective evaluation at UNESCO. I was encouraged, therefore, by the attention given to it by the Director General in his oral report. Guidelines exist; expertise is available. As the Director General, himself, suggested, it is time to get on with the job. We consider this a key area of reform and are convinced that effective mechanisms of evaluation will contribute also to program concentration, to the establishment of clear and attainable priorities, and to financial economies. Indeed the 21st General Conference underscored the importance of evaluation when it stated, in paragraph 3 of resolution 100, that the Second Medium-Term plan itself "should be susceptible to adjustment, if necessary, in the light of the evolution of problems and on the basis of an evaluation of progress achieved." Should the need arise, the Second Medium-Term Plan can be adjusted or changed. This was, indeed, the case for the First Medium-Term Plan. "Ab esse ad posse legitimum est," said Thomas of Aquinas.

The management initiatives proposed by the Director General to reorganize the Secretariat, to improve recruitment

procedures, to decentralize administration, to trim and prioritize the program, and to improve the transparency of budget procedures are of considerable interest. I believe that prompt and effective action in each of these areas is needed, and I look forward to obtaining more detailed information from the Director General during the Executive Board's private session. For now, I associate myself fully with the comments on management in paragraph 10 of the British paper. I believe, in particular, that UNESCO must insist on the highest recruitment standards and that decision-making power should be delegated more effectively. We were encouraged to hear the Director General address both of these issues in his oral report. I do not know exactly what decision-making authority UNESCO officials at the professional levels enjoy, but I have the distinct impression that they have less authority than counterparts at similar levels in governmental service and in the academic and business communities.

With the exception of the statements which refer to my government's decision to withdraw from UNESCO, we associate ourselves also with the views expressed on the budget in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Mr. Raison's proposals. We believe, in particular, that the balance in Part VIII of the 1981-1983 budget should be returned to Member States during 1984 in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Appropriation Resolution and the Financial Regulations.

Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other areas in which reform is needed. Some of these appear in a paper endorsed by a large majority of a working group chaired by Ambassador Mourik of the Netherlands. Copies of this document have been widely circulated, and I hope that members of the Board and any subsidiary body the Board might establish will give its analyses and conclusions their careful consideration. I was instructed by my government to participate actively in the work of this group and have done so.

I could go on, Mr. Chairman, to raise other issues that deserve our attention, such as a greater use of the secret ballot, the need for attitudinal changes between the Secretariat and Member States and among Member States themselves, and the unfortunate and paradoxical fact that a considerable number of the major contributors to the organization have the impression of being more and more excluded from the real process of establishing the goals, the philosophy, and the direction of the organization.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that UNESCO, through its governing bodies and its Director General, must have the courage to de-emphasize drastically or eliminate entirely those elements of the program that, in Minister Raison's words, "can all too easily become a platform for ideological confrontation." Education, science, and culture, have intrinsic value. They are intrinsic goods. They merit our

support for their own sake. Herein lies, we believe, the answer to the fundamental question which we have raised, and to which others have reacted: "What are the purposes of the Organization, and is it serving them now?"

For the United States, the contribution to peace and security which the Organization is called upon to make is described rather precisely in Article I of the Constitution. I shall not cite that entire passage here, nor do I wish to begin a lengthy exegesis of the Constitution's text. But to us its meaning is simple: it calls for "collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture..." as the basis for UNESCO's contribution to peace and security.

To us that does not mean education, science, and culture for peace and security, or for development, or for any particular purposes. What it means is that there will be a much better atmosphere for peace and security if the people of the world are able to share more equally and more fully in the benefits of education, science, culture and communication. We believe in the wisdom and good judgement and desire for peace of the people of the world. We believe that people can be trusted with the greater insight which education provides, the greater confidence about how to live with the natural world which science provides, the greater insight into other societies and peoples which cultural development can provide, and the greater understanding which free access to all available information provides.

In short we trust people. We do not believe that people should have only that education which supports one or another point of view, or one or another interpretation of history. We do not believe that the free flow of information should be limited in any way. We do not believe that scientific and cultural exchange should be enlisted in any cause but that of greater understanding and sensitivity. And we believe that the overall effect of higher levels of education -- for its own sake; of greater scientific and technological development -- for its own sake; of wider cultural appreciation and access -- for its own sake; of free access to information, for no purpose other than to allow people to make their own choices will be to strengthen peace and security, to encourage economic development, and to increase the freedom and dignity of people everywhere.

Some have said during this debate that UNESCO programs /can only be useful if they are tied to, or subordinated to, other objectives. Some have said that education, science, and culture, to be usefully promoted in international cooperation, must have some other purposes beyond themselves. We could not disagree more strongly. We see such attitudes as based in fear, and in a lack of confidence in the judgement and good sense of people. Knowledge, and understanding, and facts themselves, are only fearsome to those who are unaccustomed to their free exchange and use.

UNESCO may or may not be able to make a contribution to the solution of the world's pressing political and economic problems. Even the most optimistic would, I believe, inject at least some doubt into their answers to that problem. But there is no doubt about what we can do: we can teach people to read and write, we can increase their access to scientific advances, we can preserve and protect our cultural heritage, and we can increase the flow of information in the world. Why not do what we know we can do, and leave behind that which it is now clear can fracture the unity of the organization.

APPENDIX 13

THE 15 BEST UNESCO PROGRAMS AS RATED BY WESTERN
INFORMATION GROUP

UNESCO program	Score on a scale of 3 to 0
V.3.3 Expansion and Improvement of Vocational-Technical Education.....	2.87
III.3.3 Training of Communications Personnel.....	2.75
II.1.3 Training of Literacy Personnel.....	2.73
XI.1.6 Cultural Heritage: Training of Specialized Personnel	2.69
II.4.2 Promoting Access to Education for Girls and Women	2.53
III.3.5 Action to Promote Books and Reading.....	2.53
III.3.2 Acquisition of Appropriate Communications Equipment and Local Production of Equipment	2.50
XI.1.5 Preservation and Presentation of the "Movable Cultural Heritage" (e.g., Museum collections)	2.44
II.1.2 Access to Primary Education and the Eradication of Illiteracy.....	2.40
II.6.1 Action on Behalf of Disabled Persons	2.38
X.3.3 Water Resources: Training of Specialists, Special Attention to Women Specialists	2.38
X.2.2 The Human Environment: Risks Arising from Natural Hazards.....	2.33
X.4.1 Scientific Investigation of the Ocean and Its Resources.....	2.33
X.4.4 Strengthening National and Regional Capacities for Marine Research, Ocean Services and Training	2.31
X.5.4 Training of Specialists in Coastal & Island Region Management.....	2.31

APPENDIX 14

U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO—ORGANIZATION MEMBERS REPRESENTED ON THE COMMISSION AS OF DECEMBER 1983

Alliance for Environmental Education.
 American Home Economic Assn.
 National Academy of Sciences.
 International Council of Fine Arts Deans.
 Assn. of Science Tech. Centers.
 Consortium on Peace, Research, Edu. & Development.
 Women's Int'l. League of Peace and Freedom.
 Int'l. Center of Photography.
 National Wildlife Federation.
 ICOMOS.
 American Psychological Assn.
 Amer. Assn. of Comm. & Jr. Colleges.
 One Hundred Black Men, Inc.,
 Amer. Academy of Arts & Sciences.
 American Student Assn.
 Assn. For Asian Studies.
 Amer. Assn. of Univ. Women.
 American Theatre Assn.
 Council of Chief State School Officers.
 Nat'l. Council of Jewish Women.
 Nat'l. Education Assn.
 American Library Assn.
 American Anthropological Assn.
 American Society of Int'l. Law.
 Planned Parenthood Federation.
 American Political Science Assn.
 American Women in Radio & TV.
 Overseas Development Council.
 Institute of Int'l. Education.
 National Science Teachers Assn.
 American Soc. for Engineering Education.
 Nat'l. Assn. of Broadcasters.
 AFRICARE.
 Women's American ORT.
 American Geological Inst.
 American Jewish Committee.
 Nat'l. Council of Churches of Christ.
 Assn. of American Geographers.
 Int'l. Studies Assn.
 American Council of Learned Societies.
 Amer. Council on Education.
 ASPIRA.
 League of Women Voters.
 Amer. Assn. for the Advancement of Science.
 American Economic Assn.
 Nat'l. Indian Ed. Assn.
 Int'l. Reading Assn.
 Nat'l. Congress of Parents and Teachers.
 Freedom House.
 Social Science Research Council.
 Nat'l. Council of Negro Women.
 Sierra Club.
 Nat'l. Council for the Social Studies.
 American Sociological Assn.
 Nat'l. Council of La Raza.

APPENDIX 15

CHARTER OF THE MONITORING PANEL ON UNESCO

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of the Monitoring Panel on UNESCO is to monitor and report on the activities and practices of, and developments within, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) during the calendar year 1984. The Panel will report to the Secretary of State. The functions of the Panel shall be solely advisory, and will assist the Secretary of State to determine the future relations of the United States with UNESCO.

II. AUTHORITY

The Panel is established under the general authority of the Secretary and Department of State as set forth in title 22 of the United States Code, in particular section 2656 thereof. The approval of this charter by the Under Secretary of State for Management constitutes a determination by the Secretary of State that the establishment of the Panel is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed by law on the Department of State.

III. ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

A. Membership. Members of the Panel shall be appointed by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. The term of membership shall be for the duration of this charter, except that the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs may revoke the membership of any member of the Panel at any time in his sole discretion. The initial number of members shall be approximately 14 and is not expected to exceed 14 for the duration of this charter.

B. Designation of Officers. The Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs shall appoint a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman an Executive Secretary, and an Assistant Executive Secretary for the Panel.

B. Support Functions. Support functions for the operation of the Panel and its subsidiary bodies shall be supplied by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State.

IV. OPERATIONS

A. Functions of Officers. The Officers of the Panel will have the following responsibilities, in addition to those specified above:

(1) The Chairman will assist in the preparation of the agenda, will preside over meetings, and will certify to the accuracy of all Panel minutes.

(2) The Vice-Chairman will act for the Chairman in his absence.

(3) The Executive Secretary will call all Panel meetings, will approve the agenda for each meeting, will convene and adjourn each meeting, and will provide for the keeping of detailed minutes of each meeting.

(4) The Assistant Executive Secretary will perform the functions of the Executive Secretary in his absence or at his direction.

B. Meetings. It is expected that the Panel will meet approximately 6 times during the duration of this Charter. All meetings will be open to the public unless a determination has been made in accordance with Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, that a meeting or a portion of a meeting should be closed to the public. Timely notice of each meeting, stating the name of the Panel, the time, place and purpose of the meeting and whether the meeting is open to the public shall be published in the Federal Register. Except as an emergency may otherwise require, such notice shall be given at least 15 days in advance of the meeting date.

C. Records. The records of the Panel will consist of all papers and documents pertinent to its establishment and activities, including its charter, agenda, determinations for closed meetings, minutes, reports, and all documents related to its proceedings, including working papers, drafts, studies or other documents made available to or prepared for or by the Panel. These records shall be available for public inspection and copying to the extent required by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, at the offices of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State.

V. FUNDING

All funding necessary for the organization and operation of the Panel shall come from the salaries and expenses account of the Department of State. The operating costs of the Panel during the duration of this Charter are estimated to be approximately \$200,000 and 1½ man years.

VI. TERMINATION

The Panel shall terminate on December 31, 1984, unless it is renewed or extended by appropriate action prior to that date.

VII. FILING AND EFFECTIVE DATE

This Charter shall become effective upon its filing with the Department of State, with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, with the Committee Management Secretariat of the General Services Administration, and with the Library of Congress. The effective date of this Charter will be that of which copies were mailed to both houses of Congress.

Approved: RONALD I. SPIERS, *Under Secretary of State for Management*, Date: 22 March 1984.

APPENDIX 16

Congress of the United States
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

June 25, 1984

The Honorable Gregory Newell
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of International Organization
Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Secretary:


As we discussed during your appearance before the subcommittees on May 2, I am submitting additional questions for the record.

The questions are as follows:

- 1) What will be the effect of withdrawal on international programs that further:
 - a) the international flow of publications and information
 - b) international copyright agreements
 - c) Universal Bibliographic Control, and
 - d) worldwide promotion of books, libraries, publishing, and literacy?
2. What steps are being taken to insure active participation of the U.S. library, information, and archival communities in international activities?
- 3) International standards have been developed, with active participation of the U.S. information community, for software, databases, and networks, as part of UNESCO-supported activities.
 - a) If the U.S. withdraws, are we likely to see standards being developed which will favor foreign information industries?
 - b) How can we insure that the U.S. information community will continue to participate actively in standards development, if the U.S. withdraws?

I would appreciate it very much if you could respond to these questions as soon as possible. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,



Gus Yatron
Chairman
Subcommittee on Human Rights
and International Organizations

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of June 25, 1984, to Assistant Secretary Gregory J. Newell, containing additional questions for the record stemming from his May 2, 1984, appearance to discuss UNESCO before your subcommittee and that of Mr. Mica, the attached responses have been prepared.

I trust these further explanations will help to clarify our position on these matters of mutual concern. If we may be of further assistance, we will be pleased to respond to your inquiries.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. F. Turner", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Robert F. Turner
Acting Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosures:
as stated.

The Honorable
Gus Yatron, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Human Rights
and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

Q. What will be the effect of withdrawal on international programs that further the international flow of publications and information?

A. We believe there will be little impact. The United States is committed to the free flow of information and will continue to stress that point in relevant fora such as the International Telecommunication Union and the Universal Postal Union. We will also encourage international non-governmental organizations that have associate status with UNESCO, such as the World Press Freedom Committee, to continue to concern themselves with this issue and to use their observer privilege to speak out from the floor. The British and our other allies will, of course, continue to be active in defense of the free flow of information and publications.

Q. What will be the effect of withdrawal on international copyright agreements?

A. UNESCO membership is not a requirement for participation in the Intergovernmental Copyright Committee of the Universal Copyright Convention. The United States is presently a member of this body and is eligible for reelection in November 1985. The Committee is the organ within UNESCO which oversees the formulation and execution of all of UNESCO's copyright activities. Although the UNESCO General Conference takes up copyright as part of its consideration of the entire UNESCO draft program and budget, substantive copyright matters, which are extremely technical in nature, are in reality dealt with in the Committee rather than in the General Conference. Thus our absence from UNESCO should have no effect on our ability to influence copyright in UNESCO.

Q. What will be the effect of withdrawal on international programs that affect universal bibliographic control?

A. The US departure from UNESCO is likely to have little impact on this highly specialized area of activity. The basic work in this field is done by such international professional societies as the International Federation for Documentation, the International Federation of Library Associations, the International Council of Archives, the International Council of Scientific Unions/Abstracting Board, and the International Organization for Standardization. American professionals are actively involved in the work of all these bodies and hold leadership positions in many of them. It is true that withdrawal from UNESCO would deprive us of membership in the UNESCO Intergovernmental Council for the General Information Program (GPI), which provides a unified focus for UNESCO's diverse activities in the areas of library and information science, archives, documentation, and scientific and technological information. We are, therefore, working closely with the National Commission on Libraries and Information Science to identify alternatives to our current participation in the GPI program. Moreover, we shall continue our close collaboration with other important members of the GPI group such as the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Q. What will be the effect of withdrawal on international programs that affect the worldwide promotion of books, libraries, publishing and literacy?

A. These areas of UNESCO's work are well supported by its member states and, indeed, represent some of UNESCO's best programs. The programs are carried out mainly by international professional societies and other non-governmental bodies (such as the International Reading Association) in which American scholars and experts have been and will continue to be actively involved. The US departure is likely to have minimal impact, whether on UNESCO's commitment to these activities or on the quality of work being performed.

Q. What steps are being taken to insure active participation of the US library, information, and archival communities in international activities?

A. The State Department attaches great importance to the work of these communities. As stated above, the Department has for many years collaborated closely with the National Commission on Libraries and Information Science, and this will continue.

By way of example, as part of a just completed effort to respond to a UNESCO request for recommendations on the fashioning of its next biennial program, we sought these groups' suggestions and guidance. We are also working closely with them on developing alternatives to our current participation in their fields through UNESCO.

Q. International standards have been developed, with active participation of the US information community, for software, data bases, and networks, as a part of UNESCO-supported activities. If the US withdraws, are we likely to see standards being developed which will favor foreign information industries?

A. No, for several reasons. First, UNESCO formulates very few technical standards of the kind the question implies. Most of these are in the field of statistics, copyright, and circulation of educational materials. The majority of UNESCO's standards are of a normative character and are aimed at influencing the code of behavior of professional groups (e.g., Recommendation on the Status of Artists). Secondly, UNESCO's standard-setting activities take the form mainly of declarations and recommendations which do not have a binding force. Although its conventions, on the other hand, have a mandatory character, few of these involve the setting of technical standards. Thirdly, international standards, to be viable, should respond to felt needs within the world community, and must involve consensus on the nature and form of the standard. UNESCO is not likely to move precipitately in areas where the US is predominant and is not present to voice its views. Finally, it should be noted that technical standards are set mainly through other specialized agencies of the UN system such as the International Telecommunication Union and the Universal Postal Union. The US will continue to be vigilant in promoting US interests in these fora.

Q. How can we insure that the US information community will continue to participate actively in standards development?

A. Representatives of US equipment manufacturers and suppliers, directly or through their trade associations, will continue to take part in international meetings whether UNESCO-supported or not. They will also continue to be involved in communications development assistance to Third World countries, an activity which promotes professional standards and western-oriented values. For example, the United States Telecommunications Training Institute, which is supported in part by the US Government and which provides assistance in the form of fellowships, is presently exposing developing country nationals to US information facilities, while increasing the interest of US private communication companies in Third World needs. This mutual exposure will aid in the development of international standards which are compatible with those of the US information industry. In planning for the post-withdrawal period, we envision the promotion of even greater private sector involvement in the information field.

APPENDIX 17

United Nations Association of the United States of America

300 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017 212 697 3232

THE UNITED STATES AND UNESCO:
A YEAR OF DECISION

The United States has informed the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) of its intention to withdraw from the agency at the end of 1984. If the decision is implemented, this would be only the second time in the history of the United Nations that the United States has pulled out of an organ of the world body.¹

The U.S. Decision

The U.S. decision, announced on December 28, 1983, is due to take effect on December 31, 1984. The move was recommended by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Gregory J. Newell with the support of U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO Jean Gerard. It was preceded by a six-month interagency review in which federal agencies, U.S. overseas missions, and private professional organizations were asked to evaluate UNESCO programs.

In a press conference on December 29, a State Department spokesman said that UNESCO has "extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with," is hostile to the institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press, and has "demonstrated unrestrained budgetary expansion." Significantly, in this case, the Administration argues that UNESCO's problems cannot be remedied by U.S. action from within the organization and that the United States might find other channels for international cooperation in pursuit of UNESCO's original goals.

The U.S. decision was not supported in all quarters, however. On December 16, the United States National Commission for UNESCO, a quasi-governmental body of private citizens and professional organizations that advises the

¹The first was in 1977, when the Carter Administration took the United States out of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in protest over "politicization." The U.S. rejoined the ILO in 1980.

State Department, opposed the pullout by a vote of 41 to 8. The Commission surveyed more than a dozen U.S. organizations that participate in UNESCO's scientific, educational, and cultural work and reported unanimous support for working for reform from within. These included the American Library Association, the National Education Association, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the International Reading Association, the National Wildlife Federation, and the American Theater Association. Early in December, one such organization, Freedom House, which has been a consistent critic of attempts within UNESCO to limit press freedom worldwide, openly called on the U.S. Government "to remain an active member" of UNESCO and to "monitor the organization carefully and persistently in the future."

The Complaints Against UNESCO

The problems identified by the State Department appear to be widely acknowledged even among the agency's supporters, although there is clear disagreement on how best to respond to them. The major areas of complaint are:

1. Politicization. By taking up issues like disarmament, human rights, and the Middle East, the United States argues, the UNESCO membership has injected divisive debate into many of the normal areas of its technical competence. Consideration of the importance of archeological digs in Jerusalem, for example, has become an extension of the bitter Arab-Israeli feud rather than an exercise in impartial scientific inquiry. And a legitimate concern over cultural bias in the international flow of news often degenerates into a press freedom debate that pits the Western democracies against authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe and the third world.
 Government delegations wage these battles at the biennial UNESCO General Conference, primarily, but U.S. charges are also aimed at the professional staff, who carry out the programs in between these governmental meetings. The administrative staff of Amadou-Mahtar M'bow of Senegal, now in his second six-year term as Director-General of UNESCO, is said to be geographically imbalanced by U.N. standards, weighted in favor of Africans and East Europeans, many of whom are unsympathetic to Western values.
2. Mismanagement and budgetary excess. At a time when most U.N. agencies and the United Nations itself were exercising budgetary restraint in the face of strong pressure to do so by the United States and other major contributors, the UNESCO Secretariat asked for a significant increase in the

agency's 1984-85 budget. (The increase was cut substantially by the most recent General Conference, which then approved the budget with the United States casting the only "no" vote.) In addition, there are accusations of mismanagement and, more specifically, of favoritism and nepotism in the handling of personnel. For example, in March 1983, the UNESCO Staff Association conducted a poll of all UNESCO employees, in which 85 percent of the respondents indicated that they believed that promotions were not based on merit. The United States also charges that UNESCO has an excessively large bureaucracy and a tendency to place too many officials in its Paris headquarters and too few in the field.

UNESCO's Response

Director-General M'Bow wrote to Secretary of State George P. Shultz on January 18, 1984 expressing his regret over the U.S. decision and saying that he hoped that the United States would decide to remain in the organization.

In the letter, M'Bow specifically addressed some of the U.S. charges. On the question of politicization, he argued that "a distinction should...be drawn between the viewpoints expressed by UNESCO's individual Member States...and the activities of the Organization itself." This distinction, he said, is "too often neglected by UNESCO's critics." He also pointed out that since 1976, "the vast majority of the decisions taken by the General Conference...have been reached by consensus." By avoiding a vote on all but the most intractable issues, minority views have largely been accommodated, he said.

As for the conduct of the UNESCO staff, M'Bow stated that he believed that it would be impossible to "cite a single case" in which the activities of the Director-General or any UNESCO program activity were "contrary to the ideals enunciated in the Constitution...."

On budgetary and management questions, M'Bow cited a September 1979 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) that called UNESCO's management procedures "unique and forward-looking compared to other UN agencies examined" and said that planning and budgeting processes were "conceptually sound."

UNESCO officials in the United States have emphasized this seeming inconsistency between recent statements by U.S. officials and the decision to withdraw. A month before that decision was announced, Ambassador Gerard had given a favorable review of the just-concluded 22nd General Conference by saying, "We can take pride in the work and in many of the accomplishments of this General Conference."

And Congress was assured in a State Department report issued the previous February that there was nothing in UNESCO's work that would require a cutback in U.S. contributions.

A Year To Decide

With the formal announcement by the United States of its intention to withdraw, there remain the questions of what it will do during the one-year interval and how UNESCO and other member states will respond.

The United States has the choice of either treating the decision as irrevocable or using the now-real threat of a pullout as leverage to bring about change. The assumption held by some observers that UNESCO cannot be reformed from within might usefully be put to the test during this period. One reason for doing so is the relative success the United States achieved at the most recent General Conference. The United States placed a high priority on that meeting, entered it with clearly stated objectives, and effectively coordinated with its allies. As a result, there was no mention of Israel, and only cursory treatment of Grenada--remarkable given the timing. An unusually large number of decisions were reached by consensus. The language adopted on the controversial communications issue contained no mention of international codes that might impinge on press freedom. The United States and its allies won approval for more Western-oriented UNESCO studies, such as the contribution of a free press to cultural development, the watchdog role of the press, measures to ensure the plurality of media forms and channels, and so on. Finally, U.S. pressure had much to do with the Conference's decision to slash budget growth.²

If a consistent U.S. effort can produce similar results as UNESCO goes about its routine work in 1984, these observers argue, the Administration might well consider rescinding its withdrawal notice and maintaining a vigilant, high-priority approach to its participation in UNESCO. Indeed, they say, continued success in UNESCO in 1984 would suggest that a more active and aggressive form of multilateral diplomacy by the United States, aimed at reinforcing the basic principles of the United Nations,

²The actual numbers are interpreted differently by different sides in the dispute: the United States says the originally proposed budget represented a 9.7 percent increase, while the approved budget can be seen as either a 5.5 or a 3.8 percent increase. UNESCO, supported by a number of its European members, says the original proposal represented a 6.1 percent increase and the final compromise a 2.5 percent increase.

could result in reduced politicization, greater efficiency and effectiveness, and more budgetary restraint throughout the U.N. system.

What Might Be Done In 1984

If the U.S.-UNESCO separation is not to become a divorce by the end of 1984, substantial efforts will be required: the arguments for the need for change within UNESCO are persuasive; at the same time, strong and inspired leadership by the United States is essential if multilateral institutions are to live up to their potential. Because UNESCO is in many ways a test case for the entire U.N. system, the following steps should be considered for this decisive year:

1. The outcome of the last General Conference was widely viewed as favorable. The United States should analyze its experience there to identify how it contributed to that result. This approach should then be rigorously followed and refined at UNESCO meetings throughout the year to see if a trend toward reform can be firmly established.
2. UNESCO staff should look for ways to reduce the chance of divisive political issues that sidetrack its deliberative sessions and its useful and important work in science, education, and culture.
3. Consistent with the similar efforts at budget control being made elsewhere in the U.N. community, the UNESCO Secretariat should informally give early assurance to the United States and other major contributors of its intent to exercise budgetary restraint in the planning of the 1986-87 biennium.
4. The UNESCO Secretariat should take every opportunity to redress geographical imbalance at the senior management levels within the organization with an eye to neutralizing any national, regional, or ideological bias.
5. The United States, recognizing that a temporary withdrawal would be a severe blow to UNESCO and that permanent withdrawal could be fatal to the agency, should hold open the option of rescinding its notice of withdrawal while it studies developments this year. Substantial evidence of a trend toward reform should constitute grounds for a reversal of the pullout decision.
6. A bipartisan commission of prominent private individuals who are familiar with UNESCO's work and its structure should be established. The panel should weigh any evidence of wrongdoing by or within

UNESCO in light of its Charter as well as basic U.S. values. In the process, it should evaluate the assumption that the United States can achieve through other channels the same ends it once sought in UNESCO, taking into account the views of other member states, especially Israel and other U.S. allies. It should also monitor developments within UNESCO during the current year to gauge responsiveness to U.S. concerns as well as the quality of the U.S. performance. Finally, it should report its findings to the Secretary of State before the end of the year with a recommendation either to make good on the notice of withdrawal or to rescind it.

This briefing paper was prepared by the staff of The Multilateral Project, an ongoing study of international issues and institutions carried out by the United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA). The viewpoints expressed here do not necessarily represent those of UNA-USA as a whole.

Frederic Eckhard
Executive Director

Peter Fromuth
Editorial Director

The United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA) is an independent, non-partisan, nationwide membership organization. Through its programs of research and education it seeks to strengthen public knowledge about the United Nations, to increase the effectiveness of international organizations, and to promote constructive US policies on matters of global concern.

APPENDIX 18



UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA, S. C. 29208

November 8, 1983

The Honorable Gregory J. Newell
Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs
Suite 6323
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The National Commission for UNESCO is glad to respond to your request for comments on your review of United States relations with UNESCO (your letter of August 12 and my interim reply of August 23).

The Commission is concerned about the deterioration of relations with UNESCO. We wish to help safeguard America's international interests in the fields of education, science, culture, and communications. We support your effort to try and secure a positive response to United States demands for control over UNESCO spending and the depoliticization of its programs. We share the frustration of the Administration and many others in this country at the inadequacies of UNESCO's management and the unacceptable intrusion of ideology into the organization.

At the same time, the Commission recognizes the continuing value to the United States of many of UNESCO's specialized programs, and we share the Administration's commitment to exerting active and forceful American leadership in the multilateral organizations to which we belong, in the interests of sustaining a peaceful and stable world order, and promoting human dignity and democratic values.

Noting these basic factors -- the United States commitment to improving international understanding and promoting a stable world order, the intrinsic value of many UNESCO programs both to the world order and to specific U.S. interests, and the shortcomings of UNESCO's management and certain programs -- the Commission is convinced that the best means of serving U.S. interests in UNESCO is to press for reform from within.

As you are aware, unacceptable UNESCO policies and programs, for example in the communications area, have been modified largely as a result of strong American leadership, supported by likeminded countries. Although we recognize that it is difficult and at times impossible to exert positive influence on UNESCO, nevertheless our national interests dictate a continuing effort to play an active and hopefully increasingly influential role, in concert with our friends and allies whenever possible.

We also remain convinced that the United States must improve the management of our relations with UNESCO if we are to reap the advantages of membership. This requires more resources and a concerted effort by the private sector, under national leadership, to take a more active role in the specialized work of the agency. A revitalized National Commission, which we are working to achieve with your encouragement, is an essential element. This is the way to assure greater American involvement in, and direction and leadership of UNESCO's specialized programs, as well as the prospect of more direct benefits for American interests. There is potential for achieving both.

Our Executive Committee has reached these conclusions after a careful assessment of U.S. relations with UNESCO undertaken by the Commission last year, and a survey we have undertaken recently, in response to your request, of major associations in this country affected by UNESCO.

Our 1982 assessment was summarized in a report published in October last year under the title "A Critical Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO -- Special Meeting of the U.S. National Commission." The five working groups at that meeting recommended unanimously that the U.S. should remain in UNESCO and that the effectiveness of U.S. participation be improved. Specific steps to that end were outlined in the Report, copies of which are available to you.

Our recent survey reaffirms last year's conclusion, that notwithstanding the frustrations of membership and the failings of UNESCO, American interests will be best served by remaining in the organization and increasing our impact there.

Some twenty national associations were consulted. Their unanimous recommendation is that the country should remain in UNESCO. They are also virtually unanimous in concluding that we should continue to meet the full financial obligations of membership.

The Commission accordingly does not support withholding our financial dues, as sometimes suggested in the Congress. Freedom House suggests exerting financial pressure as a tool of persuasion. The American Newspaper Publishers Association opposes withholding but urges that if it is deemed a necessary policy it should be implemented only in concert with other nations, never in isolation. In a published critique, the Heritage Foundation advocates withholding contributions for programs of which we disapprove ("For UNESCO, a Failing Grade in Education," October 1982).

But the preponderant view of organizations we have consulted is that withholding would be counterproductive. The United States would be in violation of legal obligations, setting an unhelpful precedent in the international community, an unseemly position for a great power to adopt. Experience suggests, moreover, that withholding would be ineffective, reducing rather than increasing the co-operation we seek from the Secretariat and other member states.


While most organizations express disapproval of UNESCO's performance in various respects, several point out that the voice of the United States is the strongest and most influential in safeguarding the values of freedom and pluralism, and that these interests would suffer, both at home and abroad, if the U.S. presence in UNESCO were reduced or withdrawn. The Commission and all the organizations we have consulted therefore call for more American involvement and leadership in UNESCO. This will require clarification of policy, anticipation of problems and opportunities, and the development of plans and strategies for our participation.

Several organizations have quantified the specific benefits of UNESCO membership in their respective fields, and the anticipated costs of withdrawal. Extracts - to convey the essence of their conclusions - are attached, for your information.

We hope these comments and recommendations will be helpful to the Administration in the task of reassessing U.S. relations with UNESCO.

Please feel free to call on me if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,


James B. Holderman
Chairman
United States National
Commission for UNESCO

EXTRACTS FROM COMMENTS OF ASSOCIATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
CONSULTED BY NATIONAL COMMISSION, OCTOBER, 1983

"In terms of the science sectors of UNESCO, the U.S. continues to exert a strong influence and derive multiple benefits. Withdrawing from UNESCO would inevitably be detrimental to U.S. scientific needs, unless funds equal to or greater than UNESCO dues were expended. In order to improve the benefits we derive from UNESCO participation, increased Federal funds for assessing and increasing our involvement in its scientific structure and its research programs are needed."

Professor Paul T. Baker
Chairman, U.S. Man and
Biosphere Program,
Former Chairman, Subcommittee
on UNESCO and Science,
National Academy of Sciences

"UNESCO has become a convenient whipping-boy. As an organization, it is far from perfect... ..UNESCO reinforces U.S. interests in many ways. Literate populations buy U.S. technology of many kinds. The UNESCO-encouraged literacy programs are often fostered by the military, for military technology demands literacy... Information dissemination also demands literacy. It is in the interests of the U.S. information industry to promote the free flow of information."

International Reading
Association

"U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO almost certainly would encourage greater activity by totalitarian governments which seek to restrict information and press freedom both internationally and domestically..."

We feel that in order to continue strong U.S. support for the principles of free expression, freedom of the press and the international free flow of information, the U.S. should remain in UNESCO. At the same time, we understand that American policy in intergovernmental organizations must serve the broad spectrum of national interests. If U.S. policy evolves in such a way that it is advisable to withdraw from UNESCO, or to restrict our financial participation in UNESCO, we believe such action should be taken in concert with a number of other like-minded UNESCO member states. Unilateral action by the U.S. without the support of Western allies could severely damage efforts within UNESCO to advocate freedom of expression as a fundamental human right."

American Newspaper Publishers Association

"A continued strong U.S. presence in UNESCO is of major concern to such varied national professional and trade organizations as the Association of American Publishers, the American Society for Information Science, the American Library Association, the National Micrographics Association, the American Chemical Society, the Data Processing Manufacturers Association and the Association for Computing Machinery. The international marketing and/or program activities of these and many similar groups and their members depend heavily on the forums provided through UNESCO and its many affiliated international organizations in the library, information and communications fields."

American Library Association

"We would like to take this opportunity to express our support for this country's participation in UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program (MAB). MAB is one of the few international conservation programs that combines ecological research with practical applications... This country's active participation in MAB is crucial to the success and effectiveness of the program. This program deserves to be included among the highest priorities of UNESCO activities."

National Wildlife Federation

"AAAS supports the conduct of the policy review of UNESCO participation by the U.S. and urges the interagency task force to make specific recommendations to strengthen the U.S. voice in UNESCO affairs. The U.S. should continue and enhance its active participation in UNESCO affairs."

**American Association for the
Advancement of Science**

"UNESCO is a vital organization, having made many significant and immeasurable contributions to cultural heritage worldwide and to the U.S. This is the only vehicle through which the U.S. public sector can identify with the world family of sovereign nations concerned with heritage. ... Contributions from the international community of government, and private sources have been channeled to 27 international campaigns since the first one at Nubia. These UNESCO missions and their work are respected around the world for setting high standards and for being of the highest professional calibre. U.S. professionals have been involved in a number of these campaigns."

**U.S./International Council on
Monuments and Sites**

"As a professional educator-artist who has personally, and through several organizations, experienced the rewards from UNESCO's cultural and educational sectors, I perceive the thought of expressing U.S. dissatisfaction with an "imperfect UNESCO" by withdrawing support as punitive, with a whole galaxy of excellent and effective programs doomed should such a thought come to fruition. I share, with almost all other Americans, the view that UNESCO should not be burdened with political issues and that it suffers from management problems common to many international organizations. I speak for several sectors, i.e. Educational, Culture, Women, when I express my desire to see us build on our strengths in UNESCO rather than withdraw our support."

**Winona Fletcher
American Theater Association**

"We urge the continuance of United States participation in UNESCO. We believe that a means can be found to improve the performance of UNESCO functions without overt financial intimidation of the institution and its Secretariat; we hope for constructive U.S. effort toward that end. We suggest the strengthening of the U.S. National Commission to enable an increased flow of useful, timely information to Commission members and, through them, to the necessary constituency."

National Education Association

"Irritation over dealing with problems in UNESCO should not blind us to the assets represented by the institution... The organization has led to the creation of many useful institutions--local, national, regional and global--and to a series of networks and flows of information of considerable importance.

...Because of UNESCO, there are more institutions, non-governmental organizations and individuals in touch with and friendly to the U.S. than would otherwise have been likely...

What is needed--and what has been sorely lacking for many years--is a long-term policy concerning the future of all forms of cooperation in education, science, culture and communications. To that should be added a strategy for change in UNESCO."

**John E. Fobes
Vice Chairman, National
Commission for UNESCO**

"UNESCO is uniquely established and serves quite well as a data base source on education for women and girls, and is improving in its role as an information clearinghouse and transmittal library as well as catalyst for developing of social science research on women.

It has been beneficial to the world's women and U.S. women to have the immediate past and current Ambassador to UNESCO be women. Their advocacy of the importance of hiring women and serving women's needs through sector programs has a positive effect on the bureaucracy of UNESCO which has been primarily male."

**American Association of
University Women**

"In other places and publications we have extensively expressed our concerns over certain activities and programs at UNESCO. ...We were among the first American organizations to support the full matrix of intergovernmental organizations formed after World War II. Our support for the fundamental concept has never diminished. We regard the distortions of that concept, however, as doubly injurious. The trend to turn UNESCO, for example, into a machine for particular ideological changes undermines broad support for the organization.

...But we believe that this UNESCO process (human rights appeals to a UNESCO committee) is salutary and important. In our view the UNESCO system is more effective than the better publicized one employed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

...We have long admired the work of UNESCO in the fields of science, illiteracy, and the preservation of cultural landmarks...

Americans should use all the tools of persuasion open to them: debate within UNESCO, international discourse in public and private, and financial pressure. For as long as we are persuaded that the majority of states and the secretariat are listening and responsive to our concerns and arguments, we should employ all these tools as intelligently, appropriately and forcefully as possible. We should make known to all member states and the secretariat--clearly and restrainedly--that we do not regard the fundamental issue (the commitment of the organization to human freedom) as subject to majority vote at UNESCO."

Freedom House

"The LWVUS supports the fundamental responsibilities of UNESCO: to help in the advancement and spread of knowledge; to give a vigorous impulse to the development of education and the spread of science; to work for knowledge and mutual understanding among nations. The LWVUS ...urges that any reassessment of U.S. policy options toward UNESCO focus on a strategy of tough diplomacy on the one hand and practical accommodation on the other."

**League of Women Voters of the
United States**

"Science-related programs represent in many ways UNESCO's most successful effort and fulfill an important function for the U.S. in terms of international science cooperation and science education. UNESCO provides opportunities for multi-lateral contacts and collaboration that might not otherwise be available to U.S. scientists. ...The assistance of governments is frequently required for access to areas and data needed by U.S. scientists working in these disciplines, and UNESCO is a forum in which such cooperation by governments can be achieved."

National Academy of Sciences

"UNESCO and its activities are important to the United States and to the Institute of International Education ...UNESCO's goals in education include equality of educational opportunity, quality in curriculum and teaching methods, and literacy, all of which correspond to our own. ...it is better for the U.S. to participate in a forum where conflicting policies and world views meet than to be absent from such meetings."

Institute of International Education

"American participation in UNESCO research and education is a quality guarantee. It ensures a minimization of irrelevant political discussion and a constant focusing and refocusing on substantive issues at hand. The benefits to the U.S. of this participation are also substantial."

Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development

"Free from any political constraints they (American scientists) have been highly represented on the international teaching staffs and have established many strong and lasting relationships with young scientists from all over the globe. Besides being very positive from a human relations standpoint, our participation in these courses also exposes to the world's scientific community the numerous important contributions of Americans to international science. ...for a very modest expenditure on the part of UNESCO, ICRO achieves several important objectives ranging from the promotion

of good basic science and biotechnology to the betterment of human relations and its obvious consequences for world peace."

International Cell Research Organization

"UNESCO plays a unique role in providing opportunities for international contact among scientists on methodological issues, and also practical current problems in social, economic and political change. UNESCO, or its functional equivalent, is needed to improve the quality of our own social analytic skills and our knowledge of problems and events in other areas of the world. If UNESCO did not exist, we would have to invent it.

...a marginally greater investment of time and high quality people-- not additional financial support--would bring the United States a much greater return on its investment."

Social Science Research Council

"The membership of the Alliance includes organizations with very diverse needs and purposes; including as it does the National Education Association, United Auto Workers-Conservation Department, National Wildlife Federation and the Edison Electric Institute. Individual members have their points of disagreement and agreement within the wide spectrum of UNESCO programs. As a group, however, there is strong support for UNESCO's "Man and the Biosphere" program and International Education programs. Throughout the life of both these programs there has been important participation by U.S. professionals as consultants, experts and UNESCO staff. The direction and productivity of these important efforts have been heavily influenced by this participation with considerable benefit also accruing to the United States."

The Alliance for Environmental Education

"UNA's relations with the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO have been quite close over many years, and our plans are to continue this in the future."

United Nations Association of the United States of America

APPENDIX 19

Congress of the United States**Committee on Foreign Affairs****House of Representatives****Washington, D.C. 20515**

April 24, 1984

The Honorable Gus Yatron, Chairman ✓
Subcommittee on Human Rights
and International Organizations
The Honorable Dan Mica, Chairman
Subcommittee on International Operations
Washington, D.C. 20515


Dear Gus & Dan:

Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal, Ambassador of Egypt to the United States and Dean of the African Diplomatic Corps in Washington has recently sent me a copy of the letter sent by the African Ambassador accredited to the United States to the Secretary of State, the Honorable George Shultz concerning UNESCO. He also enclosed a resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OAU at its 40th session. Both the letter and the resolution strongly appeal to the US to reconsider its decision on UNESCO.

Because your subcommittees are having joint hearings on US participation in UNESCO in the next couple of weeks, I wanted to transmit this to you for your consideration during those hearings.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,


Dante B. Fascell
ChairmanDBF:PGdmh
Enclosure

EMBASSY OF THE
ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT

2310 DECATUR PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

April 11, 1984

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman *Dante* Fascell:

I have the pleasure of attaching herewith a copy of a letter I addressed to Secretary of State Shultz on behalf of my colleagues, the African Ambassadors, appealing for the U.S. reconsideration of its intention to withdraw from UNESCO.

The African Ambassadors look forward to your support regarding this matter.

Sincerely,



Ashraf Ghorbal
Ambassador of Egypt
and Dean of the African
Diplomatic Corps

Enclosure

EMBASSY OF THE
ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT

2310 DECATUR PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

April 11, 1984

The Honorable George Shultz
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On behalf of my colleagues, the African Ambassadors accredited to the United States, I am appealing for your reconsideration of the U.S. intention to withdraw from UNESCO.

Needless to say, the effectiveness of international organizations such as UNESCO, depends to a large extent on the continued strong and active participation and contribution of the developed countries in its activities. The United States' leadership role, as a founding member of UNESCO and as the largest contributor and participant in its activities, is highly regarded by all other members, and is a vital element in assuring the fulfillment of the tasks and objectives for which the organization was created.

Since its inception, UNESCO has undertaken a variety of constructive programs in the educational, social, and cultural fields, that have been of tremendous benefit, not only to Africans, but to all the people of the world.

Enclosed, please find the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OAU, in its Fortieth Session, which strongly appeals to the U.S. to reconsider its decision regarding UNESCO.

It is the collective hope of African Ambassadors that the U.S. maintain its active membership and contributions to UNESCO, and join with others in developing the organization's programs for the benefit of all mankind.

Sincerely,



Ashraf Ghannouchi
Ambassador of Egypt
and Dean of the African
Diplomatic Corps

Enclosure

CM/Rcs.929 (XL)

RESOLUTION ON THE INTENDED WITHDRAWAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM UNESCO

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Fortieth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 27 February to 5 March, 1984,

Having heard the statement made by the OAU Secretary-General a.i. concerning the intention of the United States of America to withdraw from UNESCO at the end of this year,

Considering that UNESCO and the OAU have since the 1960s maintained fruitful co-operation in the fields of Education, Social and Human Sciences, the Natural Sciences, Culture and Communication,

Bearing in mind the Co-operation Agreement signed on 10 July 1968 by the two Organizations,

Expressing appreciation for the assistance UNESCO offers within the scope of its competence, not only to Member States, but also to the OAU General Secretariat, African national liberation movements and to African Refugees:

1. REAFFIRMS its commitment to the noble ideals of UNESCO;
2. WELCOMES the action that it undertakes within the scope of its competence to promote Peace, Security and Understanding amongst Men;
3. COMMENDS the Director-General of UNESCO for his wise leadership and his dedication and his exceptional role in assisting the Member States of the Organization;
4. REGRETS the intention of the United States of America to withdraw from UNESCO in the near future with the consequences this would have on the life and mission of the Organization;
5. BELIEVES that such an action, if it does materialize, would deprive the Organization and its Member States of a valid representative in the fields of Education, the Sciences, Culture and Communication;
6. STRONGLY APPEALS to the Government of the USA to re-consider its position.

APPENDIX 20

STATEMENT OF RALPH C. STAIGER OF THE INTERNATIONAL READING ASSOCIATION ON POSITIVE ASPECTS OF UNESCO'S WORK IN LITERACY AND THE PROMOTION OF BOOKS AND READING

My name is Ralph Staiger, and I am the Executive Director of the International Reading Association and its representative on the U.S. National Commission for Unesco. I would like to submit testimony on two aspects of Unesco's work with which I have become familiar over a twenty-year span of interaction.

U.S. BOOKS ABROAD: NEGLECTED AMBASSADORS is the title of a 1983 publication of the Library of Congress. The author, the late Curtis Benjamin, concludes that a greater national effort to fulfill the dire need for U.S. books abroad is imperative for reasons "both of societal morality and enlightened self-interest".

Withdrawal from Unesco conflicts with this objective. Withdrawal also runs counter to the worldwide demand for books of all kinds which can enhance U.S. prestige abroad. Developing countries, especially, look upon the development of a literate population as a high priority, for they see literacy as the technology of the intellect.

We must be actively involved in this important contest for human minds. Increased U.S. participation in Unesco programs has often been recommended, but never implemented. We cannot be surprised that we have lost the initiative in the contest.

Illiteracy also occurs in developed countries. Even in Britain and in the United States, literacy programs warrant official support. The need is much more obvious in developing nations, however, and it is a much more acute problem.

In the words of one delegate during the recent Unesco General Conference, "Reading is the pillar upon which learning is based."

Another said that it underpins all of Unesco's work. The title of a Unesco publication, written by an eminent Englishman and a well-known Frenchman, suggests the importance of reading to two-thirds of the population of the world: THE BOOK HUNGER.

What Has Unesco Done?

For a long time, literacy data were unavailable for most countries of the world. In developed countries they were , until recently, not considered necessary. In developing countries, whether as colonies or as independent nations, concealing illiteracy seemed almost obligatory. Unesco has performed a valuable service in undertaking, against great odds, to provide literacy statistics for the use of policymakers and literacy workers in all countries.

The population explosion, especially in the developing countries, has complicated these statistics. The birth rate in most countries far outstrips the ability to provide teaching. Since Unesco provides coordination, expertise, and recommendations to member states, but not the services themselves, it has been fighting an uphill battle against illiteracy in most places. The actual number of literate persons is increasing every year, however.

Interferences with the solution of the literacy problem are cultural influences which militate against literacy for women, political considerations which discourage literacy for certain tribal, economic or ethnic groups, the many different languages used, and the lack of appropriate materials for new literates to read. Nevertheless, Unesco continues to raise consciousness, to train personnel for planning and managing

programs, to encourage the publication of materials for new literates to read, and to validate practises.

The most successful "international year" ever celebrated, International Book Year 1972, was held with the support of individuals and organizations in every aspect of the book world by the division of the Free Flow of Information. The informal support committee for IBY 72 still exists, and I am currently a member. Most recently, we served to stimulate a World Congress on the Book, held in London in 1982, in which 315 participants from 92 countries discussed problems in the book world and possible solutions. These were published in a report, TOWARDS A READING SOCIETY, and regional followup meetings are already helping to implement the recommendations.

Helping indigenous printing and publishing industries in developing countries has been one of the goals of the book program. Technical assistance, so that the economically hazardous business of publishing would be strengthened by competent editors, printers, and other support personnel, were organized. With the cooperation of local governments, book-related businesses and non-governmental organizations, Centers have been set up in Tokyo, Karachi, Bogota, and Yaounde. The Tokyo center, with powerful local support, has conducted training courses throughout Asia, and has engaged on a copublishing program for childrens' books in many languages which has been very successful. Research on readership, possible markets, and other activities which coordinate the activities of the builders of the book world in Latin America have been the focus of the Bogota center. Similar programs have been started by the Karachi and Yaounde

centers.

How World Literacy Affects the United States

Unesco reinforces U.S. interests in many ways. Literate countries buy U.S. manufactures of many kinds, not the least of which are military. Complex products of American labor can be sold to a literate people, to the profit of everyone.

Exports of books are an important way in which U.S. influence can be carried to many developing countries. When books are exported, so are culture and prestige. It is in the best interests of the U.S. to promote the free flow of information.

Copyright protection is essential if writers are expected to continue making their contributions to human knowledge and pleasure. Unesco's activities in bringing groups together, and in emphasizing the value of international copyright conventions are making book piracy unacceptable in many developing nations. Under the Unesco Agreement on Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, customs duties on books, journals and other materials of knowledge were abolished for signatory nations.

Isaac Stern once said, "The easiest way to learn about another country is to know the professionals in one's own field". This is as true in the world of books and reading as it is in music. Membership in Unesco permits and encourages such meetings.

Withdrawal from Unesco will cost the United States far more than the financial cost of participating in loss of prestige, potential for influence and ultimate economic yield.

APPENDIX 21

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. GALVIN, DEAN, SCHOOL OF LIBRARY AND
INFORMATION SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

As Chair of the International Relations Committee of the American Library Association and as a member of the United States National Commission for UNESCO, I appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement for the hearing record on the proposed withdrawal of the United States from membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

The American Library Association, founded in 1876, is the oldest and largest national library association in the world. It is the only non-governmental organization at the national level representing all types of library and information services. Almost 40,000 member libraries, librarians and information specialists, library trustees, educators and communicators share the common mission of promoting and improving library services and libraries. Since 1980, I have represented the American Library Association on the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, a citizen body created by the Congress in 1946 under Public Law 565 to advise the U.S. government in matters relating to UNESCO.

The American Library Association is committed to encouraging the unrestricted flow of library materials and of all forms of information in print, audio-visual and electronic formats throughout the world. It is this

commitment to the free flow of information across national boundaries and to the goal of equal access to information worldwide that has led the American Library Association to support UNESCO's bibliographic and information programs from the founding of that organization. We are proud that a member of our profession, the late Dr. Luther Evans, tenth Librarian of Congress, was the only American ever to serve as UNESCO's Director-General, from 1953 to 1958. The American Library Association took the lead in organizing the United States National Committee for the UNESCO General Information Programme (PGI) which has had an important role in involving both major U.S. government libraries and the principal U.S. professional societies in the library and information field in the development of UNESCO's priorities for strengthening national and international information structures. The secretariat for the Committee now resides in the National Commission on Libraries and Information Science, an agency of the United States government.

Over its thirty-eight year history, UNESCO has carried out a broad range of important, effective programs to enhance access to information worldwide. It has created a workable multilateral copyright structure through the Universal Copyright Convention. It has taken leadership in persuading many nations to relax import duty barriers to books and other educational materials, as well as some scientific instruments, through the Beirut, Florence and Nairobi Agreements. Senator Robert Dole, in remarks appearing in the Congressional Record for December 14, 1983, stated that "the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol benefit particularly worthy groups, not only in this country, but in all countries that become signatories to it." Through its UNISIST and General Information Programs, UNESCO has

systematically pursued the goals of Universal Bibliographic Control (UBC) and Universal Availability of Publications (UAP). The announced objective of the UAP program is

The widest possible availability of published material... to intending users, wherever and whenever they need it, as an essential element in economic, social, technological, educational and personal development.
(Maurice Line and Stephen Vickers. Universal Availability of Publications (UAP). Munich: K.G. Saur, 1983. p. 19)

Limitations of space will not permit me to do justice to the many real past and current positive achievements of UNESCO in creating a world climate that supports, facilitates and encourages the movement of essential information, business and technical data across national boundaries. I do want to make the Subcommittee members aware, however, that even in the information sector, where of late UNESCO has been the object of both deep concern and of some well-deserved harsh criticism from the U.S. and other Western nations, there is also a substantial record of positive accomplishment that is of critical importance to the U.S. information, academic and research communities--as well as to the publishing and media industries--a record in which the U.S. can justifiably take genuine pride as a UNESCO member state.

Recognizing that UNESCO is both a vital mechanism for world information flow and a critical arena for the formulation of policies, norms, standards and international agreements in the information area, the American Library Association on January 11, 1984 expressed its concern at the prospect of United States withdrawal from UNESCO. A copy of that resolution is appended

to my statement. In it, the Association called on the Secretary of State and the Director General of UNESCO to initiate promptly discussions that would lead to resolution of outstanding differences before December 31, 1984. Today we remain deeply troubled that no process yet appears to have been initiated by the State Department to pursue such negotiations. And time is running out!

There are serious problems with UNESCO that urgently need to be resolved. As a member of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, I am keenly aware of many of those problems. But while there is genuine conflict at the political level, the fact remains that, even in the information sector, which has been the most controversial, the Department of State in a report to the Congress on February 24, 1983, certified that UNESCO "has debated but has not implemented policies or procedures of an anti-free press nature." What UNESCO has done in the information field, at the operational level, is to develop and implement successful, non-politicized, practical programs of cooperation and development that are vital to U.S. interests and for which no workable alternatives exist.

Experience makes it abundantly clear, for example, that international copyright cannot be effectively negotiated or sustained on a bilateral basis. At risk here is future access by the U.S. library, academic, scientific and technical communities to important books, journals and technical reports imported from overseas, as well as access to international data bases of growing significance to the research and business community. At risk as well is the future protection in other countries of works copyrighted in the United States by American authors and other creators.

The economic significance of international copyright is made clear in the Department of State's U.S./UNESCO Policy Review of February 27, 1984:

The industries based on these works generate substantial export earnings for the U.S....Total export earnings of the U.S. copyright industries, plus royalty payments, approximated \$3.5 billion in 1982 (books, \$650 million; periodicals, \$393 million; film/theatricals, \$569 million; television productions, \$375 million; music, \$1.5 billion). In addition, there is a large category of other products based on copyrighted works. Exports of these products... amounted to approximately \$3 billion in 1982. (p. 39)

Continued U.S. membership in the Universal Copyright Convention alone is not enough to assure that these vital economic interests will be adequately protected. UNESCO itself has become the critical forum for the debates that will determine future international copyright policy. We dare not absent ourselves from that forum.

The risks are even greater with respect to policies that will increasingly govern the flow of business, scientific and technical data in electronic form across national boundaries. Future scientific and industrial progress in the United States requires continued access to both primary data and research results compiled in other countries, because today, according to the Director of the National Technical Information Service in the Department of Commerce, an estimated seventy-five to eighty per cent of worldwide research and development is done outside the United States. Today, U.S. scientists, engineers and scholars rely increasingly on electronic access to the results of ongoing research outside the United States through shared international bibliographic data banks. The computer and modern telecommunications have revolutionized patterns of scientific communication in many disciplines. While books and journals are still

important sources of information for the research community, print has been augmented and, in some disciplines, largely replaced by digitized data and information. Similarly, the U.S. business community must be assured of the daily passage of computerized data across national boundaries unimpeded by restrictive governmental regulations. Worldwide, the market for information products and services has been estimated at \$60 billion annually. While the United States information and computer industry still commands the major share of that world market, American dominance is increasingly being challenged by other countries.

For all of these reasons, it seems to me essential that the U.S. voice continue to be heard in UNESCO debates that, under the rubric of a "New World Information and Communications Order," might, without our presence, result in adoption of norms and standards incompatible with U.S. computer and telecommunications hardware and software or of national and international information policies inconsistent with U.S. interests. Our continued effective participation, for example, in the UNESCO General Information Program, which is generally acknowledged to have been highly significant in aiding less developed nations to acquire and use modern electronic information technology, is essential in this respect.

As an educator, I must also emphasize the important contribution made by those UNESCO programs that enable students from less developed nations to pursue advanced study and research in American universities. At the University of Pittsburgh last year alone, twenty students from Third World countries were supported by UNESCO funds in advanced studies in many disciplines. These UNESCO fellowship programs, which supported more than three hundred international students in all U.S. universities last year,

create long-term relationships that are vital in linking U.S. scholars and researchers to their counterparts overseas.

For all of these reasons, as the American Library Association's representative to the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, I was among the overwhelming majority of Commissioners who voted last December to advise the Department of State not to recommend that the U.S. withdraw from UNESCO. I urge the Congress to recognize fully how much of importance to the American academic, library, publishing and information communities will be threatened if our current differences with UNESCO are not speedily resolved. To implement our announced intention to withdraw from UNESCO would serve only to encourage further politicization of that organization in ways potentially damaging to U.S. commercial, academic and research interests.

CONTINUED UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

WHEREAS, the United States was a founding member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; and

WHEREAS, UNESCO's programs are vital to the international flow of publications and information, to Universal Bibliographical Control, to international copyright, to the worldwide promotion of books, libraries, publishing and literacy; and

WHEREAS, the American Library Association has been a longstanding member of the United States National Commission for UNESCO; and

WHEREAS, ALA has a strong and continuing concern for the issues of press freedoms which are addressed in the UNESCO forum; and

WHEREAS, the United States National Commission for UNESCO, on the basis of an extensive study of the views of the American Library Association and other U.S. non-governmental organizations qualified to evaluate the UNESCO program, affirmed on December 16, 1983, that continued United States membership in UNESCO is in the national interest;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Library Association deeply regrets the decision of the President of the United States, on recommendation of the Secretary of State, to issue notice of the intention of the United States to withdraw from membership in UNESCO effective December 31, 1984; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Library Association calls upon the Secretary of State and the Director-General of UNESCO to initiate prompt, serious and productive negotiations leading to timely and satisfactory resolution of differences in order to preserve the many positive benefits of continuing U.S. participation in UNESCO; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and the Director-General of UNESCO and other appropriate bodies.

Adopted by the Council of the
American Library Association
Washington, D.C.
January 11, 1984
(Council Document #21)

APPENDIX 22

STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF THE YOUNG WOMEN'S
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

The National Board of the YWCA of the U.S.A., representing 2.5 million members, in support of H.R. 5082 wishes to express its strong opposition to the Administration proposal to withdraw from UNESCO by December 31, 1984. We believe that withdrawal would damage rather than enhance the foreign policy interests of the United States. Moreover, as a member and supporter of the World YWCA, which has national affiliates in 83 countries, we have a direct concern for the continuation of UNESCO programs which complement YWCA work in those countries. Therefore, we urge the Committee to consider the following recommendations in the preparation of its report:

Concentration on UNESCO programs rather than the rhetoric of governments in General Conference debate

Measures to correct demonstrated management deficiencies rather than to abandon a program that a variety of U.S. constituencies finds of value

Measures required to enrich and strengthen the participation of the United States, such as

Further involvement of sectors of the public related to aspects of UNESCO program

Broader political and financial support for UNESCO work of concern to these sectors

Strengthening the capacity of the U.S. Commission for UNESCO to accomplish its mandate

Increasing the number of quality staff, both for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the U.S. Commission for UNESCO, in order to make a more significant impact on UNESCO policy and program.

This investment, we believe, will broaden existing benefits of the UNESCO programs which support U.S. goals. In addition to the documentation that has been presented to the Subcommittee, we wish to call your attention especially to the value of:

1. The integration of knowledge in a number of fields as exemplified by the Man and Biosphere program which U.S. scientists have said could not be pursued under the limited auspices which have been suggested.

2. The world's largest program to promote literacy, including special emphasis on the most neglected group, women and girls in developing countries, a program which reinforces the efforts of a number of U.S. organizations and religious groups in their overseas work for basic education.

3. The preservation and conservation of endangered culture treasures and monuments which for political or economic reasons cannot be undertaken bilaterally.

4. Technical assistance to Third World news media to acquire the equipment and training to produce material in usable form by the world press, a needed contribution to expanding the world awareness of U.S. readers.

5. The formulation and monitoring of several international conventions, including the convention on access to education of special importance to the YWCA and other women's organizations.

In reference to the series of proposals known as the New World Information and Communications Order, we hope the committee will review the specific context of these proposals themselves as a basis for deciding whether what has been written and resolved on the subject is a threat to press freedom. We strenuously oppose efforts to curtail the free flow of information and were pleased to note that the last UNESCO General Conference avoided action which would have attempted to expand the restrictions a large number of governments impose on their domestic press.

We believe that the United States could contribute more to press freedom in the world by building on its participation in the 1983 World Communication Year and by assisting UNESCO to improve appropriate infrastructures than by rejecting this positive thrust of the "NWI&CO" that the flow of information should be a two-way process rather than the present largely one-way channel from London, Moscow, New York and Paris to the rest of the world.

In light of the recommendations of U.S. governmental agencies and significant U.S. scientific and educational organizations cooperating with UNESCO, as well as the changes now under way at UNESCO itself, we suggest that the proposed U.S. withdrawal be postponed for at least another year.

APPENDIX 23

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., May 11, 1984.

Hon. GUS YATRON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations,

Hon. DAN MICA,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations, Washington, D.C.

DEAR GUS and DAN: Enclosed for your information is a recent letter I received from Ms. Martha W. Coigney, Director, International Theatre Institute of the United States, Inc., regarding U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.

Because your subcommittees are having joint hearings on US participation in UNESCO in the next couple of weeks, I wanted to transmit this to you for your consideration during those hearings.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman.

Enclosure.

INTERNATIONAL THEATRE INSTITUTE
OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.,
April 21, 1984.

Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Before the hearings you have scheduled on our future with UNESCO, I want to share some ideas about that organization. Of all the specialized agencies in the United Nations family UNESCO seems to be the hardest for us to participate in. That is probably because UNESCO's agenda deals with intangibles. Instead of hunger and disease, it deals with ideas and disagreements. However practical and efficient UNESCO's programs are (some are of extraordinary value to America), the organization is always reported to be a hotbed of intrigue and anti-American opinion.

To be sure, UNESCO needs changing, but how can we expect it to change without our active participation and in the face of our threatened departure?

There is one crucial role that UNESCO plays in its relationship with its flock of international NGO's (Non-governmental Organizations). These organizations cover all the disciplines in UNESCO's competence and, in fact, carry out many parts of UNESCO's mandate. My organization, the International Theatre Institute, is one of the oldest of these NGO's and for us UNESCO is the reason why we are free to do our work. UNESCO's charter demands a certain non-political code of behaviour from the organizations connected with it. In this way it acts as a buffer between organizations like ITI and the divisive political pressures that exist in the world.

So, what UNESCO is accused of—politicization—is precisely what we are protected from by UNESCO. If this is true for a small specific NGO, imagine how important this function is with regard to larger more complex organizations.

It is quite clear that UNESCO needs serious review. Ironically, what it probably needs most is strong, objective and self-interested participation from the United States. For too long we have shown that organization our indifference and finally our exasperation and the result, understandably, is not to our liking.

UNESCO is the forum for the world's "State of Mind"—shouldn't our thoughts be represented? Thank you for your attention and for your leadership on this issue.

Sincerely yours,

MARTHA W. COIGNEY,
Director.

APPENDIX 24

RESOLUTION BY THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR THEATRE RESEARCH, ON
CONTINUED UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

Whereas the United States helped found the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and

Whereas UNESCO's programs are vital to the international flow of ideas in international congresses and in publications important to the American Society for Theatre Research, to universal bibliographical control, to international copyright, to the world-wide promotion of books, libraries, and literacy, and

Whereas the U.S. National Commission at its annual meeting on 16 December 1983, after a searching study of the views of its non-governmental organization constituents (qualified to evaluate the UNESCO programs), voted overwhelmingly that continued membership of the United States is in the national, as well as international, interest,

Be it resolved, That the American Society for Theatre Research deeply regrets the decision of the President of the United States, on recommendation of the Secretary of State, to declare intention of withdrawing the United States from membership in UNESCO;

Be it further resolved, That the American Society for Theatre Research calls upon the Secretary of State and the Director General of UNESCO to undertake prompt, serious, and productive negotiations leading to timely and satisfactory resolution of the differences in order to preserve the many positive benefits of continuing U.S. participation in UNESCO;

And be it further resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Director General of UNESCO, and other appropriate bodies.

[This resolution was unanimously approved at the ASTR Executive Committee meeting of 31 March 1984 in Toronto, Ont., Canada.]

APPENDIX 25

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT MANOA,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
Honolulu, Hawaii, April 13, 1984.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Your letter of 29 February to the Secretary of State regarding support for the GAO study of UNESCO operations has come to my attention. I write to give you a strong vote of confidence as a private citizen with a genuine interest in the work of UNESCO. I have chaired an international specialist committee set up by UNESCO, and until last year I was the only American member of the International Social Science Council, and chairman of one of its international standing committees. In this capacity I have had a number of opportunities to attend meetings in Paris and to get a close-up picture of UNESCO activities. I should add that the work of the ISSC and my committee is totally funded by UNESCO. Needless to say I regard the substance of our work as having real long-term significance, although so far it is surely one of the very tiny UNESCO programs. We have launched a process that will eventually generate on a self-sustaining basis a new kind of "conceptual encyclopedia" for the social sciences that will, I believe, enable scholars in all countries, North and South, East and West, to communicate more successfully with each other when they talk about the kinds of problems of development, of social change, ethnic relations, conflict resolution, family and women, war and peace, etc. that social scientists are concerned with. Needless to say I would be happy to provide more data about this if you are interested.

Here, however, I want to say that I am working with a small group of persons in Hawaii to stimulate interest in our UNESCO relations and to become usefully involved in doing something about the subject. To coordinate our activities we count on Prof. Harold Jacobson of the University of Michigan, who is currently a scholar in residence at the Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution. On my nomination he was elected to membership of the International Social Science Council at its last meeting, held in Paris in December. One of our first projects was to get the Board of our state chapter of the UN Association to discuss the matter, and to adopt the enclosed resolution which was sent to the House Committee on Science and Technology at the time of its recent hearings on UNESCO. A copy is enclosed for your information.

In his testimony at these hearings Prof. Paul T. Baker, representing the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, made some very cogent points. One that I greatly appreciate—p. 2, #4 of his statement—concerns the lack of U.S. support for the participation of American scientists in UNESCO-sponsored activities. He points out that this has "severely limited the benefits" we derive from UNESCO's activities, and also "restricted the ability of the U.S. scientific community to affect the direction of UNESCO activities." I know from personal experience that this is very true. Indeed, active American participation at the working level has a very strong potential for influencing the content of UNESCO actual operations. At the recent ISSC Assembly, which I attended, the American voice was far more effective in the deliberations than the Soviet voice. There were several East Europeans in the Assembly whose participation was also more effective than the Soviet, and the content of what they said was quite non-ideological.

The State Department complains that the budget and planning documents given to the General Conference tend to pre-determine final decisions, greatly reducing the effectiveness of member positions, especially when a member, like the U.S., has only one vote despite its 25% contribution to the budget. My impression is that when the U.S. has a well-conceived position, it is able to mobilize the votes of many friendly countries, in the Third World as well as in Europe. Actually, it is much more strategically important to influence the content of UNESCO Secretariat plans *before* they come to the General Conference. Given the structure of the Organization and the very large number of member states, it is really unrealistic to expect otherwise.

If this is true, then it follows that the participation of Americans in the planning of programs has the utmost importance. In part this is affected by the extent to which Americans hold policy-making posts in the Secretariat. We need to do all we can to press for our full quota. However, in addition to that, and far more important in the long run, is the involvement of American specialists and scientists in the many advisory groups and committees that really shape policy. My experience is that the Secretariat is highly responsive to the recommendations of committees of

experts. The participation of Americans in these groups is therefore highly strategic, and we need to have a good mechanism for coordinating our efforts. The National Academy of Sciences is able to do this very effectively and it has an international committee chaired by a colleague of mine, Prof. Roland Fuchs, that supports this cooperative effort among national scientists. We utterly lack any such support within the social science community. As a result we truly miss many opportunities not only to coordinate our work but even to take advantage of genuine openings for involvement at the scientific and specialist level in UNESCO-sponsored programs.

My experience has also been that when I have been invited to take part in the work of committees, round tables, workshops etc. that are UNESCO-related, I not only cannot get any funding from U.S. sources for my participation, but there is no interest in the State Department, either in briefing before I go abroad, or in debriefing on my return. Consequently it is not feasible at either the governmental or the non-governmental levels to facilitate linkages that would enhance the effectiveness of American participation in international programs.

According to the U.S./UNESCO Policy Review issued by the State Department on February 27, in the case of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, it would be possible for the U.S. to help American institutions participate directly in cooperation with foreign counterparts—for example, in the social sciences, with the International Social Science Council (p.20). I am really curious to know how they think that could be done. Actually the machinery is now in place to enable American social scientists to cooperate far more effectively than they can now do in such international cooperative projects. The cost and effectiveness of doing it on a bilateral basis will be much more problematical. What is more, if genuine support could be given by the State Department, the NSF, or other agencies for real participation by qualified American specialists in UNESCO-related projects, we would greatly increase the importance to our country of such cooperation and, at the same time, we would vastly enhance the impact that we could have on the planning and execution of UNESCO-sponsored activities.

Again, let me thank you for your interest and support—it is much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

FRED W. RIGGS,
Professor.

APPENDIX 26

STATEMENT OF GEORGE WINCHESTER STONE, FORMER MEMBER OF THE
U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNESCO

APPENDIX 26

STATEMENT OF GEORGE WINCHESTER STONE

UNESCO

The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

Continuing participation by the United States in UNESCO in jeopardy

Over forty years ago the United States helped create UNESCO as an international organization to appeal to and work with the minds of mankind in the important fields of education, science, and culture towards mutual enlightenment, and, by the free flow of ideas, to help create the conditions for peace. UNESCO has provided a forum for over forty years for intellectual discussion and subsequent program development in these fields. Never was the organization conceived to subserve the particular interests of any single nation, or of Western, Eastern, Asian, or particular hemispheric thought. Yet, international in purpose all participating members have gained in human freedoms, and tolerance for differences of opinion--all, ultimately, in the national interests of the membership.

Unesco's long list of program interests and accomplishments over the years has been magnificent: oceanographic research, educational planning, teacher training, the preservation of cultural heritages (in Egypt, in Florence) in subsidizing international congresses of scholars in the humanities and the social sciences, in forging an international copyright agreement, and in advancing international bibliographical control--to name but a few. Thirty three volumes of its monthly publication The UNESCO Courier, have opened a window on the world in ten languages to broaden the knowledge, deepen the understanding, and stimulate the thinking in articles from "Rare Masterpieces of World Art" to "The Promise of Atomic Power"; from the "East Frontiers of Civilization" to "Saving our Heritage in Stone"; from "The Negro in America", to "Youth in the New Japan"; from "Ignorance and Poverty" to "Antarctica the International Land of Science"; from "New Horizons in Music" to "Man Through his Art"; from "World Population" to "Ghandi and the Inheritance of Non-Violence"; from "The Pollution of the Oceans" to "Unknown

Treasurers of Himalayan Art"; from "Vernacular Languages in Changing Africa" to "The First Steps in Space." This for the general reader. Through UNESCO's International Council of Philosophy and Human Sciences (CIPSH) the prestigious periodical DIOGENES is published in three languages, entertaining contributions from top scholars in any nation.

Of basic interest to humanistic scholars are the partial subsidies UNESCO provides through CIPSH for travel to International Congresses, and for the publication of their Acta. Twenty such organizations comprise, for example, membership in the International Federation for Languages and Literatures (FILLM), which for thirty years has held triennial Congresses in Rome, Oxford, Florence, Heidelberg, Islamabad, Cambridge, Paris, Sydney, New York, Liege, and Phoenix. In August 1984 the congress will be held in Budapest. At the XVth in Phoenix (1981) scholars from fifty-two countries met, socialized, read valuable and interesting papers, saw the wonders of the Grand Canyon, and the American West. The Acta published the major papers to make them available to libraries throughout the world. In Phoenix, as at the other locations, the free flow of ideas abounded. There Jew spoke to Arab, the East to the West Germans, and the French talked with everyone. Through these contacts not only these scholars, but graduate students of these scholars will have easy access to their counterparts, and to the libraries of the countries from which they come.

That the USA will withdraw its participation in the source for so much of this activity is unthinkable, yet the intention to do so has been made.

Membership in UNESCO is by the Departments of State of the various national governments. And each such department is advised by a National Commission composed of 100 members representing the department, the non-government organizations, state and local governments, and a few members at large. The U.S. National Commission is comprised of some 60 representatives of the non-governmental group (such as The League of Women Voters, American Student Association, American Theatre Association,

National Education Association, American Library Association, American Council of Learned Societies, National Wildlife Federation, National Science Foundation, etc.) with a rotating organizational membership--in an effort to gain a cross-section of national groups, and to bring in new ones at three-year intervals. The Commission meets annually, hears reports from its committees, and advises the State Department re our participation in UNESCO and its programs.

Membership in UNESCO has grown over the years, and its character has, as might be expected, changed somewhat from what it was twenty years ago, but it reflects the interests (and, hopefully, the international interests) of its peoples. Resolutions from time to time appear on the agenda of the general conference which may seem startling to "Western concepts" of what a stable world should enjoy, just as in the past appeared on the agenda some resolutions by the West unappealing to Eastern and newly developing countries. But there they were argued out and proper solutions were agreed upon.

The U.S. National Commission at its meeting on 16 December 1983, after a year-long study of apparent problems with the UNESCO secretariat, the programs it proposed, and the budget it requested, listened to two long presentations by the Department of State's Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and by its U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO. Both complained (according to a transcript of the meeting) that "UNESCO policies for several years have served anti-U.S. political ends.", that instead of a no-growth budget for the next biennium it had come in with a 9% increase, that it was spending funds on such things as disarmament and peace (better cared for in other organizations), that it wanted to look into "people's rights" more than "individual rights" (defined by the State Department as "Statism,") saw merit in looking into a New World Order of Communications, which might pose some guidelines and limitations on the press, that it was flirting with an idea of guidelines for activities of international corporations, that the number of U.S. employees in the Paris office was three under the quota allowed and

should therefore be strengthened, and that the next general conference was proposed for a meeting in Sofia rather than in the new Paris headquarters.

Discussion at the meeting revealed however, that at the conference the budget adopted was cut to a 2.5 increase (thanks to a Nordic Resolution), that, even so, the portion for which the United States would be responsible (about 45 million) was less than a quarter of the size of, say, the Montgomery County, Maryland annual school budget). For the potential of UNESCO and in view of its accomplishments this is hardly a sticking point. Speakers for the State Department seemed to think that emphasis on peace and disarmament was Russian propaganda, but when cries for reduction in nuclear arms are world wide, consideration and debate, even a program or two seem legitimate in this international organization. When one thinks in the abstract of "People's Rights," one thinks of our national origins--"When in the course of human events, etc., etc.," or of our long-time insistence on the values of self-determination of peoples. But the issue seems to be defined as statism hence of possible intolerance and pressure. One suspects that a country other than ours might see in the Assistant Secretary's assumption that UNESCO's policies are antithetical to U.S. political ends a sort of statism from this side of the water. At any rate, the place for debate, leadership, and persuasion would seem to be the forum which UNESCO provides. If we walk away from that, where will our voice be heard? Where better to debate communications and international corporate activities? Under the rubric of Education these seem legitimate areas for debate. Bringing U.S. employees up to quota should happen, and should be easy to accomplish, for the Secretariat customarily operates at 20% less than full quota, but why, one asks, beef up any U.S. quota if the U.S.A. is abandoning participation? That a General Conference might be held in another city than Paris might be inconvenient, yet there seems to be a precedent, and what a boon to the democratic spirit might occur if dozens of U.S. representatives of good will descended on the Bulgarian capital under the aegis of UNESCO! That

spirit was not exactly crushed at the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo. And the pre-registration figures for the FILLM Congress to be held in Budapest indicate a flood of U.S. scholars planning to attend. That can't be all bad in an Orwellian year.

The State Department counters that in bowing out of UNESCO it will, as an alternative, select programs and priorities which it wishes to back internationally in other international programs, and support such selected programs bilaterally. Such would seem to do little for the U.S. image in the world.

From the verbatim transcript of the meeting of the U.S. National Commission on 16 December 1983 it appears that a vote was taken by these members, who had studied the situation for 18 months, who listened to reports from their special committees, who listened to the briefings by the Department of State speakers (and questioned them closely). The vote was an overwhelming 41 to 7 to advise the Secretary of State that the U.S. should remain in UNESCO and seek to exercise leadership there.

A week later the Secretary of State recommended, and the President agreed that we should declare intention to withdraw from participation. However, the U.S. has one year to think the matter over. One hopes that hearings will be held, but in the meantime organizations, or individuals which see pride in the past and hope for the future in UNESCO might well indicate to the Department of State their concern.



Geo. Winchester Stone, Jr., Dean Emeritus of Libraries, NYU, past President of MLA and FILLM, former Member of the U.S. National Commission, Representing the ACLS.

APPENDIX 27

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH,
UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
Pittsburgh, Pa., June 18, 1984.

Mr. GUS YATRON,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. YATRON: The Executive Committee of the Pennsylvania Council for International Education (PaCIE), an organization of Pennsylvania universities and colleges committed to international education, has adopted the following resolution concerning the intention of the U.S. government to withdraw from UNESCO:

The Executive Committee of the Pennsylvania Council for International Education understands the reasons for the announcement by the U.S. government of its intention to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). There are indeed serious political, administrative, and budgetary problems to be dealt with. However, we hope that the difficulties can be overcome without the drastic step of actual withdrawal. In fact, UNESCO furthers important international cooperative endeavors that serve the purposes of American education. Thus, a withdrawal from UNESCO would hurt American education and decrease American influence. The global circumstances surrounding American education and research are now so pervasive that for the United States to withdraw from UNESCO would be self-defeating. We urge the United States government to give greater—not less—attention to UNESCO and to undertake a long-term effort to improve the performance of this international organization. That is the path which will best serve the interests of American education and of the American people.

Sincerely,

BURKART HOLZNER,
Chairman For the Executive Committee.

APPENDIX 28

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE AMERICAN HOME ECONOMICS
ASSOCIATION ON CONTINUED U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

Whereas, the United States was a founding member of United Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United States National Commission for UNESCO was created by Joint Resolution of Congress in 1946, to advise the U.S. Government on matters relating to UNESCO, and to promote a general understanding in the United States of UNESCO's objectives; and

Whereas, UNESCO's education and scientific programs have provided strong support for the improvement of the quality of life for individuals and families worldwide; and

Whereas, in UNESCO's recent 6-year plan it is apparent that participating governments want stronger programs in vocational education and technical education, including a specific resolution requesting assurance of nutrition education in that plan; and

Whereas, the Nutrition, Health and Home Economics Education, Division of Science, Technical and Vocational Education UNESCO has requested specific assistance from AHEA to develop teaching modules integrating science into home economics with emphasis on nutrition and primary health care for teacher trainers; and

Whereas, the World Food Programme of UNESCO seeks counsel of home economists in their activities, particularly school lunch programs; and

Whereas, home economists represented in the American Home Economics Association have expertise in nutrition and education, and

Whereas, home economists are currently developing plans for conducting a workshop on Home Economics and Primary Health Care for developing countries to be held in Nairobi in 1985, and based upon a request by the Division of Science, Technical and Vocational Education; and

Whereas, the American Home Economics Association has previously been elected and is currently serving as a member of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO; and

Whereas, the U.S. National Commission UNESCO, on the basis of extensive studies of the views of U.S. non-governmental organizations affirmed on 16 December 1983 that continued U.S. membership in UNESCO is in the national interest; now therefore be it

Resolved, That the American Home Economics Association requests that the Secretary of State critically re-examine the action taken and pursue serious negotiations with the Director-General of UNESCO which would lead to resolving differences in a timely manner and therefore preserve the many positive benefits of continuing U.S. participation in UNESCO.

Adopted at the 75th Annual Meeting of the American Home Economics Association Anaheim, California, June 28, 1984.

BACKGROUND STATEMENT REGARDING UNESCO RESOLUTION

The issue of the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO has been a topic of discussion for several years. In December 1983 a letter was transmitted by the State Department to the Director General, M. Bow, confirming the U.S. intention to withdraw as of December 31, 1984. In the meantime, intensive studies are being taken to appraise this decision.

During the past year an ad hoc task force was appointed by the Chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Dr. James Holderman, to make a careful review and to report its findings to the Commission and to the State Department. The report supporting continuation in UNESCO was forwarded to the State Department. In December 1983 the full commission approved it by a vote of 41-8 of those present. Arguments for continuation emphasized that in a world of dynamic and complex interdependence the U.S. must intensify efforts to achieve mutual understanding. UNESCO reflects world conditions and attitudes; therefore the U.S. should assert values and principles in a manner that evokes cooperation and press for reform from within. Worthwhile literacy programs; a clearinghouse for statistical and scientific information and concentrated efforts to move towards "Health for All by Year 2000" are all current programs that benefit the well being of families.

The Secretary of State has announced the appointment of an Advisory panel of 12-15 citizens to examine UNESCO in the course of 1984 and advise the Secretary

of State by December whether sufficient concrete changes were underway in UNESCO to warrant a review of the Administration's decision to withdraw.

The effect of the attached resolution for adoption by the AHEA Assembly is to reaffirm that home economists continue to be supportive of UNESCO programs. Participation through the years in activities related to the Education and Science sectors has been valuable. Support of the resolution would provide continuity for present and future activities in UNESCO.

No monetary costs are implied.

APPENDIX 29

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN LIBRARY
ASSOCIATION ON U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

Whereas the United States has given notice of its intention to withdraw from membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization effective December 31, 1984; and

Whereas the Council of the American Library Association, on January 1, 1984 called upon the U.S. Secretary of State and the Director-General of UNESCO to initiate negotiations leading to timely and satisfactory resolution of differences in order to preserve the may positive benefits of continuing U.S. participation in UNESCO; and

Whereas these negotiations have not yet been initiated; now, therefore be it

Resolved, That the American Library Association express its support for the concepts embodied in H.R. 5686 extending United States membership in UNESCO to December 31, 1985 and requiring consultation with the Congress prior to any decision concerning termination; and

Be it further resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, appropriate Members of Congress, the Director-General of UNESCO, the United States National Commission for UNESCO and other appropriate bodies.

Adopted by the Council of the American Library Association, Dallas, Texas, June 27, 1984.



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